Files
windmill/backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/datatable_permissions.rs
T
Diego Imbert 28b31a437e feat(datatables): gate role and ACL changes on the enterprise edition
Both planners now live in windmill-ee-private, reached through a dispatcher
that refuses in the open-source build, and an enterprise binary additionally
checks for an active license before planning anything. Reading a data table's
roles, its usable roles and a schema's owner and grants stays open, so an
instance that lapses can still see what it has; every mutation is refused.

The UI stops offering what the server would refuse: no Roles entry on a data
table, and no Permissions entry on a schema or table, without a license.
2026-09-01 04:32:52 +02:00

608 lines
22 KiB
Rust

/*
* Author: Ruben Fiszel
* Copyright: Windmill Labs, Inc 2022
* This file and its contents are licensed under the AGPLv3 License.
* Please see the included NOTICE for copyright information and
* LICENSE-AGPL for a copy of the license.
*/
//! Role-based access control for data tables: read the config, preview the SQL a
//! change plans out, and apply it.
//!
//! A permissioned data table maps each Windmill role onto a real Postgres login
//! role, so a script that runs as `analyst` connects as `analyst` and the
//! database — not Windmill — enforces what it may touch. `admin` is the exception:
//! it is the connection the data table already resolved to before permissions
//! were turned on, so it owns every existing object and is never created,
//! renamed or dropped.
use axum::{
extract::{Extension, Path},
routing::{get, post},
Json, Router,
};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::collections::{BTreeMap, HashSet};
use windmill_api_auth::ApiAuthed;
use windmill_audit::audit_oss::audit_log;
use windmill_audit::ActionKind;
use windmill_common::ensure_instance_db_grant_options;
use windmill_common::error::{pg_error_message, Error, JsonResult, Result};
use windmill_common::query_builders::{render_db_quoted_identifier, DbType};
use windmill_common::utils::require_admin;
use windmill_common::workspaces::{
can_use_datatable_role, get_datatable_resource_from_db_unchecked, DataTable,
DataTableCatalogResourceType, DataTablePermissions, ADMIN_DATATABLE_ROLE,
};
use windmill_common::{PgDatabase, DB};
pub(crate) fn routes() -> Router {
Router::new()
.route(
"/datatable_permissions/{datatable_name}",
get(get_datatable_permissions).post(set_datatable_permissions),
)
.route(
"/datatable_permissions/{datatable_name}/preview",
post(preview_datatable_permissions),
)
.route(
"/datatable_usable_roles/{datatable_name}",
get(list_usable_datatable_roles),
)
}
/// A data table role as the UI sees it: the generated password never leaves the
/// server, since it grants direct database access to anyone who reads it.
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug)]
pub struct DatatableRoleInfo {
pub name: String,
#[serde(default)]
pub tenants: Vec<String>,
/// The underlying Postgres role, so grants can be written by hand against it.
/// Absent for `admin`, which reuses the data table's own connection.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub pg_rolename: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Debug)]
pub struct DatatablePermissionsInfo {
pub enabled: bool,
pub roles: Vec<DatatableRoleInfo>,
/// The role a script gets when it names none.
pub default_role: String,
}
#[derive(Deserialize, Debug)]
pub struct SetDatatablePermissions {
pub enabled: bool,
#[serde(default)]
pub roles: Vec<DatatableRoleInfo>,
/// The role a script gets when it names none. Absent means `admin`.
#[serde(default)]
pub default_role: Option<String>,
/// Role renames (old -> new), tracked client-side by a stable id so a rename
/// plans an `ALTER ROLE ... RENAME` instead of a drop plus a create — which
/// would destroy the grants the role had accumulated.
#[serde(default)]
pub renames: Vec<DatatableRoleRename>,
}
#[derive(Deserialize, Debug, Clone)]
pub struct DatatableRoleRename {
pub from: String,
pub to: String,
}
/// The roles the caller may actually run as, for pickers. Unlike the admin-only
/// permissions view this exposes no tenant lists — only what the caller can use.
#[derive(Serialize, Debug)]
pub struct UsableDatatableRoles {
pub enabled: bool,
pub roles: Vec<String>,
pub default_role: String,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Debug)]
pub struct DatatablePermissionsPreview {
pub statements: Vec<String>,
pub warnings: Vec<String>,
}
/// One planned statement. `display` is what the preview shows: identical to
/// `sql` except where a generated password would otherwise be printed.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(crate) struct PlannedStatement {
pub(crate) sql: String,
pub(crate) display: String,
}
impl PlannedStatement {
/// Only the planner builds these, and that is the enterprise module.
#[cfg_attr(not(feature = "private"), allow(dead_code))]
pub(crate) fn plain(sql: String) -> Self {
Self { display: sql.clone(), sql }
}
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(crate) struct RolePlan {
pub(crate) statements: Vec<PlannedStatement>,
/// The permissions block to persist once the statements have run.
pub(crate) permissions: DataTablePermissions,
pub(crate) warnings: Vec<String>,
}
/// Refuse to plan a change on a binary that carries the enterprise modules but
/// no active plan. Without them there is no planner at all, so this is the whole
/// gate on an enterprise build.
pub(crate) async fn require_datatable_permissions_license() -> Result<()> {
#[cfg(feature = "enterprise")]
if !matches!(
windmill_common::ee_oss::get_license_plan().await,
windmill_common::ee_oss::LicensePlan::Enterprise
) {
return Err(Error::BadRequest(
"Data table permissions require an Enterprise license".to_string(),
));
}
Ok(())
}
/// Only the planners quote identifiers, and those are the enterprise modules.
#[cfg_attr(not(feature = "private"), allow(dead_code))]
pub(crate) fn quote_ident(ident: &str) -> String {
render_db_quoted_identifier(ident, DbType::Postgresql)
}
pub(crate) async fn read_datatable(db: &DB, w_id: &str, datatable_name: &str) -> Result<DataTable> {
let value = sqlx::query_scalar!(
"SELECT ws.datatable->'datatables'->$2 FROM workspace_settings ws WHERE ws.workspace_id = $1",
w_id,
datatable_name,
)
.fetch_one(db)
.await?
.filter(|v| !v.is_null())
.ok_or_else(|| Error::NotFound(format!("Data table '{datatable_name}' not found")))?;
serde_json::from_value(value)
.map_err(|e| Error::internal_err(format!("Invalid data table config: {e}")))
}
/// Make sure `custom_instance_user` can pass its privileges on, for a data table
/// on an instance database.
///
/// Handing privileges to the roles this feature creates means granting them, and
/// a privilege held without `WITH GRANT OPTION` cannot be granted on — Postgres
/// answers such a statement with a warning and no effect. Databases provisioned
/// before those options were part of the grants still hold them plain, and only
/// the instance's own Postgres user, which owns them, can add the options.
///
/// Idempotent, and a no-op for a data table on a user-provided resource, where
/// Windmill does not own the Postgres user. Never fatal: the caller's own work
/// is what the admin asked for, and it may well not need any of this.
pub(crate) async fn ensure_instance_db_can_delegate(db: &DB, w_id: &str, datatable_name: &str) {
let Ok(datatable) = read_datatable(db, w_id, datatable_name).await else {
return;
};
if datatable.database.resource_type != DataTableCatalogResourceType::Instance {
return;
}
if let Err(e) = ensure_instance_db_grant_options(db, &datatable.database.resource_path).await {
tracing::warn!(
"Could not refresh the grant options of instance database '{}': {}. Continuing.",
datatable.database.resource_path,
e
);
}
}
/// Connect to the data table's own database as `admin` and report the identity
/// the plan has to be built against: the database name, the role that owns the
/// existing objects, and the roles that actually exist in the cluster.
/// What the plan has to be built against, probed from the data table's own
/// database rather than assumed from its config.
pub(crate) struct AdminConnection {
pub(crate) dbname: String,
pub(crate) admin_pg_role: String,
pub(crate) existing_pg_roles: HashSet<String>,
/// Whether `PUBLIC` holds CREATE on schema `public`, i.e. every role in this
/// database — including the ones created here — can make objects in it.
pub(crate) public_schema_is_open: bool,
/// The default-privilege rules already in force for this data table's roles.
pub(crate) default_acl_rules: Vec<DefaultAclRule>,
}
/// One `ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES` rule as the catalog has it.
///
/// Postgres records such a rule per creating role, so a role added later is not
/// covered by any of them: a grant on "future tables" would quietly stop
/// applying to whatever that new role creates. Replaying the existing rules for
/// each new role is what keeps the policy whole.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub(crate) struct DefaultAclRule {
/// `None` for a rule that is not scoped to a schema.
pub(crate) schema: Option<String>,
/// `TABLES`, `SEQUENCES`, `FUNCTIONS` or `TYPES`.
pub(crate) objects: String,
/// Postgres role the privileges go to, or `PUBLIC`.
pub(crate) grantee: String,
pub(crate) privileges: Vec<String>,
}
async fn read_default_acl_rules(client: &tokio_postgres::Client) -> Result<Vec<DefaultAclRule>> {
// Only the rules of this feature's own roles — and of the data table's
// connection — are replayed; the rest of the cluster's policy is not ours to
// copy onto a new role.
let rows = client
.query(
"SELECT n.nspname,
CASE d.defaclobjtype
WHEN 'r' THEN 'TABLES' WHEN 'S' THEN 'SEQUENCES'
WHEN 'f' THEN 'FUNCTIONS' ELSE 'TYPES' END,
CASE WHEN a.grantee = 0 THEN 'PUBLIC' ELSE pg_get_userbyid(a.grantee) END,
a.privilege_type
FROM pg_default_acl d
LEFT JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = d.defaclnamespace,
aclexplode(d.defaclacl) a
WHERE pg_get_userbyid(d.defaclrole) LIKE 'wm\\_%'
OR pg_get_userbyid(d.defaclrole) = current_user",
&[],
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
Error::internal_err(format!(
"Failed to read the default privileges: {}",
pg_error_message(&e)
))
})?;
let mut folded: BTreeMap<(Option<String>, String, String), Vec<String>> = BTreeMap::new();
for row in rows {
folded
.entry((row.get(0), row.get(1), row.get(2)))
.or_default()
.push(row.get(3));
}
Ok(folded
.into_iter()
.map(|((schema, objects, grantee), mut privileges)| {
privileges.sort();
privileges.dedup();
DefaultAclRule { schema, objects, grantee, privileges }
})
.collect())
}
pub(crate) async fn connect_as_admin(
db: &DB,
w_id: &str,
datatable_name: &str,
) -> Result<(tokio_postgres::Client, AdminConnection)> {
let db_resource = get_datatable_resource_from_db_unchecked(db, w_id, datatable_name).await?;
let pg_db: PgDatabase = serde_json::from_value(db_resource)
.map_err(|e| Error::internal_err(format!("Failed to parse database credentials: {e}")))?;
let dbname = pg_db.dbname.clone();
let (client, connection) = pg_db.connect(Some(db)).await?;
tokio::spawn(async move {
if let Err(e) = connection.await {
tracing::error!("Datatable permissions connection error: {}", e);
}
});
let admin_pg_role: String = client
.query_one("SELECT current_user", &[])
.await
.map_err(|e| {
Error::internal_err(format!(
"Failed to read the data table's connection identity: {}",
pg_error_message(&e)
))
})?
.get(0);
let existing_pg_roles = client
.query(
"SELECT rolname FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname LIKE 'wm\\_%'",
&[],
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
Error::internal_err(format!(
"Failed to list existing roles: {}",
pg_error_message(&e)
))
})?
.into_iter()
.map(|row| row.get::<_, String>(0))
.collect();
// grantee 0 is PUBLIC. A NULL acl means the server default, which granted
// PUBLIC CREATE on `public` before Postgres 15.
let public_schema_is_open: bool = client
.query_one(
"SELECT COALESCE(
(SELECT bool_or(a.privilege_type = 'CREATE' AND a.grantee = 0)
FROM pg_namespace n, aclexplode(n.nspacl) a
WHERE n.nspname = 'public'),
current_setting('server_version_num')::int < 150000
)",
&[],
)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
Error::internal_err(format!(
"Failed to inspect the public schema: {}",
pg_error_message(&e)
))
})?
.get(0);
let default_acl_rules = read_default_acl_rules(&client).await?;
Ok((
client,
AdminConnection {
dbname,
admin_pg_role,
existing_pg_roles,
public_schema_is_open,
default_acl_rules,
},
))
}
async fn build_plan(
db: &DB,
w_id: &str,
datatable_name: &str,
req: &SetDatatablePermissions,
) -> Result<(tokio_postgres::Client, RolePlan)> {
require_datatable_permissions_license().await?;
let datatable = read_datatable(db, w_id, datatable_name).await?;
let (client, conn) = connect_as_admin(db, w_id, datatable_name).await?;
let plan = crate::datatable_permissions_oss::plan_role_changes(
w_id,
datatable_name,
&conn.dbname,
&conn.admin_pg_role,
datatable.permissions.as_ref(),
req,
&conn.existing_pg_roles,
conn.public_schema_is_open,
&conn.default_acl_rules,
)?;
Ok((client, plan))
}
/// Drop the Postgres roles a data table leaves behind when it is removed from the
/// workspace config, giving its objects back to admin first.
///
/// Best-effort: a data table whose database is already unreachable must still be
/// removable from the config, so a failure is logged rather than propagated. Any
/// role that survives is reconciled by the next plan, which reads `pg_roles`.
pub(crate) async fn drop_roles_of_deleted_datatable(db: &DB, w_id: &str, datatable_name: &str) {
let req = SetDatatablePermissions {
enabled: false,
roles: vec![],
default_role: None,
renames: vec![],
};
let res = async {
let datatable = read_datatable(db, w_id, datatable_name).await?;
if !datatable
.permissions
.as_ref()
.is_some_and(|p| p.enabled && p.roles.len() > 1)
{
return Ok(());
}
let (mut client, plan) = build_plan(db, w_id, datatable_name, &req).await?;
run_statements(&mut client, &plan).await
}
.await;
if let Err(e) = res {
tracing::error!(
"Could not drop the Postgres roles of deleted data table {datatable_name} in {w_id}: {e:#}"
);
}
}
/// Run a plan's statements in a single transaction, so a failure part-way leaves
/// the database exactly as it was.
async fn run_statements(client: &mut tokio_postgres::Client, plan: &RolePlan) -> Result<()> {
let pg_tx = client.transaction().await.map_err(|e| {
Error::internal_err(format!(
"Failed to open a transaction on the data table: {}",
pg_error_message(&e)
))
})?;
for statement in plan.statements.iter() {
pg_tx.batch_execute(&statement.sql).await.map_err(|e| {
Error::ExecutionErr(format!(
"Failed to run `{}`: {}",
statement.display,
pg_error_message(&e)
))
})?;
}
pg_tx.commit().await.map_err(|e| {
Error::internal_err(format!(
"Failed to commit the role changes: {}",
pg_error_message(&e)
))
})
}
async fn get_datatable_permissions(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
Path((w_id, datatable_name)): Path<(String, String)>,
) -> JsonResult<DatatablePermissionsInfo> {
require_admin(authed.is_admin, &authed.username)?;
let datatable = read_datatable(&db, &w_id, &datatable_name).await?;
let permissions = datatable.permissions.unwrap_or_default();
let default_role = permissions.default_role().to_string();
Ok(Json(DatatablePermissionsInfo {
enabled: permissions.enabled,
default_role,
roles: permissions
.roles
.into_iter()
.map(|(name, role)| DatatableRoleInfo {
name,
tenants: role.tenants,
pg_rolename: role.pg_rolename,
})
.collect(),
}))
}
/// Refuse a data table operation that would run as a role `authed` may not use.
///
/// The executor enforces this too, so this is not the security boundary — it is
/// what turns "the migration job failed" into an error naming the role and the
/// migration, before anything is pushed or recorded.
pub(crate) async fn ensure_can_use_datatable_role(
db: &DB,
w_id: &str,
datatable_name: &str,
role: Option<&str>,
authed: &ApiAuthed,
context: &str,
) -> Result<()> {
let datatable = read_datatable(db, w_id, datatable_name).await?;
let Some(permissions) = datatable.permissions.filter(|p| p.enabled) else {
// Unpermissioned: only the built-in role exists, and everyone reaches it.
return match role {
Some(role) if role != ADMIN_DATATABLE_ROLE => Err(Error::BadRequest(format!(
"{context} names role '{role}', but permissions are not enabled on data table '{datatable_name}'"
))),
_ => Ok(()),
};
};
let role_name = role.unwrap_or_else(|| permissions.default_role());
let entry = permissions.roles.get(role_name).ok_or_else(|| {
Error::NotFound(format!(
"{context} names role '{role_name}', which is not defined on data table '{datatable_name}'"
))
})?;
if !can_use_datatable_role(entry, &authed.to_authed_ref()) {
return Err(Error::NotAuthorized(format!(
"{context} runs as role '{role_name}' of data table '{datatable_name}', which you are not allowed to use"
)));
}
Ok(())
}
/// List the roles `authed` may run this data table as. An unpermissioned data
/// table reports `enabled: false` and no roles, so a picker can hide itself.
async fn list_usable_datatable_roles(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
Path((w_id, datatable_name)): Path<(String, String)>,
) -> JsonResult<UsableDatatableRoles> {
let datatable = read_datatable(&db, &w_id, &datatable_name).await?;
let Some(permissions) = datatable.permissions.filter(|p| p.enabled) else {
return Ok(Json(UsableDatatableRoles {
enabled: false,
roles: vec![],
default_role: ADMIN_DATATABLE_ROLE.to_string(),
}));
};
let authed_ref = authed.to_authed_ref();
Ok(Json(UsableDatatableRoles {
enabled: true,
default_role: permissions.default_role().to_string(),
roles: permissions
.roles
.iter()
.filter(|(_, role)| can_use_datatable_role(role, &authed_ref))
.map(|(name, _)| name.clone())
.collect(),
}))
}
async fn preview_datatable_permissions(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
Path((w_id, datatable_name)): Path<(String, String)>,
Json(req): Json<SetDatatablePermissions>,
) -> JsonResult<DatatablePermissionsPreview> {
require_admin(authed.is_admin, &authed.username)?;
let (_client, plan) = build_plan(&db, &w_id, &datatable_name, &req).await?;
Ok(Json(DatatablePermissionsPreview {
statements: plan.statements.into_iter().map(|s| s.display).collect(),
warnings: plan.warnings,
}))
}
async fn set_datatable_permissions(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
Path((w_id, datatable_name)): Path<(String, String)>,
Json(req): Json<SetDatatablePermissions>,
) -> Result<String> {
require_admin(authed.is_admin, &authed.username)?;
// The roles about to be created are handed privileges by this connection,
// which cannot pass on what it holds without the grant option.
ensure_instance_db_can_delegate(&db, &w_id, &datatable_name).await;
// The plan is rebuilt here rather than trusted from the preview: the client
// never gets to choose what runs against the database.
let (mut client, plan) = build_plan(&db, &w_id, &datatable_name, &req).await?;
// The roles are committed before the config: a Windmill-side failure after
// this point leaves roles the config does not know about, which the next plan
// reconciles (it reads `pg_roles`), whereas the reverse order would leave the
// config naming roles that were never created.
run_statements(&mut client, &plan).await?;
let permissions = serde_json::to_value(&plan.permissions)
.map_err(|e| Error::internal_err(format!("Failed to serialize permissions: {e}")))?;
let mut tx = db.begin().await?;
// Written at the permissions path only, so a concurrent edit of the data
// table's own settings is not clobbered.
let updated = sqlx::query_scalar!(
"UPDATE workspace_settings
SET datatable = jsonb_set(datatable, ARRAY['datatables', $2, 'permissions'], $3)
WHERE workspace_id = $1 AND datatable->'datatables' ? $2
RETURNING workspace_id",
&w_id,
&datatable_name,
permissions,
)
.fetch_optional(&mut *tx)
.await?;
if updated.is_none() {
return Err(Error::NotFound(format!(
"Data table '{datatable_name}' not found"
)));
}
audit_log(
&mut *tx,
&authed,
"workspaces.set_datatable_permissions",
ActionKind::Update,
&w_id,
Some(&authed.email),
Some(
[
("datatable", datatable_name.as_str()),
("enabled", if req.enabled { "true" } else { "false" }),
]
.into(),
),
)
.await?;
tx.commit().await?;
Ok(format!(
"Updated permissions of data table {datatable_name}"
))
}