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Ruben Fiszel aff0a4ec18 fix(security): sanitize dependency names & connection strings against command/SQL injection (#9590 )

* fix(security): sanitize dependency names & connection strings against command/SQL injection

Follow-up to the PowerShell module-name injection fix (#9587, CWE-78): the
same audit surfaced the identical "secondary identifier interpolated into an
interpreter/SQL command without escaping" pattern in a few other executors.

- R executor (the real twin, HIGH): package name/version parsed from a
  user-supplied renv.lock were interpolated raw into an `Rscript -e
  "...renv::install(\"{pkg}@{version}\"...)"` eval string. A double-quote in
  the name/version broke out → arbitrary R (unsandboxed under DISABLE_NSJAIL /
  non-Linux). Now validated in parse_renv_lock (charset) and escaped at the
  sink as defense-in-depth (also escapes the lib path, which holds backslashes
  on Windows).

- DuckDB ATTACH (MED): the connection string built from resource fields
  (host/db/user/password) is embedded in a single-quoted DuckDB literal; escape
  quotes so a field value can't break out of the ATTACH statement.

- PgDatabase::to_uri: URL-encode host and dbname (user/password already were),
  so '@'/'/'/'?'/'&' can't reshape the parsed URI (feeds live PG connect and
  DuckDB ATTACH).

- DuckDB CREATE SECRET (FFI): wrap the interpolated S3 key/secret/endpoint in
  the existing sql_single_quote() helper, consistent with the resource-limits
  setup right above it.

- PowerShell: also escape the configured private repo URL/PAT in the install
  template (same sink as the module names; the escape landed after #9587 was
  squash-merged so it was not in the merged change).

Adds unit tests for the R validation/escaping.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): escape ducklake/snowflake/bigquery identifiers; preserve IPv6 host

- to_uri: don't percent-encode bracketed IPv6 literal hosts ([::1]) — encoding
  their brackets/colons would stop them parsing as a host (review fix).
- duckdb ducklake ATTACH: the catalog conn string, storage and data_path are
  embedded in single-quoted DuckDB literals; escape quotes so a resource field
  can't break out (the ducklake path bypassed the ATTACH escape added earlier).
- snowflake: validate account_identifier (it forms the request hostname).
- bigquery: validate project_id (it forms a request URL path segment).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-06-15 19:06:00 +02:00

nsjail

fix(nsjail): make ansible collections mount non-mandatory (#9510 )

2026-06-10 12:54:34 +00:00

src

fix(security): sanitize dependency names & connection strings against command/SQL injection (#9590 )

2026-06-15 19:06:00 +02:00

build.rs

refactor: isolate deno_core into windmill-runtime-nativets subcrate (#7848 )

2026-02-08 09:16:37 +00:00

Cargo.toml

fix: actually isolate windows job children from CTRL_BREAK_EVENT + reap on worker death (#9563 )