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Security: on the agent-worker path the completion payload's owner fields (permissioned_as/email) are attacker-supplied, and create_token_for_owner(perms: None) falls back to fetch_authed_from_permissioned_as — letting a completion mint a token for an arbitrary identity. Instead fetch the server-written job_perms row and pass Some(perms); when the row is absent (e.g. zombie replay after the queue row was reaped) keep the step token rather than trusting the payload. Gating: refresh based on the token's actual remaining lifetime (DB-free decode_without_verify) instead of step duration. This confines the extra get_job_perms lookup to near-expiry completions and also covers completions with no recorded duration (Noop/cache), which the duration guard missed. Add job_token_remaining_lifetime_secs + JOB_TOKEN_REFRESH_MARGIN_SECS (must exceed the 60s JWT leeway) in windmill-common::auth, with unit tests pinning the margin-vs-leeway invariant and the near-expiry detection. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Windmill Worker
The worker. Used to process and execute flows & jobs.
This crate exposes both a library as well as a binary target.