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windmill/backend/windmill-api-groups/src/groups.rs
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0e807fb1dd feat: put a data table's connection under Postgres roles (#11020)
* feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles

A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection,
`custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say
this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table.

A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the
instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares
`-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch —
grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from
the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`.
A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before.

Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint,
`get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when
there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could
`RESET ROLE` its way out of.

A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a
copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the
parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a
pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the
governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and
ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not
where an access decision should be made.

Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing
workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a
replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin

Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a
caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema
export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the
connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table
under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing
workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant.

All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a
restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the
only right answer for the copy paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping

A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin
putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the
host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and
`CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the
permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials
on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read.

Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration
generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration
rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or
removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after
which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the
entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it
calls a data table changes nothing about the data table.

Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an
entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than
living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's
tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename
dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded

Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo.

Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an
`UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a
live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because
the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so
the operation is retryable once the row is restored.

Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are
left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy
would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it
stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table
this workspace never had.

`InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now
hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line.

Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the
governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that
predates this and sends no job id.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code

The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that
matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line
form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence.

`list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop
it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin
check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not
and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the
check runs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract

The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all
read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the
cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password
nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation
now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the
write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL
helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them.

Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely
multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the
transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway.

The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns
plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and
`converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's
raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at
the definition, which is where the next caller looks.

Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip
that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and
`resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing
resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker.

Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a
`StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an
operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and
never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated
secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now
said at the field.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery

Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways.
The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the
operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML
editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either.
Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of
that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every
login it described.

`custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret,
written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot
read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape:
`datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist.
No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to
take it out.

Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables
outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save
committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And
`set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its
transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the
default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings
row across validation and write.

Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish:
`read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole
job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and
`converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's.

Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but
`extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so
code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced

The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all
three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now
drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names.
Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it
fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot".

The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than
none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it.
`read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any
workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while
`set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the
rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record
or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same
treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every
resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions`
— it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing

The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own
`global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles`
and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The
neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it
predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a
consequence of this change.

Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing:

A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across
as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save
succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step,
and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose.

Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table
disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to
suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction.

Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what
it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which
workspace is gone.

Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions
handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed);
the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog`
was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its
roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings

Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.

The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.

One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.

Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks

Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved.

A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any
lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a
PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in
which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed
nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state.

Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which
still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows
onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual
old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a
target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one
target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so
a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The
pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade
one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once
from what it named before the save.

The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named,
with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal.
Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint.

Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of
a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole
document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical
value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from
the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically

The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call
`/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which
deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining
therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the
username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually
calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant".

The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's
admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role
check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check
when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any
connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role
a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that.

Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in
separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect
as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now
runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles

pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied
data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role.
The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass
Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by
Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing.

Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork
path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is
what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the
copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data

A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only
the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one
created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed —
and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops
entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one.

Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* nit worker error msg

* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it

`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.

A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.

Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it

`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.

The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry

The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".

Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands

Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.

The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test

Two review findings, both real.

`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.

`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy

Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.

Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.

Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist

The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.

Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created

A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.

That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.

Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database

A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.

`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"

This reverts commit 7dd3275a10.

The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the
database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork
request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open
connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it
dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at
the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization
with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it
did before this PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation

A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a
failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_*` behind, as it did
before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes
away once the clone is a single server-side operation.

The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover
on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully
copied database between its import and its final fork request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted

Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected
the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture
already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection
it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the
governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection
happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry
did the same.

Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own
transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a
listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is
split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal

Three fixes from review.

`edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so
the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and
an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is
still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable,
but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request.

The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional
`deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing
a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived
from the stored configuration against the saved one.

`delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork
committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside
the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share
locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on
the missing parent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart

A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's
roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than
chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a
data table now carries one or the other:

- a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data
  table under roles;
- roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads
  the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names
  each one to disable.

This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace
deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline
fix from the same review round is kept.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved

Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was
accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30
seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a
data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its
listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it

Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered
database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it
goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and
able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it.
The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete
leaves a disabled role to retry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting

Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once,
without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in
that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a
healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one
advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and
trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared
while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener
connects after roles are committed and refuses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing `?`

Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture
once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication
connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose
listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a
listener for, now still counts as streaming.

Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such
entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them:
`a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at
a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole
reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH
and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep
the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers

A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only
for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends.
The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the
CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns.

Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check
makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is
refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename

A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles

The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition

Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.

Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition

The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition

The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it

Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license

Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition

The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4

New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): drop a DuckDB data table secret once its ATTACH has used it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf(datatables): resolve a workspace's data tables per pointer hop, not per entry

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): hold the parent's settings while a fork points at its data tables

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #787 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 38d6fcf2aeb39cfdac21814bbdbbcc02911e566a

New ee-repo-ref: 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-18 13:56:41 +02:00

1547 lines
47 KiB
Rust

/*
* Author: Ruben Fiszel
* Copyright: Windmill Labs, Inc 2022
* This file and its contents are licensed under the AGPLv3 License.
* Please see the included NOTICE for copyright information and
* LICENSE-AGPL for a copy of the license.
*/
use windmill_api_auth::{require_super_admin, ApiAuthed};
use windmill_common::DB;
use axum::{
extract::{Extension, Path, Query},
routing::{delete, get, post},
Json, Router,
};
use windmill_audit::audit_oss::audit_log;
use windmill_audit::ActionKind;
use windmill_common::worker::CLOUD_HOSTED;
use windmill_common::{
auth::get_groups_for_user,
error::{Error, JsonResult, Result},
utils::{not_found_if_none, paginate, Pagination},
};
use windmill_common::{
db::UserDB,
users::{username_to_permissioned_as, usr_accepts_email},
};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use sqlx::{query_scalar, FromRow, Postgres, Transaction};
use windmill_git_sync::handle_deployment_metadata;
pub fn workspaced_service() -> Router {
Router::new()
.route("/list", get(list_groups))
.route("/listnames", get(list_group_names))
.route("/create", post(create_group))
.route("/get/{name}", get(get_group))
.route("/update/{name}", post(update_group))
.route("/delete/{name}", delete(delete_group))
.route("/adduser/{name}", post(add_user))
.route("/removeuser/{name}", post(remove_user))
.route("/is_owner/{name}", get(is_owner))
}
pub fn global_service() -> Router {
Router::new()
.route("/list", get(list_igroups))
.route("/list_with_workspaces", get(list_igroups_with_workspaces))
.route("/get/{name}", get(get_igroup))
.route("/create", post(create_igroup))
.route("/update/{name}", post(update_igroup))
.route("/delete/{name}", delete(delete_igroup))
.route("/adduser/{name}", post(add_user_igroup))
.route("/removeuser/{name}", post(remove_user_igroup))
.route("/export", get(export_igroups))
.route("/overwrite", post(overwrite_igroups))
}
/// Normalize group names: replace spaces with underscores and convert to lowercase
/// Used when manually creating groups and SCIM-managed groups
pub fn convert_name(name: &str) -> String {
name.replace(" ", "_").to_lowercase()
}
#[derive(FromRow, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct Group {
pub workspace_id: String,
pub name: String,
pub summary: Option<String>,
pub extra_perms: serde_json::Value,
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub struct NewGroup {
pub name: String,
pub summary: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
pub struct GroupInfo {
pub workspace_id: String,
pub name: String,
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub summary: Option<String>,
pub members: Vec<String>,
pub extra_perms: serde_json::Value,
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub struct EditGroup {
pub summary: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub struct Username {
pub username: String,
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub struct Email {
pub email: String,
}
async fn list_groups(
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
Path(w_id): Path<String>,
Query(pagination): Query<Pagination>,
) -> JsonResult<Vec<Group>> {
let (per_page, offset) = paginate(pagination);
let rows = sqlx::query_as!(
Group,
"SELECT workspace_id, name, summary, extra_perms FROM group_ WHERE workspace_id = $1 ORDER BY name asc LIMIT $2 OFFSET $3",
w_id,
per_page as i64,
offset as i64
)
.fetch_all(&db)
.await?;
Ok(Json(rows))
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct QueryListGroup {
pub only_member_of: Option<bool>,
}
async fn list_group_names(
ApiAuthed { username, email, .. }: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
Query(QueryListGroup { only_member_of }): Query<QueryListGroup>,
Path(w_id): Path<String>,
) -> JsonResult<Vec<String>> {
let rows = if !only_member_of.unwrap_or(false) {
sqlx::query_scalar!(
"SELECT name FROM group_ WHERE workspace_id = $1 UNION SELECT name FROM instance_group ORDER BY name asc",
w_id
)
.fetch_all(&db)
.await?
.into_iter()
.filter_map(|x| x)
.collect()
} else {
get_groups_for_user(&w_id, &username, &email, &db).await?
};
Ok(Json(rows))
}
async fn check_name_conflict<'c>(
tx: &mut Transaction<'c, Postgres>,
w_id: &str,
name: &str,
) -> Result<()> {
let exists = sqlx::query_scalar!(
"SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM group_ WHERE name = $1 AND workspace_id = $2)",
name,
w_id
)
.fetch_one(&mut **tx)
.await?
.unwrap_or(false);
if exists {
return Err(windmill_common::error::Error::BadRequest(format!(
"Group {} already exists",
name
)));
}
return Ok(());
}
pub async fn is_owner(
ApiAuthed { username, is_admin, groups, .. }: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
Path((w_id, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
) -> JsonResult<bool> {
if is_admin {
Ok(Json(true))
} else {
Ok(Json(
require_is_owner(&name, &username, &groups, &w_id, &db)
.await
.is_ok(),
))
}
}
pub async fn require_is_owner(
group_name: &str,
username: &str,
groups: &Vec<String>,
w_id: &str,
db: &DB,
) -> Result<()> {
let is_owner = query_scalar!(
"SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM group_ WHERE (group_.extra_perms ->> CONCAT('u/', $1::text))::boolean AND name = $2 AND workspace_id = $4) OR exists(
SELECT 1 FROM group_ g, jsonb_each_text(g.extra_perms) f
WHERE $2 = g.name AND $4 = g.workspace_id AND SPLIT_PART(key, '/', 1) = 'g' AND key = ANY($3::text[])
AND value::boolean)",
username,
group_name,
groups,
w_id,
).fetch_one(db)
.await?
.unwrap_or(false);
if !is_owner {
Err(Error::BadRequest(format!(
"{} is not an owner of {} and hence is not authorized to perform this operation",
username, group_name
)))
} else {
Ok(())
}
}
async fn _check_nb_of_groups(db: &DB) -> Result<()> {
let nb_groups = sqlx::query_scalar!("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM group_ WHERE name != 'all' AND name != 'error_handler' AND name != 'slack' AND name != 'wm_deployers'",)
.fetch_one(db)
.await?;
if nb_groups.unwrap_or(0) >= 3 {
return Err(Error::BadRequest(
"You have reached the maximum number of groups (3 outside of native groups 'all', 'slack', 'error_handler' and 'wm_deployers') without an enterprise license"
.to_string(),
));
}
return Ok(());
}
async fn create_group(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(_db): Extension<DB>,
Extension(user_db): Extension<UserDB>,
Path(w_id): Path<String>,
Json(ng): Json<NewGroup>,
) -> Result<String> {
crate::check_demo_workspace_restriction(&authed, &w_id, "Group creation")?;
let mut tx = user_db.begin(&authed).await?;
check_name_conflict(&mut tx, &w_id, &ng.name).await?;
#[cfg(not(feature = "enterprise"))]
_check_nb_of_groups(&_db).await?;
sqlx::query!(
"INSERT INTO group_ (workspace_id, name, summary, extra_perms) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4)",
w_id,
ng.name,
ng.summary,
serde_json::json!({username_to_permissioned_as(&authed.username): true})
)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
sqlx::query!(
"INSERT INTO usr_to_group (workspace_id, usr, group_) VALUES ($1, $2, $3) ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING",
&w_id,
&authed.username,
ng.name,
)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
audit_log(
&mut *tx,
&authed,
"group.create",
ActionKind::Create,
&w_id,
Some(&ng.name.to_string()),
None,
)
.await?;
log_group_permission_change(&mut *tx, &w_id, &ng.name, &authed.username, "create", None)
.await?;
tx.commit().await?;
handle_deployment_metadata(
&authed.email,
&authed.username,
&_db,
&w_id,
windmill_git_sync::DeployedObject::Group { name: ng.name.clone() },
Some(format!("Created group '{}'", &ng.name)),
true,
None,
)
.await?;
Ok(format!("Created group {}", ng.name))
}
async fn create_igroup(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
Json(ng): Json<NewGroup>,
) -> Result<String> {
use uuid::Uuid;
require_super_admin(&db, &authed).await?;
let mut tx = db.begin().await?;
let normalized_name = convert_name(&ng.name);
let id = Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
sqlx::query!(
"INSERT INTO instance_group (name, summary, id) VALUES ($1, $2, $3) ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING",
normalized_name,
ng.summary,
id,
)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
audit_log(
&mut *tx,
&authed,
"igroup.create",
ActionKind::Create,
"global",
Some(&normalized_name),
None,
)
.await?;
tx.commit().await?;
Ok(format!("Created group {}", normalized_name))
}
fn validate_instance_role(role: &Option<String>) -> Result<Option<String>> {
match role.as_deref() {
None => Ok(None),
Some("") | Some("user") => Ok(None),
Some("devops") => Ok(Some("devops".to_string())),
Some("superadmin") => Ok(Some("superadmin".to_string())),
Some(other) => Err(Error::BadRequest(format!(
"Invalid instance_role '{}'. Must be 'devops', 'superadmin', 'user', or empty to clear",
other
))),
}
}
/// Compute the highest-precedence instance role from all groups a user belongs to.
/// superadmin > devops > none
pub async fn compute_effective_instance_role(
email: &str,
tx: &mut Transaction<'_, Postgres>,
) -> Result<Option<String>> {
let roles = sqlx::query_scalar!(
"SELECT ig.instance_role FROM email_to_igroup eig
JOIN instance_group ig ON ig.name = eig.igroup
WHERE eig.email = $1 AND ig.instance_role IS NOT NULL",
email
)
.fetch_all(&mut **tx)
.await?;
let mut highest: Option<String> = None;
for role in roles.into_iter().flatten() {
match role.as_str() {
"superadmin" => return Ok(Some("superadmin".to_string())),
"devops" => highest = Some("devops".to_string()),
_ => {}
}
}
Ok(highest)
}
/// Apply computed instance role to password table and invalidate session tokens.
/// Only applies if role_source = 'instance_group' or user has no elevated role.
pub async fn apply_instance_role(
email: &str,
role: Option<&str>,
tx: &mut Transaction<'_, Postgres>,
) -> Result<()> {
let current = sqlx::query!(
"SELECT super_admin, devops, role_source FROM password WHERE email = $1",
email
)
.fetch_optional(&mut **tx)
.await?;
let current = match current {
Some(c) => c,
None => return Ok(()), // user doesn't exist in password table
};
// Don't touch manually-set elevated roles — manual always wins
if current.role_source == "manual" && (current.super_admin || current.devops) {
return Ok(());
}
let (new_super_admin, new_devops) = match role {
Some("superadmin") => (true, false),
Some("devops") => (false, true),
_ => (false, false),
};
// Only update if something actually changed
if current.super_admin == new_super_admin && current.devops == new_devops {
return Ok(());
}
sqlx::query!(
"UPDATE password SET super_admin = $1, devops = $2, role_source = 'instance_group' WHERE email = $3",
new_super_admin,
new_devops,
email
)
.execute(&mut **tx)
.await?;
// Invalidate session tokens to force re-login with new privileges
sqlx::query!(
"DELETE FROM token WHERE email = $1 AND label = 'session'",
email
)
.execute(&mut **tx)
.await?;
// Update super_admin flag on non-session tokens
sqlx::query!(
"UPDATE token SET super_admin = $1 WHERE email = $2 AND label != 'session'",
new_super_admin,
email
)
.execute(&mut **tx)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
/// Recompute and apply roles for all members of a given instance group.
pub async fn propagate_instance_group_roles(
group_name: &str,
tx: &mut Transaction<'_, Postgres>,
) -> Result<()> {
let members = sqlx::query_scalar!(
"SELECT email FROM email_to_igroup WHERE igroup = $1",
group_name
)
.fetch_all(&mut **tx)
.await?;
for email in members {
let effective_role = compute_effective_instance_role(&email, tx).await?;
apply_instance_role(&email, effective_role.as_deref(), tx).await?;
}
Ok(())
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct IGroupUpdate {
new_summary: String,
instance_role: Option<String>,
}
async fn update_igroup(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
Path(name): Path<String>,
Json(igroup_update): Json<IGroupUpdate>,
) -> Result<String> {
require_super_admin(&db, &authed).await?;
let mut tx: Transaction<'_, Postgres> = db.begin().await?;
let exists_opt = sqlx::query("SELECT 1 FROM instance_group WHERE name = $1")
.bind(name.clone())
.fetch_optional(&mut *tx)
.await?;
not_found_if_none(exists_opt, "instance_group", name.clone())?;
let validated_role = validate_instance_role(&igroup_update.instance_role)?;
// Fetch old role before updating so we can detect changes
let old_role = if igroup_update.instance_role.is_some() {
sqlx::query_scalar!(
"SELECT instance_role FROM instance_group WHERE name = $1",
&name
)
.fetch_one(&mut *tx)
.await?
} else {
None
};
sqlx::query("UPDATE instance_group SET summary = $1, instance_role = $2 WHERE name = $3")
.bind(igroup_update.new_summary)
.bind(&validated_role)
.bind(&name)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
// If instance_role actually changed, propagate to all group members
if igroup_update.instance_role.is_some() && old_role != validated_role {
propagate_instance_group_roles(&name, &mut tx).await?;
}
audit_log(
&mut *tx,
&authed,
"igroup.updated",
ActionKind::Update,
"global",
Some(&name.to_string()),
None,
)
.await?;
tx.commit().await?;
Ok(format!("Updated group {}", name))
}
/// Workspaces whose auto-assignment config references any of `groups`.
///
/// Reads `workspace_settings` across the whole instance without checking the caller's rights.
/// Callers must have established superadmin beforehand; the result leaks which workspaces are
/// configured with a given instance group.
///
/// This and every reconcile call site are gated on `private` alone, NOT `enterprise`: CE
/// builds ship `private` without `enterprise`, and gating on `enterprise` would scrub
/// references while stranding the affected workspace members on CE.
#[cfg(feature = "private")]
pub async fn workspaces_referencing_instance_groups(
groups: &[String],
tx: &mut Transaction<'_, Postgres>,
) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
if groups.is_empty() {
return Ok(vec![]);
}
let workspaces = sqlx::query_scalar!(
"SELECT workspace_id FROM workspace_settings WHERE auto_invite->'instance_groups' ?| $1",
groups
)
.fetch_all(&mut **tx)
.await?;
Ok(workspaces)
}
/// Compute and advisory-lock every workspace whose auto-assignment config references any of
/// `groups`. Mutation paths call this after locking their `instance_group` rows and before
/// any other row lock — the hierarchy is group rows → workspace advisory locks → all other
/// row locks (see `reconcile_workspace_instance_groups`). Same authorization contract as
/// `workspaces_referencing_instance_groups`.
#[cfg(feature = "private")]
pub async fn lock_workspaces_referencing_instance_groups(
groups: &[String],
tx: &mut Transaction<'_, Postgres>,
) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
use windmill_api_workspaces::workspaces_ee::lock_instance_group_workspaces;
let workspaces = workspaces_referencing_instance_groups(groups, tx).await?;
lock_instance_group_workspaces(&workspaces, tx).await?;
Ok(workspaces)
}
/// Drop `groups` from every workspace's instance-group auto-assignment config.
///
/// Workspaces reference instance groups by name in `workspace_settings.auto_invite`, and
/// nothing in the schema ties those references to `instance_group` rows. A deleted group whose
/// name is left behind here silently re-acquires its members if a group of the same name is
/// created later.
///
/// Mutates every workspace's settings, so callers must have established superadmin first.
/// Deliberately not audited per workspace: the mutation is instance-scoped and recorded by
/// the caller's global igroup audit event.
pub async fn remove_instance_groups_from_workspace_settings(
groups: &[String],
tx: &mut Transaction<'_, Postgres>,
) -> Result<()> {
if groups.is_empty() {
return Ok(());
}
// Row filter must stay `?|`: it yields false on a JSON `null` instance_groups, where
// jsonb_array_elements_text would instead raise and abort the whole transaction; the
// jsonb_typeof guard rules out the same class of value for the roles object. The filter is
// not index-backed — the GIN index covers the auto_invite column, not this expression —
// which is acceptable since workspace_settings holds one row per workspace.
sqlx::query!(
r#"UPDATE workspace_settings SET
auto_invite = jsonb_set(
jsonb_set(
COALESCE(auto_invite, '{}'::jsonb),
'{instance_groups}',
(SELECT COALESCE(jsonb_agg(elem), '[]'::jsonb)
FROM jsonb_array_elements(COALESCE(auto_invite->'instance_groups', '[]'::jsonb)) elem
WHERE elem #>> '{}' <> ALL($1))
),
'{instance_groups_roles}',
CASE WHEN jsonb_typeof(auto_invite->'instance_groups_roles') = 'object'
THEN (auto_invite->'instance_groups_roles') - $1::text[]
ELSE '{}'::jsonb
END
)
WHERE auto_invite->'instance_groups' ?| $1"#,
groups
)
.execute(&mut **tx)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
/// Follow an instance-group rename through every workspace's auto-assignment config.
///
/// Workspaces reference instance groups by name, so a rename that leaves the old name behind
/// strands those references: the reconciler resolves membership from the groups a workspace
/// references, and a name that no longer matches any group reads as "no members", which would
/// evict everyone granted through it on the next reconcile.
///
/// Mutates every workspace's settings, so callers must have established superadmin first.
/// Deliberately not audited per workspace: the mutation is instance-scoped and recorded by
/// the caller's global igroup audit event.
pub async fn rename_instance_group_in_workspace_settings(
old_name: &str,
new_name: &str,
tx: &mut Transaction<'_, Postgres>,
) -> Result<()> {
// Row filter must stay `?`: it yields false on a JSON `null` instance_groups, where
// jsonb_array_elements would instead raise and abort the whole transaction.
sqlx::query!(
r#"UPDATE workspace_settings SET
auto_invite = jsonb_set(
jsonb_set(
COALESCE(auto_invite, '{}'::jsonb),
'{instance_groups}',
(SELECT COALESCE(jsonb_agg(
CASE WHEN elem #>> '{}' = $1 THEN to_jsonb($2::text) ELSE elem END), '[]'::jsonb)
FROM jsonb_array_elements(COALESCE(auto_invite->'instance_groups', '[]'::jsonb)) elem)
),
'{instance_groups_roles}',
CASE WHEN COALESCE(auto_invite->'instance_groups_roles', '{}'::jsonb) ? $1
THEN (COALESCE(auto_invite->'instance_groups_roles', '{}'::jsonb) - $1)
|| jsonb_build_object($2::text, auto_invite->'instance_groups_roles'->$1)
ELSE COALESCE(auto_invite->'instance_groups_roles', '{}'::jsonb)
END
)
WHERE auto_invite->'instance_groups' ? $1"#,
old_name,
new_name
)
.execute(&mut **tx)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn delete_igroup(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
Path(name): Path<String>,
) -> Result<String> {
require_super_admin(&db, &authed).await?;
let mut tx: Transaction<'_, Postgres> = db.begin().await?;
// FOR UPDATE: the group row is the group-level mutex, taken before the workspace
// advisory locks (see reconcile_workspace_instance_groups).
let group_role = sqlx::query_scalar!(
"SELECT instance_role FROM instance_group WHERE name = $1 FOR UPDATE",
&name
)
.fetch_optional(&mut *tx)
.await?
.flatten();
let affected_members: Vec<String> = if group_role.is_some() {
sqlx::query_scalar!("SELECT email FROM email_to_igroup WHERE igroup = $1", &name)
.fetch_all(&mut *tx)
.await?
} else {
vec![]
};
// Captured and advisory-locked before the settings update strips the group from them.
#[cfg(feature = "private")]
let affected_workspaces =
lock_workspaces_referencing_instance_groups(std::slice::from_ref(&name), &mut tx).await?;
remove_instance_groups_from_workspace_settings(std::slice::from_ref(&name), &mut tx).await?;
sqlx::query!("DELETE FROM email_to_igroup WHERE igroup = $1", name)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
sqlx::query!("DELETE FROM instance_group WHERE name = $1", name)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
// Recompute roles for affected members after deletion
for email in &affected_members {
let effective_role = compute_effective_instance_role(email, &mut tx).await?;
apply_instance_role(email, effective_role.as_deref(), &mut tx).await?;
}
#[cfg(feature = "private")]
{
use windmill_api_workspaces::workspaces_ee::reconcile_workspace_instance_groups;
reconcile_workspace_instance_groups(&affected_workspaces, &mut tx, &authed).await?;
}
audit_log(
&mut *tx,
&authed,
"igroup.delete",
ActionKind::Delete,
"global",
Some(&name.to_string()),
None,
)
.await?;
tx.commit().await?;
Ok(format!("Deleted group {}", name))
}
pub async fn get_group_opt<'c>(
db: &mut Transaction<'c, Postgres>,
w_id: &str,
name: &str,
) -> Result<Option<Group>> {
let group_opt = sqlx::query_as!(
Group,
"SELECT workspace_id, name, summary, extra_perms FROM group_ WHERE name = $1 AND workspace_id = $2",
name,
w_id
)
.fetch_optional(&mut **db)
.await?;
Ok(group_opt)
}
async fn get_group(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(user_db): Extension<UserDB>,
Path((w_id, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
) -> JsonResult<GroupInfo> {
if *CLOUD_HOSTED && w_id == "demo" && name == "all" && !authed.is_admin {
return Ok(Json(GroupInfo {
workspace_id: w_id,
name: name,
summary: Some("The group that contains all users".to_string()),
members: vec!["redacted_in_demo_workspace".to_string()],
extra_perms: serde_json::json!({}),
}));
}
let mut tx = user_db.begin(&authed).await?;
let group = not_found_if_none(get_group_opt(&mut tx, &w_id, &name).await?, "Group", &name)?;
let members = sqlx::query_scalar!(
"SELECT usr.username
FROM usr_to_group LEFT JOIN usr ON usr_to_group.usr = usr.username AND usr_to_group.workspace_id = $2
WHERE group_ = $1 AND usr.workspace_id = $2 AND usr_to_group.workspace_id = $2",
name,
w_id
)
.fetch_all(&mut *tx)
.await?;
tx.commit().await?;
Ok(Json(GroupInfo {
workspace_id: group.workspace_id,
name: group.name,
summary: group.summary,
members,
extra_perms: group.extra_perms,
}))
}
async fn delete_group(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
Extension(user_db): Extension<UserDB>,
Path((w_id, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
) -> Result<String> {
let mut tx = user_db.begin(&authed).await?;
if name == "all" {
return Err(Error::BadRequest(
"The group 'all' is a special group that contains all users and cannot be deleted"
.to_string(),
));
}
if !authed.is_admin {
require_is_owner(&name, &authed.username, &authed.groups, &w_id, &db).await?;
}
not_found_if_none(get_group_opt(&mut tx, &w_id, &name).await?, "Group", &name)?;
// A tenant list names a principal, so a freed name must not linger in one: a later group
// reusing it would silently inherit the data table access this one had.
windmill_common::workspaces::remove_datatable_tenant_in_workspace(
&mut tx,
&w_id,
&format!("g/{name}"),
)
.await?;
sqlx::query!(
"DELETE FROM usr_to_group WHERE group_ = $1 AND workspace_id = $2",
name,
w_id
)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
sqlx::query!(
"DELETE FROM group_ WHERE name = $1 AND workspace_id = $2",
name,
w_id
)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
audit_log(
&mut *tx,
&authed,
"group.delete",
ActionKind::Delete,
&w_id,
Some(&name.to_string()),
None,
)
.await?;
tx.commit().await?;
handle_deployment_metadata(
&authed.email,
&authed.username,
&db,
&w_id,
windmill_git_sync::DeployedObject::Group { name: name.clone() },
Some(format!("Deleted group '{}'", &name)),
true,
None,
)
.await?;
Ok(format!("delete group at name {}", name))
}
async fn update_group(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
Extension(user_db): Extension<UserDB>,
Path((w_id, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
Json(eg): Json<EditGroup>,
) -> Result<String> {
let mut tx = user_db.begin(&authed).await?;
if !authed.is_admin {
require_is_owner(&name, &authed.username, &authed.groups, &w_id, &db).await?;
}
not_found_if_none(get_group_opt(&mut tx, &w_id, &name).await?, "Group", &name)?;
sqlx::query!(
"UPDATE group_ SET summary = $1 WHERE name = $2 AND workspace_id = $3",
eg.summary,
&name,
&w_id
)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
audit_log(
&mut *tx,
&authed,
"group.edit",
ActionKind::Update,
&w_id,
Some(&name.to_string()),
None,
)
.await?;
log_group_permission_change(
&mut *tx,
&w_id,
&name,
&authed.username,
"update_summary",
None,
)
.await?;
tx.commit().await?;
handle_deployment_metadata(
&authed.email,
&authed.username,
&db,
&w_id,
windmill_git_sync::DeployedObject::Group { name: name.clone() },
Some(format!("Updated group '{}'", &name)),
true,
None,
)
.await?;
Ok(format!("Edited group {}", name))
}
async fn add_user(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
Extension(user_db): Extension<UserDB>,
Path((w_id, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
Json(Username { username: user_username }): Json<Username>,
) -> Result<String> {
let mut tx = user_db.begin(&authed).await?;
if !authed.is_admin {
require_is_owner(&name, &authed.username, &authed.groups, &w_id, &db).await?;
}
not_found_if_none(get_group_opt(&mut tx, &w_id, &name).await?, "Group", &name)?;
let result = sqlx::query!(
"INSERT INTO usr_to_group (workspace_id, usr, group_) VALUES ($1, $2, $3) ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING",
&w_id,
user_username,
name,
)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
if result.rows_affected() == 0 {
return Ok(format!(
"{} is already a member of group {}",
user_username, name
));
}
audit_log(
&mut *tx,
&authed,
"group.adduser",
ActionKind::Update,
&w_id,
Some(&name.to_string()),
Some([("user", user_username.as_str())].into()),
)
.await?;
log_group_permission_change(
&mut *tx,
&w_id,
&name,
&authed.username,
"add_member",
Some(&user_username),
)
.await?;
tx.commit().await?;
handle_deployment_metadata(
&authed.email,
&authed.username,
&db,
&w_id,
windmill_git_sync::DeployedObject::Group { name: name.clone() },
Some(format!("Added user to group '{}'", &name)),
true,
None,
)
.await?;
Ok(format!("Added {} to group {}", user_username, name))
}
async fn add_user_igroup(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
Path(name): Path<String>,
Json(Email { email }): Json<Email>,
) -> Result<String> {
require_super_admin(&db, &authed).await?;
// `email_to_igroup` has no shape constraint of its own; `usr`, which the member is
// promoted into on reconcile, has `proper_email`, and a value failing it there would
// roll back every member of the group.
if !usr_accepts_email(&db, &email).await? {
return Err(Error::BadRequest(format!(
"'{email}' is not a valid email address"
)));
}
let mut tx: Transaction<'_, Postgres> = db.begin().await?;
// FOR UPDATE: the group row is the group-level mutex, taken before the workspace
// advisory locks (see reconcile_workspace_instance_groups).
let group_opt = sqlx::query_scalar!(
"SELECT name FROM instance_group WHERE name = $1 FOR UPDATE",
name
)
.fetch_optional(&mut *tx)
.await?;
not_found_if_none(group_opt, "IGroup", &name)?;
// Before the membership insert's row lock.
#[cfg(feature = "private")]
let affected_workspaces =
lock_workspaces_referencing_instance_groups(std::slice::from_ref(&name), &mut tx).await?;
sqlx::query!(
"INSERT INTO email_to_igroup (email, igroup) VALUES ($1, $2) ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING",
email,
name,
)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
audit_log(
&mut *tx,
&authed,
"igroup.adduser",
ActionKind::Update,
"global",
Some(&name.to_string()),
Some([("email", email.as_str())].into()),
)
.await?;
// Apply instance-level role from group membership
let effective_role = compute_effective_instance_role(&email, &mut tx).await?;
apply_instance_role(&email, effective_role.as_deref(), &mut tx).await?;
// Sync workspace membership derived from this instance group.
#[cfg(feature = "private")]
{
use windmill_api_workspaces::workspaces_ee::reconcile_workspace_instance_groups;
reconcile_workspace_instance_groups(&affected_workspaces, &mut tx, &authed).await?;
}
tx.commit().await?;
Ok(format!("Added {} to igroup {}", email, name))
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
struct IGroup {
name: String,
summary: Option<String>,
emails: Option<Vec<String>>,
instance_role: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
struct IGroupWithWorkspaces {
name: String,
summary: Option<String>,
emails: Option<Vec<String>>,
instance_role: Option<String>,
workspaces: Vec<WorkspaceInfo>,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Clone)]
struct WorkspaceInfo {
workspace_id: String,
workspace_name: String,
role: String,
}
async fn list_igroups(Extension(db): Extension<DB>) -> JsonResult<Vec<IGroup>> {
let mut tx: Transaction<'_, Postgres> = db.begin().await?;
let groups = sqlx::query_as!(
IGroup,
"SELECT name, summary, array_remove(array_agg(email_to_igroup.email), null) as emails, instance_role FROM email_to_igroup RIGHT JOIN instance_group ON instance_group.name = email_to_igroup.igroup GROUP BY name, instance_role"
)
.fetch_all(&mut *tx)
.await?;
tx.commit().await?;
return Ok(Json(groups));
}
async fn list_igroups_with_workspaces(
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
) -> JsonResult<Vec<IGroupWithWorkspaces>> {
let mut tx: Transaction<'_, Postgres> = db.begin().await?;
// Get all instance groups with their emails first
let groups = sqlx::query_as!(
IGroup,
"SELECT name, summary, array_remove(array_agg(email_to_igroup.email), null) as emails, instance_role FROM email_to_igroup RIGHT JOIN instance_group ON instance_group.name = email_to_igroup.igroup GROUP BY name, summary, instance_role"
)
.fetch_all(&mut *tx)
.await?;
// Get all workspace mappings for instance groups in a single query
let workspace_mappings = sqlx::query!(
r#"
SELECT
ig.name as group_name,
ws.workspace_id,
w.name as workspace_name,
ws.auto_invite->'instance_groups_roles'->ig.name as role
FROM instance_group ig
INNER JOIN workspace_settings ws ON ws.auto_invite->'instance_groups' IS NOT NULL
AND ws.auto_invite->'instance_groups' ? ig.name
INNER JOIN workspace w ON w.id = ws.workspace_id AND w.deleted = false
ORDER BY ig.name, ws.workspace_id
"#
)
.fetch_all(&mut *tx)
.await?;
// Create a map of group_name -> Vec<WorkspaceInfo>
let mut workspaces_by_group: std::collections::HashMap<String, Vec<WorkspaceInfo>> =
std::collections::HashMap::new();
for mapping in workspace_mappings {
let role = mapping
.role
.and_then(|r| r.as_str().map(|s| s.to_string()))
.unwrap_or_else(|| "developer".to_string());
let workspace_info = WorkspaceInfo {
workspace_id: mapping.workspace_id.clone(),
workspace_name: mapping.workspace_name,
role,
};
workspaces_by_group
.entry(mapping.group_name)
.or_insert_with(Vec::new)
.push(workspace_info);
}
let mut result = Vec::new();
for group in groups {
let workspaces = workspaces_by_group
.get(&group.name)
.cloned()
.unwrap_or_default();
result.push(IGroupWithWorkspaces {
name: group.name,
summary: group.summary,
emails: group.emails,
instance_role: group.instance_role,
workspaces,
});
}
tx.commit().await?;
return Ok(Json(result));
}
async fn get_igroup(
Path(name): Path<String>,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
) -> JsonResult<IGroupWithWorkspaces> {
let group = sqlx::query_as!(
IGroup,
"SELECT name, summary, array_remove(array_agg(email_to_igroup.email), null) as emails, instance_role FROM email_to_igroup RIGHT JOIN instance_group ON instance_group.name = email_to_igroup.igroup WHERE name = $1 GROUP BY name, instance_role",
name
)
.fetch_optional(&db)
.await?;
let group = not_found_if_none(group, "IGroup", &name)?;
let workspace_mappings = sqlx::query!(
r#"
SELECT
ws.workspace_id,
w.name as workspace_name,
ws.auto_invite->'instance_groups_roles'->$1 as role
FROM workspace_settings ws
INNER JOIN workspace w ON w.id = ws.workspace_id AND w.deleted = false
WHERE ws.auto_invite->'instance_groups' ? $1
ORDER BY ws.workspace_id
"#,
&name
)
.fetch_all(&db)
.await?;
let workspaces: Vec<WorkspaceInfo> = workspace_mappings
.into_iter()
.map(|m| WorkspaceInfo {
workspace_id: m.workspace_id,
workspace_name: m.workspace_name,
role: m
.role
.and_then(|r| r.as_str().map(|s| s.to_string()))
.unwrap_or_else(|| "developer".to_string()),
})
.collect();
return Ok(Json(IGroupWithWorkspaces {
name: group.name,
summary: group.summary,
emails: group.emails,
instance_role: group.instance_role,
workspaces,
}));
}
async fn remove_user_igroup(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
Path(name): Path<String>,
Json(Email { email }): Json<Email>,
) -> Result<String> {
require_super_admin(&db, &authed).await?;
let mut tx = db.begin().await?;
// FOR UPDATE: the group row is the group-level mutex, taken before the workspace
// advisory locks (see reconcile_workspace_instance_groups).
let group_opt = sqlx::query_scalar!(
"SELECT name FROM instance_group WHERE name = $1 FOR UPDATE",
name,
)
.fetch_optional(&mut *tx)
.await?;
not_found_if_none(group_opt, "IGroup", &name)?;
// Before the membership delete's row lock.
#[cfg(feature = "private")]
let affected_workspaces =
lock_workspaces_referencing_instance_groups(std::slice::from_ref(&name), &mut tx).await?;
sqlx::query!(
"DELETE FROM email_to_igroup WHERE email = $1 AND igroup = $2",
email,
name,
)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
audit_log(
&mut *tx,
&authed,
"igroup.removeuser",
ActionKind::Update,
"global",
Some(&name.to_string()),
Some([("email", email.as_str())].into()),
)
.await?;
// Recompute instance-level role after group removal
let effective_role = compute_effective_instance_role(&email, &mut tx).await?;
apply_instance_role(&email, effective_role.as_deref(), &mut tx).await?;
// Re-derive workspace membership now that the base tables reflect the removal: drops the
// user where this group was their only access source, or re-roles them from the groups
// they still belong to.
#[cfg(feature = "private")]
{
use windmill_api_workspaces::workspaces_ee::reconcile_workspace_instance_groups;
reconcile_workspace_instance_groups(&affected_workspaces, &mut tx, &authed).await?;
}
tx.commit().await?;
Ok(format!("Removed {} from igroup {}", email, name))
}
async fn remove_user(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
Extension(user_db): Extension<UserDB>,
Path((w_id, name)): Path<(String, String)>,
Json(Username { username: user_username }): Json<Username>,
) -> Result<String> {
let mut tx = user_db.begin(&authed).await?;
if !authed.is_admin {
require_is_owner(&name, &authed.username, &authed.groups, &w_id, &db).await?;
}
not_found_if_none(get_group_opt(&mut tx, &w_id, &name).await?, "Group", &name)?;
if &name == "all" {
return Err(Error::BadRequest(format!("Cannot delete users from all")));
}
sqlx::query!(
"DELETE FROM usr_to_group WHERE usr = $1 AND group_ = $2 AND workspace_id = $3",
user_username,
name,
&w_id,
)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
audit_log(
&mut *tx,
&authed,
"group.removeuser",
ActionKind::Update,
&w_id,
Some(&name.to_string()),
Some([("user", user_username.as_str())].into()),
)
.await?;
log_group_permission_change(
&mut *tx,
&w_id,
&name,
&authed.username,
"remove_member",
Some(&user_username),
)
.await?;
tx.commit().await?;
handle_deployment_metadata(
&authed.email,
&authed.username,
&db,
&w_id,
windmill_git_sync::DeployedObject::Group { name: name.clone() },
Some(format!("Removed user from group '{}'", &name)),
true,
None,
)
.await?;
Ok(format!("Removed {} to group {}", user_username, name))
}
#[cfg(feature = "enterprise")]
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct ExportedIGroup {
name: String,
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
summary: Option<String>,
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
id: Option<String>,
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
scim_display_name: Option<String>,
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
external_id: Option<String>,
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
emails: Option<Vec<String>>,
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
instance_role: Option<String>,
}
#[cfg(feature = "enterprise")]
async fn export_igroups(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
) -> JsonResult<Vec<ExportedIGroup>> {
require_super_admin(&db, &authed).await?;
let mut tx = db.begin().await?;
let igroups = sqlx::query_as!(
ExportedIGroup,
"SELECT name, summary, array_remove(array_agg(email_to_igroup.email), null) as emails, id, scim_display_name, external_id, instance_role FROM email_to_igroup RIGHT JOIN instance_group ON instance_group.name = email_to_igroup.igroup GROUP BY name",
).fetch_all(&mut *tx).await?;
audit_log(
&mut *tx,
&authed,
"igroups.export",
ActionKind::Execute,
"global",
None,
None,
)
.await?;
tx.commit().await?;
Ok(Json(igroups))
}
#[cfg(not(feature = "enterprise"))]
async fn export_igroups() -> JsonResult<String> {
Err(Error::BadRequest(
"This feature is only available in the enterprise version".to_string(),
))
}
#[cfg(feature = "enterprise")]
async fn overwrite_igroups(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
Json(igroups): Json<Vec<ExportedIGroup>>,
) -> Result<String> {
require_super_admin(&db, &authed).await?;
let mut tx = db.begin().await?;
// The import replaces the whole group catalog, so the whole-table lock is its
// group-mutex phase, taken first like every path's group locks (see
// reconcile_workspace_instance_groups). Per-row FOR UPDATE would miss rows committed
// after the scan, which the unqualified deletes below would then lock after the
// workspace locks — the inverted order. EXCLUSIVE conflicts with the writes and the
// FOR UPDATE of every other mutation path while leaving plain reads unblocked.
sqlx::query("LOCK TABLE instance_group IN EXCLUSIVE MODE")
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
let imported_names: Vec<String> = igroups.iter().map(|g| g.name.clone()).collect();
// NULL-safe and correct for an empty import: `name <> ALL('{}')` is true for every row.
let previous_names: Vec<String> = sqlx::query_scalar!(
"SELECT name FROM instance_group WHERE name <> ALL($1)",
&imported_names
)
.fetch_all(&mut *tx)
.await?;
// Membership of retained groups is wiped and re-imported below, so workspaces referencing
// either side of the import may see their projection change. Captured and advisory-locked
// before the settings update strips the dropped groups from them.
#[cfg(feature = "private")]
let affected_workspaces = {
let mut all_names = previous_names.clone();
all_names.extend(imported_names.iter().cloned());
lock_workspaces_referencing_instance_groups(&all_names, &mut tx).await?
};
remove_instance_groups_from_workspace_settings(&previous_names, &mut tx).await?;
sqlx::query!("DELETE FROM email_to_igroup")
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
sqlx::query!("DELETE FROM instance_group")
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
for igroup in igroups.iter() {
let validated_role = validate_instance_role(&igroup.instance_role)?;
sqlx::query!(
"INSERT INTO instance_group (name, summary, id, scim_display_name, external_id, instance_role) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6)",
igroup.name,
igroup.summary,
igroup.id,
igroup.scim_display_name,
igroup.external_id,
validated_role,
)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
if let Some(emails) = &igroup.emails {
for email in emails.iter() {
// An export can carry a member the source instance stored before ingest
// validated member values; it is dropped rather than failing the import.
if !usr_accepts_email(&mut *tx, email).await? {
tracing::warn!(
"Skipping member '{}' of imported instance group '{}': not an email address",
email,
igroup.name
);
continue;
}
sqlx::query!(
"INSERT INTO email_to_igroup (email, igroup) VALUES ($1, $2)",
email,
igroup.name,
)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
}
}
}
// Propagate instance roles for all groups that have one
for igroup in igroups.iter() {
if igroup.instance_role.is_some() {
propagate_instance_group_roles(&igroup.name, &mut tx).await?;
}
}
// Demote orphaned users: those whose role was set by a group that no longer
// grants them any instance_role after the import
let orphaned_users = sqlx::query_scalar!(
"SELECT email FROM password
WHERE role_source = 'instance_group' AND (super_admin = true OR devops = true)
AND email NOT IN (
SELECT eig.email FROM email_to_igroup eig
JOIN instance_group ig ON ig.name = eig.igroup
WHERE ig.instance_role IS NOT NULL
)"
)
.fetch_all(&mut *tx)
.await?;
for email in &orphaned_users {
apply_instance_role(email, None, &mut tx).await?;
}
// Runs after the re-insert so the reconciler judges membership against the imported
// state: a member who moved from a dropped group to a retained one is re-roled in place
// instead of losing workspace access.
#[cfg(feature = "private")]
{
use windmill_api_workspaces::workspaces_ee::reconcile_workspace_instance_groups;
reconcile_workspace_instance_groups(&affected_workspaces, &mut tx, &authed).await?;
}
audit_log(
&mut *tx,
&authed,
"igroups.import",
ActionKind::Create,
"global",
None,
None,
)
.await?;
tx.commit().await?;
Ok("Imported igroups".to_string())
}
#[cfg(not(feature = "enterprise"))]
async fn overwrite_igroups() -> JsonResult<String> {
Err(Error::BadRequest(
"This feature is only available in the enterprise version".to_string(),
))
}
pub async fn log_group_permission_change<'c, E: sqlx::Executor<'c, Database = Postgres>>(
db: E,
workspace_id: &str,
group_name: &str,
changed_by: &str,
change_type: &str,
member_affected: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<()> {
sqlx::query!(
"INSERT INTO group_permission_history
(workspace_id, group_name, changed_by, change_type, member_affected)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5)",
workspace_id,
group_name,
changed_by,
change_type,
member_affected
)
.execute(db)
.await?;
Ok(())
}