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The `// sandbox` annotation (and global nsjail sandboxing) restricted Deno to `--allow-run=git,/usr/bin/chromium`. Both binaries can be coerced into spawning `/bin/sh`, escaping Deno's permission model: - git via hook configs, e.g. `git -c core.fsmonitor='/bin/sh -c <cmd>' status` - chromium via subprocess-launcher flags, e.g. `--renderer-cmd-prefix` / `--gpu-launcher`, pointed at a launcher the script writes into `./` Because the subprocess is spawned by git/chromium — not Deno — it is invisible to Deno's permission checks, giving any user with script-execution permission arbitrary OS command execution (root, in the default worker container). Critically, the Deno runtime is the ONE language never wrapped in nsjail (there is no run.deno.config.proto; every other language has one). So for deno the Deno permission model is the *entire* sandbox — there is no OS-level containment to fall back on, and handing it any subprocess-spawning binary is an unconditional escape regardless of the nsjail setting. Fix: emit no `--allow-run` in the restricted path, denying all subprocess execution. The advisory's alternative (inject `-c core.fsmonitor=false ...`) doesn't apply — the user controls the git/chromium argv, so any injected hardening is overridden. Admins who accept the risk (e.g. puppeteer) can still re-add specific binaries via `DENO_FLAGS`. Verified with both PoCs on a running worker: git and chromium invocations now return `Requires run access to "<bin>"`; the sandbox escapes are closed. Fixes WIN-2151 Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Windmill Worker
The worker. Used to process and execute flows & jobs.
This crate exposes both a library as well as a binary target.