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* fix(backend): authorize single-job read endpoints by job/flow visibility Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(jobs): share read links + cached access checks for run visibility - Cache the job read-access RLS probe (size-bounded LRU keyed by the caller's authz-relevant identity + job id; no TTL since job-side inputs are immutable). - Inherit visibility along the full parent_job chain so any flow you can see lets you read its (deeply nested) steps. - Share read links: GET /jobs/job_view_token/{id} mints a stateless HMAC(workspace_key, job_id) token (only if the caller can read the job); the token grants an authenticated member read of that job and its flow subtree via a ?view_token query param or X-View-Token header. Run page gains a Share button and honors a ?view_token link. - Denied-but-existing reads now return 403 with guidance to request a share link (vs 404 for non-existent), and the run page renders that case with instructions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(jobs): address PR review — scope-tag check on mint, constant-time view-token verify - P1 (Codex): get_job_view_token now enforces the caller's if_jobs:filter_tags scope before minting, so a tag-scoped token can't mint a transferable link for a job outside its tags. Adds a scoped-token regression test (allowed + denied). - Constant-time view-token verification (HmacSha256::verify_slice) instead of comparing hex strings (Claude/Pi nit). - get_completed_job_result: an authed reader passing an invalid suspended-secret triple now falls through to the normal visibility gate instead of erroring out (Claude nit); unauthenticated callers still rejected. - Length-prefix the read-access cache key fields so no input values can collide. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(api): add job_view_token to openapi spec; use generated client in run page Addresses Codex review nit: the new GET /jobs/job_view_token/{id} endpoint was missing from openapi.yaml (the source the frontend client is generated from). Adds the path + operationId getJobViewToken, and switches the run page's Share button from a raw fetch to JobService.getJobViewToken. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(frontend): carry view_token on share-link downloads Addresses Codex review: download actions bypass the request interceptor that adds X-View-Token (downloadViaClient uses raw fetch; cookie-mode downloads use plain hrefs), so a share-link viewer got 403 downloading logs/results/args. Append the view_token query param to the job download paths (result/logs/args/flow-all-logs) via a new appendViewToken() helper, covering both client-fetch and href modes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(jobs): enforce tag scope in require_job_read_access (view-token use side) Addresses Codex P1: the view_token use-side bypassed if_jobs:filter_tags on handlers that don't tag-filter their data query (result_by_id, get_flow_job_debug_info, get_otel_traces) — a tag-scoped token could use someone else's valid share token to read out-of-scope job data. Move the tag-scope check into require_job_read_access (runs before any created_by/view_token/RLS grant), so it applies uniformly to every gated handler; removes the now-redundant explicit check in get_job_view_token. Adds a use-side regression test (scoped token + valid out-of-scope view_token denied on otel/result_by_id; in-scope still allowed). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(frontend): include workspace in share read link Addresses Codex P1: the copied share URL omitted the workspace. The token is signed with the run's workspace key and the logged layout only switches $workspaceStore when the URL carries workspace=, so a recipient whose persisted active workspace differs would open the link against the wrong workspace and the token would fail validation. Pin workspace= alongside view_token in the link. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(jobs): authorize get_result_maybe get_started branch for queued jobs Addresses Codex P1: get_completed_job_result_maybe only gated when a completed row existed; with ?get_started=true a non-reader reached the fallback branch and got started:true for a running private job. Now fetches created_by and authorizes (created_by/view_token/RLS, or anonymous for unauth) before disclosing running-state; a non-existent job still returns started:false (leaks nothing). Adds a regression test with a queued (no completed row) private job. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
591 lines
20 KiB
Rust
591 lines
20 KiB
Rust
/*
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* Author: Ruben Fiszel
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* Copyright: Windmill Labs, Inc 2022
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* This file and its contents are licensed under the AGPLv3 License.
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* Please see the included NOTICE for copyright information and
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* LICENSE-AGPL for a copy of the license.
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*/
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use crate::db::{Authable, UserDB};
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use crate::error::{self, Error};
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use crate::scripts::ScriptHash;
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use crate::utils::WarnAfterExt;
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use crate::worker::Connection;
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use crate::{worker::WORKER_GROUP, BASE_URL, DB};
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use chrono::{SecondsFormat, Utc};
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use magic_crypt::{MagicCrypt256, MagicCryptError, MagicCryptTrait};
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use quick_cache::sync::Cache;
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use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
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lazy_static::lazy_static! {
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pub static ref SECRET_SALT: Option<String> = std::env::var("SECRET_SALT").ok();
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static ref RESERVED_WM_VAR_NAME: regex::Regex = regex::Regex::new(r"^WM_[A-Z_]+$").unwrap();
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}
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#[derive(Serialize, Clone)]
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pub struct ContextualVariable {
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pub name: String,
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pub value: String,
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pub description: String,
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pub is_custom: bool,
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}
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#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, sqlx::FromRow, Clone)]
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pub struct ListableVariable {
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pub workspace_id: String,
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pub path: String,
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pub value: Option<String>,
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pub is_secret: bool,
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pub description: String,
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pub extra_perms: serde_json::Value,
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pub account: Option<i32>,
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pub is_oauth: Option<bool>,
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pub is_expired: Option<bool>,
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pub is_refreshed: Option<bool>,
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pub refresh_error: Option<String>,
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pub is_linked: Option<bool>,
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pub expires_at: Option<chrono::DateTime<Utc>>,
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#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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pub labels: Option<Vec<String>>,
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#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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pub ws_specific: Option<bool>,
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#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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pub edited_at: Option<chrono::DateTime<Utc>>,
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#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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pub edited_by: Option<String>,
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}
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#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, sqlx::FromRow)]
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pub struct ExportableListableVariable {
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pub workspace_id: String,
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pub path: String,
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pub value: Option<String>,
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pub is_secret: bool,
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pub description: String,
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pub extra_perms: serde_json::Value,
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#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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pub account: Option<i32>,
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#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "is_none_or_false")]
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pub is_oauth: Option<bool>,
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#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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pub expires_at: Option<chrono::DateTime<Utc>>,
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#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
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pub labels: Option<Vec<String>>,
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}
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fn is_none_or_false(b: &Option<bool>) -> bool {
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b.is_none() || !b.unwrap()
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}
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#[derive(Deserialize)]
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pub struct CreateVariable {
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pub path: String,
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pub value: String,
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pub is_secret: bool,
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pub description: String,
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pub account: Option<i32>,
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pub is_oauth: Option<bool>,
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pub expires_at: Option<chrono::DateTime<Utc>>,
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#[serde(default)]
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pub labels: Option<Vec<String>>,
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#[serde(default)]
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pub ws_specific: Option<bool>,
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}
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pub async fn build_crypt(db: &DB, w_id: &str) -> crate::error::Result<MagicCrypt256> {
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// Check cache first (300-second staleness)
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let cached_key_o = WORKSPACE_CRYPT_CACHE.get(w_id).and_then(|(ts, key)| {
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if ts > chrono::Utc::now().timestamp() - 300 {
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Some(key)
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} else {
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None
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}
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});
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let crypt = if let Some(cached_key) = cached_key_o {
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cached_key
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} else {
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let key = get_workspace_key(w_id, db).await?;
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tracing::info!(
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"crypt for workspace {} with key {}*** expired, refetching",
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w_id,
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&key[..key.len().min(8)]
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);
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let crypt_key = if let Some(ref salt) = SECRET_SALT.as_ref() {
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format!("{}{}", key, salt)
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} else {
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key
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};
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let ncrypt = magic_crypt::new_magic_crypt!(crypt_key, 256);
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WORKSPACE_CRYPT_CACHE.insert(
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w_id.to_string(),
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(chrono::Utc::now().timestamp(), ncrypt.clone()),
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);
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ncrypt
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};
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Ok(crypt)
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}
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pub async fn build_crypt_with_key_suffix(
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db: &DB,
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w_id: &str,
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key_suffix: &str,
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) -> crate::error::Result<MagicCrypt256> {
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let key = get_workspace_key(w_id, db).await?;
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let crypt_key = if let Some(ref salt) = SECRET_SALT.as_ref() {
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format!("{}{}{}", key, salt, key_suffix)
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} else {
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format!("{}{}", key, key_suffix)
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};
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Ok(magic_crypt::new_magic_crypt!(crypt_key, 256))
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}
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pub async fn get_workspace_key(w_id: &str, db: &DB) -> crate::error::Result<String> {
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let key = sqlx::query_scalar!(
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"SELECT key FROM workspace_key WHERE workspace_id = $1 AND kind = 'cloud'",
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w_id
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)
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.fetch_one(db)
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.warn_after_seconds(5)
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.await
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.map_err(|e| crate::Error::internal_err(format!("fetching workspace key: {e:#}")))?;
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Ok(key)
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}
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/// Generate a stateless approval token from workspace key + job_id.
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/// This token grants access to view approval info and attempt to resume,
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/// but cannot be reversed to obtain the HMAC resume secret.
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pub async fn generate_approval_token(
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w_id: &str,
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job_id: uuid::Uuid,
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db: &DB,
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) -> crate::error::Result<String> {
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use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
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use sha2::Sha256;
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let key = get_workspace_key(w_id, db).await?;
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let mut mac = Hmac::<Sha256>::new_from_slice(key.as_bytes())
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.map_err(|e| crate::Error::internal_err(format!("HMAC key error: {e}")))?;
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mac.update(job_id.as_bytes());
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mac.update(b"approval_token");
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Ok(hex::encode(mac.finalize().into_bytes()))
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}
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/// Stateless read-share signature for a job: `HMAC(workspace_key, job_id || "view_token")`.
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/// Mirrors [`generate_approval_token`] but in a distinct domain so an approval token can
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/// never be used as a view token (or vice-versa). Used to build a "share read link" that
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/// grants an authenticated workspace member read access to a job (and its flow subtree)
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/// they otherwise lack ACL on. No expiry/revocation (stateless), like the approval token.
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pub async fn generate_view_token(
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w_id: &str,
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job_id: uuid::Uuid,
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db: &DB,
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) -> crate::error::Result<String> {
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use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
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use sha2::Sha256;
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let key = get_workspace_key(w_id, db).await?;
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let mut mac = Hmac::<Sha256>::new_from_slice(key.as_bytes())
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.map_err(|e| crate::Error::internal_err(format!("HMAC key error: {e}")))?;
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mac.update(job_id.as_bytes());
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mac.update(b"view_token");
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Ok(hex::encode(mac.finalize().into_bytes()))
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}
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pub async fn get_secret_value_as_admin(
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db: &DB,
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w_id: &str,
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path: &str,
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) -> crate::error::Result<String> {
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let variable_o = sqlx::query!(
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"SELECT value, is_secret, path from variable WHERE variable.path = $1 AND variable.workspace_id = $2", path, w_id
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)
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.fetch_optional(db)
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.await?;
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let variable = if let Some(variable) = variable_o {
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variable
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} else {
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return Err(crate::Error::NotFound(format!(
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"variable {} not found in workspace {}",
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path, w_id
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)));
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};
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let r = if variable.is_secret {
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let value = variable.value;
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if !value.is_empty() {
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let mc = build_crypt(db, w_id).await?;
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decrypt(&mc, value).map_err(|e| {
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crate::error::Error::internal_err(format!(
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"Error decrypting variable {}: {}",
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variable.path, e
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))
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})?
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} else {
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"".to_string()
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}
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} else {
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variable.value
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};
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Ok(r)
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}
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pub fn encrypt(mc: &MagicCrypt256, value: &str) -> String {
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mc.encrypt_str_to_base64(value)
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}
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pub fn decrypt(mc: &MagicCrypt256, value: String) -> error::Result<String> {
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mc.decrypt_base64_to_string(value).map_err(|e| match e {
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MagicCryptError::DecryptError(_) => error::Error::internal_err(
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"Could not decrypt value. The value may have been encrypted with a different key."
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.to_string(),
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),
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_ => error::Error::internal_err(e.to_string()),
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})
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}
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pub const WM_SCHEDULED_FOR: &str = "WM_SCHEDULED_FOR";
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lazy_static::lazy_static! {
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pub static ref CUSTOM_ENVS_CACHE: Cache<String, (i64, Vec<(String, String)>)> = Cache::new(100);
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pub static ref WORKSPACE_CRYPT_CACHE: Cache<String, (i64, MagicCrypt256)> = Cache::new(1000);
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}
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pub async fn get_reserved_variables(
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conn: &Connection,
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w_id: &str,
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token: &str,
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email: &str,
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username: &str,
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job_id: &str,
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permissioned_as: &str,
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path: Option<String>,
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flow_id: Option<String>,
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flow_path: Option<String>,
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schedule_path: Option<String>,
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step_id: Option<String>,
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flow_innermost_root_job: Option<String>,
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root_job_id: Option<String>,
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scheduled_for: Option<chrono::DateTime<Utc>>,
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runnable_id: Option<ScriptHash>,
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end_user_email: Option<String>,
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tested_runnable: Option<String>,
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) -> Vec<ContextualVariable> {
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let state_path = {
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let trigger = if schedule_path.is_some() {
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username.to_string()
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} else {
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"user".to_string()
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};
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if let Some(flow_path) = flow_path.clone() {
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format!(
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"{flow_path}/{}_{trigger}",
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step_id.clone().unwrap_or_else(|| "nostep".to_string())
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)
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} else if let Some(script_path) = path.clone() {
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let script_path = if script_path.ends_with("/") {
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format!("{script_path}state")
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} else {
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script_path
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};
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format!("{script_path}/{trigger}")
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} else {
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format!("u/{username}/tmp_state")
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}
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};
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let custom_envs = get_cached_workspace_envs(conn, w_id).await;
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let joined_schedule_path = schedule_path
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.clone()
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.unwrap_or("manual".to_string())
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.split("/")
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.collect::<Vec<&str>>()
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.join("_");
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let ts = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp_millis();
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let object_path = if let Some(flow_path) = flow_path.clone() {
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let flow_path = flow_path.split("/").collect::<Vec<&str>>().join("_");
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let step_id = step_id.clone().unwrap_or("".to_string());
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format!("{flow_path}/{joined_schedule_path}/{step_id}/{ts}_{job_id}")
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} else {
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let joined_script_path = path
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.clone()
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.unwrap_or("".to_string())
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.split("/")
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.collect::<Vec<&str>>()
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.join("_");
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format!("{joined_script_path}/{joined_schedule_path}/{ts}_{job_id}")
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};
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vec![
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ContextualVariable {
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name: "WM_WORKSPACE".to_string(),
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value: w_id.to_string(),
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description: "Workspace id of the current script".to_string(),
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is_custom: false,
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},
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ContextualVariable {
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name: "WM_TOKEN".to_string(),
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value: token.to_string(),
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description: "Token ephemeral to the current script with equal permission to the \
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permission of the run (Usable as a bearer token)"
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.to_string(),
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is_custom: false,
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},
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ContextualVariable {
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name: "WM_EMAIL".to_string(),
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value: email.to_string(),
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description: "Email of the user that executed the current script".to_string(),
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is_custom: false,
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},
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ContextualVariable {
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name: "WM_USERNAME".to_string(),
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value: username.to_string(),
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description: "Username of the user that executed the current script".to_string(),
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is_custom: false,
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},
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ContextualVariable {
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name: "WM_BASE_URL".to_string(),
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value: (**BASE_URL.load()).clone(),
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description: "base url of this instance".to_string(),
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is_custom: false,
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},
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ContextualVariable {
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name: "WM_JOB_ID".to_string(),
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value: job_id.to_string(),
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description: "Job id of the current script".to_string(),
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is_custom: false,
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},
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ContextualVariable {
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name: WM_SCHEDULED_FOR.to_string(),
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value: scheduled_for
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.map(|ts| ts.to_rfc3339_opts(SecondsFormat::Secs, true))
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.unwrap_or_else(|| "".to_string()),
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description: "date-time in UTC (e.g: 2014-11-28T12:45:59.324310806Z) of when the job was scheduled".to_string(),
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is_custom: false,
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},
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ContextualVariable {
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name: "WM_JOB_PATH".to_string(),
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value: path.unwrap_or_else(|| "".to_string()),
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description: "Path of the script or flow being run if any".to_string(),
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is_custom: false,
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},
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ContextualVariable {
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name: "WM_FLOW_JOB_ID".to_string(),
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value: flow_id.unwrap_or_else(|| "".to_string()),
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description: "Job id of the encapsulating flow if the job is a flow step".to_string(),
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is_custom: false,
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},
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ContextualVariable {
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name: "WM_ROOT_FLOW_JOB_ID".to_string(),
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value: flow_innermost_root_job.unwrap_or_else(|| "".to_string()),
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description: "Job id of the innermost root flow if the job is a flow step".to_string(),
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is_custom: false,
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},
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ContextualVariable {
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name: "WM_ROOT_JOB_ID".to_string(),
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value: root_job_id.unwrap_or_else(|| "".to_string()),
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description: "Job id of the root job".to_string(),
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is_custom: false,
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},
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ContextualVariable {
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name: "WM_FLOW_PATH".to_string(),
|
|
value: flow_path.unwrap_or_else(|| "".to_string()),
|
|
description: "Path of the encapsulating flow if the job is a flow step".to_string(),
|
|
is_custom: false,
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
ContextualVariable {
|
|
name: "WM_SCHEDULE_PATH".to_string(),
|
|
value: schedule_path.unwrap_or_else(|| "".to_string()),
|
|
description: "Path of the schedule if the job of the step or encapsulating step has \
|
|
been triggered by a schedule"
|
|
.to_string(),
|
|
is_custom: false,
|
|
},
|
|
ContextualVariable {
|
|
name: "WM_PERMISSIONED_AS".to_string(),
|
|
value: permissioned_as.to_string(),
|
|
description: "Fully Qualified (u/g) owner name of executor of the job".to_string(),
|
|
is_custom: false,
|
|
},
|
|
ContextualVariable {
|
|
name: "WM_STATE_PATH".to_string(),
|
|
value: state_path.clone(),
|
|
description: "State resource path unique to a script and its trigger".to_string(),
|
|
is_custom: false,
|
|
},
|
|
ContextualVariable {
|
|
name: "WM_FLOW_STEP_ID".to_string(),
|
|
value: step_id.unwrap_or_else(|| "".to_string()),
|
|
description: "The node id in a flow (like 'a', 'b', or 'f')".to_string(),
|
|
is_custom: false,
|
|
},
|
|
ContextualVariable {
|
|
name: "WM_OBJECT_PATH".to_string(),
|
|
value: object_path,
|
|
description: "Script or flow step execution unique path, useful for storing results in an external service".to_string(),
|
|
is_custom: false,
|
|
},
|
|
ContextualVariable {
|
|
name: "WM_WORKER_GROUP".to_string(),
|
|
value: WORKER_GROUP.clone(),
|
|
description: "Name of the worker group the job is running on".to_string(),
|
|
is_custom: false,
|
|
},
|
|
ContextualVariable {
|
|
name: "WM_RUNNABLE_ID".to_string(),
|
|
value: runnable_id.map(|x| x.to_string()).unwrap_or_else(|| "".to_string()),
|
|
description: "Hash of the script. Useful as cache key for cache that should be runnable specific.".to_string(),
|
|
is_custom: false,
|
|
},
|
|
ContextualVariable {
|
|
name: "WM_END_USER_EMAIL".to_string(),
|
|
value: end_user_email.unwrap_or_else(|| "".to_string()),
|
|
description: "Email of the end user that executed the current script. Only available when triggered from an app.".to_string(),
|
|
is_custom: false,
|
|
},
|
|
ContextualVariable {
|
|
name: "WM_TESTED_RUNNABLE".to_string(),
|
|
value: tested_runnable.unwrap_or_else(|| "".to_string()),
|
|
description: "Qualified path ({kind}/{path}) of the runnable that triggered this CI test. Empty string unless the job was triggered by a CI test annotation.".to_string(),
|
|
is_custom: false,
|
|
},
|
|
].into_iter().chain(custom_envs.into_iter().map(|(name, value)| ContextualVariable {
|
|
name,
|
|
value,
|
|
description: "Custom workspace environment variable".to_string(),
|
|
is_custom: true,
|
|
})).collect()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async fn get_cached_workspace_envs(conn: &Connection, w_id: &str) -> Vec<(String, String)> {
|
|
let cached_envs_o = CUSTOM_ENVS_CACHE.get(w_id).and_then(|(ts, envs)| {
|
|
if ts > chrono::Utc::now().timestamp() - (60 * 15) {
|
|
Some(envs)
|
|
} else {
|
|
None
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
let custom_envs = if let Some(cached_envs) = cached_envs_o {
|
|
cached_envs
|
|
} else {
|
|
let raw_envs = match conn {
|
|
Connection::Sql(db) => sqlx::query_as::<_, (String, String)>(
|
|
"SELECT name, value FROM workspace_env WHERE workspace_id = $1",
|
|
)
|
|
.bind(w_id)
|
|
.fetch_all(db)
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap_or_default(),
|
|
Connection::Http(client) => client
|
|
.get(&format!("/api/w/{w_id}/agent_workers/custom_envs"))
|
|
.await
|
|
.unwrap_or_default(),
|
|
};
|
|
// Applied here (not in the SQL branch alone) so agent workers going
|
|
// through `Connection::Http` are covered too — drop any name that
|
|
// would shadow a built-in `%%WM_*%%` contextual var.
|
|
let custom_envs: Vec<(String, String)> = raw_envs
|
|
.into_iter()
|
|
.filter(|(name, _)| !RESERVED_WM_VAR_NAME.is_match(name))
|
|
.collect();
|
|
CUSTOM_ENVS_CACHE.insert(
|
|
w_id.to_string(),
|
|
(chrono::Utc::now().timestamp(), custom_envs.clone()),
|
|
);
|
|
custom_envs
|
|
};
|
|
custom_envs
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pub async fn get_variable_or_self(
|
|
path: String,
|
|
db: &DB,
|
|
w_id: &str,
|
|
) -> crate::error::Result<String> {
|
|
if !path.starts_with("$var:") {
|
|
return Ok(path);
|
|
}
|
|
let path = path.strip_prefix("$var:").unwrap().to_string();
|
|
|
|
let record = sqlx::query!(
|
|
"SELECT value, is_secret
|
|
FROM variable
|
|
WHERE path = $1 AND workspace_id = $2",
|
|
&path,
|
|
&w_id
|
|
)
|
|
.fetch_optional(db)
|
|
.await?;
|
|
|
|
if let Some(record) = record {
|
|
let mut value = record.value;
|
|
if record.is_secret {
|
|
let mc = build_crypt(db, w_id).await?;
|
|
value = decrypt(&mc, value).map_err(|e| {
|
|
Error::internal_err(format!("Error decrypting variable {}: {}", path, e))
|
|
})?;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Ok(value)
|
|
} else {
|
|
Err(Error::NotFound(format!(
|
|
"Variable not found when resolving `$var:{}`",
|
|
path
|
|
)))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Like `get_variable_or_self`, but uses an RLS-scoped connection to enforce
|
|
/// that the caller has read access to the referenced variable.
|
|
pub async fn get_variable_or_self_as<T: Authable + Sync>(
|
|
path: String,
|
|
db: &DB,
|
|
user_db: &UserDB,
|
|
authed: &T,
|
|
w_id: &str,
|
|
) -> crate::error::Result<String> {
|
|
if !path.starts_with("$var:") {
|
|
return Ok(path);
|
|
}
|
|
let var_path = path.strip_prefix("$var:").unwrap().to_string();
|
|
|
|
// Use an RLS-scoped transaction so the query respects row-level security
|
|
let mut tx = user_db.clone().begin(authed).await?;
|
|
let record = sqlx::query!(
|
|
"SELECT value, is_secret
|
|
FROM variable
|
|
WHERE path = $1 AND workspace_id = $2",
|
|
&var_path,
|
|
&w_id
|
|
)
|
|
.fetch_optional(&mut *tx)
|
|
.await?;
|
|
tx.commit().await?;
|
|
|
|
if let Some(record) = record {
|
|
let mut value = record.value;
|
|
if record.is_secret {
|
|
let mc = build_crypt(db, w_id).await?;
|
|
value = decrypt(&mc, value).map_err(|e| {
|
|
Error::internal_err(format!("Error decrypting variable {}: {}", var_path, e))
|
|
})?;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Ok(value)
|
|
} else {
|
|
Err(Error::NotFound(format!(
|
|
"Variable not found when resolving `$var:{}`",
|
|
var_path
|
|
)))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|