* fix(ai): enforce RLS and scope check on user-supplied X-Resource-Path
The AI proxy handler accepts an X-Resource-Path header to override the
configured workspace AI provider. When supplied, the handler loaded the
resource value from the resource table using the root DB pool with no
resources:read scope check, so any authenticated workspace user could
point X-Resource-Path at a restricted AI resource (e.g. one in a folder
they cannot read) and the proxy would use that resource's provider
credentials for the outbound AI request.
For user-supplied resource paths, now require resources:read:{path}
scope and fetch the resource through user_db.begin(&authed) so RLS
enforces the same folder/group boundary as the resource API. The RLS-
scoped $var: resolution stays in place as defense in depth. The
admin-configured workspace/instance ai_config path is unchanged.
Fixes WIN-1971
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(ai): regression test for X-Resource-Path RLS enforcement
Cover all four cases:
- non-admin pointing X-Resource-Path at a restricted resource is rejected
- non-admin pointing it at a resource they own still works
- admin can point it at any resource
- workspace-configured proxy flow (no X-Resource-Path) is unchanged
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ruben Fiszel
0692b97c8a