Files
windmill/backend/windmill-api-configs/src/lib.rs
T
c2deea13b7 fix(security): a WM_TOKEN job token can never be a global superadmin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr) (#10124)
* fix(security): a WM_TOKEN job token can never be a global superadmin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr)

Privilege escalation: an app/flow/schedule/trigger execution policy's `on_behalf_of`
(which a `wm_deployers` member can set) could point at a superadmin email. The
resulting job `WM_TOKEN` then passed the email-based superadmin checks, granting
instance superadmin. `forbid_superadmin_job_token` only guarded ~15 of ~75 routes.

Fix at the token layer: a WM_TOKEN must never satisfy a superadmin gate,
regardless of whose email it runs as (sentinel OR a real superadmin).

- `ApiAuthed` gains a `job_id` field, stamped once in `AuthCache::get_opt_job_authed`
  from the resolved token's job_id (correct even on cache hits).
- `require_super_admin(db, email)` -> `require_super_admin(db, &ApiAuthed)`, rejects
  `authed.job_id.is_some()`. `require_super_admin_email` kept for the few internal
  callers without an ApiAuthed.
- `is_super_admin_authed(db, &ApiAuthed)` for the boolean `is_super_admin_email`
  authorization branches on request handlers (workspace deletion, fork drops,
  dev-workspace attach/archive, object-storage SSRF exemption, custom dbname, EE GHES
  + connected repositories, ...). Migrate ~75 sites (OSS + EE).
- CUSTOM_INSTANCE_DB reads the *authenticated* job_id, not the caller-supplied
  `?job_id` query param. Worker-tag check takes a precomputed job-aware `is_super_admin`
  on the request path.

Execution-time on-behalf checks (scheduled/flow worker-tag, Cloud enqueue quota,
is_devops_email) are hardened in a follow-up — see
docs/followup-onbehalf-execution-privilege-hardening.md.

Regression tests: a superadmin-email WM_TOKEN is rejected on `require_super_admin`
routes, on `DELETE /workspaces/delete/{w}` (403, workspace preserved), and on the
CUSTOM_INSTANCE_DB lookup with no `?job_id` (401); real superadmin tokens still succeed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: cap devops role at workspace admin and reject reserved on_behalf_of identities

Extends the job-token cap with three pieces:

- `require_devops_role` takes `&ApiAuthed` and rejects job tokens.
  `is_devops_email` is true for superadmin emails, so every worker-management,
  instance-config and service-log route was reachable by the same superadmin
  `WM_TOKEN` that `require_super_admin` already rejects.
- A `job_id` claim that does not parse as a uuid rejects the token rather than
  resolving to `None`, which would clear the job provenance and uncap it. Applies
  to the internal JWT and the external `jwt_ext_` path.
- Defense in depth at store time: `validate_on_behalf_of` refuses the reserved
  internal sentinels as an `on_behalf_of` on apps/flows/scripts/schedules/triggers,
  and app execution refuses a policy carrying one — covering already-persisted and
  forked-app rows that predate the cap. Deploying on behalf of a real user,
  including a real superadmin, stays allowed; the cap handles that at execution.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(mcp): preserve job-token provenance when minting the proxy JWT

The MCP endpoint-tool proxy re-mints a JWT from the caller's ApiAuthed to
forward the proxied request, but passed job_id: None. A job's WM_TOKEN is
capped at workspace admin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr); dropping the job_id here
re-minted an uncapped token that satisfies require_super_admin /
require_devops_role on the proxied route (e.g. listWorkers exposing worker
IPs, job/workspace IDs, and sensitive tags).

Carry api_authed.job_id into create_jwt_token. Adds an in-module regression
that decodes the forwarded JWT and asserts the job_id is preserved for a job
caller and absent for a non-job caller.

Reported by Codex CI review (P1) on #10124.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: cap the admin-or-devops gate at workspace admin for job tokens

require_admin_or_devops (the EE critical-alerts endpoints) grants when the
caller is a workspace admin OR an instance devops. is_devops_email is true
for superadmins, so a WM_TOKEN running on-behalf of a superadmin who is not a
member of the target workspace could clear the devops branch and read/ack that
workspace's critical alerts (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr). This gate takes a bare
email, not an ApiAuthed, so the token-layer cap could not see it.

Thread the caller's job-token provenance and reject the devops branch for job
tokens, matching require_devops_role. The workspace-admin branch stays allowed
— that is the cap ceiling. Adds an enterprise-gated regression proving the
bypass is closed and a real superadmin token still clears the gate.

Found while auditing the PR for bare-email gates the choke-point cap misses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: cap instance-global is_admin gates at workspace admin for job tokens

Three instance-global routes gate on the caller's own `is_admin` claim, which
`ApiAuthed.is_admin` carries into a WM_TOKEN (it is a workspace-admin claim,
true for superadmins too). A job token is capped at workspace admin
(GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr), so its is_admin claim must not authorize instance
actions on a route with no workspace binding:

- `unarchive_workspace` — unarchive an arbitrary workspace by id
- `prune_concurrency_group` — delete a global concurrency group
- `list_worker_groups` — return unobfuscated `env_vars_static` (may hold secrets)

Add job-token-aware `is_instance_admin` / `require_instance_admin` helpers (the
same shape as `require_super_admin` / `require_devops_role`) and use them at
these three sites. Workspace-scoped `require_admin(authed.is_admin, ...)` gates
are intentionally left unchanged — a workspace-admin job token is within the
cap there. Regression added covering all three; verified it lets a WM_TOKEN
unarchive/leak without the fix and is blocked with it.

Reported by Codex CI review (P1) on #10124.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(mcp): drop orphaned path_field_renames from EndpointTool test helper

The merge with main adopted main's mcp path-substitution refactor (#10162),
which removed the `path_field_renames` field from `EndpointTool` and its
consumer (`substitute_path_params` no longer takes per-field path renames).
main's `runner.rs` `ep` test helper still constructed the struct with
`path_field_renames: None`, so the workspace test build (cargo test --all,
which compiles windmill-mcp's own #[cfg(test)] module under the `server`
feature) failed with E0560. A plain `cargo check` does not compile that test
module, so it only surfaced in CI's cargo_test.

Remove the orphaned field to match the struct.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: describe the sentinel-rejection policy the forged-identity test asserts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: complete ApiAuthed initializers in feature-gated tests after merge

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: stop job tokens minting credentials that shed their provenance

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: cap the MCP OAuth approval mint at the same elevated-job-token gate

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: cap the self-service password reset at the elevated-job-token gate

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: cap app embed/SDK mints and scope widening at the elevated-job-token gate

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep job tokens from destroying the account they run on behalf of

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: deny job tokens a foreign-workspace admin claim and workspace ejection

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: keep the follow-up inventory in the PR instead of the repo

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: make the session workspace status gate job-token aware

session_workspace_status derived its superadmin branch from a bare email
check, so a job token carrying a superadmin identity resolved the existence
of workspaces it has no relationship with rather than seeing them as
deleted. Switch to is_super_admin_authed, matching every other instance
gate reached from a request ApiAuthed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* revert: leave the global concurrency-group listing on the plain admin gate

The listing exposes concurrency keys across workspaces, which is metadata
rather than a capability, and it 401s rather than degrading. Keep the guard
on the prune route next to it, which is the destructive one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep the instance-admin gate on the global concurrency listing

The listing spans every workspace's concurrency keys, and the gate rejects
only job tokens: the !is_admin branch is the pre-existing check, so
workspaced tokens and interactive admins are unaffected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to d30af67d38954f9012f7bad08da23e347344b4c6

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #664 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 7870573dbc3360f99bada143f094c67dce0d9e9c

New ee-repo-ref: d30af67d38954f9012f7bad08da23e347344b4c6

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: hugocasa <hugo@casademont.ch>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-19 22:33:46 +02:00

417 lines
13 KiB
Rust

/*
* Author: Ruben Fiszel
* Copyright: Windmill Labs, Inc 2022
* This file and its contents are licensed under the AGPLv3 License.
* Please see the included NOTICE for copyright information and
* LICENSE-AGPL for a copy of the license.
*/
use axum::{
extract::{Extension, Path, Query},
routing::{get, post},
Json, Router,
};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use sqlx::FromRow;
use windmill_audit::audit_oss::audit_log;
use windmill_audit::ActionKind;
use windmill_common::{
error::{self},
utils::Pagination,
worker::MIN_PERIODIC_SCRIPT_INTERVAL_SECONDS,
DB,
};
use windmill_api_auth::{is_instance_admin, require_devops_role, ApiAuthed};
pub fn global_service() -> Router {
Router::new()
.route("/list_worker_groups", get(list_worker_groups))
.route("/update/{name}", post(update_config).delete(delete_config))
.route("/get/{name}", get(get_config))
.route("/list", get(list_configs))
.route(
"/list_autoscaling_events/{worker_group}",
get(list_autoscaling_events),
)
.route(
"/native_kubernetes_autoscaling_healthcheck",
get(native_kubernetes_autoscaling_healthcheck),
)
.route(
"/list_available_python_versions",
get(list_available_python_versions),
)
.route(
"/list_all_workspace_dependencies",
get(list_all_workspace_dependencies),
)
.route(
"/list_all_dedicated_with_deps",
get(list_all_dedicated_with_deps),
)
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, FromRow)]
struct Config {
name: Option<String>,
config: serde_json::Value,
}
async fn list_worker_groups(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
) -> error::JsonResult<Vec<Config>> {
let mut configs_raw =
sqlx::query_as!(Config, "SELECT name, config FROM config WHERE name LIKE 'worker__%'")
.fetch_all(&db)
.await?;
// Remove the 'worker__' prefix from all config names
for config in configs_raw.iter_mut() {
if let Some(name) = &config.name {
if name.starts_with("worker__") {
config.name = Some(name.strip_prefix("worker__").unwrap().to_string());
}
}
}
// Worker-group configs are instance-global and expose env_vars_static (may hold
// secrets); a job token (capped at workspace admin) gets the obfuscated view even
// when its identity is a superadmin. See is_instance_admin (GHSA-hfh4-cx4h-3fcr).
let configs = if !is_instance_admin(&authed) {
let mut obfuscated_configs: Vec<Config> = vec![];
for config in configs_raw {
let config_value_opt = config.config.as_object().map(|obj| obj.to_owned());
if let Some(mut config_value) = config_value_opt {
if let Some(env_var_map) = config_value
.get("env_vars_static")
.map(|obj| obj.as_object())
.flatten()
{
let mut new_env_var_map: serde_json::Map<String, serde_json::Value> =
serde_json::Map::new();
for (key, value) in env_var_map {
new_env_var_map.insert(
key.to_owned(),
// we know the value is a string here, so we to_string() it and take -2 to remove the quotes
serde_json::json!("*".repeat(value.to_string().len() - 2)),
);
}
config_value.insert(
"env_vars_static".to_string(),
serde_json::Value::Object(new_env_var_map),
);
}
obfuscated_configs.push(Config {
name: config.name,
config: serde_json::Value::Object(config_value),
})
}
}
obfuscated_configs
} else {
configs_raw
};
Ok(Json(configs))
}
async fn get_config(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Path(name): Path<String>,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
) -> error::JsonResult<Option<serde_json::Value>> {
require_devops_role(&db, &authed).await?;
let config = sqlx::query_as!(Config, "SELECT name, config FROM config WHERE name = $1", name)
.fetch_optional(&db)
.await?
.map(|c| c.config);
Ok(Json(config))
}
async fn update_config(
Path(name): Path<String>,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
authed: ApiAuthed,
Json(config): Json<serde_json::Value>,
) -> error::Result<String> {
require_devops_role(&db, &authed).await?;
#[cfg(not(feature = "enterprise"))]
let config = if name.starts_with("worker__") {
// In CE, only allow setting worker_tags, cache_clear, init_bash, and native_mode
serde_json::json!({
"worker_tags": config.get("worker_tags"),
"cache_clear": config.get("cache_clear"),
"init_bash": config.get("init_bash"),
"native_mode": config.get("native_mode")
})
} else {
config
};
if name.starts_with("worker__") {
let periodic_script_bash = config
.get("periodic_script_bash")
.filter(|v| !v.is_null())
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.filter(|s| !s.is_empty());
let periodic_script_interval = config
.get("periodic_script_interval_seconds")
.filter(|v| !v.is_null());
match (periodic_script_bash, periodic_script_interval) {
(Some(_), Some(interval_value)) => {
if let Some(interval) = interval_value.as_u64() {
if interval < MIN_PERIODIC_SCRIPT_INTERVAL_SECONDS {
return Err(error::Error::BadRequest(format!(
"Periodic script interval must be at least {} seconds, got {} seconds",
MIN_PERIODIC_SCRIPT_INTERVAL_SECONDS, interval
)));
}
} else {
return Err(error::Error::BadRequest(
"Periodic script interval must be a valid number".to_string(),
));
}
}
(Some(_), None) => {
return Err(error::Error::BadRequest(
"Periodic script interval must be specified when periodic script is configured"
.to_string(),
));
}
_ => {}
}
}
let mut tx = db.begin().await?;
sqlx::query!(
"INSERT INTO config (name, config) VALUES ($1, $2) ON CONFLICT (name) DO UPDATE SET config = EXCLUDED.config",
&name,
config
)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
audit_log(
&mut *tx,
&authed,
"worker_config.update",
ActionKind::Update,
"global",
Some(&name),
None,
)
.await?;
tx.commit().await?;
Ok(format!("Updated config {name}"))
}
async fn delete_config(
Path(name): Path<String>,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
authed: ApiAuthed,
) -> error::Result<String> {
require_devops_role(&db, &authed).await?;
let mut tx = db.begin().await?;
let deleted = sqlx::query!("DELETE FROM config WHERE name = $1 RETURNING name", name)
.fetch_all(&mut *tx)
.await?;
audit_log(
&mut *tx,
&authed,
"worker_config.delete",
ActionKind::Delete,
"global",
Some(&name),
None,
)
.await?;
tx.commit().await?;
if deleted.len() == 0 {
return Err(error::Error::NotFound(format!(
"Config {name} not found",
name = name
)));
}
Ok(format!("Deleted config {name}"))
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, FromRow)]
struct AutoscalingEvent {
id: i64,
worker_group: String,
event_type: Option<String>,
desired_workers: i32,
reason: Option<String>,
applied_at: chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>,
}
async fn list_autoscaling_events(
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
Path(worker_group): Path<String>,
Query(mut pagination): Query<Pagination>,
) -> error::JsonResult<Vec<AutoscalingEvent>> {
if pagination.per_page.is_none() {
pagination.per_page = Some(5);
}
let (per_page, offset) = windmill_common::utils::paginate(pagination);
// applied_at is a naive TIMESTAMP; reinterpret it as UTC so the response
// includes a timezone (otherwise the browser parses it as local time and
// TimeAgo clamps future timestamps to "0s ago").
let events = sqlx::query_as!(
AutoscalingEvent,
r#"SELECT id, worker_group, event_type::text, desired_workers, reason, (applied_at AT TIME ZONE 'UTC') AS "applied_at!: chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>" FROM autoscaling_event WHERE worker_group = $1 ORDER BY applied_at DESC LIMIT $2 OFFSET $3"#,
worker_group,
per_page as i64,
offset as i64
)
.fetch_all(&db)
.await?;
Ok(Json(events))
}
#[cfg(all(feature = "enterprise", feature = "private"))]
async fn native_kubernetes_autoscaling_healthcheck(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
) -> Result<(), windmill_autoscaling::kubernetes_integration_ee::KubeError> {
require_devops_role(&db, &authed).await.map_err(|e| {
windmill_autoscaling::kubernetes_integration_ee::KubeError::Other(e.to_string())
})?;
windmill_autoscaling::kubernetes_integration_ee::kubernetes_healthcheck().await
}
#[cfg(not(all(feature = "enterprise", feature = "private")))]
async fn native_kubernetes_autoscaling_healthcheck() -> Result<(), error::Error> {
Err(error::Error::BadRequest(
"Native Kubernetes autoscaling available only in the enterprise version".to_string(),
))
}
async fn list_available_python_versions() -> error::JsonResult<Vec<String>> {
#[cfg(not(all(feature = "python", feature = "run_inline")))]
return Err(error::Error::BadRequest(
"Python listing available only with 'python' feature enabled".to_string(),
));
#[cfg(all(feature = "python", feature = "run_inline"))]
use itertools::Itertools;
#[cfg(all(feature = "python", feature = "run_inline"))]
return Ok(Json(
windmill_worker::PyV::list_available_python_versions()
.await
.iter()
.map(|v| v.to_string())
.collect_vec(),
));
}
#[cfg(feature = "enterprise")]
async fn list_configs(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
) -> error::JsonResult<Vec<Config>> {
require_devops_role(&db, &authed).await?;
let configs = sqlx::query_as!(Config, "SELECT name, config FROM config")
.fetch_all(&db)
.await?;
Ok(Json(configs))
}
#[cfg(not(feature = "enterprise"))]
async fn list_configs() -> error::JsonResult<String> {
Err(error::Error::BadRequest(
"Config listing available only in the enterprise version".to_string(),
))
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
struct WorkspaceDependencySummary {
workspace_id: String,
name: Option<String>,
language: windmill_common::scripts::ScriptLang,
}
async fn list_all_workspace_dependencies(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
) -> error::JsonResult<Vec<WorkspaceDependencySummary>> {
require_devops_role(&db, &authed).await?;
let deps = sqlx::query!(
r#"SELECT workspace_id, name, language AS "language: windmill_common::scripts::ScriptLang"
FROM workspace_dependencies
WHERE archived = false
ORDER BY workspace_id, name"#,
)
.fetch_all(&db)
.await?;
Ok(Json(
deps.into_iter()
.map(|r| WorkspaceDependencySummary {
workspace_id: r.workspace_id,
name: r.name,
language: r.language,
})
.collect(),
))
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
struct DedicatedScriptDepsWithWorkspace {
workspace_id: String,
path: String,
language: windmill_common::scripts::ScriptLang,
workspace_dep_names: Vec<String>,
}
async fn list_all_dedicated_with_deps(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
) -> error::JsonResult<Vec<DedicatedScriptDepsWithWorkspace>> {
require_devops_role(&db, &authed).await?;
let rows = sqlx::query!(
r#"SELECT DISTINCT ON (workspace_id, path)
workspace_id, path, language AS "language: windmill_common::scripts::ScriptLang", content
FROM script
WHERE archived = false
AND dedicated_worker = true
AND language = ANY($1::text[]::SCRIPT_LANG[])
ORDER BY workspace_id, path, created_at DESC"#,
&["python3", "bun", "bunnative", "deno"] as &[&str],
)
.fetch_all(&db)
.await?;
let result = rows
.into_iter()
.map(|row| {
let dep_names =
windmill_common::scripts::extract_workspace_dependencies_annotated_refs(
&row.language,
&row.content,
&row.path,
)
.map(|refs| refs.external)
.unwrap_or_default();
DedicatedScriptDepsWithWorkspace {
workspace_id: row.workspace_id,
path: row.path,
language: row.language,
workspace_dep_names: dep_names,
}
})
.collect();
Ok(Json(result))
}