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* fix: resolve the head commit of GitHub App repos in the git repo viewer `get_git_commit_hash` ran `git ls-remote` against the raw resource URL. A GitHub-App-backed repository stores a tokenless URL, so the probe failed with "could not read Username" and the viewer never got past its first step. Resolve the head over the GitHub REST API with a server-side installation token instead, reusing the lookup the auto-pull poller already uses for app repos. Non-app repositories keep the ls-remote path. Also picks up the EE-side allowlist fix that lets the clone hub script request an installation token. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 63c67e2a2db198af26a0334f5be14af7d9987eb1 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #732 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 2a260961fa0a9bb5631c17e2f718cb8efb4f9aa2 New ee-repo-ref: 63c67e2a2db198af26a0334f5be14af7d9987eb1 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. * fix: honour the app-repo head lookup's not-app-backed result `get_app_repo_head_for_autopull` documents `Ok(None)` as "this repo is not app-backed, use the ls-remote path", which is what the other two callers do. Fall through to `ls-remote` on `None` instead of turning it into a 500, and drop the handler's own `is_github_app` read now that the callee's answer is honoured. Also bumps ee-repo-ref to pick up route-safe ref handling in that lookup. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: serve GitHub App repositories as an archive instead of a token The viewer's clone script asked the server for an installation token and put it in the clone URL. That token is installation-wide and carries the App's full permissions, so minting one requires a workspace admin, and the viewer was therefore admin-only for app-backed repositories. The server now streams a tarball of the commit instead, authorized by read access to the git_repository resource, so no GitHub credential reaches the job. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: run delegate_to_git_repo playbooks from GitHub App repositories An Ansible job's runnable_path is the user's own script, which no entry in the git-sync script allowlist can match, so `delegate_to_git_repo` could never obtain a token for an app-backed repo. It also gave up entirely on agent workers, whose connection has no database to mint one from. A playbook run only reads a working tree: the clone is followed by one rev-parse for a log line, and nothing after that touches git. So take the same archive route the viewer uses, extracting the commit's tarball into the job's repository directory. No GitHub credential reaches the worker, and agent workers work because the route is HTTP. Archive entries are joined onto the target by hand so a crafted archive cannot write outside the job directory. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: drop the now-immutable secret_url binding Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: point the repo viewer at the archive-based clone script hub/28905 reads app-backed repositories through the server's archive route instead of minting an installation token, which the backend in this release no longer grants it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: stream repository archives to disk rather than into memory The archive download went through `AuthedClient::get`, whose client caps a request at 20 seconds and whose response was then buffered whole. A repository is arbitrarily large, so that cut off slow downloads and put every job on the worker at risk of running the process out of memory. Add `get_streaming`, the read counterpart to the streaming upload path, and write the response out chunk by chunk. Extraction now creates each entry's parent directory: a tar carries directory entries only by convention, and the traversal guard now has tests, one of which caught the missing parent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: require admin to read an app-backed repository A `git_repository` resource names the repository rather than holding a credential for it, so read access to one authorizes nothing: anyone who can write a resource path can point one at any repository the GitHub App installation reaches, then read their own resource. The head lookup now requires admin for app-backed repos, matching the archive route and the repository picker, which already limits itself to workspaces where the caller is an admin. Repos that aren't app-backed are untouched and stay open to any reader. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: describe the repo viewer's hub script as it stands The file read as a patch waiting to be applied, against a hub version two releases stale. Describe what the published script does, including the archive route app-backed repositories now take. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: run the archive fetch under the job poller, off the job directory Three defects in the delegate path's fetch: The download and extraction ran outside the job poller that the git clone paths go through, so a cancelled or timed-out run kept streaming and extracting an arbitrarily large repository while holding the worker. There is no wall-clock bound on the download itself, by design, which is exactly why it needs the poller. The archive was written to a fixed name inside the job directory, where `create_file_resources` has already laid down the run's own files at paths the playbook chooses. A run naming a file `repo_archive.tar.gz` had it truncated and then deleted. It goes to a per-job temp path now. Link entries were unpacked with their target unchecked. `Entry::unpack` writes the link verbatim, so a link out of the tree plus a later entry descending through it writes wherever it points. Targets now face the same containment check as entry paths. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep repo symlinks, refuse only writes that go through them The link check rejected any target containing `..`, which is ordinary in a repository — `docs/x -> ../README.md` resolves inside the tree, and a git checkout keeps it. Rejecting it failed the whole extraction for repositories the clone path handles, and app-backed repos have no clone path to fall back to. Targets are preserved as git preserves them. What would let one escape is a later entry written at or underneath the link, so that is what is refused. Extraction also polls an abort flag now: a `spawn_blocking` task outlives the join handle its caller drops, so a cancelled job left it unpacking in the background. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: refuse hard links in a repository archive Leaving link targets verbatim is right for symlinks — git checks them out that way, and an escape needs a second entry descending through the link, which is refused. A hard link is not like that: unpacking one creates it against a target resolved there and then, so an escaping target is useful on its own. No git tree can express a hard link, so an archive carrying one did not come from a repository. Refuse it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 21f79bbbd39ae89665d1a89738630978616aa309 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to 37695a769b25d16b34107eedc1076793a8b388c8 This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #737 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 21f79bbbd39ae89665d1a89738630978616aa309 New ee-repo-ref: 37695a769b25d16b34107eedc1076793a8b388c8 Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>