fix(functions): complete secret validation parity

python/python/lancedb/db.py

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ from typing import (
     Iterable,
     List,
     Literal,
+    Mapping,
     Optional,
     Union,
 )
@@ -687,17 +688,35 @@ class DBConnection(EnforceOverrides):
         """
         raise NotImplementedError("serialize is not supported for this connection type")
 
-    def create_function(self, definition: UdfDefinition) -> FunctionVersion:
+    def create_function(
+        self,
+        definition: UdfDefinition,
+        *,
+        secrets: Optional[Mapping[str, str]] = None,
+    ) -> FunctionVersion:
         """Register a scalar Python UDF and wait for its immutable version.
 
+        ``secrets`` must contain exactly the names declared by
+        ``@udf(secrets=[...])``. Values are sent in the create request and
+        stored server-side in the private execution artifact; returned
+        Function and Job metadata contain only the declared names.
         This is the blocking counterpart of :meth:`create_function_async`.
         Local connections raise ``NotImplementedError``.
         """
-        return self.create_function_async(definition).wait()
+        return self.create_function_async(definition, secrets=secrets).wait()
 
-    def create_function_async(self, definition: UdfDefinition) -> Job[FunctionVersion]:
+    def create_function_async(
+        self,
+        definition: UdfDefinition,
+        *,
+        secrets: Optional[Mapping[str, str]] = None,
+    ) -> Job[FunctionVersion]:
         """Register a scalar Python UDF through the remote Function catalog.
 
+        ``secrets`` must contain exactly the names declared by
+        ``@udf(secrets=[...])``. Values are sent in the create request and
+        stored server-side in the private execution artifact; returned
+        Function and Job metadata contain only the declared names.
         Submission returns a typed job. The immutable Function version becomes
         available only when :meth:`Job.wait` succeeds. Local connections raise
         ``NotImplementedError``.
@@ -1405,8 +1424,13 @@ class LanceDBConnection(DBConnection):
         return Job(self._conn.job(job_id))
 
     @override
-    def create_function_async(self, definition: UdfDefinition) -> Job[FunctionVersion]:
-        job = LOOP.run(self._conn.create_function_async(definition))
+    def create_function_async(
+        self,
+        definition: UdfDefinition,
+        *,
+        secrets: Optional[Mapping[str, str]] = None,
+    ) -> Job[FunctionVersion]:
+        job = LOOP.run(self._conn.create_function_async(definition, secrets=secrets))
         return Job(job)
 
     @override
@@ -2225,17 +2249,24 @@ class AsyncConnection(object):
         return AsyncJob(self._inner.job(job_id))
 
     async def create_function_async(
-        self, definition: UdfDefinition
+        self,
+        definition: UdfDefinition,
+        *,
+        secrets: Optional[Mapping[str, str]] = None,
     ) -> AsyncJob[FunctionVersion]:
         """Register a scalar Python UDF through the remote Function catalog.
 
+        ``secrets`` must contain exactly the names declared by
+        ``@udf(secrets=[...])``. Values are sent in the create request and
+        stored server-side in the private execution artifact; returned
+        Function and Job metadata contain only the declared names.
         The returned typed job resolves to the immutable Function version.
         Local connections raise ``NotImplementedError``.
         """
         if not isinstance(definition, UdfDefinition):
             raise TypeError("create_function_async requires a @udf definition")
         inner = await self._inner.create_function_async(
-            definition.registration_request.to_canonical_json()
+            definition._submission_json(secrets)
         )
         return _typed_job(inner, FunctionVersion.from_json)
 

python/python/lancedb/functions.py

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 """Canonical Function values exchanged with LanceDB Enterprise services.
 
 These immutable models contain client/wire state only. Catalog persistence,
-environment bake, and execution are owned by Sophon.
+environment bake, secret resolution, and execution are owned by Sophon.
 ``RefreshColumnResult`` is also the backend-neutral result of a local
 expression-backed refresh job.
 """
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ class PythonEnvironmentSpec(_RemoteValue):
 
 
 class PythonRuntimeSpec(_RemoteValue):
-    """Remote runtime definition with environment values.
+    """Remote runtime definition with non-secret environment values.
 
     V1 supports ``kind="python"``. Newer runtime kinds remain readable, while
     their unknown payload fields are intentionally not retained by the client.
@@ -268,6 +268,7 @@ class FunctionVersion(_RemoteValue):
     runtime: PythonRuntimeSpec
     runtime_digest: str
     environment_digest: str
+    required_secrets: tuple[str, ...] = ()
     created_at: str
 
     def __call__(self, **inputs: Any) -> FunctionApplication:
@@ -329,12 +330,17 @@ class FunctionVersion(_RemoteValue):
 
 
 class FunctionRegistrationRequest(_RemoteValue):
-    """Stable remote registration envelope produced by :func:`udf`."""
+    """Stable remote registration envelope produced by :func:`udf`.
+
+    Only secret names are represented. Secret values are supplied separately
+    when the definition is submitted and are not part of this durable value.
+    """
 
     name: str
     artifact: FunctionArtifactRequest
     signature: FunctionSignature
     runtime: PythonRuntimeSpec
+    required_secrets: tuple[str, ...] = ()
 
 
 class FunctionVersionRef(_OpenRemoteValue):
@@ -479,6 +485,27 @@ class RefreshColumnResult(_RemoteValue):
 
 
 _FUNCTION_NAME = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_.-]*$")
+_SECRET_NAME = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$")
+# Keep this byte limit aligned with Sophon's MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES.
+_MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES = 64 * 1024
+_MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUES_BYTES = 512 * 1024
+
+
+def _validate_secret_value(name: str, value: Any) -> str:
+    """Validate one secret value before building the create request."""
+    if not isinstance(value, str):
+        raise TypeError(f"Function secret {name!r} value must be a string")
+    if not value:
+        raise ValueError(f"Function secret {name!r} value must be non-empty")
+    if "\0" in value:
+        raise ValueError(f"Function secret {name!r} value must not contain NUL")
+    value_bytes = len(value.encode("utf-8"))
+    if value_bytes > _MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES:
+        raise ValueError(
+            f"Function secret {name!r} value exceeds the "
+            f"{_MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES}-byte limit"
+        )
+    return value
 
 
 _GRAMMAR_PRIMITIVES = (
@@ -909,6 +936,7 @@ class UdfDefinition:
         output_schema: Optional[pa.DataType | pa.Field | pa.Schema],
         pip: tuple[str, ...],
         env: Mapping[str, str],
+        secrets: tuple[str, ...],
         python_version: Optional[str],
         conda: tuple[str, ...] = (),
         conda_channels: tuple[str, ...] = (),
@@ -935,6 +963,17 @@ class UdfDefinition:
             for key, value in environment.items()
         ):
             raise TypeError("Function env keys and values must be strings")
+        required_secrets = tuple(sorted(set(secrets)))
+        invalid_secrets = [
+            secret for secret in required_secrets if not _SECRET_NAME.fullmatch(secret)
+        ]
+        if invalid_secrets:
+            raise ValueError(f"invalid Function secret names: {invalid_secrets!r}")
+        overlap = set(environment) & set(required_secrets)
+        if overlap:
+            raise ValueError(
+                f"Function env and secret names must be disjoint: {sorted(overlap)!r}"
+            )
         signature = _infer_signature(function, input_schema, output_schema)
         source = _package_source(function)
         digest = f"sha256:{hashlib.sha256(source).hexdigest()}"
@@ -963,14 +1002,65 @@ class UdfDefinition:
             ),
             signature=signature,
             runtime=runtime,
+            required_secrets=required_secrets,
         )
         functools.update_wrapper(self, function)
 
     @property
     def registration_request(self) -> FunctionRegistrationRequest:
-        """The immutable request sent by ``create_function_async``."""
+        """The immutable, value-free client model for a Function submission."""
         return self._request
 
+    def _submission_json(self, secrets: Optional[Mapping[str, str]]) -> str:
+        """Build one registration submission without retaining values on self."""
+        if secrets is None:
+            secret_values: Mapping[str, str] = {}
+        elif not isinstance(secrets, Mapping):
+            raise TypeError("Function secrets must be a mapping of names to strings")
+        else:
+            secret_values = secrets
+
+        if any(not isinstance(name, str) for name in secret_values):
+            raise TypeError("Function secret names must be strings")
+        expected = set(self._request.required_secrets)
+        provided = set(secret_values)
+        if provided != expected:
+            missing = sorted(expected - provided)
+            unexpected = sorted(provided - expected)
+            details = []
+            if missing:
+                details.append(f"missing: {missing!r}")
+            if unexpected:
+                details.append(f"unexpected: {unexpected!r}")
+            raise ValueError(
+                "Function secret values must exactly match the declared secrets ("
+                + "; ".join(details)
+                + ")"
+            )
+
+        canonical_values = {}
+        total_bytes = 0
+        for name in sorted(secret_values):
+            value = _validate_secret_value(name, secret_values[name])
+            total_bytes += len(value.encode("utf-8"))
+            if total_bytes > _MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUES_BYTES:
+                raise ValueError(
+                    "Function secret values exceed the "
+                    f"{_MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUES_BYTES}-byte request limit"
+                )
+            canonical_values[name] = value
+
+        submission = self._request._known_dict()
+        if canonical_values:
+            submission["secret_values"] = canonical_values
+        return json.dumps(
+            submission,
+            ensure_ascii=False,
+            allow_nan=False,
+            sort_keys=True,
+            separators=(",", ":"),
+        )
+
     def __call__(self, *args, **kwargs):
         return self._function(*args, **kwargs)
 
@@ -988,6 +1078,7 @@ def udf(
     output_schema: Optional[pa.DataType | pa.Field | pa.Schema] = None,
     pip: tuple[str, ...] | list[str] = (),
     env: Optional[Mapping[str, str]] = None,
+    secrets: tuple[str, ...] | list[str] = (),
     python_version: Optional[str] = None,
     conda: tuple[str, ...] | list[str] = (),
     conda_channels: tuple[str, ...] | list[str] = (),
@@ -1002,6 +1093,7 @@ def udf(
     output_schema: Optional[pa.DataType | pa.Field | pa.Schema] = None,
     pip: tuple[str, ...] | list[str] = (),
     env: Optional[Mapping[str, str]] = None,
+    secrets: tuple[str, ...] | list[str] = (),
     python_version: Optional[str] = None,
     conda: tuple[str, ...] | list[str] = (),
     conda_channels: tuple[str, ...] | list[str] = (),
@@ -1032,7 +1124,10 @@ def udf(
     conda_channels : sequence of str, optional
         Conda channels in priority order; requires ``conda``.
     env : mapping of str to str, optional
-        Environment variables included in the Function definition.
+        Non-secret environment variables. Use ``secrets`` for credentials.
+    secrets : sequence of str, optional
+        Names of secrets required by the callable. Supply their values separately
+        to ``create_function`` or ``create_function_async``.
     python_version : str, optional
         Remote Python major/minor version. Defaults to the client version.
 
@@ -1054,11 +1149,15 @@ def udf(
     Examples
     --------
     >>> from lancedb import udf
-    >>> @udf(pip=["numpy==2.2.0"])
+    >>> @udf(pip=["numpy==2.2.0"], secrets=["MODEL_TOKEN"])
     ... def score(value: float) -> float:
     ...     return value * 2
     >>> score(1.5)
     3.0
+    >>> db.create_function(  # doctest: +SKIP
+    ...     score, secrets={"MODEL_TOKEN": "user-secret-value"}
+    ... )
+
     """
 
     def decorate(target: Callable[..., Any]) -> UdfDefinition:
@@ -1069,6 +1168,7 @@ def udf(
             output_schema=output_schema,
             pip=tuple(pip),
             env={} if env is None else env,
+            secrets=tuple(secrets),
             python_version=python_version,
             conda=tuple(conda),
             conda_channels=tuple(conda_channels),

python/python/lancedb/remote/db.py

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import json
 import logging
 from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
 import sys
-from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, Dict, Iterable, List, Optional, Union
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, Dict, Iterable, List, Mapping, Optional, Union
 from urllib.parse import urlparse
 import warnings
 
@@ -742,8 +742,15 @@ class RemoteDBConnection(DBConnection):
         return Job(self._conn.job(job_id))
 
     @override
-    def create_function_async(self, definition: UdfDefinition) -> Job[FunctionVersion]:
-        return Job(LOOP.run(self._conn.create_function_async(definition)))
+    def create_function_async(
+        self,
+        definition: UdfDefinition,
+        *,
+        secrets: Optional[Mapping[str, str]] = None,
+    ) -> Job[FunctionVersion]:
+        return Job(
+            LOOP.run(self._conn.create_function_async(definition, secrets=secrets))
+        )
 
     @override
     def get_function(self, name: str, *, version: str) -> FunctionVersion:

python/python/tests/test_first_class_function_slice1.py

@@ -37,6 +37,21 @@ def job_result(name: str) -> dict:
     return json.loads(fixture(name))["result"]
 
 
+def assert_no_secret_values(value):
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        for key, child in value.items():
+            assert key not in {
+                "secret_value",
+                "secret_values",
+                "resolved_secret",
+                "resolved_secrets",
+            }
+            assert_no_secret_values(child)
+    elif isinstance(value, list):
+        for child in value:
+            assert_no_secret_values(child)
+
+
 def test_public_function_values_are_in_api_reference():
     docs = Path(__file__).parents[3] / "docs" / "src" / "python" / "python.md"
     rendered = docs.read_text()
@@ -94,6 +109,7 @@ def test_function_version_identity_is_immutable_and_exact():
     version = FunctionVersion.from_json(json.dumps(value))
     assert version.name == "embed"
     assert version.version == "fv_01K3EXACT"
+    assert version.required_secrets == ("HF_TOKEN",)
 
     with pytest.raises((TypeError, ValueError)):
         version.version = "fv_changed"
@@ -276,6 +292,15 @@ def test_refresh_result_rejects_non_u64_values(field):
         RefreshColumnResult.from_json(json.dumps(value))
 
 
+def test_canonical_client_values_contain_secret_names_only():
+    version = FunctionVersion.from_json(
+        json.dumps(job_result("remote_function_job.json"))
+    )
+    canonical = json.loads(version.to_canonical_json())
+    assert canonical["required_secrets"] == ["HF_TOKEN"]
+    assert_no_secret_values(canonical)
+
+
 class _FunctionDeclarationInner:
     def __init__(self):
         self.calls = []

python/python/tests/test_first_class_function_slice2.py

@@ -19,7 +19,13 @@ import pyarrow as pa
 import pytest
 
 import lancedb
-from lancedb.functions import UdfDefinition, udf
+from lancedb.functions import (
+    _MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES,
+    _MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUES_BYTES,
+    FunctionRegistrationRequest,
+    UdfDefinition,
+    udf,
+)
 
 THRESHOLD = 20
 _CACHE = None
@@ -39,12 +45,28 @@ FIXTURES = (
 @udf(
     pip=["numpy>=2"],
     env={"MODE": "test"},
+    secrets=["API_TOKEN"],
     python_version="3.12",
 )
 def normalize_score(value: float) -> float:
     return value / 100.0
 
 
+def _assert_no_secret_values(value):
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        for key, child in value.items():
+            assert key not in {
+                "secret_value",
+                "secret_values",
+                "resolved_secret",
+                "resolved_secrets",
+            }
+            _assert_no_secret_values(child)
+    elif isinstance(value, list):
+        for child in value:
+            _assert_no_secret_values(child)
+
+
 def test_scalar_udf_matches_shared_registration_golden_and_remains_callable():
     assert isinstance(normalize_score, UdfDefinition)
     assert normalize_score(25.0) == 0.25
@@ -59,6 +81,8 @@ def test_scalar_udf_matches_shared_registration_golden_and_remains_callable():
         "kind": "scalar_to_arrow_batch",
         "version": 1,
     }
+    assert request["required_secrets"] == ["API_TOKEN"]
+    _assert_no_secret_values(request)
 
 
 def _run_packaged(definition, *args):
@@ -372,6 +396,7 @@ def test_udf_recursion_versus_a_rebound_module_name(tmp_path):
         output_schema=None,
         pip=(),
         env={},
+        secrets=(),
         python_version=None,
     )
     with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="binds that name to another value"):
@@ -526,13 +551,54 @@ def test_annotation_and_explicit_schema_validation_fail_closed():
             return value
 
 
+def test_secret_names_are_canonical_and_disjoint_from_environment():
+    @udf(secrets=["Z_TOKEN", "A_TOKEN", "Z_TOKEN"])
+    def canonical_secrets(value: int) -> int:
+        return value
+
+    assert canonical_secrets.registration_request.required_secrets == (
+        "A_TOKEN",
+        "Z_TOKEN",
+    )
+
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="must be disjoint"):
+
+        @udf(env={"TOKEN": "plaintext"}, secrets=["TOKEN"])
+        def overlapping(value: int) -> int:
+            return value
+
+
+def test_declared_secret_api_still_requires_explicit_create_values():
+    @udf(secrets=["API_TOKEN"])
+    def declared_secret(value: int) -> int:
+        return value
+
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="missing"):
+        declared_secret._submission_json(None)
+    submission = json.loads(
+        declared_secret._submission_json({"API_TOKEN": "explicit-secret"})
+    )
+    assert submission["required_secrets"] == ["API_TOKEN"]
+    assert submission["secret_values"] == {"API_TOKEN": "explicit-secret"}
+
+
+def test_no_secrets_preserve_canonical_registration_shape():
+    @udf
+    def no_secrets(value: int) -> int:
+        return value
+
+    canonical = json.loads(no_secrets.registration_request.to_canonical_json())
+    assert "required_secrets" not in canonical
+    assert json.loads(no_secrets._submission_json(None)) == canonical
+
+
 def test_local_function_catalog_operations_are_not_supported(tmp_path):
     db = lancedb.connect(tmp_path)
     message = "Function catalog operations are not supported by this database"
     with pytest.raises(NotImplementedError, match=message):
-        db.create_function(normalize_score)
+        db.create_function(normalize_score, secrets={"API_TOKEN": "value"})
     with pytest.raises(NotImplementedError, match=message):
-        db.create_function_async(normalize_score)
+        db.create_function_async(normalize_score, secrets={"API_TOKEN": "value"})
     with pytest.raises(NotImplementedError, match=message):
         db.get_function("normalize_score", version="fv_exact")
 
@@ -562,6 +628,7 @@ def _mock_remote_function_catalog():
                     "runtime": body["runtime"],
                     "runtime_digest": "sha256:runtime",
                     "environment_digest": "sha256:environment",
+                    "required_secrets": body.get("required_secrets", []),
                     "created_at": "2026-08-21T00:00:00Z",
                 }
                 response = {"job_id": "job-register"}
@@ -608,7 +675,9 @@ def test_remote_registration_job_and_exact_version_reopen_round_trip():
             host_override=host,
             client_config={"retry_config": {"retries": 0}},
         )
-        registration = db.create_function_async(normalize_score)
+        registration = db.create_function_async(
+            normalize_score, secrets={"API_TOKEN": "secret-value"}
+        )
         assert registration.id == "job-register"
         created = registration.wait()
         reopened = db.get_function("normalize_score", version=created.version)
@@ -617,9 +686,18 @@ def test_remote_registration_job_and_exact_version_reopen_round_trip():
     assert reopened.name == "normalize_score"
     assert reopened.version == "fv_exact"
     create_request = state["requests"][0][1]
-    assert create_request == json.loads(
+    expected = json.loads(normalize_score.registration_request.to_canonical_json())
+    expected["secret_values"] = {"API_TOKEN": "secret-value"}
+    assert create_request == expected
+    durable_request = FunctionRegistrationRequest.from_json(json.dumps(create_request))
+    assert not hasattr(durable_request, "secret_values")
+    assert "secret_values" not in json.loads(durable_request.to_canonical_json())
+    assert "secret_values" not in json.loads(
         normalize_score.registration_request.to_canonical_json()
     )
+    assert "secret-value" not in repr(normalize_score)
+    assert "secret-value" not in repr(normalize_score.registration_request)
+    assert not hasattr(created, "secret_values")
 
 
 def test_blocking_remote_registration_returns_function_version():
@@ -630,7 +708,9 @@ def test_blocking_remote_registration_returns_function_version():
             host_override=host,
             client_config={"retry_config": {"retries": 0}},
         )
-        created = db.create_function(normalize_score)
+        created = db.create_function(
+            normalize_score, secrets={"API_TOKEN": "blocking-secret"}
+        )
 
     assert created.name == "normalize_score"
     assert created.version == "fv_exact"
@@ -638,3 +718,121 @@ def test_blocking_remote_registration_returns_function_version():
         "/v1/functions/create",
         "/v1/jobs/describe",
     ]
+    assert state["requests"][0][1]["secret_values"] == {"API_TOKEN": "blocking-secret"}
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("secret_values", "error_type", "message"),
+    [
+        (None, ValueError, "missing"),
+        ({}, ValueError, "missing"),
+        ({"OTHER": "value"}, ValueError, "missing.*unexpected"),
+        ({"API_TOKEN": ""}, ValueError, "non-empty"),
+        ({"API_TOKEN": "bad\0value"}, ValueError, "NUL"),
+        ({"API_TOKEN": 123}, TypeError, "must be a string"),
+        ([("API_TOKEN", "value")], TypeError, "must be a mapping"),
+    ],
+)
+def test_secret_values_are_validated_before_remote_request(
+    secret_values, error_type, message
+):
+    with _mock_remote_function_catalog() as (host, state):
+        db = lancedb.connect(
+            "db://dev",
+            api_key="fake",
+            host_override=host,
+            client_config={"retry_config": {"retries": 0}},
+        )
+        with pytest.raises(error_type, match=message):
+            db.create_function_async(normalize_score, secrets=secret_values)
+        assert state["requests"] == []
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "value",
+    [
+        "x" * _MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES,
+        "é" * (_MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES // len("é".encode("utf-8"))),
+    ],
+    ids=["ascii", "multibyte"],
+)
+def test_secret_value_accepts_exact_utf8_byte_limit(value):
+    submission = json.loads(normalize_score._submission_json({"API_TOKEN": value}))
+    assert submission["secret_values"]["API_TOKEN"] == value
+    assert len(value.encode("utf-8")) == _MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    "value",
+    [
+        "x" * (_MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES + 1),
+        "é" * (_MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES // len("é".encode("utf-8")) + 1),
+    ],
+    ids=["ascii", "multibyte"],
+)
+def test_secret_value_rejects_over_utf8_byte_limit_before_json_construction(
+    monkeypatch, value
+):
+    def fail_if_json_construction_starts(self):
+        pytest.fail("oversized secret reached JSON construction")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        FunctionRegistrationRequest, "_known_dict", fail_if_json_construction_starts
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match=r"exceeds the 65536-byte limit"):
+        normalize_score._submission_json({"API_TOKEN": value})
+
+
+def test_secret_values_accept_exact_aggregate_utf8_byte_limit(monkeypatch):
+    names = tuple(f"SECRET_{index}" for index in range(8))
+    value = "é" * (_MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES // len("é".encode("utf-8")))
+    values = {name: value for name in names}
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        normalize_score,
+        "_request",
+        normalize_score._request._copy(update={"required_secrets": names}),
+    )
+
+    submission = json.loads(normalize_score._submission_json(values))
+
+    assert submission["secret_values"] == values
+    assert sum(len(item.encode("utf-8")) for item in values.values()) == (
+        _MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUES_BYTES
+    )
+
+
+def test_secret_values_reject_aggregate_over_limit_before_construction(monkeypatch):
+    names = tuple(f"SECRET_{index}" for index in range(9))
+    values = {name: "x" * _MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES for name in names}
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        normalize_score,
+        "_request",
+        normalize_score._request._copy(update={"required_secrets": names}),
+    )
+
+    def fail_if_json_construction_starts(self):
+        pytest.fail("oversized aggregate reached JSON construction")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        FunctionRegistrationRequest, "_known_dict", fail_if_json_construction_starts
+    )
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match=r"exceed.*524288-byte request limit"):
+        normalize_score._submission_json(values)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_async_remote_registration_submits_secret_values_only_once():
+    with _mock_remote_function_catalog() as (host, state):
+        db = await lancedb.connect_async(
+            "db://dev",
+            api_key="fake",
+            host_override=host,
+            client_config={"retry_config": {"retries": 0}},
+        )
+        registration = await db.create_function_async(
+            normalize_score, secrets={"API_TOKEN": "async-secret"}
+        )
+        created = await registration.wait()
+
+    assert state["requests"][0][1]["secret_values"] == {"API_TOKEN": "async-secret"}
+    assert not hasattr(created, "secret_values")

rust/lancedb/src/function.rs

@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@
 //! backend-neutral terminal result of a computed-column refresh.
 //!
 //! This module contains client/wire values only. Catalog persistence,
-//! environment bake, and execution are owned by Sophon.
+//! environment bake, secret resolution, and execution are owned by Sophon.
 
-use std::collections::BTreeMap;
+use std::collections::{BTreeMap, BTreeSet};
 
 use serde::de::{self, DeserializeOwned};
 use serde::{Deserialize, Deserializer, Serialize, Serializer};
@@ -15,6 +15,16 @@ use serde_json::Value;
 
 use crate::{Error, Result};
 
+// Keep these byte limits aligned with Sophon's Function submission validation.
+pub(crate) const MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES: usize = 64 * 1024;
+const MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUES_BYTES: usize = 512 * 1024;
+
+fn is_portable_environment_name(name: &str) -> bool {
+    let mut bytes = name.bytes();
+    matches!(bytes.next(), Some(b'A'..=b'Z' | b'a'..=b'z' | b'_'))
+        && bytes.all(|byte| matches!(byte, b'A'..=b'Z' | b'a'..=b'z' | b'0'..=b'9' | b'_'))
+}
+
 fn invalid_json(error: impl std::fmt::Display) -> Error {
     Error::InvalidInput {
         message: format!("invalid remote Function JSON: {error}"),
@@ -198,6 +208,11 @@ pub struct PythonEnvironmentSpec {
 }
 
 /// Reproducible Python runtime definition understood by Sophon.
+///
+/// `env` contains non-secret values. Secret values are submission-only in the
+/// client model and do not become part of this public runtime identity;
+/// [`FunctionVersion::required_secrets`] contains names only. Sophon persists
+/// submitted values separately in the private execution artifact.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
 #[non_exhaustive]
 pub enum PythonRuntimeSpec {
@@ -239,7 +254,7 @@ impl PythonRuntimeSpec {
         }
     }
 
-    /// Environment variables, or `None` for an unknown kind.
+    /// Non-secret environment variables, or `None` for an unknown kind.
     pub fn env(&self) -> Option<&BTreeMap<String, String>> {
         match self {
             Self::Python { env, .. } => Some(env),
@@ -324,6 +339,8 @@ pub struct FunctionVersion {
     runtime: PythonRuntimeSpec,
     runtime_digest: String,
     environment_digest: String,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
+    required_secrets: Vec<String>,
     created_at: String,
 }
 
@@ -356,6 +373,12 @@ impl FunctionVersion {
         &self.environment_digest
     }
 
+    /// Required secret names. Resolved values exist only in Sophon's private
+    /// execution artifact and worker launch path.
+    pub fn required_secrets(&self) -> &[String] {
+        &self.required_secrets
+    }
+
     pub fn created_at(&self) -> &str {
         &self.created_at
     }
@@ -397,12 +420,115 @@ pub struct FunctionArtifactRequest {
 }
 
 /// Stable request envelope for remote immutable Function registration.
-#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+///
+/// Secret values are submission-only in the client model. Sophon persists them
+/// in the database-scoped private execution artifact; returned
+/// [`FunctionVersion`] and Job metadata contain only
+/// [`Self::required_secrets`] names. Debug formatting always redacts values.
+#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct FunctionRegistrationRequest {
     pub name: String,
     pub artifact: FunctionArtifactRequest,
     pub signature: FunctionSignature,
     pub runtime: PythonRuntimeSpec,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
+    pub required_secrets: Vec<String>,
+    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "BTreeMap::is_empty")]
+    pub secret_values: BTreeMap<String, String>,
+}
+
+impl FunctionRegistrationRequest {
+    pub(crate) fn validate_secret_values(&self) -> Result<()> {
+        let mut required = BTreeSet::new();
+        for name in &self.required_secrets {
+            if !is_portable_environment_name(name) {
+                return Err(Error::InvalidInput {
+                    message: format!(
+                        "Function secret name {name:?} must be a portable environment variable name"
+                    ),
+                });
+            }
+            if !required.insert(name) {
+                return Err(Error::InvalidInput {
+                    message: format!("Function required_secrets contains duplicate name {name:?}"),
+                });
+            }
+        }
+
+        if let PythonRuntimeSpec::Python { env, .. } = &self.runtime
+            && let Some(name) = required.iter().find(|name| env.contains_key(**name))
+        {
+            return Err(Error::InvalidInput {
+                message: format!(
+                    "Function runtime env and secret names must be disjoint: {name:?}"
+                ),
+            });
+        }
+
+        let provided = self.secret_values.keys().collect::<BTreeSet<_>>();
+        if required != provided {
+            return Err(Error::InvalidInput {
+                message: "Function secret_values keys must exactly match required_secrets"
+                    .to_string(),
+            });
+        }
+
+        let mut total_bytes = 0usize;
+        for (name, value) in &self.secret_values {
+            if value.is_empty() {
+                return Err(Error::InvalidInput {
+                    message: format!("Function secret {name:?} value must be non-empty"),
+                });
+            }
+            if value.contains('\0') {
+                return Err(Error::InvalidInput {
+                    message: format!("Function secret {name:?} value must not contain NUL"),
+                });
+            }
+            if value.len() > MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES {
+                return Err(Error::InvalidInput {
+                    message: format!(
+                        "Function secret {name:?} value exceeds the \
+                         {MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES}-byte limit"
+                    ),
+                });
+            }
+            total_bytes =
+                total_bytes
+                    .checked_add(value.len())
+                    .ok_or_else(|| Error::InvalidInput {
+                        message: "Function secret values exceed the request byte limit".to_string(),
+                    })?;
+        }
+        if total_bytes > MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUES_BYTES {
+            return Err(Error::InvalidInput {
+                message: format!(
+                    "Function secret values exceed the \
+                     {MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUES_BYTES}-byte request limit"
+                ),
+            });
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+impl std::fmt::Debug for FunctionRegistrationRequest {
+    fn fmt(&self, formatter: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        let secret_values = self
+            .secret_values
+            .keys()
+            .map(|name| (name, "[REDACTED]"))
+            .collect::<BTreeMap<_, _>>();
+        formatter
+            .debug_struct("FunctionRegistrationRequest")
+            .field("name", &self.name)
+            .field("artifact", &self.artifact)
+            .field("signature", &self.signature)
+            .field("runtime", &self.runtime)
+            .field("required_secrets", &self.required_secrets)
+            .field("secret_values", &secret_values)
+            .finish()
+    }
 }
 
 impl_json!(FunctionRegistrationRequest);
@@ -587,6 +713,185 @@ impl RefreshColumnResult {
 
 impl_json!(RefreshColumnResult);
 
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod secret_value_tests {
+    use super::{
+        FunctionRegistrationRequest, MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES,
+        MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUES_BYTES, PythonRuntimeSpec,
+    };
+    use crate::Error;
+
+    fn request() -> FunctionRegistrationRequest {
+        FunctionRegistrationRequest::from_json(include_str!(
+            "../tests/fixtures/first_class_functions/v1/remote_function_registration_request.json"
+        ))
+        .unwrap()
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validates_secret_name_and_value_invariants() {
+        let missing = request();
+        assert!(matches!(
+            missing.validate_secret_values(),
+            Err(Error::InvalidInput { message }) if message.contains("exactly match")
+        ));
+
+        let mut empty = request();
+        empty
+            .secret_values
+            .insert("API_TOKEN".to_string(), String::new());
+        assert!(matches!(
+            empty.validate_secret_values(),
+            Err(Error::InvalidInput { message }) if message.contains("non-empty")
+        ));
+
+        let mut nul = request();
+        nul.secret_values
+            .insert("API_TOKEN".to_string(), "before\0after".to_string());
+        assert!(matches!(
+            nul.validate_secret_values(),
+            Err(Error::InvalidInput { message }) if message.contains("NUL")
+        ));
+
+        let mut unexpected = request();
+        unexpected
+            .secret_values
+            .insert("OTHER".to_string(), "value".to_string());
+        assert!(matches!(
+            unexpected.validate_secret_values(),
+            Err(Error::InvalidInput { message }) if message.contains("exactly match")
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_invalid_duplicate_and_overlapping_secret_declarations() {
+        let mut invalid_name = request();
+        invalid_name.required_secrets = vec!["BAD=NAME".to_string()];
+        invalid_name
+            .secret_values
+            .insert("BAD=NAME".to_string(), "secret".to_string());
+
+        let mut duplicate = request();
+        duplicate.required_secrets = vec!["API_TOKEN".to_string(), "API_TOKEN".to_string()];
+        duplicate
+            .secret_values
+            .insert("API_TOKEN".to_string(), "secret".to_string());
+
+        let mut overlap = request();
+        overlap
+            .secret_values
+            .insert("API_TOKEN".to_string(), "secret".to_string());
+        if let PythonRuntimeSpec::Python { env, .. } = &mut overlap.runtime {
+            env.insert("API_TOKEN".to_string(), "public".to_string());
+        }
+
+        assert!(matches!(
+            invalid_name.validate_secret_values(),
+            Err(Error::InvalidInput { message }) if message.contains("portable environment variable")
+        ));
+        assert!(matches!(
+            duplicate.validate_secret_values(),
+            Err(Error::InvalidInput { message }) if message.contains("duplicate")
+        ));
+        assert!(matches!(
+            overlap.validate_secret_values(),
+            Err(Error::InvalidInput { message }) if message.contains("must be disjoint")
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn enforces_portable_secret_name_boundaries() {
+        for name in ["A", "_", "A0_"] {
+            let mut request = request();
+            request.required_secrets = vec![name.to_string()];
+            request
+                .secret_values
+                .insert(name.to_string(), "secret".to_string());
+            request.validate_secret_values().unwrap();
+        }
+
+        for name in ["", "0TOKEN", "BAD-NAME", "TÖKEN"] {
+            let mut request = request();
+            request.required_secrets = vec![name.to_string()];
+            request
+                .secret_values
+                .insert(name.to_string(), "secret".to_string());
+            assert!(matches!(
+                request.validate_secret_values(),
+                Err(Error::InvalidInput { message })
+                    if message.contains("portable environment variable")
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn accepts_exact_secret_value_utf8_byte_limit() {
+        for value in [
+            "x".repeat(MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES),
+            "é".repeat(MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES / "é".len()),
+        ] {
+            assert_eq!(value.len(), MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES);
+            let mut request = request();
+            request.secret_values.insert("API_TOKEN".to_string(), value);
+            request.validate_secret_values().unwrap();
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_secret_value_over_utf8_byte_limit() {
+        for value in [
+            "x".repeat(MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES + 1),
+            "é".repeat(MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES / "é".len() + 1),
+        ] {
+            assert!(value.len() > MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES);
+            let mut request = request();
+            request.secret_values.insert("API_TOKEN".to_string(), value);
+            assert!(matches!(
+                request.validate_secret_values(),
+                Err(Error::InvalidInput { message }) if message.contains("65536-byte limit")
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_aggregate_secret_value_bytes_over_server_limit() {
+        let mut request = request();
+        request.required_secrets = (0..9).map(|index| format!("SECRET_{index}")).collect();
+        request.secret_values = request
+            .required_secrets
+            .iter()
+            .map(|name| (name.clone(), "x".repeat(MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES)))
+            .collect();
+
+        assert!(matches!(
+            request.validate_secret_values(),
+            Err(Error::InvalidInput { message })
+                if message.contains(&format!("{MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUES_BYTES}-byte request limit"))
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn accepts_exact_aggregate_secret_value_byte_limit() {
+        let mut request = request();
+        request.required_secrets = (0..8).map(|index| format!("SECRET_{index}")).collect();
+        request.secret_values = request
+            .required_secrets
+            .iter()
+            .map(|name| (name.clone(), "x".repeat(MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES)))
+            .collect();
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            request
+                .secret_values
+                .values()
+                .map(String::len)
+                .sum::<usize>(),
+            MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUES_BYTES
+        );
+        request.validate_secret_values().unwrap();
+    }
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod conda_environment_tests {
     use super::PythonEnvironmentSpec;

rust/lancedb/src/remote/client.rs

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ use reqwest::{
     Body, Request, RequestBuilder, Response,
     header::{HeaderMap, HeaderValue},
 };
+use serde_json::Value;
 use std::{collections::HashMap, future::Future, str::FromStr, sync::Arc, time::Duration};
 
 use crate::error::{Error, Result};
@@ -14,6 +15,60 @@ use crate::remote::db::RemoteOptions;
 use crate::remote::retry::{ResolvedRetryConfig, RetryCounter};
 
 const REQUEST_ID_HEADER: HeaderName = HeaderName::from_static("x-request-id");
+const REDACTED_JSON_VALUE: &str = "[REDACTED]";
+const SUPPRESSED_JSON_BODY: &str = "[JSON BODY SUPPRESSED]";
+
+fn is_sensitive_json_field(name: &str) -> bool {
+    name.to_ascii_lowercase().contains("secret")
+}
+
+fn redact_sensitive_json_fields(value: &mut Value) {
+    match value {
+        Value::Object(fields) => {
+            for (name, child) in fields {
+                if is_sensitive_json_field(name) {
+                    *child = Value::String(REDACTED_JSON_VALUE.to_string());
+                } else {
+                    redact_sensitive_json_fields(child);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        Value::Array(values) => values.iter_mut().for_each(redact_sensitive_json_fields),
+        _ => {}
+    }
+}
+
+fn redacted_json_body(request: &Request) -> Option<String> {
+    let body = request.body()?.as_bytes()?;
+    let mut value = serde_json::from_slice(body).ok()?;
+    redact_sensitive_json_fields(&mut value);
+    serde_json::to_string(&value).ok()
+}
+
+fn request_log_message(request: &Request, request_id: &str) -> String {
+    let prefix = format!(
+        "Sending request_id={}: {} {}",
+        request_id,
+        request.method(),
+        request.url()
+    );
+    let content_type = request
+        .headers()
+        .get("content-type")
+        .and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
+        .and_then(|value| value.split(';').next());
+    if content_type.is_some_and(|value| value.eq_ignore_ascii_case("application/json")) {
+        // Never format the raw Request here: its Debug representation is not a
+        // redaction boundary and may include the original body. If the JSON body
+        // cannot be structurally parsed, suppress it instead of logging raw bytes.
+        let body = redacted_json_body(request).unwrap_or_else(|| SUPPRESSED_JSON_BODY.to_string());
+        format!("{prefix} with body {body}")
+    } else {
+        // Method and URL are sufficient request context. Raw Request formatting
+        // may expose headers or a non-JSON body, so it is never a logging fallback.
+        prefix
+    }
+}
 
 /// Configuration for TLS/mTLS settings.
 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
@@ -839,22 +894,9 @@ impl<S: HttpSend> RestfulLanceDbClient<S> {
         }
     }
 
-    pub(crate) fn log_request(&self, request: &Request, request_id: &String) {
+    pub(crate) fn log_request(&self, request: &Request, request_id: &str) {
         if log::log_enabled!(log::Level::Debug) {
-            let content_type = request
-                .headers()
-                .get("content-type")
-                .map(|v| v.to_str().unwrap());
-            if content_type == Some("application/json") {
-                let body = request.body().as_ref().unwrap().as_bytes().unwrap();
-                let body = String::from_utf8_lossy(body);
-                debug!(
-                    "Sending request_id={}: {:?} with body {}",
-                    request_id, request, body
-                );
-            } else {
-                debug!("Sending request_id={}: {:?}", request_id, request);
-            }
+            debug!("{}", request_log_message(request, request_id));
         }
     }
 
@@ -1077,6 +1119,49 @@ mod tests {
         ENV_MUTEX.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner())
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn test_request_log_message_redacts_secrets_and_never_formats_raw_requests() {
+        const SECRET_SENTINEL: &str = "udf-secret-log-sentinel-7e4e";
+        const MALFORMED_SENTINEL: &str = "malformed-secret-log-sentinel-b652";
+        const NON_JSON_SENTINEL: &str = "non-json-secret-log-sentinel-7fd1";
+
+        let request = reqwest::Client::new()
+            .post("https://example.com/v1/functions/create")
+            .json(&serde_json::json!({
+                "name": "uses_secret",
+                "nested": {
+                    "secret_values": {"OPENAI_API_KEY": SECRET_SENTINEL},
+                    "safe": "visible-value"
+                }
+            }))
+            .build()
+            .unwrap();
+        let log_message = request_log_message(&request, "valid-json");
+
+        let malformed_request = reqwest::Client::new()
+            .post("https://example.com/v1/functions/create")
+            .header("content-type", "application/json; charset=utf-8")
+            .body(format!(r#"{{"secret_values":"{MALFORMED_SENTINEL}""#))
+            .build()
+            .unwrap();
+        let malformed_log_message = request_log_message(&malformed_request, "malformed-json");
+
+        let non_json_request = reqwest::Client::new()
+            .post("https://example.com/v1/functions/create")
+            .header("content-type", "text/plain")
+            .body(NON_JSON_SENTINEL)
+            .build()
+            .unwrap();
+        let non_json_log_message = request_log_message(&non_json_request, "non-json");
+
+        assert!(log_message.contains("visible-value"));
+        assert!(log_message.contains(REDACTED_JSON_VALUE));
+        assert!(!log_message.contains(SECRET_SENTINEL));
+        assert!(malformed_log_message.contains(SUPPRESSED_JSON_BODY));
+        assert!(!malformed_log_message.contains(MALFORMED_SENTINEL));
+        assert!(!non_json_log_message.contains(NON_JSON_SENTINEL));
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn test_timeout_config_default() {
         let config = TimeoutConfig::default();

rust/lancedb/src/remote/db.rs

@@ -554,6 +554,7 @@ impl<S: HttpSend> Database for RemoteDatabase<S> {
         &self,
         request: FunctionRegistrationRequest,
     ) -> Result<Job<FunctionVersion>> {
+        request.validate_secret_values()?;
         let req = self.client.post("/v1/functions/create").json(&request);
         let (request_id, response) = self.client.send(req).await?;
         let response = self.client.check_response(&request_id, response).await?;
@@ -2642,7 +2643,8 @@ mod tests {
         );
         const FUNCTION_JOB: &str =
             include_str!("../../tests/fixtures/first_class_functions/v1/remote_function_job.json");
-        let expected: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(REQUEST).unwrap();
+        let mut expected: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(REQUEST).unwrap();
+        expected["secret_values"] = serde_json::json!({"API_TOKEN": "secret-value"});
         let conn = Connection::new_with_handler(move |request| match request.url().path() {
             "/v1/functions/create" => {
                 assert_eq!(request.method(), &reqwest::Method::POST);
@@ -2660,7 +2662,10 @@ mod tests {
                 .unwrap(),
             path => panic!("unexpected path: {path}"),
         });
-        let request = crate::function::FunctionRegistrationRequest::from_json(REQUEST).unwrap();
+        let mut request = crate::function::FunctionRegistrationRequest::from_json(REQUEST).unwrap();
+        request
+            .secret_values
+            .insert("API_TOKEN".to_string(), "secret-value".to_string());
         let job = conn.create_function_async(request).await.unwrap();
         assert_eq!(job.id(), Some("job-function-1"));
         let version = job.wait().await.unwrap();
@@ -2668,6 +2673,32 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(version.version(), "fv_01K3EXACT");
     }
 
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn test_create_function_async_validates_secrets_before_serialization_and_send() {
+        const REQUEST: &str = include_str!(
+            "../../tests/fixtures/first_class_functions/v1/remote_function_registration_request.json"
+        );
+        let sends = Arc::new(AtomicUsize::new(0));
+        let sends_ref = sends.clone();
+        let conn = Connection::new_with_handler(move |_| {
+            sends_ref.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
+            http::Response::builder().status(500).body("").unwrap()
+        });
+        let mut request = crate::function::FunctionRegistrationRequest::from_json(REQUEST).unwrap();
+        request.secret_values.insert(
+            "API_TOKEN".to_string(),
+            "x".repeat(crate::function::MAX_FUNCTION_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES + 1),
+        );
+
+        let error = conn.create_function_async(request).await.unwrap_err();
+
+        assert!(matches!(
+            error,
+            Error::InvalidInput { message } if message.contains("65536-byte limit")
+        ));
+        assert_eq!(sends.load(Ordering::SeqCst), 0);
+    }
+
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn test_get_function_requires_and_sends_exact_version() {
         const VERSION: &str = include_str!(

rust/lancedb/src/table/computed_columns.rs

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 use std::collections::{BTreeSet, HashMap};
 use std::sync::Arc;
 
-use arrow_schema::{DataType, Field as ArrowField, Fields, Schema as ArrowSchema, SchemaRef};
+use arrow_schema::{DataType, Field as ArrowField, Schema as ArrowSchema, SchemaRef};
 use datafusion_common::tree_node::TreeNode;
 use datafusion_physical_plan::PhysicalExpr;
 use lance::dataset::NewColumnTransform;
@@ -1273,11 +1273,6 @@ pub(crate) fn bind(schema: SchemaRef, column: &str, expression: &str) -> Result<
 /// refresh time: that the expression parses, that every column it reads
 /// exists, and that the target name is free. A declaration that survives this
 /// is one a refresh can always act on.
-///
-/// Each accepted column joins the schema the next one resolves against, so a
-/// batch may declare `a` and then `b = a + 1` in one commit. Refresh fills a
-/// column's computed inputs before the column, so the order of refresh calls
-/// does not matter.
 pub(crate) fn plan(schema: SchemaRef, columns: &[(String, String)]) -> Result<Vec<ArrowField>> {
     if columns.is_empty() {
         return Err(Error::InvalidInput {
@@ -1285,11 +1280,11 @@ pub(crate) fn plan(schema: SchemaRef, columns: &[(String, String)]) -> Result<Ve
         });
     }
 
-    let mut schema = schema;
     let mut fields = Vec::with_capacity(columns.len());
+    let mut declared: Vec<&str> = Vec::with_capacity(columns.len());
 
     for (name, expression) in columns {
-        if schema.field_with_name(name).is_ok() {
+        if schema.field_with_name(name).is_ok() || declared.contains(&name.as_str()) {
             return Err(Error::ColumnAlreadyExists { name: name.clone() });
         }
 
@@ -1297,31 +1292,16 @@ pub(crate) fn plan(schema: SchemaRef, columns: &[(String, String)]) -> Result<Ve
 
         // Declared columns start entirely null, so nullability is a property
         // of the declaration rather than of what the expression yields.
-        let field = ArrowField::new(name, bound.data_type, true)
-            .with_metadata(computed_column_metadata(expression, &bound.inputs));
-        schema = Arc::new(ArrowSchema::new_with_metadata(
-            schema
-                .fields()
-                .iter()
-                .cloned()
-                .chain(std::iter::once(Arc::new(field.clone())))
-                .collect::<Fields>(),
-            schema.metadata().clone(),
-        ));
-        fields.push(field);
+        fields.push(
+            ArrowField::new(name, bound.data_type, true)
+                .with_metadata(computed_column_metadata(expression, &bound.inputs)),
+        );
+        declared.push(name);
     }
 
     Ok(fields)
 }
 
-/// Check `(name, expression)` pairs against `schema` exactly as
-/// [`AddColumnsBuilder::computed`](super::AddColumnsBuilder::computed) will
-/// admit them, without committing. For callers that stage declarations
-/// behind other work and need the rejection before any of it lands.
-pub fn validate_declarations(schema: SchemaRef, columns: &[(String, String)]) -> Result<()> {
-    plan(schema, columns).map(drop)
-}
-
 /// Build the transform that declares `columns` against `schema`.
 ///
 /// An all-null column is how a binding with no values yet is carried into a
@@ -1602,40 +1582,6 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(declared(&table).await.is_empty());
     }
 
-    /// A batch may build on itself: one commit, and the later entry's inputs
-    /// name the earlier one.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_a_declaration_may_read_one_declared_before_it() {
-        let table = table_with_ints("chain").await;
-        let before = table.version().await.unwrap();
-        add_computed(
-            &table,
-            &[("a".into(), "x + 1".into()), ("b".into(), "a * 2".into())],
-        )
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(table.version().await.unwrap(), before + 1);
-        let declared = declared(&table).await;
-        assert_eq!(declared[1].name, "b");
-        assert_eq!(declared[1].inputs, vec!["a".to_string()]);
-
-        // Order is the dependency order; reading ahead is still unknown.
-        let err = add_computed(
-            &table,
-            &[("c".into(), "d + 1".into()), ("d".into(), "x + 1".into())],
-        )
-        .await
-        .unwrap_err();
-        assert!(matches!(err, Error::InvalidExpression { column, .. } if column == "c"));
-        assert!(
-            validate_declarations(
-                table.schema().await.unwrap(),
-                &[("e".into(), "random()".into())]
-            )
-            .is_err()
-        );
-    }
-
     /// A column added by an ordinary transform is materialized, not bound, so
     /// it carries no declaration to report.
     #[tokio::test]

rust/lancedb/src/table/refresh.rs

@@ -7,12 +7,6 @@
 //! therefore idempotent and does not observe input mutation -- once a row is
 //! filled, changing what the expression reads leaves the stored result alone.
 //!
-//! A column's computed inputs are filled first, each by its own refresh and
-//! commit, so the expression never reads an input's placeholder null as a
-//! value. Two concurrent fills of one input collide on its field in lance's
-//! conflict check, so a dependent fill can only commit over inputs that were
-//! already durable when it read them.
-//!
 //! Two passes per fragment. The first scans only the unfilled live rows and
 //! evaluates the expression over them, which yields the exact fill count and
 //! decides whether the fragment is staged at all -- a fragment where nothing
@@ -47,8 +41,7 @@ use crate::{Error, Result};
 /// The result of refreshing a computed column.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
 pub struct RefreshColumnResult {
-    /// Rows that had a value computed, in the requested column only; inputs
-    /// filled on its behalf are not counted.
+    /// Rows that had a value computed.
     #[serde(default)]
     pub rows_filled: u64,
     /// The commit version associated with the operation.
@@ -81,35 +74,7 @@ async fn execute_refresh_column_with_source(
 
     let expression = declared_expression(&dataset, column)?;
     let schema = Arc::new(ArrowSchema::from(dataset.schema()));
-    let bound = Arc::new(super::computed_columns::bind(
-        schema.clone(),
-        column,
-        &expression,
-    )?);
-
-    // Inputs that are themselves computed are filled first, so their
-    // placeholder nulls are never read as values. Declarations are acyclic by
-    // construction: a column can only read what existed when it was declared.
-    for input in &bound.roots {
-        let Some(declaration) = schema
-            .field_with_name(input)
-            .ok()
-            .and_then(computed_column_from_field)
-        else {
-            continue;
-        };
-        if !matches!(declaration.kind, ComputedColumnKind::Sql { .. }) {
-            return Err(Error::NotSupported {
-                message: format!(
-                    "computed column '{column}' reads '{input}', which this refresh cannot \
-                     fill first; refresh '{input}' before '{column}'"
-                ),
-            });
-        }
-        Box::pin(execute_refresh_column_with_source(table, input)).await?;
-    }
-    // Re-read: the input fills above committed on this handle.
-    let dataset = table.dataset.get().await?;
+    let bound = Arc::new(super::computed_columns::bind(schema, column, &expression)?);
     let field = dataset
         .schema()
         .field(column)
@@ -449,37 +414,6 @@ mod tests {
         table.add(batch).execute().await.unwrap();
     }
 
-    /// The gate's reproducer: `b = coalesce(a, 0)` refreshed before `a`
-    /// must not bake zeros from `a`'s placeholder null.
-    #[tokio::test]
-    async fn test_dependent_refresh_cannot_fill_from_placeholder_null() {
-        let table = table_with("dependent_refresh_order", vec![1, 2, 3]).await;
-        table
-            .add_columns()
-            .computed("a", "x + 1")
-            .computed("b", "coalesce(a, 0)")
-            .execute()
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
-
-        let result = table.refresh_column("b").await.unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(result.rows_filled, 3);
-        assert_eq!(read(&table, "a").await, vec![Some(2), Some(3), Some(4)]);
-        assert_eq!(
-            table.count_rows(Some("b = a".to_string())).await.unwrap(),
-            3
-        );
-        assert_eq!(table.refresh_column("a").await.unwrap().rows_filled, 0);
-
-        // Appended rows: the input is filled in the new fragment first too.
-        append(&table, vec![10]).await;
-        assert_eq!(table.refresh_column("b").await.unwrap().rows_filled, 1);
-        assert_eq!(
-            table.count_rows(Some("b = 0".to_string())).await.unwrap(),
-            0
-        );
-    }
-
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn test_refresh_fills_a_declared_column() {
         let table = table_with("refresh_fills", vec![1, 2, 3]).await;

rust/lancedb/tests/first_class_function_slice1.rs

@@ -20,6 +20,25 @@ fn job_result(name: &str) -> Value {
     serde_json::from_str::<Value>(&fixture(name)).expect("remote Job fixture")["result"].clone()
 }
 
+fn assert_no_secret_values(value: &Value) {
+    match value {
+        Value::Object(values) => {
+            for (key, value) in values {
+                assert!(
+                    !matches!(
+                        key.as_str(),
+                        "secret_value" | "secret_values" | "resolved_secret" | "resolved_secrets"
+                    ),
+                    "client canonical value must not model resolved secret material"
+                );
+                assert_no_secret_values(value);
+            }
+        }
+        Value::Array(values) => values.iter().for_each(assert_no_secret_values),
+        _ => {}
+    }
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn function_version_job_result_matches_shared_canonical_golden() {
     let result = job_result("remote_function_job.json");
@@ -28,6 +47,7 @@ fn function_version_job_result_matches_shared_canonical_golden() {
     assert_eq!(version.name(), "embed");
     assert_eq!(version.version(), "fv_01K3EXACT");
     assert_eq!(version.runtime_digest(), "sha256:runtime");
+    assert_eq!(version.required_secrets(), &["HF_TOKEN"]);
     assert_eq!(
         version.to_canonical_json().expect("canonical JSON"),
         fixture("remote_function_version.canonical.json").trim()
@@ -142,3 +162,21 @@ fn floating_point_application_literals_are_rejected_consistently() {
             .contains("floating-point Function literals")
     );
 }
+
+#[test]
+fn canonical_client_values_contain_secret_names_only() {
+    let result = job_result("remote_function_job.json");
+    let version = FunctionVersion::from_json(&result.to_string()).expect("FunctionVersion result");
+    let canonical: Value = serde_json::from_str(
+        &version
+            .to_canonical_json()
+            .expect("canonical FunctionVersion"),
+    )
+    .expect("canonical JSON");
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        canonical["required_secrets"],
+        serde_json::json!(["HF_TOKEN"])
+    );
+    assert_no_secret_values(&canonical);
+}

rust/lancedb/tests/first_class_function_slice2.rs

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ use std::path::PathBuf;
 
 use lancedb::Error;
 use lancedb::function::FunctionRegistrationRequest;
+use serde_json::Value;
 
 fn fixture(name: &str) -> String {
     let path = PathBuf::from(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"))
@@ -14,6 +15,25 @@ fn fixture(name: &str) -> String {
     fs::read_to_string(path).expect("fixture must be readable")
 }
 
+fn assert_no_secret_values(value: &Value) {
+    match value {
+        Value::Object(values) => {
+            for (key, value) in values {
+                assert!(
+                    !matches!(
+                        key.as_str(),
+                        "secret_value" | "secret_values" | "resolved_secret" | "resolved_secrets"
+                    ),
+                    "registration requests must not model resolved secret material"
+                );
+                assert_no_secret_values(value);
+            }
+        }
+        Value::Array(values) => values.iter().for_each(assert_no_secret_values),
+        _ => {}
+    }
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn registration_request_matches_shared_canonical_golden() {
     let request = FunctionRegistrationRequest::from_json(&fixture(
@@ -22,10 +42,33 @@ fn registration_request_matches_shared_canonical_golden() {
     .expect("registration request");
     assert_eq!(request.name, "normalize_score");
     assert_eq!(request.artifact.adapter.kind, "scalar_to_arrow_batch");
+    assert_eq!(request.required_secrets, ["API_TOKEN"]);
+    assert!(request.secret_values.is_empty());
     assert_eq!(
         request.to_canonical_json().expect("canonical request"),
         fixture("remote_function_registration_request.canonical.json").trim()
     );
+
+    let value: Value =
+        serde_json::from_str(&request.to_canonical_json().expect("canonical request"))
+            .expect("request JSON");
+    assert_no_secret_values(&value);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn registration_request_serializes_secret_values_but_redacts_debug_output() {
+    let mut value: Value =
+        serde_json::from_str(&fixture("remote_function_registration_request.json")).unwrap();
+    value["secret_values"] = serde_json::json!({"API_TOKEN": "secret-plaintext"});
+    let request = FunctionRegistrationRequest::from_json(&value.to_string()).unwrap();
+
+    assert_eq!(request.secret_values["API_TOKEN"], "secret-plaintext");
+    let canonical = request.to_canonical_json().unwrap();
+    assert!(canonical.contains("secret-plaintext"));
+    let debug = format!("{request:?}");
+    assert!(debug.contains("API_TOKEN"));
+    assert!(debug.contains("[REDACTED]"));
+    assert!(!debug.contains("secret-plaintext"));
 }
 
 #[tokio::test]

rust/lancedb/tests/fixtures/first_class_functions/v1/remote_function_job.json

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
     },
     "runtime_digest": "sha256:runtime",
     "environment_digest": "sha256:environment",
+    "required_secrets": ["HF_TOKEN"],
     "created_at": "2026-08-21T00:00:00Z"
   },
   "future_job": {"trace_id": "trace-1"}

rust/lancedb/tests/fixtures/first_class_functions/v1/remote_function_registration_request.canonical.json

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"artifact":{"adapter":{"kind":"scalar_to_arrow_batch","version":1},"content":{"data":"ZnJvbSBfX2Z1dHVyZV9fIGltcG9ydCBhbm5vdGF0aW9ucwoKZGVmIG5vcm1hbGl6ZV9zY29yZSh2YWx1ZTogZmxvYXQpIC0+IGZsb2F0OgogICAgcmV0dXJuIHZhbHVlIC8gMTAwLjAK","encoding":"base64"},"digest":"sha256:760784bdcef57b802f389b97804cc0b618aae39e86044733451bcd0b13089a7f","entrypoint":"normalize_score","kind":"python_callable"},"name":"normalize_score","runtime":{"env":{"MODE":"test"},"environment":{"kind":"pip","packages":["numpy>=2"]},"kind":"python","python_version":"3.12"},"signature":{"inputs":[{"arrow_type":"float64","name":"value","nullable":false}],"output":{"arrow_type":"float64","kind":"scalar","nullable":false}}}
+{"artifact":{"adapter":{"kind":"scalar_to_arrow_batch","version":1},"content":{"data":"ZnJvbSBfX2Z1dHVyZV9fIGltcG9ydCBhbm5vdGF0aW9ucwoKZGVmIG5vcm1hbGl6ZV9zY29yZSh2YWx1ZTogZmxvYXQpIC0+IGZsb2F0OgogICAgcmV0dXJuIHZhbHVlIC8gMTAwLjAK","encoding":"base64"},"digest":"sha256:760784bdcef57b802f389b97804cc0b618aae39e86044733451bcd0b13089a7f","entrypoint":"normalize_score","kind":"python_callable"},"name":"normalize_score","required_secrets":["API_TOKEN"],"runtime":{"env":{"MODE":"test"},"environment":{"kind":"pip","packages":["numpy>=2"]},"kind":"python","python_version":"3.12"},"signature":{"inputs":[{"arrow_type":"float64","name":"value","nullable":false}],"output":{"arrow_type":"float64","kind":"scalar","nullable":false}}}

rust/lancedb/tests/fixtures/first_class_functions/v1/remote_function_registration_request.json

@@ -39,5 +39,8 @@
     "env": {
       "MODE": "test"
     }
-  }
+  },
+  "required_secrets": [
+    "API_TOKEN"
+  ]
 }

rust/lancedb/tests/fixtures/first_class_functions/v1/remote_function_version.canonical.json

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"artifact":{"digest":"sha256:code","entrypoint":"embed","kind":"python_callable"},"created_at":"2026-08-21T00:00:00Z","environment_digest":"sha256:environment","name":"embed","runtime":{"env":{"TOKENIZERS_PARALLELISM":"false"},"environment":{"kind":"pip","packages":["sentence-transformers>=3"]},"kind":"python","python_version":"3.12"},"runtime_digest":"sha256:runtime","signature":{"inputs":[{"arrow_type":"utf8","name":"text","nullable":true}],"output":{"arrow_type":"list<float32>","kind":"scalar","nullable":false}},"version":"fv_01K3EXACT"}
+{"artifact":{"digest":"sha256:code","entrypoint":"embed","kind":"python_callable"},"created_at":"2026-08-21T00:00:00Z","environment_digest":"sha256:environment","name":"embed","required_secrets":["HF_TOKEN"],"runtime":{"env":{"TOKENIZERS_PARALLELISM":"false"},"environment":{"kind":"pip","packages":["sentence-transformers>=3"]},"kind":"python","python_version":"3.12"},"runtime_digest":"sha256:runtime","signature":{"inputs":[{"arrow_type":"utf8","name":"text","nullable":true}],"output":{"arrow_type":"list<float32>","kind":"scalar","nullable":false}},"version":"fv_01K3EXACT"}