Files
neon/.github/workflows/check-permissions.yml
StepSecurity Bot 88ea855cff fix(ci): Fixing StepSecurity Flagged Issues (#11311)
This pull request is created by
[StepSecurity](https://app.stepsecurity.io/securerepo) at the request of
@areyou1or0.
 ## Summary

This pull request is created by
[StepSecurity](https://app.stepsecurity.io/securerepo) at the request of
@areyou1or0. Please merge the Pull Request to incorporate the requested
changes. Please tag @areyou1or0 on your message if you have any
questions related to the PR.
## Summary

This pull request is created by
[StepSecurity](https://app.stepsecurity.io/securerepo) at the request of
@areyou1or0. Please merge the Pull Request to incorporate the requested
changes. Please tag @areyou1or0 on your message if you have any
questions related to the PR.

## Security Fixes

### Least Privileged GitHub Actions Token Permissions

The GITHUB_TOKEN is an automatically generated secret to make
authenticated calls to the GitHub API. GitHub recommends setting minimum
token permissions for the GITHUB_TOKEN.

- [GitHub Security
Guide](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/automatic-token-authentication#using-the-github_token-in-a-workflow)
- [The Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) Security
Guide](https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/main/docs/checks.md#token-permissions)
### Pinned Dependencies

GitHub Action tags and Docker tags are mutable. This poses a security
risk. GitHub's Security Hardening guide recommends pinning actions to
full length commit.

- [GitHub Security
Guide](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/security-hardening-for-github-actions#using-third-party-actions)
- [The Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) Security
Guide](https://github.com/ossf/scorecard/blob/main/docs/checks.md#pinned-dependencies)
### Harden Runner

[Harden-Runner](https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner) is an
open-source security agent for the GitHub-hosted runner to prevent
software supply chain attacks. It prevents exfiltration of credentials,
detects tampering of source code during build, and enables running jobs
without `sudo` access. See how popular open-source projects use
Harden-Runner
[here](https://docs.stepsecurity.io/whos-using-harden-runner).

<details>
<summary>Harden runner usage</summary>

You can find link to view insights and policy recommendation in the
build log

<img
src="https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner/blob/main/images/buildlog1.png?raw=true"
width="60%" height="60%">

Please refer to
[documentation](https://docs.stepsecurity.io/harden-runner) to find more
details.
</details>



will fix https://github.com/neondatabase/cloud/issues/26141
2025-03-19 16:44:22 +00:00

42 lines
1.2 KiB
YAML

name: Check Permissions
on:
workflow_call:
inputs:
github-event-name:
required: true
type: string
defaults:
run:
shell: bash -euo pipefail {0}
# No permission for GITHUB_TOKEN by default; the **minimal required** set of permissions should be granted in each job.
permissions: {}
jobs:
check-permissions:
runs-on: ubuntu-22.04
steps:
- name: Harden the runner (Audit all outbound calls)
uses: step-security/harden-runner@v2
with:
egress-policy: audit
- name: Disallow CI runs on PRs from forks
if: |
inputs.github-event-name == 'pull_request' &&
github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name != github.repository
run: |
if [ "${{ contains(fromJSON('["OWNER", "MEMBER", "COLLABORATOR"]'), github.event.pull_request.author_association) }}" = "true" ]; then
MESSAGE="Please create a PR from a branch of ${GITHUB_REPOSITORY} instead of a fork"
else
MESSAGE="The PR should be reviewed and labelled with 'approved-for-ci-run' to trigger a CI run"
fi
# TODO: use actions/github-script to post this message as a PR comment
echo >&2 "We don't run CI for PRs from forks"
echo >&2 "${MESSAGE}"
exit 1