Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into brennanb2025/chat-ui-supported-agents

.gitignore

@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ docs/**
 !docs/reference/git-compatibility.md
 !docs/reference/headless-linux-server.md
 !docs/reference/linux-glibc-compatibility.md
+!docs/reference/macos-press-and-hold.md
 !docs/reference/orcad-operations.md
 !docs/reference/relay-grace-time-reconfiguration.md
 !docs/reference/windows-process-enumeration.md

config/tsconfig.cli.json

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
     "../src/shared/**/*",
     "../src/main/agent-state-file-reader.ts",
     "../src/main/agent-hooks/hook-stdin-contract.ts",
+    "../src/main/agent-hooks/hook-post-command.ts",
     "../src/main/agent-hooks/hook-config-write-path.ts",
     "../src/main/agent-hooks/hooks-json-read.ts",
     "../src/main/agent-hooks/installer-utils.ts",

docs/assets/readme-downloads.svg

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="106" height="20" role="img" aria-label="downloads: 30m">
-  <title>downloads: 30m</title>
+<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="106" height="20" role="img" aria-label="downloads: 31m">
+  <title>downloads: 31m</title>
   <linearGradient id="s" x2="0" y2="100%">
     <stop offset="0" stop-color="#bbb" stop-opacity=".1"/>
     <stop offset="1" stop-opacity=".1"/>
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
   <g fill="#fff" text-anchor="middle" font-family="Verdana,Geneva,DejaVu Sans,sans-serif" text-rendering="geometricPrecision" font-size="11">
     <text x="37" y="15" fill="#010101" fill-opacity=".3">downloads</text>
     <text x="37" y="14">downloads</text>
-    <text x="90" y="15" fill="#010101" fill-opacity=".3">30m</text>
-    <text x="90" y="14">30m</text>
+    <text x="90" y="15" fill="#010101" fill-opacity=".3">31m</text>
+    <text x="90" y="14">31m</text>
   </g>
 </svg>

docs/reference/macos-press-and-hold.md

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+# macOS press-and-hold and key repeat
+
+macOS opens the accent picker when a key is held unless an application opts out in its preferences
+domain. That prevents held keys from repeating in terminal applications such as vim. On the first
+eligible launch, Orca writes:
+
+```sh
+defaults write com.stablyai.orca ApplePressAndHoldEnabled -bool false
+```
+
+The write is scoped to Orca's packaged bundle domain. Bare Electron development bundles and
+non-macOS platforms are left untouched. A fresh write is conservatively treated as taking effect
+on the next launch.
+
+## Precedence and decision record
+
+Orca checks for an explicit domain value before writing. Either `true` or `false` is treated as a
+user choice and preserved. Only an unset key receives the `false` default.
+
+The decision is stored once in
+`<userData>/macos-press-and-hold-default.json`. An `applied` or
+`kept-user-preference` decision prevents future launches from touching the domain again.
+Probe and write failures remain retryable so a transient failure does not permanently disable the
+fix.
+
+`defaults read <domain> <key>` is used instead of
+`systemPreferences.getUserDefault`: the Electron API cannot distinguish an unset key from an
+explicit `false`. Only the missing-key exit status is interpreted as unset; spawn failures,
+timeouts, and other exit statuses leave the preference alone.
+
+## Restoring the accent picker
+
+Set the preference explicitly, then restart Orca:
+
+```sh
+defaults write com.stablyai.orca ApplePressAndHoldEnabled -bool true
+```
+
+After Orca has recorded its one-time decision, deleting the key also restores the macOS default
+without Orca recreating it:
+
+```sh
+defaults delete com.stablyai.orca ApplePressAndHoldEnabled
+```
+
+Development and prerelease channels may use a channel-suffixed Orca bundle identifier; use that
+domain instead when applicable.
+
+## Reverting
+
+Deleting the startup code is not enough. AppKit reads the persisted preference, so a code revert
+must also arrange to delete the key for users who ran an affected build.
+
+## Test coverage
+
+Unit tests cover platform guards, explicit-value preservation, retry behavior, domain ownership,
+record persistence, and subprocess exit interpretation on CI. A macOS-only test additionally pins
+the real `defaults(1)` behavior, but current PR CI does not execute tests on macOS.

electron.vite.config.ts

@@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ export const electronViteConfig: UserConfig = {
           index: resolve('src/main/index.ts'),
           // Why: sandboxed webview preloads cannot load Rollup helper chunks.
           'browser-window-close-preload': resolve('src/preload/browser-window-close.ts'),
+          'doc-preview-link-preload': resolve('src/preload/doc-preview-link.ts'),
           'daemon-entry': resolve('src/main/daemon/daemon-entry.ts'),
           'plugin-host-entry': resolve('src/main/plugins/plugin-host-entry.ts'),
           'computer-sidecar': resolve('src/main/computer/sidecar-entry.ts'),

src/cli/handlers/agent-hooks.test.ts

@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ describe('agent hooks CLI handler', () => {
   })
 
   afterEach(() => {
+    vi.unstubAllEnvs()
     vi.restoreAllMocks()
     rmSync(userDataPath, { recursive: true, force: true })
   })
@@ -139,6 +140,33 @@ describe('agent hooks CLI handler', () => {
     })
   })
 
+  it('forwards WSL pane routing to the runtime exactly once without using the host installer', async () => {
+    const home = '/home/jin/.local/share/orca/codex-runtime-home/home'
+    vi.stubEnv('CODEX_HOME', home)
+    vi.stubEnv('ORCA_CODEX_HOME', home)
+    vi.stubEnv('WSL_DISTRO_NAME', 'Ubuntu-24.04')
+    callMock.mockResolvedValue({ result: { state: 'installed' } })
+
+    await main(['agent', 'hooks', 'prepare-codex'], userDataPath)
+
+    expect(callMock).toHaveBeenCalledExactlyOnceWith(
+      'agentHooks.prepareCodexForWslPane',
+      { codexHome: home, orcaCodexHome: home, wslDistro: 'Ubuntu-24.04' },
+      { timeoutMs: 50_000 }
+    )
+    expect(prepareManagedCodexHomeBeforeShellLaunchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('fails open when WSL runtime preparation is unavailable', async () => {
+    vi.stubEnv('CODEX_HOME', '/home/jin/.local/share/orca/codex-runtime-home/home')
+    vi.stubEnv('ORCA_CODEX_HOME', '/home/jin/.local/share/orca/codex-runtime-home/home')
+    vi.stubEnv('WSL_DISTRO_NAME', 'Ubuntu')
+    callMock.mockRejectedValue(new Error('method_not_found'))
+
+    await expect(main(['agent', 'hooks', 'prepare-codex'], userDataPath)).resolves.toBeUndefined()
+    expect(prepareManagedCodexHomeBeforeShellLaunchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
   it('honors Codex-specific disablement when the runtime is unavailable', async () => {
     const state = getDefaultPersistedState(userDataPath)
     state.settings.disabledTuiAgents = ['codex']

src/cli/handlers/agent-hooks.ts

@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ type AgentHookCommandResult = {
   statuses: AgentHookInstallStatus[]
 }
 
+// Covers managed-home verification, WSL identity, trust grant, and bounded app-server reap.
+const WSL_CODEX_PREPARE_TIMEOUT_MS = 50_000
+
 function getDataPath(): string {
   const userDataPath = getDefaultUserDataPath()
   const indexPath = join(userDataPath, 'orca-profile-index.json')
@@ -207,6 +210,22 @@ async function setAgentHooksEnabled(
 
 export const AGENT_HOOK_HANDLERS: Record<string, CommandHandler> = {
   'agent hooks prepare-codex': async ({ client }) => {
+    if (process.env.WSL_DISTRO_NAME?.trim()) {
+      try {
+        await client.call(
+          'agentHooks.prepareCodexForWslPane',
+          {
+            codexHome: process.env.CODEX_HOME ?? '',
+            orcaCodexHome: process.env.ORCA_CODEX_HOME ?? '',
+            wslDistro: process.env.WSL_DISTRO_NAME
+          },
+          { timeoutMs: WSL_CODEX_PREPARE_TIMEOUT_MS }
+        )
+      } catch {
+        // Best effort: old or unavailable runtimes must not block Codex launch.
+      }
+      return
+    }
     const settings = await readHookSettings(client)
     await prepareManagedCodexHomeBeforeShellLaunch({
       userDataPath: getDefaultUserDataPath(),

src/main/__fixtures__/shell-wrapper-snapshots/daemon-bash-rcfile.txt

@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ fi
 # Why || : twice — zsh alone aborts inside the substitution, but every shell's
 # assignment adopts its exit status, so an absent codex trips set -e in bash too.
 __orca_codex_binary="$(unalias codex 2>/dev/null || :; command -v codex 2>/dev/null || :)"
-if [[ -n "${ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT:-}" && -n "${__orca_codex_binary:-}" && -x "${__orca_codex_binary}" ]]; then
+if [[ -n "${ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT:-}" && -x "${ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT}" && -n "${__orca_codex_binary:-}" && -x "${__orca_codex_binary}" ]]; then
   # Why the function reserved word: it suppresses alias expansion of the name,
   # which otherwise rewrites this header at parse time and aborts the whole file.
   function codex {

src/main/__fixtures__/shell-wrapper-snapshots/daemon-fish-init.txt

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ function __orca_shell_ready_marker --on-event fish_prompt
   builtin printf "\033]777;orca-shell-ready\007"
   functions -e __orca_shell_ready_marker
 end
-if test -n "$ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT"; and test (type -t codex 2>/dev/null) = file
+if test -x "$ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT"; and test (type -t codex 2>/dev/null) = file
   function codex
     command "$ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT" agent hooks prepare-codex >/dev/null 2>&1; or true
     command codex $argv

src/main/__fixtures__/shell-wrapper-snapshots/daemon-zsh-zshenv.txt

@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ __orca_deferred_init() {
     # Why || : twice — zsh alone aborts inside the substitution, but every shell's
     # assignment adopts its exit status, so an absent codex trips set -e in bash too.
     __orca_codex_binary="$(unalias codex 2>/dev/null || :; command -v codex 2>/dev/null || :)"
-    if [[ -n "${ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT:-}" && -n "${__orca_codex_binary:-}" && -x "${__orca_codex_binary}" ]]; then
+    if [[ -n "${ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT:-}" && -x "${ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT}" && -n "${__orca_codex_binary:-}" && -x "${__orca_codex_binary}" ]]; then
       # Why the function reserved word: it suppresses alias expansion of the name,
       # which otherwise rewrites this header at parse time and aborts the whole file.
       function codex {

src/main/__fixtures__/shell-wrapper-snapshots/local-bash-rcfile.txt

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ fi
 # Why || : twice — zsh alone aborts inside the substitution, but every shell's
 # assignment adopts its exit status, so an absent codex trips set -e in bash too.
 __orca_codex_binary="$(unalias codex 2>/dev/null || :; command -v codex 2>/dev/null || :)"
-if [[ -n "${ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT:-}" && -n "${__orca_codex_binary:-}" && -x "${__orca_codex_binary}" ]]; then
+if [[ -n "${ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT:-}" && -x "${ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT}" && -n "${__orca_codex_binary:-}" && -x "${__orca_codex_binary}" ]]; then
   # Why the function reserved word: it suppresses alias expansion of the name,
   # which otherwise rewrites this header at parse time and aborts the whole file.
   function codex {

src/main/__fixtures__/shell-wrapper-snapshots/local-fish-init.txt

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ function __orca_shell_ready_marker --on-event fish_prompt
   builtin printf "\033]777;orca-shell-ready\007"
   functions -e __orca_shell_ready_marker
 end
-if test -n "$ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT"; and test (type -t codex 2>/dev/null) = file
+if test -x "$ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT"; and test (type -t codex 2>/dev/null) = file
   function codex
     command "$ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT" agent hooks prepare-codex >/dev/null 2>&1; or true
     command codex $argv

src/main/__fixtures__/shell-wrapper-snapshots/local-zsh-zshenv.txt

@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ __orca_deferred_init() {
     # Why || : twice — zsh alone aborts inside the substitution, but every shell's
     # assignment adopts its exit status, so an absent codex trips set -e in bash too.
     __orca_codex_binary="$(unalias codex 2>/dev/null || :; command -v codex 2>/dev/null || :)"
-    if [[ -n "${ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT:-}" && -n "${__orca_codex_binary:-}" && -x "${__orca_codex_binary}" ]]; then
+    if [[ -n "${ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT:-}" && -x "${ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT}" && -n "${__orca_codex_binary:-}" && -x "${__orca_codex_binary}" ]]; then
       # Why the function reserved word: it suppresses alias expansion of the name,
       # which otherwise rewrites this header at parse time and aborts the whole file.
       function codex {

src/main/agent-hooks/hook-post-command.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+import type { AgentHookSource } from '../../shared/agent-hook-relay'
+import { ORCA_HOOK_RAW_JSON_TRANSPORT } from '../../shared/agent-hook-types'
+
+export function buildPosixAgentHookPostCommand(
+  source: AgentHookSource,
+  options: { curlCommand?: string; indent?: string } = {}
+): string[] {
+  const curlCommand = options.curlCommand ?? 'curl'
+  const indent = options.indent ?? '  '
+  return [
+    `if [ "\${ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TRANSPORT:-}" = "${ORCA_HOOK_RAW_JSON_TRANSPORT}" ] && command -v base64 >/dev/null 2>&1 && command -v tr >/dev/null 2>&1; then`,
+    `  orca_hook_metadata=$(printf '%s\\037%s\\037%s\\037%s\\037%s\\037%s' "$ORCA_PANE_KEY" "$ORCA_TAB_ID" "$ORCA_AGENT_LAUNCH_TOKEN" "$ORCA_WORKTREE_ID" "$ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_ENV" "$ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_VERSION" | base64 | tr -d '\\n') && \\`,
+    `  [ -n "$orca_hook_metadata" ] && \\`,
+    `  printf '%s' "$payload" | ${curlCommand} -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:\${ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_PORT}/hook/${source}" \\`,
+    `  ${indent}--connect-timeout "\${connect_timeout:-0.5}" --max-time "\${max_time:-1.5}" \\`,
+    `  ${indent}--noproxy "127.0.0.1" \\`,
+    `  ${indent}-H "Content-Type: application/json" \\`,
+    `  ${indent}-H "X-Orca-Agent-Hook-Token: \${ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TOKEN}" \\`,
+    `  ${indent}-H "X-Orca-Agent-Hook-Meta-Encoding: base64" \\`,
+    `  ${indent}-H "X-Orca-Agent-Hook-Meta: \${orca_hook_metadata}" \\`,
+    `  ${indent}--data-binary @-`,
+    'else',
+    `  printf '%s' "$payload" | ${curlCommand} -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:\${ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_PORT}/hook/${source}" \\`,
+    `  ${indent}--connect-timeout "\${connect_timeout:-0.5}" --max-time "\${max_time:-1.5}" \\`,
+    `  ${indent}--noproxy "127.0.0.1" \\`,
+    `  ${indent}-H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \\`,
+    `  ${indent}-H "X-Orca-Agent-Hook-Token: \${ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TOKEN}" \\`,
+    `  ${indent}--data-urlencode "paneKey=\${ORCA_PANE_KEY}" \\`,
+    `  ${indent}--data-urlencode "tabId=\${ORCA_TAB_ID}" \\`,
+    `  ${indent}--data-urlencode "launchToken=\${ORCA_AGENT_LAUNCH_TOKEN}" \\`,
+    `  ${indent}--data-urlencode "worktreeId=\${ORCA_WORKTREE_ID}" \\`,
+    `  ${indent}--data-urlencode "env=\${ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_ENV}" \\`,
+    `  ${indent}--data-urlencode "version=\${ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_VERSION}" \\`,
+    `  ${indent}--data-urlencode "payload@-"`,
+    'fi'
+  ]
+}

src/main/agent-hooks/installer-utils.test.ts

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ import {
   writeHooksJson,
   type HooksConfig
 } from './installer-utils'
+import { buildPosixAgentHookPostCommand } from './hook-post-command'
 import { POSIX_HOOK_STDIN_DRAIN_COMMAND } from './hook-stdin-contract'
 import { wrapRuntimeHomeHookCommand } from './runtime-home-hook-command'
 
@@ -882,6 +883,26 @@ describe('buildWindowsAgentHookPostCommand', () => {
   })
 })
 
+describe('buildPosixAgentHookPostCommand', () => {
+  it('uses raw JSON only when the listener advertises support', () => {
+    const command = buildPosixAgentHookPostCommand('claude').join('\n')
+
+    expect(command).toContain('ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TRANSPORT:-}')
+    expect(command).toContain('raw-json-v1')
+    expect(command).toContain('command -v base64')
+    expect(command).toContain('command -v tr')
+    expect(command).toContain('Content-Type: application/json')
+    expect(command).toContain('X-Orca-Agent-Hook-Meta-Encoding: base64')
+    expect(command).toContain('X-Orca-Agent-Hook-Meta: ${orca_hook_metadata}')
+    expect(command).toContain("printf '%s\\037%s\\037%s\\037%s\\037%s\\037%s'")
+    expect(command).toContain('$ORCA_PANE_KEY')
+    expect(command).toContain('$ORCA_WORKTREE_ID')
+    expect(command).toContain('--data-binary @-')
+    expect(command).toContain('Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded')
+    expect(command).toContain('--data-urlencode "payload@-"')
+  })
+})
+
 describe('buildWindowsAgentHookCurlPostCommand', () => {
   it('posts form fields via curl.exe and reads the payload from stdin', () => {
     const command = buildWindowsAgentHookCurlPostCommand('codex')

src/main/agent-hooks/remote-hook-service-installers.test.ts

@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ describe('remote hook service installers', () => {
       hooks: Record<string, { hooks: { command: string }[] }[]>
     }
     expect(hooks.hooks.Stop?.[0]?.hooks?.[0]?.command).toContain(
-      '/home/dev/.orca/agent-hooks/codex-hook.sh'
+      '/home/dev/.local/share/orca/codex-runtime-home/home/.orca/agent-hooks/codex-hook.sh'
     )
     expect(fs.files.get(`${runtimeHome}/config.toml`)).toContain(
       `${runtimeHome}/hooks.json:stop:0:0`

src/main/agent-hooks/server-endpoint-file-lifecycle.test.ts

@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ describe('Endpoint file lifecycle', () => {
       expect(contents).toContain(`${prefix}ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TOKEN=${expectedToken}`)
       expect(contents).toContain(`${prefix}ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_ENV=development`)
       expect(contents).toContain(`${prefix}ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_VERSION=1`)
+      expect(contents).toContain(`${prefix}ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TRANSPORT=raw-json-v1`)
     } finally {
       server.stop()
     }

src/main/agent-hooks/server-hook-http-ingest.test.ts

@@ -44,6 +44,38 @@ async function postClaudeHook(
 }
 
 describe('AgentHookServer listener replay', () => {
+  it('accepts raw JSON hook bodies with base64 metadata headers', async () => {
+    const server = new AgentHookServer()
+    await server.start({ env: 'production' })
+    try {
+      const env = server.buildPtyEnv()
+      const response = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${env.ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_PORT}/hook/claude`, {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: {
+          'Content-Type': 'application/json',
+          'X-Orca-Agent-Hook-Token': env.ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TOKEN,
+          'X-Orca-Agent-Hook-Meta-Encoding': 'base64',
+          'X-Orca-Agent-Hook-Meta': Buffer.from(
+            [PANE, 'tab-1', '', 'wt-1', 'production', ''].join('\x1f')
+          ).toString('base64')
+        },
+        body: JSON.stringify({ hook_event_name: 'UserPromptSubmit', prompt: 'raw JSON' })
+      })
+
+      expect(response.status).toBe(204)
+      expect(server.getStatusSnapshot()).toEqual([
+        expect.objectContaining({
+          paneKey: PANE,
+          worktreeId: 'wt-1',
+          state: 'working',
+          prompt: 'raw JSON'
+        })
+      ])
+    } finally {
+      server.stop()
+    }
+  })
+
   it('caches and notifies status/main/plugin before retry scheduling and HTTP response', async () => {
     const server = new AgentHookServer()
     await server.start({ env: 'production' })

src/main/agent-hooks/server.ts

@@ -8,7 +8,10 @@ import { join } from 'node:path'
 import { track } from '../telemetry/client'
 import { getCohortAtEmit } from '../telemetry/cohort-classifier'
 import { AGENT_KIND_VALUES, type AgentKind } from '../../shared/telemetry-events'
-import { ORCA_HOOK_PROTOCOL_VERSION } from '../../shared/agent-hook-types'
+import {
+  ORCA_HOOK_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+  ORCA_HOOK_RAW_JSON_TRANSPORT
+} from '../../shared/agent-hook-types'
 import {
   clearAllListenerCaches,
   clearPaneCacheState,
@@ -46,6 +49,7 @@ import {
 } from '../../shared/agent-hook-listener/listener-limits'
 import { isNewTurnEvent } from '../../shared/agent-hook-listener/provider-event-routing'
 import { normalizeHookPayload } from '../../shared/agent-hook-listener'
+import { mergeAgentHookRequestHeaders } from '../../shared/agent-hook-listener/hook-envelope'
 import {
   parseFormEncodedBody,
   readRequestBody
@@ -2616,8 +2620,9 @@ export class AgentHookServer {
           return
         }
 
-        trackEmptyPaneKeyHook(body)
-        const aliasedBody = this.normalizeHookBodyPaneKeyAlias(body)
+        const hookBody = mergeAgentHookRequestHeaders(body, req.headers)
+        trackEmptyPaneKeyHook(hookBody)
+        const aliasedBody = this.normalizeHookBodyPaneKeyAlias(hookBody)
         const normalized = this.normalizeLocalHookPayload(source, aliasedBody)
         const statusDisposition = normalized.event
           ? this.getAgentStatusDisposition(normalized.event.paneKey, {
@@ -3129,7 +3134,8 @@ export class AgentHookServer {
       ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_PORT: String(this.port),
       ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TOKEN: this.token,
       ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_ENV: this.env,
-      ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_VERSION: ORCA_HOOK_PROTOCOL_VERSION
+      ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_VERSION: ORCA_HOOK_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+      ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TRANSPORT: ORCA_HOOK_RAW_JSON_TRANSPORT
     }
     // Why: hooks source this file at invocation; dev namespaces it so parallel `pnpm dev` runs don't steal each other's hooks.
     if (this.endpointFileWritten && this.endpointFilePathCache) {
@@ -3156,7 +3162,8 @@ export class AgentHookServer {
       port: this.port,
       token: this.token,
       env: this.env,
-      version: ORCA_HOOK_PROTOCOL_VERSION
+      version: ORCA_HOOK_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+      transport: ORCA_HOOK_RAW_JSON_TRANSPORT
     })
     this.endpointFileWritten = ok
   }

src/main/agent-hooks/wsl-hook-fs-adapter.ts

@@ -12,19 +12,23 @@ import {
   type ManagedHookDetectionSettings
 } from './managed-hook-detection-commands'
 import type { SshChannelMultiplexer } from '../ssh/ssh-channel-multiplexer'
-import { wslCodexRuntimeHomeForGuestHome } from '../pty/codex-home-wsl-env'
 import { WSL_HOOK_FS_METHODS, type WslFsResult } from '../../shared/wsl-hook-relay-contract'
+import type { AgentHookInstallStatus } from '../../shared/agent-hook-types'
 
 /** Run the shared remote hook installers against a WSL guest over the relay's fs bridge. */
 export async function installWslGuestHooks(options: {
   mux: SshChannelMultiplexer
   guestHome: string
+  codexHomePath: string | null
   distro: string
   installHooks: typeof installRemoteManagedAgentHooks
   settings: ManagedHookDetectionSettings
   warn: (message: string) => void
+  /** Canonical runtime-host installer for redirected Codex homes. */
+  installCodex: (runtimeHomePath: string, distro: string) => Promise<AgentHookInstallStatus | null>
 }): Promise<void> {
-  const { mux, guestHome, distro, installHooks, settings, warn } = options
+  const { mux, guestHome, codexHomePath, distro, installHooks, settings, warn, installCodex } =
+    options
   let agents
   try {
     const detected = (await mux.request('preflight.detectAgents', {
@@ -42,12 +46,25 @@ export async function installWslGuestHooks(options: {
   if (agents.length === 0) {
     return
   }
+  if (agents.includes('codex') && codexHomePath) {
+    try {
+      const status = await installCodex(codexHomePath, distro)
+      if (status?.state === 'error') {
+        warn(
+          `[agent-hooks] WSL Codex hook install for '${distro}' failed: ${status.detail ?? 'unknown error'}`
+        )
+      }
+    } catch (error) {
+      warn(
+        `[agent-hooks] WSL Codex hook install for '${distro}' failed: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`
+      )
+    }
+  }
+  // Codex is redirected into the runtime home and must use the canonical
+  // runtime-host writer above; the relay adapter owns all other agents.
+  const remoteAgents = agents.filter((agent) => agent !== 'codex')
   const results = await installHooks(createWslHookSftpAdapter(mux), guestHome, {
-    agents,
-    // WSL Codex launches use Orca's managed runtime CODEX_HOME, not ~/.codex.
-    // Keep relay hooks in that active home so status callbacks are received.
-    codexHomeDir: wslCodexRuntimeHomeForGuestHome(guestHome),
-    deferTrustUntilConfigToml: true
+    agents: remoteAgents
   })
   const failed = results.filter((r) => r.state === 'error').length
   if (failed > 0) {

src/main/agent-hooks/wsl-hook-relay-deps.ts

@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ import { agentHookServer } from './server'
 import type { ManagedHookDetectionSettings } from './managed-hook-detection-commands'
 import { installRemoteManagedAgentHooks } from './remote-managed-hook-installers'
 import { getOpenCodePluginSource } from '../opencode/hook-service'
+import { codexHookService } from '../codex/hook-service'
+import type { AgentHookInstallStatus } from '../../shared/agent-hook-types'
 import type { PluginSources } from '../../relay/plugin-overlay'
 import {
   isWslDistroRunning,
@@ -61,6 +63,7 @@ export type WslHookRelayManagerDeps = {
   waitForSentinel: typeof waitForWslRelaySentinel
   ingest: (envelope: Record<string, unknown>, connectionId: string) => void
   installHooks: typeof installRemoteManagedAgentHooks
+  installCodex: (runtimeHomePath: string, distro: string) => Promise<AgentHookInstallStatus | null>
   managedHookSettings: () => ManagedHookDetectionSettings
   /** Plugin source strings shipped to the guest relay so an Orca update needn't redeploy the relay bundle. */
   pluginSources: () => PluginSources
@@ -102,6 +105,11 @@ export const defaultWslHookRelayDeps: WslHookRelayManagerDeps = {
       connectionId
     ),
   installHooks: installRemoteManagedAgentHooks,
+  installCodex: (runtimeHomePath, distro) =>
+    codexHookService.installForRuntimeHomeSerialized(runtimeHomePath, {
+      runtime: 'wsl',
+      wslDistro: distro
+    }),
   managedHookSettings: () => null,
   // Why: only OpenCode is in scope for WSL now; the payload shape stays identical to SSH so Pi/OMP are additive later.
   pluginSources: () => ({ opencodePluginSource: getOpenCodePluginSource() }),

src/main/agent-hooks/wsl-hook-relay-guest-install.ts

@@ -6,13 +6,14 @@ import type { ManagedHookDetectionSettings } from './managed-hook-detection-comm
 import type { installRemoteManagedAgentHooks } from './remote-managed-hook-installers'
 import { requestGuestOpenCodeOverlayDir } from './wsl-guest-plugin-install'
 import { installWslGuestHooks } from './wsl-hook-fs-adapter'
-import { REINSTALL_MIN_INTERVAL_MS } from './wsl-hook-relay-deps'
+import { REINSTALL_MIN_INTERVAL_MS, type WslHookRelayManagerDeps } from './wsl-hook-relay-deps'
 import type { SshChannelMultiplexer } from '../ssh/ssh-channel-multiplexer'
 import type { PluginSources } from '../../relay/plugin-overlay'
 
 /** Structural slice of WslHookRelayManagerDeps — only what an install pass uses. */
 type GuestInstallDeps = {
   installHooks: typeof installRemoteManagedAgentHooks
+  installCodex: WslHookRelayManagerDeps['installCodex']
   managedHookSettings: () => ManagedHookDetectionSettings
   pluginSources: () => PluginSources
   warn: (message: string) => void
@@ -23,6 +24,7 @@ type GuestInstallState = {
   distro: string
   mux?: SshChannelMultiplexer
   guestHome?: string
+  codexHomePath?: string
   opencodeOverlayDir?: string
   lastInstallAt?: number
 }
@@ -37,8 +39,10 @@ export async function runWslRelayGuestInstall(
   await installWslGuestHooks({
     mux,
     guestHome,
+    codexHomePath: state.codexHomePath ?? null,
     distro: state.distro,
     installHooks: deps.installHooks,
+    installCodex: deps.installCodex,
     settings: deps.managedHookSettings(),
     warn: deps.warn
   })

src/main/agent-hooks/wsl-hook-relay-live.integration.test.ts

@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ import { afterEach, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
 
 import { AgentHookServer } from './server'
 import { WslHookRelayManager } from './wsl-hook-relay-manager'
-import { wslCodexRuntimeHomeForGuestHome } from '../pty/codex-home-wsl-env'
+import { createManagedHookLocalFilesystem } from './managed-hook-local-filesystem'
+import { codexHookService } from '../codex/hook-service'
 
 const BUNDLE_DIR = join(process.cwd(), 'out', 'relay', 'wsl')
 const BUNDLE_JS = join(BUNDLE_DIR, 'wsl-agent-hook-relay.js')
@@ -75,6 +76,7 @@ describe.skipIf(process.platform === 'win32')(
       const server = orcaServer
 
       const warns: string[] = []
+      const codexHome = join(fakeHome, '.local', 'share', 'orca', 'codex-runtime-home', 'home')
       manager = new WslHookRelayManager({
         platform: () => 'win32',
         remoteHooksEnabled: () => true,
@@ -102,6 +104,11 @@ describe.skipIf(process.platform === 'win32')(
             envelope as Parameters<AgentHookServer['ingestRemote']>[0],
             connectionId
           ),
+        installCodex: (runtimeHomePath) =>
+          codexHookService.installRemote(createManagedHookLocalFilesystem(), fakeHome, {
+            codexHomeDir: runtimeHomePath,
+            deferTrustUntilConfigToml: true
+          }),
         managedHookSettings: () => ({
           agentCmdOverrides: {
             claude: process.execPath,
@@ -112,15 +119,17 @@ describe.skipIf(process.platform === 'win32')(
         transientRetryDelayMs: 1
       })
 
-      manager.ensureForDistro('LiveDistro')
+      manager.ensureForDistro('LiveDistro', codexHome)
 
       // Waiting on Codex's artifact (not Claude's, which is written first) keeps the
       // assertions behind the still-running 14-agent installer loop.
-      const codexHome = wslCodexRuntimeHomeForGuestHome(fakeHome)
       await vi.waitFor(() => expect(existsSync(join(codexHome, 'hooks.json'))).toBe(true), {
         timeout: 15_000
       })
-      expect(existsSync(join(fakeHome, '.claude', 'settings.json'))).toBe(true)
+      await vi.waitFor(
+        () => expect(existsSync(join(fakeHome, '.claude', 'settings.json'))).toBe(true),
+        { timeout: 15_000 }
+      )
       const claudeScript = readFileSync(
         join(fakeHome, '.orca', 'agent-hooks', 'claude-hook.sh'),
         'utf8'

src/main/agent-hooks/wsl-hook-relay-manager.test.ts

@@ -147,6 +147,8 @@ describe('WslHookRelayManager', () => {
   // hosts — installHooks is mocked here, so the fs bridge only ever serves
   // the wslfs.home request and never touches the real filesystem.
   const home = '/home/wsl-test-user'
+  const codexHome =
+    '\\\\wsl.localhost\\Ubuntu\\home\\wsl-test-user\\.local\\share\\orca\\codex-runtime-home\\home'
   const opencodeOverlayDir = `${home}/.orca-relay/opencode-overlays/deadbeefcafe`
   let harnesses: GuestHarness[]
 
@@ -229,6 +231,13 @@ describe('WslHookRelayManager', () => {
       waitForSentinel: vi.fn(async () => guestTransport()),
       ingest: vi.fn(),
       installHooks: vi.fn(async () => []),
+      installCodex: vi.fn(async () => ({
+        agent: 'codex' as const,
+        state: 'installed' as const,
+        configPath: `${home}/.local/share/orca/codex-runtime-home/home/hooks.json`,
+        managedHooksPresent: true,
+        detail: null
+      })),
       managedHookSettings: () => null,
       pluginSources: () => ({ opencodePluginSource: '// opencode plugin source' }),
       warn: vi.fn(),
@@ -240,14 +249,14 @@ describe('WslHookRelayManager', () => {
 
   it('starts one relay per distro, installs hooks, exposes the guest endpoint path, and forwards envelopes', async () => {
     const { manager, deps } = createManager({})
-    manager.ensureForDistro('Ubuntu')
-    manager.ensureForDistro('Ubuntu')
+    manager.ensureForDistro('Ubuntu', codexHome)
+    manager.ensureForDistro('Ubuntu', codexHome)
     await vi.waitFor(() => expect(deps.installHooks).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1))
     expect(deps.spawnRelay).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
+    expect(deps.installCodex).toHaveBeenCalledWith(codexHome, 'Ubuntu')
+    // Codex is owned by the canonical runtime-host writer, not the relay adapter.
     expect(deps.installHooks).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.anything(), home, {
-      agents: ['codex'],
-      codexHomeDir: `${home}/.local/share/orca/codex-runtime-home/home`,
-      deferTrustUntilConfigToml: true
+      agents: []
     })
 
     expect(manager.getGuestEndpointFilePath('Ubuntu')).toBe(
@@ -272,9 +281,23 @@ describe('WslHookRelayManager', () => {
     manager.disposeAll()
   })
 
+  it('reinstalls into a newly resolved runtime home without restarting the relay', async () => {
+    const { manager, deps } = createManager({})
+    manager.ensureForDistro('Ubuntu', codexHome)
+    await vi.waitFor(() => expect(deps.installCodex).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1))
+    const nextHome = codexHome.replace('codex-runtime-home', 'codex-accounts\\account-2')
+
+    manager.ensureForDistro('ubuntu', nextHome)
+    await vi.waitFor(() => expect(deps.installCodex).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2))
+
+    expect(deps.installCodex).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith(nextHome, 'Ubuntu')
+    expect(deps.spawnRelay).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
+    manager.disposeAll()
+  })
+
   it('ships the OpenCode plugin to the guest and exposes the overlay dir', async () => {
     const { manager } = createManager({})
-    manager.ensureForDistro('Ubuntu')
+    manager.ensureForDistro('Ubuntu', codexHome)
     await vi.waitFor(() => expect(manager.getOpenCodeOverlayDir('Ubuntu')).toBe(opencodeOverlayDir))
     manager.disposeAll()
   })
@@ -397,7 +420,7 @@ describe('WslHookRelayManager', () => {
   it('stops live relays and refuses to revive them once agent status hooks are switched off', async () => {
     const settings = { agentStatusHooksEnabled: true }
     const { manager, deps } = createManager({ managedHookSettings: () => settings })
-    manager.ensureForDistro('Ubuntu')
+    manager.ensureForDistro('Ubuntu', codexHome)
     await vi.waitFor(() => expect(deps.installHooks).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1))
 
     settings.agentStatusHooksEnabled = false
@@ -414,6 +437,8 @@ describe('WslHookRelayManager', () => {
     settings.agentStatusHooksEnabled = true
     manager.resumeStoppedRelays()
     await vi.waitFor(() => expect(deps.spawnRelay).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2))
+    await vi.waitFor(() => expect(deps.installCodex).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2))
+    expect(deps.installCodex).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith(codexHome, 'Ubuntu')
     manager.disposeAll()
   })
 

src/main/agent-hooks/wsl-hook-relay-manager.ts

@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ import {
   WSL_HOOK_FS_METHODS,
   wslHookRelayEndpointFilePath
 } from '../../shared/wsl-hook-relay-contract'
+import {
+  recordManagedWslCodexHome,
+  wslRuntimeHomePathsEqual
+} from '../codex/managed-wsl-codex-home-registry'
 
 type DistroState = {
   /** Original casing for wsl.exe argv and breadcrumbs; map keys are lowercased. */
@@ -37,6 +41,7 @@ type DistroState = {
   child?: ChildProcessWithoutNullStreams
   mux?: SshChannelMultiplexer
   guestHome?: string
+  codexHomePath?: string
   guestEndpointFilePath?: string
   opencodeOverlayDir?: string
   failures: number
@@ -52,7 +57,7 @@ export class WslHookRelayManager {
   private recovery: WslRelayRecovery
   private states = new Map<string, DistroState>()
   /** Distros a hooks-off teardown stopped, so re-enabling can put them back. */
-  private stoppedByHooksOff = new Set<string>()
+  private stoppedByHooksOff = new Map<string, string | undefined>()
   private defaultDistro: string | null = null
   private disposed = false
   private warnedBundleMissing = false
@@ -64,7 +69,7 @@ export class WslHookRelayManager {
       warn: (message) => this.deps.warn(message),
       isDisposed: () => this.disposed,
       isCurrent: (state) => this.states.get(wslHookRelayStateKey(state.distro)) === state,
-      restart: (distro) => this.ensureForDistro(distro),
+      restart: (distro) => this.ensureForDistro(distro, this.stateFor(distro)?.codexHomePath),
       dropState: (state) => {
         // Why: identity-guarded — a fresh ensure() may own this key by now;
         // deleting by key alone would orphan its live relay child.
@@ -81,11 +86,11 @@ export class WslHookRelayManager {
   }
 
   /** Fire-and-forget from every WSL PTY spawn-env build; errors breadcrumb. */
-  ensureForDistro(distro: string | null): void {
+  ensureForDistro(distro: string | null, codexHomePath?: string | null): void {
     if (this.disposed || !isWslHookRelayAllowed(this.deps)) {
       return
     }
-    void this.ensureInternal(distro).catch((err) => {
+    void this.ensureInternal(distro, codexHomePath ?? undefined).catch((err) => {
       const detail = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)
       this.deps.warn(`[agent-hooks] WSL hook relay ensure failed: ${detail}`)
     })
@@ -118,7 +123,7 @@ export class WslHookRelayManager {
       state.mux?.dispose()
       state.child?.kill()
       if (!permanent) {
-        this.stoppedByHooksOff.add(state.distro)
+        this.stoppedByHooksOff.set(state.distro, state.codexHomePath)
       }
     }
     this.states.clear()
@@ -129,26 +134,39 @@ export class WslHookRelayManager {
   resumeStoppedRelays(): void {
     const distros = [...this.stoppedByHooksOff]
     this.stoppedByHooksOff.clear()
-    for (const distro of distros) {
+    for (const [distro, codexHomePath] of distros) {
       void this.deps
         .isDistroRunning(distro)
         .then((running) => {
           if (running) {
-            this.ensureForDistro(distro)
+            this.ensureForDistro(distro, codexHomePath)
           }
         })
         .catch(() => undefined)
     }
   }
 
-  private async ensureInternal(requestedDistro: string | null): Promise<void> {
+  private async ensureInternal(
+    requestedDistro: string | null,
+    requestedCodexHomePath?: string
+  ): Promise<void> {
     const distro = requestedDistro ?? (await this.resolveDefaultDistro())
     if (!distro || this.disposed) {
       return
     }
     const key = wslHookRelayStateKey(distro)
     const existing = this.states.get(key)
+    if (requestedCodexHomePath) {
+      recordManagedWslCodexHome(distro, requestedCodexHomePath)
+    }
     if (existing) {
+      if (
+        requestedCodexHomePath &&
+        !wslRuntimeHomePathsEqual(existing.codexHomePath, requestedCodexHomePath)
+      ) {
+        existing.codexHomePath = requestedCodexHomePath
+        existing.lastInstallAt = 0
+      }
       if (existing.phase === 'running') {
         void maybeRerunWslRelayGuestInstall(this.deps, existing)
         return
@@ -184,6 +202,7 @@ export class WslHookRelayManager {
       // Why: instance-keyed and on the distro's persistent fs, so it outlives a relay
       // crash — dropping it would blank status on panes spawned mid-relaunch.
       opencodeOverlayDir: existing?.opencodeOverlayDir,
+      codexHomePath: requestedCodexHomePath ?? existing?.codexHomePath,
       cooldownUntil: 0
     }
     this.states.set(key, state)

src/main/browser/browser-manager-annotation-bridge.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
+
+const browserMocks = vi.hoisted(() => ({
+  appGetPathMock: vi.fn(() => '/downloads'),
+  shellOpenExternalMock: vi.fn(),
+  browserWindowFromWebContentsMock: vi.fn(),
+  menuBuildFromTemplateMock: vi.fn(),
+  guestOffMock: vi.fn(),
+  guestOnMock: vi.fn(),
+  guestSetBackgroundThrottlingMock: vi.fn(),
+  guestSetWindowOpenHandlerMock: vi.fn(),
+  guestOpenDevToolsMock: vi.fn(),
+  webContentsFromIdMock: vi.fn(),
+  screenGetCursorScreenPointMock: vi.fn(() => ({ x: 0, y: 0 })),
+  openPopupWithOriginBarMock: vi.fn()
+}))
+
+vi.mock('electron', () => ({
+  app: { getPath: browserMocks.appGetPathMock },
+  BrowserWindow: { fromWebContents: browserMocks.browserWindowFromWebContentsMock },
+  clipboard: { writeText: vi.fn() },
+  shell: { openExternal: browserMocks.shellOpenExternalMock },
+  Menu: { buildFromTemplate: browserMocks.menuBuildFromTemplateMock },
+  screen: { getCursorScreenPoint: browserMocks.screenGetCursorScreenPointMock },
+  webContents: { fromId: browserMocks.webContentsFromIdMock }
+}))
+
+vi.mock('./popup-origin-bar-window', () => ({
+  openPopupWithOriginBar: browserMocks.openPopupWithOriginBarMock
+}))
+
+import { browserManager } from './browser-manager'
+import type { BrowserAnnotationViewportBridgeOptions } from '../../shared/browser-annotation-viewport-bridge'
+import {
+  rendererWebContentsId,
+  resetBrowserManagerMocks,
+  resetBrowserManagerState
+} from './browser-manager-test-harness'
+import {
+  createViewportGuestFactory,
+  flushViewportOps
+} from './browser-manager-viewport-test-fixtures'
+
+const { webContentsFromIdMock } = browserMocks
+const makeGuest = createViewportGuestFactory(browserMocks)
+
+const BRIDGE_OPTIONS: BrowserAnnotationViewportBridgeOptions = {
+  emitViewport: false,
+  enabled: true,
+  markers: [],
+  token: 'annotationviewporttoken'
+}
+
+function registerPage(pageId: string, guest: Record<string, unknown>): void {
+  webContentsFromIdMock.mockReturnValue(guest)
+  browserManager.attachGuestPolicies(guest as never)
+  browserManager.registerGuest({
+    browserPageId: pageId,
+    webContentsId: guest.id as number,
+    rendererWebContentsId
+  })
+}
+
+/** The production resolver's shape: read the registry now, not when the request was made. */
+function resolveFromRegistry(pageId: string): () => Electron.WebContents | null {
+  return () => browserManager.getAuthorizedGuest(pageId, rendererWebContentsId)
+}
+
+describe('browserManager.setAnnotationViewportBridge', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    resetBrowserManagerMocks(browserMocks)
+    resetBrowserManagerState()
+  })
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    vi.restoreAllMocks()
+  })
+
+  it('installs the bridge in an isolated world', async () => {
+    const { guest } = makeGuest(4646)
+    registerPage('tab-annotations', guest)
+
+    const ok = await browserManager.setAnnotationViewportBridge(
+      'tab-annotations',
+      BRIDGE_OPTIONS,
+      resolveFromRegistry('tab-annotations')
+    )
+
+    expect(ok).toBe(true)
+    expect(guest.executeJavaScriptInIsolatedWorld).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.any(Number),
+      [
+        expect.objectContaining({
+          code: expect.stringContaining('__orcaBrowserAnnotationViewportBridge')
+        })
+      ],
+      false
+    )
+  })
+
+  // Why this is the case that matters: a cross-process navigation re-registers the same page id
+  // with a new WebContents and leaves the retired one alive, so a bridge op that resolved its
+  // guest when the request arrived would inject into a page nobody is looking at — and the
+  // annotation badges would stop tracking the document on screen.
+  it('injects into the guest the page has when a queued op finally runs, not the one it was asked with', async () => {
+    const { guest: firstGuest } = makeGuest(5101)
+    let releaseFirstInjection = (): void => {}
+    // One shared gate for every call, so a wrongly-routed second injection still settles and the
+    // test fails on where it landed rather than on a timeout.
+    const firstInjectionGate = new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
+      releaseFirstInjection = () => resolve()
+    })
+    firstGuest.executeJavaScriptInIsolatedWorld = vi.fn(() => firstInjectionGate)
+    registerPage('tab-swap', firstGuest)
+
+    const firstDone = browserManager.setAnnotationViewportBridge(
+      'tab-swap',
+      BRIDGE_OPTIONS,
+      resolveFromRegistry('tab-swap')
+    )
+    await flushViewportOps()
+
+    // A second request arrives while the first still holds the chain — at this moment the page is
+    // still on the first guest, which is the guest a request-time resolution would capture.
+    const secondDone = browserManager.setAnnotationViewportBridge(
+      'tab-swap',
+      BRIDGE_OPTIONS,
+      resolveFromRegistry('tab-swap')
+    )
+    await flushViewportOps()
+
+    // Only now does the page swap renderer processes, while the second op is still queued.
+    const { guest: secondGuest } = makeGuest(5102)
+    registerPage('tab-swap', secondGuest)
+
+    releaseFirstInjection()
+    await expect(firstDone).resolves.toBe(true)
+    await expect(secondDone).resolves.toBe(true)
+
+    expect(secondGuest.executeJavaScriptInIsolatedWorld).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
+    expect(firstGuest.executeJavaScriptInIsolatedWorld).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
+  })
+
+  // Why this is the resolver's cleanup and not the bridge's: the authority that reads the registry
+  // is the one that can see the guest is gone. The bridge only reports the refusal.
+  it('refuses when its guest died while the op was queued, and the resolver drops the registration', async () => {
+    const { guest } = makeGuest(5103)
+    registerPage('tab-dies', guest)
+    expect(browserManager.getGuestWebContentsId('tab-dies')).toBe(5103)
+
+    webContentsFromIdMock.mockReturnValue(null)
+    await expect(
+      browserManager.setAnnotationViewportBridge(
+        'tab-dies',
+        BRIDGE_OPTIONS,
+        resolveFromRegistry('tab-dies')
+      )
+    ).resolves.toBe(false)
+
+    // Why assert the registry and not just the answer: a stale guest has to clear every per-tab
+    // entry, or the page keeps a dead WebContents id that later ops resolve against.
+    expect(browserManager.getGuestWebContentsId('tab-dies')).toBeNull()
+  })
+
+  // Why this one exists: an unresolved guest is not the same as a dead one. A request addressed by
+  // the wrong renderer names a page that is alive and on screen, and answering it with teardown
+  // would cancel that page's in-flight downloads and grabs over a misaddressed message.
+  it('refuses a request from the wrong renderer without tearing down the healthy page it named', async () => {
+    const { guest } = makeGuest(5105)
+    registerPage('tab-mismatch', guest)
+    const unregisterGuest = vi.spyOn(browserManager, 'unregisterGuest')
+
+    await expect(
+      browserManager.setAnnotationViewportBridge('tab-mismatch', BRIDGE_OPTIONS, () =>
+        browserManager.getAuthorizedGuest('tab-mismatch', rendererWebContentsId + 1)
+      )
+    ).resolves.toBe(false)
+
+    expect(unregisterGuest).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    expect(browserManager.getGuestWebContentsId('tab-mismatch')).toBe(5105)
+    expect(guest.executeJavaScriptInIsolatedWorld).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('refuses a destroyed guest without injecting into it', async () => {
+    const { guest } = makeGuest(5104)
+    registerPage('tab-destroyed', guest)
+    ;(guest.isDestroyed as ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>).mockReturnValue(true)
+
+    await expect(
+      browserManager.setAnnotationViewportBridge(
+        'tab-destroyed',
+        BRIDGE_OPTIONS,
+        () => guest as never
+      )
+    ).resolves.toBe(false)
+    expect(guest.executeJavaScriptInIsolatedWorld).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  // Why: a document page owns no browsing state, so treating its refusal as a stale page would run
+  // teardown against an id the browsing registry never held.
+  it('does not run page teardown when a document page resolves to nothing', async () => {
+    const unregisterGuest = vi.spyOn(browserManager, 'unregisterGuest')
+
+    await expect(
+      browserManager.setAnnotationViewportBridge('doc-page-1', BRIDGE_OPTIONS, () => null)
+    ).resolves.toBe(false)
+
+    expect(unregisterGuest).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+})

src/main/browser/browser-manager-guest-lifecycle.test.ts

@@ -45,6 +45,32 @@ import {
   resetBrowserManagerMocks,
   resetBrowserManagerState
 } from './browser-manager-test-harness'
+import { installDocPreviewGuestPolicy } from './doc-preview-guest-policy'
+import { mintDocPreviewGrant, revokeAllDocPreviewGrants } from './doc-preview-grant-registry'
+import { buildDocPreviewUrl } from '../../shared/doc-preview-scheme'
+
+/**
+ * A page the document half of the registry really holds. Built rather than named: membership is
+ * what both doors refuse on now, so an id that merely looks like a preview's would be admitted.
+ */
+function registerWorkspaceDocPage(browserPageId: string): void {
+  const grant = mintDocPreviewGrant({
+    owner: { kind: 'ssh', connectionId: 'ssh-1' },
+    root: '/home/alice/docs',
+    entryRelativePath: 'index.html',
+    browserPageId
+  })
+  const guest = {
+    isFocused: () => false,
+    isDestroyed: () => false,
+    getURL: () => buildDocPreviewUrl(grant.id, grant.entryRelativePath),
+    on: vi.fn(),
+    once: vi.fn(),
+    setWindowOpenHandler: vi.fn(),
+    setWebRTCIPHandlingPolicy: vi.fn()
+  }
+  installDocPreviewGuestPolicy(guest as never, { id: rendererWebContentsId, send: vi.fn() })
+}
 
 const {
   guestOffMock,
@@ -60,6 +86,7 @@ describe('browserManager', () => {
   beforeEach(() => {
     resetBrowserManagerMocks(browserMocks)
     resetBrowserManagerState()
+    revokeAllDocPreviewGrants()
   })
 
   afterEach(() => {
@@ -92,6 +119,77 @@ describe('browserManager', () => {
     expect(browserManager.getSessionProfileIdForTab('browser-1')).toBe('work')
   })
 
+  // Why both doors: one id in both halves of the registry would make the tool door answer with a
+  // document guest for a page the reader is browsing in.
+  it.each(['registerGuest', 'registerOffscreenGuest'] as const)(
+    'refuses %s for a page the document registry already holds',
+    (entryPoint) => {
+      const guest = {
+        id: 129,
+        isDestroyed: vi.fn(() => false),
+        getType: vi.fn(() => 'webview'),
+        setBackgroundThrottling: guestSetBackgroundThrottlingMock,
+        setWindowOpenHandler: guestSetWindowOpenHandlerMock,
+        on: guestOnMock,
+        off: guestOffMock,
+        openDevTools: guestOpenDevToolsMock
+      }
+      webContentsFromIdMock.mockReturnValue(guest)
+      browserManager.attachGuestPolicies(guest as never)
+      const browserPageId = 'doc-page-1'
+      registerWorkspaceDocPage(browserPageId)
+
+      if (entryPoint === 'registerGuest') {
+        expect(
+          browserManager.registerGuest({
+            browserPageId,
+            webContentsId: guest.id,
+            rendererWebContentsId
+          })
+        ).toBe(false)
+      } else {
+        expect(
+          browserManager.registerOffscreenGuest({ browserPageId, webContentsId: guest.id })
+        ).toBe(false)
+      }
+
+      expect(browserManager.getGuestWebContentsId(browserPageId)).toBeNull()
+    }
+  )
+
+  // Why this answer is load-bearing: the headless backend destroys its window on false, so a true
+  // for a guest that is already gone would leave a page id registered onto nothing.
+  it.each(['missing', 'destroyed'] as const)(
+    'refuses registerOffscreenGuest when the named guest is %s',
+    (guestState) => {
+      webContentsFromIdMock.mockReturnValue(
+        guestState === 'missing' ? null : { id: 137, isDestroyed: vi.fn(() => true) }
+      )
+
+      expect(
+        browserManager.registerOffscreenGuest({ browserPageId: 'offscreen-1', webContentsId: 137 })
+      ).toBe(false)
+
+      expect(browserManager.getGuestWebContentsId('offscreen-1')).toBeNull()
+    }
+  )
+
+  // Why the exit door needs the same check: a document page withdraws by revoking its grant, so its
+  // id here is misaddressed — and unregistering opens by evicting whatever grab that id names.
+  it('refuses unregisterGuest for a page the document registry holds', () => {
+    registerWorkspaceDocPage('doc-page-2')
+    const cancelGrabOp = vi.spyOn(browserManager, 'cancelGrabOp')
+
+    browserManager.unregisterGuest('doc-page-2')
+
+    expect(cancelGrabOp).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+
+    // The presence half: the same door does evict a browsing page's grab.
+    browserManager.unregisterGuest('browser-page-1')
+    expect(cancelGrabOp).toHaveBeenCalledWith('browser-page-1', 'evicted')
+    cancelGrabOp.mockRestore()
+  })
+
   it('blocks non-web guest navigations after attach', () => {
     const guest = {
       isDestroyed: vi.fn(() => false),

src/main/browser/browser-manager-guest-policy-profile.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
+
+const browserMocks = vi.hoisted(() => ({
+  appGetPathMock: vi.fn(() => '/downloads'),
+  shellOpenExternalMock: vi.fn(),
+  browserWindowFromWebContentsMock: vi.fn(),
+  menuBuildFromTemplateMock: vi.fn(),
+  guestOffMock: vi.fn(),
+  guestOnMock: vi.fn(),
+  guestSetBackgroundThrottlingMock: vi.fn(),
+  guestSetWindowOpenHandlerMock: vi.fn(),
+  guestOpenDevToolsMock: vi.fn(),
+  webContentsFromIdMock: vi.fn(),
+  screenGetCursorScreenPointMock: vi.fn(() => ({ x: 0, y: 0 })),
+  openPopupWithOriginBarMock: vi.fn()
+}))
+
+vi.mock('electron', () => ({
+  app: { getPath: browserMocks.appGetPathMock },
+  BrowserWindow: { fromWebContents: browserMocks.browserWindowFromWebContentsMock },
+  clipboard: { writeText: vi.fn() },
+  shell: { openExternal: browserMocks.shellOpenExternalMock },
+  Menu: { buildFromTemplate: browserMocks.menuBuildFromTemplateMock },
+  screen: { getCursorScreenPoint: browserMocks.screenGetCursorScreenPointMock },
+  webContents: { fromId: browserMocks.webContentsFromIdMock }
+}))
+vi.mock('./popup-origin-bar-window', () => ({
+  openPopupWithOriginBar: browserMocks.openPopupWithOriginBarMock
+}))
+
+import { browserManager } from './browser-manager'
+import { resetBrowserManagerMocks, resetBrowserManagerState } from './browser-manager-test-harness'
+import { getWorkspaceDocPageGuest } from './doc-preview-guest-policy'
+import { mintDocPreviewGrant, revokeAllDocPreviewGrants } from './doc-preview-grant-registry'
+import { buildDocPreviewUrl } from '../../shared/doc-preview-scheme'
+
+type GuestFake = {
+  id: number
+  url: string
+  listeners: Map<string, ((...args: never[]) => void)[]>
+  windowOpenHandler: ((details: { url: string; frameName: string }) => unknown) | null
+  webRtcPolicy: string | null
+  isDestroyed: () => boolean
+  isFocused: () => boolean
+  getURL: () => string
+  getType: () => string
+  setBackgroundThrottling: (value: boolean) => void
+  setWebRTCIPHandlingPolicy: (policy: string) => void
+  setWindowOpenHandler: (handler: (details: { url: string; frameName: string }) => unknown) => void
+  executeJavaScriptInIsolatedWorld: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>
+  debugger: {
+    isAttached: () => boolean
+    attach: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>
+    sendCommand: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>
+  }
+  on: (event: string, listener: (...args: never[]) => void) => void
+  once: (event: string, listener: (...args: never[]) => void) => void
+  off: (event: string, listener: (...args: never[]) => void) => void
+}
+
+function createGuest(id: number, url: string): GuestFake {
+  const listeners = new Map<string, ((...args: never[]) => void)[]>()
+  const guest: GuestFake = {
+    id,
+    url,
+    listeners,
+    windowOpenHandler: null,
+    webRtcPolicy: null,
+    isDestroyed: () => false,
+    isFocused: () => true,
+    getURL: () => guest.url,
+    getType: () => 'webview',
+    setBackgroundThrottling: vi.fn(),
+    setWebRTCIPHandlingPolicy: (policy: string) => {
+      guest.webRtcPolicy = policy
+    },
+    setWindowOpenHandler: (handler) => {
+      guest.windowOpenHandler = handler
+    },
+    executeJavaScriptInIsolatedWorld: vi.fn(async () => undefined),
+    debugger: {
+      isAttached: () => true,
+      attach: vi.fn(),
+      sendCommand: vi.fn(async () => undefined)
+    },
+    on: (event, listener) => {
+      listeners.set(event, [...(listeners.get(event) ?? []), listener])
+    },
+    once: (event, listener) => {
+      listeners.set(event, [...(listeners.get(event) ?? []), listener])
+    },
+    off: (event, listener) => {
+      listeners.set(
+        event,
+        (listeners.get(event) ?? []).filter((entry) => entry !== listener)
+      )
+    }
+  }
+  return guest
+}
+
+function listenerCount(guest: GuestFake, event: string): number {
+  return guest.listeners.get(event)?.length ?? 0
+}
+
+/** Drives the guest's own will-navigate listeners and reports whether they refused. */
+function navigateTo(guest: GuestFake, url: string): boolean {
+  let prevented = false
+  const event = { preventDefault: () => (prevented = true) } as never
+  for (const listener of guest.listeners.get('will-navigate') ?? []) {
+    ;(listener as (event: unknown, url: string) => void)(event, url)
+  }
+  return prevented
+}
+
+const host = { id: 5001, send: vi.fn() } as unknown as Electron.WebContents
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  resetBrowserManagerMocks(browserMocks)
+  resetBrowserManagerState()
+  revokeAllDocPreviewGrants()
+  browserMocks.guestSetBackgroundThrottlingMock.mockReturnValue(undefined)
+})
+
+describe('guest policy profiles', () => {
+  function attachPreviewGuest(id = 301): {
+    guest: GuestFake
+    grantId: string
+    browserPageId: string
+  } {
+    const browserPageId = `doc-page-${id}`
+    const grant = mintDocPreviewGrant({
+      owner: { kind: 'ssh', connectionId: 'ssh-1' },
+      root: '/home/alice/docs',
+      entryRelativePath: 'index.html',
+      browserPageId
+    })
+    const guest = createGuest(id, buildDocPreviewUrl(grant.id, 'index.html'))
+    browserManager.attachGuestPolicies(guest as never, null, { profile: 'workspace-doc', host })
+    return { guest, grantId: grant.id, browserPageId }
+  }
+
+  // The presence half of every absence below: a browsing guest observably takes all of it through
+  // the same method, so a profile that fenced nothing — or an attach path that stopped installing
+  // anything at all — cannot pass these by being uniformly empty.
+  it('gives a browsing guest link routing, popups and anti-detection', () => {
+    const guest = createGuest(300, 'https://example.com/')
+
+    browserManager.attachGuestPolicies(guest as never)
+
+    expect(listenerCount(guest, 'dom-ready')).toBe(1)
+    expect(listenerCount(guest, 'frame-created')).toBe(1)
+    expect(listenerCount(guest, 'did-create-window')).toBe(1)
+    expect(guest.debugger.sendCommand).toHaveBeenCalled()
+    expect(navigateTo(guest, 'https://elsewhere.example/')).toBe(false)
+  })
+
+  it('gives a workspace-document guest none of it', () => {
+    const { guest } = attachPreviewGuest()
+
+    expect(listenerCount(guest, 'dom-ready')).toBe(0)
+    expect(listenerCount(guest, 'frame-created')).toBe(0)
+    expect(listenerCount(guest, 'did-create-window')).toBe(0)
+    expect(guest.debugger.sendCommand).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    expect(guest.executeJavaScriptInIsolatedWorld).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('holds a workspace-document guest inside the grant it is showing', () => {
+    const { guest, grantId } = attachPreviewGuest()
+
+    expect(navigateTo(guest, buildDocPreviewUrl(grantId, 'other.html'))).toBe(false)
+    expect(navigateTo(guest, 'https://example.com/')).toBe(true)
+    expect(guest.webRtcPolicy).toBe('disable_non_proxied_udp')
+  })
+
+  it('denies every window a workspace-document guest asks for', () => {
+    const { guest } = attachPreviewGuest()
+
+    expect(guest.windowOpenHandler?.({ url: 'https://example.com/', frameName: '' })).toEqual({
+      action: 'deny'
+    })
+  })
+
+  // Why teardown and not just install: registration and teardown both key on the guest having been
+  // policy-attached, so a profile that installs outside that bookkeeping leaves the id marked
+  // attached forever and stays answerable to tools after the surface is gone.
+  it('tears a workspace-document guest down through the same policy cleanup', () => {
+    const { guest, browserPageId } = attachPreviewGuest(302)
+    expect(getWorkspaceDocPageGuest(browserPageId, host.id)).toBe(guest as never)
+
+    for (const listener of guest.listeners.get('destroyed') ?? []) {
+      listener()
+    }
+
+    expect(getWorkspaceDocPageGuest(browserPageId, host.id)).toBeNull()
+    // The manager's own bookkeeping was reached too: a second attach is refused while the id is
+    // still marked policy-attached, and accepted once its teardown has run.
+    browserManager.attachGuestPolicies(guest as never)
+    expect(listenerCount(guest, 'dom-ready')).toBe(1)
+  })
+
+  // The seam the whole split rests on: one public door answers for both halves, and each page id
+  // resolves in exactly one of them. Asserted against the real manager, because the IPC census
+  // test has to mock it.
+  describe('the one door across both halves of the registry', () => {
+    const BROWSING_PAGE_ID = 'browser-page-1'
+
+    function registerBrowsingGuest(id = 400): GuestFake {
+      const guest = createGuest(id, 'https://example.com/')
+      browserMocks.webContentsFromIdMock.mockReturnValue(guest)
+      browserManager.attachGuestPolicies(guest as never)
+      browserManager.registerGuest({
+        browserPageId: BROWSING_PAGE_ID,
+        workspaceId: 'workspace-1',
+        worktreeId: 'wt-1',
+        webContentsId: id,
+        rendererWebContentsId: host.id
+      })
+      return guest
+    }
+
+    it('answers each page with the guest of its own half', () => {
+      const browsing = registerBrowsingGuest()
+      const { guest: document, browserPageId } = attachPreviewGuest()
+
+      expect(browserManager.getAuthorizedGuest(BROWSING_PAGE_ID, host.id)).toBe(browsing as never)
+      expect(browserManager.getAuthorizedGuest(browserPageId, host.id)).toBe(document as never)
+    })
+
+    // Why this is the containment claim and not a lookup detail: page management, agent commands,
+    // download routing and certificate attribution all read the browsing map directly, so a
+    // document page being absent from it is what fences them without a guard of their own.
+    it('keeps a document page out of the browsing map entirely', () => {
+      registerBrowsingGuest()
+      const { browserPageId } = attachPreviewGuest()
+
+      expect(browserManager.getGuestWebContentsId(browserPageId)).toBeNull()
+      expect([...browserManager.getWebContentsIdByTabId().keys()]).toEqual([BROWSING_PAGE_ID])
+    })
+  })
+
+  it('attaches a guest once whatever profile it was asked for', () => {
+    const { guest } = attachPreviewGuest(303)
+
+    browserManager.attachGuestPolicies(guest as never)
+
+    expect(listenerCount(guest, 'dom-ready')).toBe(0)
+    expect(listenerCount(guest, 'will-navigate')).toBe(1)
+  })
+})

src/main/browser/browser-manager-viewport-override.test.ts

@@ -882,34 +882,5 @@ describe('browserManager', () => {
       expect(debuggerAttach).toHaveBeenCalledWith('1.3')
       expect(debuggerSendCommand).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
     })
-
-    it('installs annotation viewport bridge in an isolated world', async () => {
-      const { guest } = makeGuest(4646)
-      webContentsFromIdMock.mockReturnValue(guest)
-      browserManager.attachGuestPolicies(guest as never)
-      browserManager.registerGuest({
-        browserPageId: 'tab-annotations',
-        webContentsId: guest.id as number,
-        rendererWebContentsId
-      })
-
-      const ok = await browserManager.setAnnotationViewportBridge('tab-annotations', {
-        emitViewport: false,
-        enabled: true,
-        markers: [],
-        token: 'annotationviewporttoken'
-      })
-
-      expect(ok).toBe(true)
-      expect(guest.executeJavaScriptInIsolatedWorld).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
-        expect.any(Number),
-        [
-          expect.objectContaining({
-            code: expect.stringContaining('__orcaBrowserAnnotationViewportBridge')
-          })
-        ],
-        false
-      )
-    })
   })
 })

src/main/browser/browser-manager.ts

@@ -63,6 +63,11 @@ import {
   BROWSER_ANNOTATION_VIEWPORT_BRIDGE_WORLD_ID,
   buildBrowserAnnotationViewportBridgeScript
 } from '../../shared/browser-annotation-viewport-bridge'
+import {
+  getWorkspaceDocPageGuest,
+  installDocPreviewGuestPolicy,
+  isWorkspaceDocPageId
+} from './doc-preview-guest-policy'
 import type { KeybindingOverrides } from '../../shared/keybindings'
 import {
   BrowserCertificateTrustController,
@@ -157,6 +162,15 @@ type PopupOwnerContext = {
   browserTabId: string
   rootGuestWebContentsId: number
 }
+/**
+ * What a guest is allowed to be. A browsing guest is the web — popups, clicked-link routing and
+ * anti-detection all apply. A workspace-document guest renders one granted document and gets none
+ * of that; `host` is the renderer that minted its grant, and the only sink for what it reports.
+ */
+export type BrowserGuestPolicy =
+  | { profile: 'browsing' }
+  | { profile: 'workspace-doc'; host: Electron.WebContents }
+const BROWSING_GUEST_POLICY: BrowserGuestPolicy = { profile: 'browsing' }
 type PendingMainFrameNavigation = {
   currentUrl: string
   supersededUrls: string[]
@@ -671,12 +685,20 @@ export class BrowserManager {
 
   attachGuestPolicies(
     guest: Electron.WebContents,
-    inheritedOwnerContext: PopupOwnerContext | null = null
+    inheritedOwnerContext: PopupOwnerContext | null = null,
+    policy: BrowserGuestPolicy = BROWSING_GUEST_POLICY
   ): void {
     if (this.policyAttachedGuestIds.has(guest.id)) {
       return
     }
     this.policyAttachedGuestIds.add(guest.id)
+    // Why one door with a profile rather than a second installer beside it: whether a guest was
+    // policy-attached at all is what registration and teardown both key on, so a guest that took
+    // another path into the app is invisible to both.
+    if (policy.profile === 'workspace-doc') {
+      this.attachWorkspaceDocGuestPolicies(guest, policy.host)
+      return
+    }
     if (inheritedOwnerContext) {
       this.popupOwnerContextByGuestId.set(guest.id, inheritedOwnerContext)
     }
@@ -1016,6 +1038,30 @@ export class BrowserManager {
     })
   }
 
+  /**
+   * A workspace document is not the web: no popups, no link routing, no anti-detection, and no
+   * navigation bookkeeping for chrome it does not have. What it does share with a browsing guest is
+   * this method's teardown, so a retired preview drops its listeners on the same path.
+   */
+  private attachWorkspaceDocGuestPolicies(
+    guest: Electron.WebContents,
+    host: Electron.WebContents
+  ): void {
+    const disposeDocPolicy = installDocPreviewGuestPolicy(guest, host)
+    const handleDestroyed = (): void => {
+      this.cleanupGuestPolicyAttachment(guest.id)
+    }
+    guest.on('destroyed', handleDestroyed)
+    this.policyCleanupByGuestId.set(guest.id, () => {
+      disposeDocPolicy()
+      try {
+        guest.off('destroyed', handleDestroyed)
+      } catch {
+        // guest may already be destroyed
+      }
+    })
+  }
+
   // Why: navigator.userAgent (read by Google's auth JS) reflects the WebContents UA,
   // not the request header, so the header-level Firefox switch in setupClientHintsOverride
   // must be matched here per navigation or the two layers disagree — itself a bot tell.
@@ -1318,7 +1364,9 @@ export class BrowserManager {
     rendererWebContentsId
   }: BrowserGuestRegistration): boolean {
     const browserTabId = browserPageId ?? legacyBrowserTabId
-    if (!browserTabId) {
+    // Why refuse rather than overwrite: the two halves of the registry must stay disjoint, or one
+    // id resolves in both and the tool door silently prefers the document guest over the page.
+    if (!browserTabId || isWorkspaceDocPageId(browserTabId)) {
       return false
     }
     // Why: on guest-surface swap, cancel any grab bound to the old guest's listeners so it doesn't strand on a stale webContents.
@@ -1377,6 +1425,12 @@ export class BrowserManager {
   }
 
   unregisterGuest(browserTabId: string): void {
+    // Why the check on the exit door too: a document page withdraws by revoking its grant, never
+    // through here, so its id arriving is misaddressed — and the cancel below would evict that
+    // preview's live grab on the strength of it.
+    if (isWorkspaceDocPageId(browserTabId)) {
+      return
+    }
     // Why: teardown mid-grab must cancel it so the renderer gets a signal, not a dangling Promise.
     this.cancelGrabOp(browserTabId, 'evicted')
 
@@ -1444,10 +1498,15 @@ export class BrowserManager {
     sessionProfileId?: string | null
     userAgentMode?: BrowserSessionUserAgentMode
     webContentsId: number
-  }): void {
+  }): boolean {
+    // Why the same check on both registration doors: one id resolving in both halves is the exact
+    // confusion the split registries exist to prevent.
+    if (isWorkspaceDocPageId(browserPageId)) {
+      return false
+    }
     const guest = webContents.fromId(webContentsId)
     if (!guest || guest.isDestroyed()) {
-      return
+      return false
     }
     // Why: offscreen pages have no renderer webview listeners, so main owns their load-failure lifecycle.
     this.offscreenGuestIds.add(webContentsId)
@@ -1468,6 +1527,7 @@ export class BrowserManager {
       this.worktreeIdByTabId.set(browserPageId, worktreeId)
     }
     this.certificateTrustController?.onGuestRegistered(webContentsId, browserPageId)
+    return true
   }
 
   unregisterAll(): void {
@@ -1843,12 +1903,13 @@ export class BrowserManager {
 
   async setAnnotationViewportBridge(
     browserTabId: string,
-    options: BrowserAnnotationViewportBridgeOptions
+    options: BrowserAnnotationViewportBridgeOptions,
+    resolveGuest: () => Electron.WebContents | null
   ): Promise<boolean> {
     const prev = this.annotationViewportBridgeOpsByTabId.get(browserTabId) ?? Promise.resolve()
     const next = prev
       .catch(() => {})
-      .then(() => this.doSetAnnotationViewportBridgeImpl(browserTabId, options))
+      .then(() => this.doSetAnnotationViewportBridgeImpl(options, resolveGuest))
     this.annotationViewportBridgeOpsByTabId.set(browserTabId, next)
     try {
       return await next
@@ -1859,18 +1920,22 @@ export class BrowserManager {
     }
   }
 
+  // Why the caller resolves the guest: the same bridge serves browsing pages and workspace
+  // documents, which live in different halves of the page registry.
+  // Why a resolver and not the guest itself: this op may have waited behind another one, and a
+  // cross-process navigation meanwhile swaps the tab's contents without destroying the old one —
+  // injecting into the guest the request named would bridge a page nobody is looking at.
+  // Why no tab id: with teardown gone this reaches only the guest the resolver hands back, and
+  // taking an id it cannot act on would invite the next reader to act on it.
   private async doSetAnnotationViewportBridgeImpl(
-    browserTabId: string,
-    options: BrowserAnnotationViewportBridgeOptions
+    options: BrowserAnnotationViewportBridgeOptions,
+    resolveGuest: () => Electron.WebContents | null
   ): Promise<boolean> {
-    const webContentsId = this.webContentsIdByTabId.get(browserTabId)
-    if (!webContentsId) {
-      return false
-    }
-    const guest = webContents.fromId(webContentsId)
+    // Why no teardown here: the resolver already unregisters a page whose guest died, and the only
+    // case it uniquely leaves is an ownership mismatch on a healthy page — where tearing down would
+    // cancel that page's in-flight downloads and grabs over a request that was merely misaddressed.
+    const guest = resolveGuest()
     if (!guest || guest.isDestroyed()) {
-      // Why: a stale guest must clear every per-tab registry entry, not just the WebContents maps.
-      this.unregisterGuest(browserTabId)
       return false
     }
 
@@ -1977,10 +2042,21 @@ export class BrowserManager {
   // --- Browser Context Grab — main-owned operations ---
 
   /** Validate that the sender owns browserTabId; returns the guest WebContents or null. */
+  /**
+   * The guest a request from `senderWebContentsId` may act on, across both halves of the page
+   * registry. This is the only door taught about workspace-document guests: they are kept out of
+   * the browsing maps entirely, so page management, agent commands, download routing and
+   * certificate attribution all miss them without a guard of their own — and a reader who opens a
+   * tool on the document in front of them still gets an answer.
+   */
   getAuthorizedGuest(
     browserTabId: string,
     senderWebContentsId: number
   ): Electron.WebContents | null {
+    const docGuest = getWorkspaceDocPageGuest(browserTabId, senderWebContentsId)
+    if (docGuest) {
+      return docGuest
+    }
     const registeredRenderer = this.rendererWebContentsIdByTabId.get(browserTabId)
     if (registeredRenderer == null || registeredRenderer !== senderWebContentsId) {
       return null

src/main/browser/browser-session-partition-policies.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
+import type { BrowserSessionProfile } from '../../shared/browser-workspace-types'
+
+const mocks = vi.hoisted(() => ({
+  handleGuestWillDownload: vi.fn(),
+  noticeDocPreviewDownloadBlocked: vi.fn()
+}))
+
+type WillDownloadListener = (
+  event: { preventDefault: () => void },
+  item: { id: string },
+  webContents: { id: number }
+) => void
+
+type FakeSession = {
+  listeners: WillDownloadListener[]
+  on: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>
+  removeListener: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>
+  getUserAgent: () => string
+  setUserAgent: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>
+  setPermissionRequestHandler: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>
+  setPermissionCheckHandler: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>
+  setDisplayMediaRequestHandler: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>
+}
+
+const sessionsByPartition = new Map<string, FakeSession>()
+
+function fakeSession(): FakeSession {
+  const listeners: WillDownloadListener[] = []
+  return {
+    listeners,
+    on: vi.fn((event: string, listener: WillDownloadListener) => {
+      if (event === 'will-download') {
+        listeners.push(listener)
+      }
+    }),
+    removeListener: vi.fn((event: string, listener: WillDownloadListener) => {
+      if (event !== 'will-download') {
+        return
+      }
+      const index = listeners.indexOf(listener)
+      if (index !== -1) {
+        listeners.splice(index, 1)
+      }
+    }),
+    getUserAgent: () => 'Mozilla/5.0 Orca',
+    setUserAgent: vi.fn(),
+    setPermissionRequestHandler: vi.fn(),
+    setPermissionCheckHandler: vi.fn(),
+    setDisplayMediaRequestHandler: vi.fn()
+  }
+}
+
+vi.mock('electron', () => ({
+  session: {
+    fromPartition: (partition: string) => {
+      const existing = sessionsByPartition.get(partition)
+      if (existing) {
+        return existing
+      }
+      const created = fakeSession()
+      sessionsByPartition.set(partition, created)
+      return created
+    }
+  }
+}))
+vi.mock('./browser-manager', () => ({
+  browserManager: {
+    handleGuestWillDownload: mocks.handleGuestWillDownload,
+    installCertificateRequestGuard: vi.fn(),
+    removeCertificateRequestGuard: vi.fn(),
+    notifyPermissionDenied: vi.fn()
+  }
+}))
+vi.mock('./doc-preview-download-block-notice', () => ({
+  noticeDocPreviewDownloadBlocked: mocks.noticeDocPreviewDownloadBlocked
+}))
+vi.mock('./browser-media-access', () => ({
+  hasSystemMediaAccess: () => false,
+  requestSystemMediaAccess: async () => false
+}))
+vi.mock('./browser-session-ua', () => ({
+  cleanElectronUserAgent: (userAgent: string) => userAgent,
+  setupClientHintsOverride: vi.fn()
+}))
+vi.mock('./browser-session-user-agent-mode', () => ({
+  setBrowserSessionUserAgentMode: vi.fn()
+}))
+vi.mock('./browser-webauthn-access', () => ({
+  allowsBrowserWebAuthnPermission: () => false,
+  clearBrowserWebAuthnAccessHandlers: vi.fn(),
+  installBrowserWebAuthnAccessHandlers: vi.fn()
+}))
+
+type PartitionPolicyInstaller = (
+  profile: BrowserSessionProfile,
+  options?: { downloads?: 'route' | 'deny' }
+) => void
+
+// Why imported per test rather than at the top: the installer remembers which partitions it has
+// already configured in module state, so a shared import would make the second test's install a
+// no-op and leave it reading the first test's listener.
+async function loadInstaller(): Promise<PartitionPolicyInstaller> {
+  const module = await import('./browser-session-partition-policies')
+  return module.installBrowserSessionPartitionPolicies
+}
+
+function profileFor(partition: string): BrowserSessionProfile {
+  return {
+    id: partition,
+    scope: 'isolated',
+    partition,
+    label: partition,
+    source: null,
+    userAgentMode: 'clean'
+  }
+}
+
+/** Fires the partition's real `will-download` listener and reports what it decided. */
+function fireWillDownload(partition: string): { cancelled: boolean } {
+  const sess = sessionsByPartition.get(partition)
+  if (!sess || sess.listeners.length !== 1) {
+    throw new Error(`expected exactly one will-download listener on ${partition}`)
+  }
+  let cancelled = false
+  sess.listeners[0]({ preventDefault: () => (cancelled = true) }, { id: 'item-1' }, { id: 42 })
+  return { cancelled }
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  vi.clearAllMocks()
+  sessionsByPartition.clear()
+  vi.resetModules()
+})
+
+describe('partition download policy', () => {
+  // The presence half: without it, a deny assertion passes for a partition that installed no
+  // listener at all, and would keep passing if the whole download path were removed.
+  it('routes a download on a partition that did not ask for the deny', async () => {
+    const install = await loadInstaller()
+    install(profileFor('persist:browsing-1'))
+
+    expect(fireWillDownload('persist:browsing-1').cancelled).toBe(false)
+    expect(mocks.handleGuestWillDownload).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ guestWebContentsId: 42 })
+    )
+  })
+
+  it('cancels a download on a partition that asked for the deny, routing nothing', async () => {
+    const install = await loadInstaller()
+    install(profileFor('orca-doc-preview'), { downloads: 'deny' })
+
+    expect(fireWillDownload('orca-doc-preview').cancelled).toBe(true)
+    expect(mocks.handleGuestWillDownload).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  // Why in the same run as the routing test above: a refusal the reader cannot see is a pressed
+  // button that does nothing, and a notice on the routing partition would announce a download that
+  // is about to arrive normally.
+  it('tells the reader about the refusal, and only on the partition that refused', async () => {
+    const install = await loadInstaller()
+    install(profileFor('orca-doc-preview'), { downloads: 'deny' })
+    install(profileFor('persist:browsing-1'))
+
+    fireWillDownload('persist:browsing-1')
+    expect(mocks.noticeDocPreviewDownloadBlocked).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+
+    fireWillDownload('orca-doc-preview')
+    expect(mocks.noticeDocPreviewDownloadBlocked).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ id: 42 })
+    )
+  })
+
+  // Why both partitions in one run: the listener is module state shared across sessions, so a deny
+  // installed for one partition must not follow the next partition that installs after it.
+  it('keeps each partition on its own decision', async () => {
+    const install = await loadInstaller()
+    install(profileFor('orca-doc-preview'), { downloads: 'deny' })
+    install(profileFor('persist:browsing-1'))
+
+    expect(fireWillDownload('orca-doc-preview').cancelled).toBe(true)
+    expect(fireWillDownload('persist:browsing-1').cancelled).toBe(false)
+    expect(mocks.handleGuestWillDownload).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
+  })
+})

src/main/browser/browser-session-partition-policies.ts

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import {
   clearBrowserWebAuthnAccessHandlers,
   installBrowserWebAuthnAccessHandlers
 } from './browser-webauthn-access'
+import { noticeDocPreviewDownloadBlocked } from './doc-preview-download-block-notice'
 
 // Why: one shared installer keeps every partition's deny-by-default permission/download policies from drifting apart.
 const configuredPartitions = new Set<string>()
@@ -22,6 +23,23 @@ const handleWillDownload = (
   browserManager.handleGuestWillDownload({ guestWebContentsId: webContents.id, item })
 }
 
+/**
+ * Why a second listener instead of a branch inside the shared one: `will-download` is a session
+ * event that names no partition, so the only place the decision can be keyed by partition is which
+ * listener that partition's session got. A workspace-document guest has no page of its own to
+ * attribute a download to, so routing one lands it in this desktop's Downloads folder under a
+ * remote-authored name that nothing in the UI accounts for.
+ */
+const handleDeniedWillDownload = (
+  event: Electron.Event,
+  _item: Electron.DownloadItem,
+  webContents: Electron.WebContents
+): void => {
+  event.preventDefault()
+  // The page gets nothing back; the reader gets a sentence, or a pressed button just does nothing.
+  noticeDocPreviewDownloadBlocked(webContents)
+}
+
 function resolvePermissionNoticeUrl(
   webContents: Electron.WebContents,
   details: Electron.PermissionRequest | undefined
@@ -37,7 +55,13 @@ function resolvePermissionNoticeUrl(
   }
 }
 
-export function installBrowserSessionPartitionPolicies(profile: BrowserSessionProfile): void {
+/** `route` hands the item to the owning page's download flow; `deny` cancels it before it starts. */
+export type BrowserPartitionDownloadPolicy = 'route' | 'deny'
+
+export function installBrowserSessionPartitionPolicies(
+  profile: BrowserSessionProfile,
+  options?: { downloads?: BrowserPartitionDownloadPolicy }
+): void {
   const { partition } = profile
   const sess = session.fromPartition(partition)
   setBrowserSessionUserAgentMode(sess, profile.userAgentMode ?? 'clean')
@@ -106,7 +130,11 @@ export function installBrowserSessionPartitionPolicies(profile: BrowserSessionPr
     callback({ video: undefined, audio: undefined })
   })
   sess.removeListener('will-download', handleWillDownload)
-  sess.on('will-download', handleWillDownload)
+  sess.removeListener('will-download', handleDeniedWillDownload)
+  sess.on(
+    'will-download',
+    options?.downloads === 'deny' ? handleDeniedWillDownload : handleWillDownload
+  )
   configuredPartitions.add(partition)
 }
 
@@ -115,6 +143,7 @@ export function clearBrowserSessionPartitionPolicies(partition: string, sess: Se
   configuredPartitions.delete(partition)
   browserManager.removeCertificateRequestGuard(sess)
   sess.removeListener('will-download', handleWillDownload)
+  sess.removeListener('will-download', handleDeniedWillDownload)
   clearBrowserWebAuthnAccessHandlers(sess)
   sess.setPermissionRequestHandler(null)
   sess.setPermissionCheckHandler(null)

src/main/browser/doc-preview-download-block-notice.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
+
+const mocks = vi.hoisted(() => ({
+  publishDocPreviewFailure: vi.fn(),
+  boundGrantIdByGuest: new Map<object, string>()
+}))
+
+vi.mock('./doc-preview-failure-notice', () => ({
+  publishDocPreviewFailure: mocks.publishDocPreviewFailure
+}))
+vi.mock('./doc-preview-guest-policy', () => ({
+  readDocPreviewGuestBoundGrantId: (guest: object) => mocks.boundGrantIdByGuest.get(guest) ?? null
+}))
+
+const GRANT_ID = 'a'.repeat(32)
+const OTHER_GRANT_ID = 'b'.repeat(32)
+
+/** Only the identity matters: the module asks the guest registry what grant this contents holds. */
+function guestBoundTo(grantId: string | null): Electron.WebContents {
+  const guest = {} as Electron.WebContents
+  if (grantId !== null) {
+    mocks.boundGrantIdByGuest.set(guest, grantId)
+  }
+  return guest
+}
+
+async function loadNotifier(): Promise<(guest: Electron.WebContents) => void> {
+  const module = await import('./doc-preview-download-block-notice')
+  return module.noticeDocPreviewDownloadBlocked
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  vi.clearAllMocks()
+  mocks.boundGrantIdByGuest.clear()
+  // Why per test: the module remembers which grants it has already told the reader about.
+  vi.resetModules()
+  vi.useFakeTimers()
+  vi.setSystemTime(new Date('2026-08-27T00:00:00.000Z'))
+})
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  vi.useRealTimers()
+})
+
+describe('noticeDocPreviewDownloadBlocked', () => {
+  it('tells the shell which preview had a download refused', async () => {
+    const notice = await loadNotifier()
+
+    notice(guestBoundTo(GRANT_ID))
+
+    expect(mocks.publishDocPreviewFailure).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
+      grantId: GRANT_ID,
+      reason: 'download-blocked'
+    })
+  })
+
+  // Why: a document can ask in a loop. The reader learns nothing from the second notice, and every
+  // attempt would otherwise cross the IPC boundary and re-render the strip.
+  it('says it once however often the document asks', async () => {
+    const notice = await loadNotifier()
+    const guest = guestBoundTo(GRANT_ID)
+
+    notice(guest)
+    notice(guest)
+    vi.advanceTimersByTime(1_500)
+    notice(guest)
+
+    expect(mocks.publishDocPreviewFailure).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
+  })
+
+  it('says it again for an attempt long after the last one', async () => {
+    const notice = await loadNotifier()
+    const guest = guestBoundTo(GRANT_ID)
+
+    notice(guest)
+    vi.advanceTimersByTime(2_500)
+    notice(guest)
+
+    expect(mocks.publishDocPreviewFailure).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2)
+  })
+
+  // Why not one throttle for the whole app: two previews are two readers, and silencing the second
+  // because the first just refused something leaves that press unexplained.
+  it('throttles each preview on its own', async () => {
+    const notice = await loadNotifier()
+
+    notice(guestBoundTo(GRANT_ID))
+    notice(guestBoundTo(OTHER_GRANT_ID))
+
+    expect(mocks.publishDocPreviewFailure).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2)
+    expect(mocks.publishDocPreviewFailure).toHaveBeenLastCalledWith({
+      grantId: OTHER_GRANT_ID,
+      reason: 'download-blocked'
+    })
+  })
+
+  // The absence half of the first test: no shell is showing this contents, so there is no preview
+  // to put a notice on. Without the presence tests above, this would pass on a module that never
+  // published anything at all.
+  it('says nothing for a contents no preview is bound to', async () => {
+    const notice = await loadNotifier()
+
+    notice(guestBoundTo(null))
+
+    expect(mocks.publishDocPreviewFailure).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+})

src/main/browser/doc-preview-download-block-notice.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+import { publishDocPreviewFailure } from './doc-preview-failure-notice'
+import { readDocPreviewGuestBoundGrantId } from './doc-preview-guest-policy'
+
+/**
+ * Why the reader is told at all, when the point of the fence is that nothing happens: a press that
+ * produces no file and no explanation reads as Orca being broken. The notice is chrome the document
+ * cannot see or read back, so the refusal stays as silent to the page as it was.
+ *
+ * Why a floor between notices: a document can ask in a loop, and every attempt would otherwise
+ * cross the IPC boundary and re-render the strip. The reader learns nothing from the thousandth.
+ */
+const NOTICE_MIN_INTERVAL_MS = 2_000
+const noticedAtByGrantId = new Map<string, number>()
+
+export function noticeDocPreviewDownloadBlocked(guest: Electron.WebContents): void {
+  const grantId = readDocPreviewGuestBoundGrantId(guest)
+  // Nothing to route a notice to: no shell is showing this contents as a preview.
+  if (grantId === null) {
+    return
+  }
+  const now = Date.now()
+  // Doubles as the expiry check, so what survives is exactly "noticed inside the window", and a
+  // grant that stops downloading stops being remembered.
+  for (const [noticedGrantId, noticedAt] of noticedAtByGrantId) {
+    if (now - noticedAt >= NOTICE_MIN_INTERVAL_MS) {
+      noticedAtByGrantId.delete(noticedGrantId)
+    }
+  }
+  if (noticedAtByGrantId.has(grantId)) {
+    return
+  }
+  noticedAtByGrantId.set(grantId, now)
+  publishDocPreviewFailure({ grantId, reason: 'download-blocked' })
+}

src/main/browser/doc-preview-failure-notice.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
+
+import { DOC_PREVIEW_LOAD_FAILURE_CHANNEL } from '../../shared/doc-preview-scheme'
+import { publishDocPreviewFailure, setDocPreviewFailureSink } from './doc-preview-failure-notice'
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  setDocPreviewFailureSink(null)
+})
+
+describe('publishDocPreviewFailure', () => {
+  it('sends the grant, path, and reason on the failure channel', () => {
+    const send = vi.fn()
+    setDocPreviewFailureSink({ send })
+
+    publishDocPreviewFailure({
+      grantId: 'a'.repeat(32),
+      relativePath: 'index.html',
+      reason: 'too-large'
+    })
+
+    expect(send).toHaveBeenCalledWith(DOC_PREVIEW_LOAD_FAILURE_CHANNEL, {
+      grantId: 'a'.repeat(32),
+      relativePath: 'index.html',
+      reason: 'too-large'
+    })
+  })
+
+  // Why: reads can outlive the window that asked for them; a missing sink must not throw inside
+  // the protocol handler.
+  it('is a no-op with no sink registered', () => {
+    expect(() =>
+      publishDocPreviewFailure({
+        grantId: 'b'.repeat(32),
+        relativePath: 'index.html',
+        reason: 'unreadable'
+      })
+    ).not.toThrow()
+  })
+
+  it('sends nothing into a destroyed window', () => {
+    const send = vi.fn()
+    setDocPreviewFailureSink({ send, isDestroyed: () => true })
+
+    publishDocPreviewFailure({
+      grantId: 'c'.repeat(32),
+      relativePath: 'index.html',
+      reason: 'unreadable'
+    })
+
+    expect(send).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  // Why: a WebContents can be torn down between the liveness check and the send.
+  it('swallows a throwing sink and stops using it', () => {
+    const send = vi.fn(() => {
+      throw new Error('Object has been destroyed')
+    })
+    setDocPreviewFailureSink({ send })
+    const failure = {
+      grantId: 'd'.repeat(32),
+      relativePath: 'index.html',
+      reason: 'unreadable' as const
+    }
+
+    expect(() => publishDocPreviewFailure(failure)).not.toThrow()
+    publishDocPreviewFailure(failure)
+
+    expect(send).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
+  })
+})

src/main/browser/doc-preview-failure-notice.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+import {
+  DOC_PREVIEW_LOAD_FAILURE_CHANNEL,
+  type DocPreviewFailure
+} from '../../shared/doc-preview-scheme'
+
+type DocPreviewFailureSink = {
+  send: (channel: string, payload: DocPreviewFailure) => void
+  isDestroyed?: () => boolean
+}
+
+let failureSink: DocPreviewFailureSink | null = null
+
+export function setDocPreviewFailureSink(sink: DocPreviewFailureSink | null): void {
+  failureSink = sink
+}
+
+/**
+ * The preview shell cannot read the guest's HTTP status, and a 4xx body renders as
+ * if it were the document. Pushing the reason lets the shell replace that with a
+ * localized notice for the failure the user actually hit.
+ */
+export function publishDocPreviewFailure(failure: DocPreviewFailure): void {
+  const sink = failureSink
+  // Why: a read can outlive the window that asked for it, and sending into torn-down
+  // WebContents throws — an unreadable asset must not take the protocol handler with it.
+  if (!sink || sink.isDestroyed?.()) {
+    return
+  }
+  try {
+    sink.send(DOC_PREVIEW_LOAD_FAILURE_CHANNEL, failure)
+  } catch {
+    failureSink = null
+  }
+}

src/main/browser/doc-preview-file-reader.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,333 @@
+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
+
+const mocks = vi.hoisted(() => ({
+  callRuntimeEnvironment: vi.fn(),
+  readFile: vi.fn(),
+  realpath: vi.fn(),
+  requireSshFilesystemProvider: vi.fn()
+}))
+
+vi.mock('../ipc/runtime-environment-transport-routing', () => ({
+  callRuntimeEnvironment: mocks.callRuntimeEnvironment
+}))
+vi.mock('../persistence', () => ({ getCanonicalUserDataPath: () => '/user-data' }))
+vi.mock('../providers/ssh-filesystem-dispatch', () => ({
+  requireSshFilesystemProvider: mocks.requireSshFilesystemProvider
+}))
+
+import { FileReadCapExceededError } from '../ssh/ssh-filesystem-stream-reader'
+import { docPreviewContentType, readDocPreviewFile } from './doc-preview-file-reader'
+import { mintDocPreviewGrant, revokeAllDocPreviewGrants } from './doc-preview-grant-registry'
+
+function sshGrant(): ReturnType<typeof mintDocPreviewGrant> {
+  return mintDocPreviewGrant({
+    owner: { kind: 'ssh', connectionId: 'ssh-1' },
+    root: '/home/alice/docs',
+    entryRelativePath: 'index.html',
+    browserPageId: 'page-1'
+  })
+}
+
+function runtimeGrant(root = '/srv/repo/docs'): ReturnType<typeof mintDocPreviewGrant> {
+  return mintDocPreviewGrant({
+    owner: {
+      kind: 'runtime',
+      environmentId: 'env-1',
+      worktreeSelector: 'id:wt-1',
+      worktreeRoot: '/srv/repo'
+    },
+    root,
+    entryRelativePath: 'index.html',
+    browserPageId: 'page-1'
+  })
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  vi.clearAllMocks()
+  revokeAllDocPreviewGrants()
+  // Why: an unsymlinked host canonicalizes to the path it was given.
+  mocks.realpath.mockImplementation((path: string) => Promise.resolve(path))
+  mocks.requireSshFilesystemProvider.mockReturnValue({
+    readFile: mocks.readFile,
+    realpath: mocks.realpath
+  })
+})
+
+describe('docPreviewContentType', () => {
+  it('maps document and asset extensions, defaulting to octet-stream', () => {
+    expect(docPreviewContentType('index.html')).toBe('text/html; charset=utf-8')
+    expect(docPreviewContentType('assets/app.CSS')).toBe('text/css; charset=utf-8')
+    expect(docPreviewContentType('assets/logo.png')).toBe('image/png')
+    expect(docPreviewContentType('data.bin')).toBe('application/octet-stream')
+  })
+})
+
+describe('readDocPreviewFile — ssh owner', () => {
+  it('reads text through the SSH filesystem provider', async () => {
+    mocks.readFile.mockResolvedValue({ content: '<h1>hi</h1>', isBinary: false })
+
+    const outcome = await readDocPreviewFile(sshGrant(), 'index.html')
+
+    expect(mocks.requireSshFilesystemProvider).toHaveBeenCalledWith('ssh-1')
+    expect(mocks.readFile).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/home/alice/docs/index.html')
+    expect(outcome).toEqual({
+      ok: true,
+      bytes: Buffer.from('<h1>hi</h1>', 'utf8'),
+      contentType: 'text/html; charset=utf-8'
+    })
+  })
+
+  it('decodes a base64 binary asset', async () => {
+    const png = Buffer.from([0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47])
+    mocks.readFile.mockResolvedValue({ content: png.toString('base64'), isBinary: true })
+
+    const outcome = await readDocPreviewFile(sshGrant(), 'assets/logo.png')
+
+    expect(outcome).toEqual({ ok: true, bytes: png, contentType: 'image/png' })
+  })
+
+  // Why: the SSH reader rejects an over-cap file rather than clamping it, so a completed read is
+  // always whole and needs no truncation flag.
+  it('serves a whole SSH read that carries no truncation flag', async () => {
+    mocks.readFile.mockResolvedValue({ content: '<h1>whole</h1>', isBinary: false })
+
+    expect(await readDocPreviewFile(sshGrant(), 'index.html')).toMatchObject({ ok: true })
+  })
+
+  // Why: the SSH read path only serves images and PDFs as bytes, so a font is refused there by
+  // design — the failure must name the file type, not a stale server.
+  it('reports a file type the host will not send as unsupported-asset', async () => {
+    mocks.readFile.mockResolvedValue({ content: '', isBinary: true })
+
+    const outcome = await readDocPreviewFile(sshGrant(), 'assets/font.woff2')
+
+    expect(outcome).toMatchObject({ ok: false, status: 415, reason: 'unsupported-asset' })
+  })
+
+  // Why: a host that still named the type read a 0-byte file, so 0 bytes is the honest answer —
+  // reporting it as a refused format would be a failure the workspace never reported.
+  it('serves an empty file the host still typed instead of calling it unsupported', async () => {
+    mocks.readFile.mockResolvedValue({ content: '', isBinary: true, mimeType: 'image/png' })
+
+    const outcome = await readDocPreviewFile(sshGrant(), 'assets/logo.png')
+
+    expect(outcome).toEqual({ ok: true, bytes: Buffer.alloc(0), contentType: 'image/png' })
+  })
+
+  // Why: containment above is lexical, and the SSH read RPC enforces no root of its own, so a
+  // symlink inside the grant would otherwise read anything the account can reach.
+  it('404s a path that canonicalizes outside the grant root', async () => {
+    mocks.realpath.mockImplementation((path: string) =>
+      Promise.resolve(path === '/home/alice/docs/escape.html' ? '/etc/shadow' : path)
+    )
+
+    const outcome = await readDocPreviewFile(sshGrant(), 'escape.html')
+
+    expect(outcome).toMatchObject({ ok: false, status: 404 })
+    expect(mocks.readFile).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('reads the canonical path once containment holds', async () => {
+    mocks.realpath.mockImplementation((path: string) =>
+      Promise.resolve(path === '/home/alice/docs/link.html' ? '/home/alice/docs/real.html' : path)
+    )
+    mocks.readFile.mockResolvedValue({ content: '<h1>real</h1>', isBinary: false })
+
+    expect(await readDocPreviewFile(sshGrant(), 'link.html')).toMatchObject({ ok: true })
+    expect(mocks.readFile).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/home/alice/docs/real.html')
+  })
+
+  // Why: a symlinked root is legitimate; containment must be judged on what both sides resolve to.
+  it('keeps serving a grant whose own root is a symlink', async () => {
+    mocks.realpath.mockImplementation((path: string) =>
+      Promise.resolve(path.replace('/home/alice/docs', '/mnt/data/docs'))
+    )
+    mocks.readFile.mockResolvedValue({ content: '<h1>hi</h1>', isBinary: false })
+
+    expect(await readDocPreviewFile(sshGrant(), 'index.html')).toMatchObject({ ok: true })
+    expect(mocks.readFile).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/mnt/data/docs/index.html')
+  })
+
+  it('404s when the host cannot canonicalize the path at all', async () => {
+    mocks.realpath.mockRejectedValue(new Error('no such file'))
+
+    expect(await readDocPreviewFile(sshGrant(), 'index.html')).toMatchObject({
+      ok: false,
+      status: 404
+    })
+    expect(mocks.readFile).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('404s a path outside the grant root without touching the provider', async () => {
+    const outcome = await readDocPreviewFile(sshGrant(), '../../etc/passwd')
+
+    expect(outcome).toMatchObject({ ok: false, status: 404 })
+    expect(mocks.requireSshFilesystemProvider).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('reports an over-cap SSH file as too large rather than unreadable', async () => {
+    mocks.readFile.mockRejectedValue(new FileReadCapExceededError('exceeds client cap'))
+
+    expect(await readDocPreviewFile(sshGrant(), 'huge.html')).toMatchObject({
+      ok: false,
+      status: 413
+    })
+  })
+
+  it('404s when the provider read fails', async () => {
+    mocks.readFile.mockRejectedValue(new Error('no such file'))
+
+    expect(await readDocPreviewFile(sshGrant(), 'missing.html')).toMatchObject({
+      ok: false,
+      status: 404
+    })
+  })
+})
+
+describe('readDocPreviewFile — paired runtime owner', () => {
+  it('reads text over worktree-relative files.read', async () => {
+    mocks.callRuntimeEnvironment.mockResolvedValue({
+      ok: true,
+      result: { content: '<h1>remote</h1>', truncated: false, byteLength: 15 }
+    })
+
+    const outcome = await readDocPreviewFile(runtimeGrant(), 'index.html')
+
+    expect(mocks.callRuntimeEnvironment).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      '/user-data',
+      'env-1',
+      'files.read',
+      { worktree: 'id:wt-1', relativePath: 'docs/index.html' },
+      15_000
+    )
+    expect(outcome).toEqual({
+      ok: true,
+      bytes: Buffer.from('<h1>remote</h1>', 'utf8'),
+      contentType: 'text/html; charset=utf-8'
+    })
+  })
+
+  it('falls back to the base64 preview RPC for a binary asset', async () => {
+    const png = Buffer.from([0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47])
+    mocks.callRuntimeEnvironment
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+        ok: false,
+        error: { code: 'runtime_error', message: 'binary_file' }
+      })
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+        ok: true,
+        result: {
+          content: png.toString('base64'),
+          isBinary: true,
+          isImage: true,
+          mimeType: 'image/png'
+        }
+      })
+
+    const outcome = await readDocPreviewFile(runtimeGrant(), 'assets/logo.png')
+
+    expect(mocks.callRuntimeEnvironment).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(
+      2,
+      '/user-data',
+      'env-1',
+      'files.readPreview',
+      { worktree: 'id:wt-1', relativePath: 'docs/assets/logo.png' },
+      15_000
+    )
+    expect(outcome).toEqual({ ok: true, bytes: png, contentType: 'image/png' })
+  })
+
+  it('degrades on an old server whose empty binary preview carries no metadata', async () => {
+    mocks.callRuntimeEnvironment
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+        ok: false,
+        error: { code: 'runtime_error', message: 'binary_file' }
+      })
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce({ ok: true, result: { content: '', isBinary: true } })
+
+    expect(await readDocPreviewFile(runtimeGrant(), 'assets/logo.png')).toMatchObject({
+      ok: false,
+      status: 415,
+      reason: 'unsupported-asset'
+    })
+  })
+
+  it('serves an empty paired asset the host typed rather than reporting a refusal', async () => {
+    mocks.callRuntimeEnvironment
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+        ok: false,
+        error: { code: 'runtime_error', message: 'binary_file' }
+      })
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+        ok: true,
+        result: { content: '', isBinary: true, isImage: true, mimeType: 'image/png' }
+      })
+
+    expect(await readDocPreviewFile(runtimeGrant(), 'assets/logo.png')).toEqual({
+      ok: true,
+      bytes: Buffer.alloc(0),
+      contentType: 'image/png'
+    })
+  })
+
+  // Why: files.read clamps text at the host cap and only says so in `truncated`; serving the
+  // clamped bytes renders a document that silently stops halfway.
+  it('refuses a truncated text read instead of serving the clamped bytes', async () => {
+    mocks.callRuntimeEnvironment.mockResolvedValue({
+      ok: true,
+      result: { content: '<h1>half of', truncated: true, byteLength: 40_000_000 }
+    })
+
+    const outcome = await readDocPreviewFile(runtimeGrant(), 'index.html')
+
+    expect(outcome).toMatchObject({ ok: false, status: 413 })
+    expect(outcome).not.toMatchObject({ ok: true })
+  })
+
+  it('serves a read the host reports as complete', async () => {
+    mocks.callRuntimeEnvironment.mockResolvedValue({
+      ok: true,
+      result: { content: '<h1>all</h1>', truncated: false, byteLength: 12 }
+    })
+
+    expect(await readDocPreviewFile(runtimeGrant(), 'index.html')).toMatchObject({ ok: true })
+  })
+
+  // Why: the binary RPC has no `truncated` field — it rejects an over-cap asset with this error.
+  it('reports the host rejecting an over-cap binary as too large', async () => {
+    mocks.callRuntimeEnvironment
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+        ok: false,
+        error: { code: 'runtime_error', message: 'binary_file' }
+      })
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce({
+        ok: false,
+        error: { code: 'runtime_error', message: 'file_too_large' }
+      })
+
+    expect(await readDocPreviewFile(runtimeGrant(), 'assets/huge.png')).toMatchObject({
+      ok: false,
+      status: 413
+    })
+  })
+
+  it('does not treat an unrelated RPC failure as a binary fallback', async () => {
+    mocks.callRuntimeEnvironment.mockResolvedValue({
+      ok: false,
+      error: { code: 'runtime_error', message: 'permission_denied' }
+    })
+
+    expect(await readDocPreviewFile(runtimeGrant(), 'index.html')).toMatchObject({
+      ok: false,
+      status: 404
+    })
+    expect(mocks.callRuntimeEnvironment).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
+  })
+
+  it('404s a document outside the worktree, which files.read cannot address', async () => {
+    const outcome = await readDocPreviewFile(runtimeGrant('/tmp/agent-docs'), 'index.html')
+
+    expect(outcome).toMatchObject({ ok: false, status: 404 })
+    expect(mocks.callRuntimeEnvironment).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+})

src/main/browser/doc-preview-file-reader.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+import { extname } from 'node:path'
+import type {
+  RuntimeFilePreviewResult,
+  RuntimeFileReadResult
+} from '../../shared/runtime-file-contracts'
+import type { DocPreviewFileFailureReason } from '../../shared/doc-preview-scheme'
+import { callRuntimeEnvironment } from '../ipc/runtime-environment-transport-routing'
+import { FileReadCapExceededError } from '../ssh/ssh-filesystem-stream-reader'
+import { getCanonicalUserDataPath } from '../persistence'
+import { requireSshFilesystemProvider } from '../providers/ssh-filesystem-dispatch'
+import {
+  resolveCanonicalDocPreviewPath,
+  resolveDocPreviewTargetPath,
+  toRuntimeWorktreeRelativePath,
+  type DocPreviewGrant
+} from './doc-preview-grant-registry'
+
+const DOC_PREVIEW_READ_TIMEOUT_MS = 15_000
+
+/** Why not "needs a newer server": the SSH read path only ever serves images and PDFs as bytes, so
+ *  a font is refused there by design, not by version. Name the file type, not the host's age. */
+const UNSERVABLE_ASSET_PREVIEW_MESSAGE = 'This workspace cannot send this file type to a preview.'
+
+/** `files.read` clamps text at the host's cap and reports it; serving the clamped bytes would
+ *  render a silently half-finished document. */
+const TRUNCATED_PREVIEW_MESSAGE = 'This document is too large for the server to send in full.'
+
+/** The paired host rejects an over-cap asset outright instead of clamping it. */
+const RUNTIME_TOO_LARGE_ERROR = 'file_too_large'
+
+/** Both owners refuse an over-cap file; only their error shapes differ. */
+function isTooLargeReadError(error: unknown): boolean {
+  return (
+    error instanceof FileReadCapExceededError ||
+    (error instanceof Error && error.message === RUNTIME_TOO_LARGE_ERROR)
+  )
+}
+
+export type DocPreviewReadOutcome =
+  | { ok: true; bytes: Buffer; contentType: string }
+  | { ok: false; status: number; reason: DocPreviewFileFailureReason; message: string }
+
+const DOC_PREVIEW_CONTENT_TYPES: Record<string, string> = {
+  '.html': 'text/html; charset=utf-8',
+  '.htm': 'text/html; charset=utf-8',
+  '.css': 'text/css; charset=utf-8',
+  '.js': 'text/javascript; charset=utf-8',
+  '.mjs': 'text/javascript; charset=utf-8',
+  '.json': 'application/json; charset=utf-8',
+  '.txt': 'text/plain; charset=utf-8',
+  '.md': 'text/plain; charset=utf-8',
+  '.csv': 'text/plain; charset=utf-8',
+  '.svg': 'image/svg+xml',
+  '.png': 'image/png',
+  '.jpg': 'image/jpeg',
+  '.jpeg': 'image/jpeg',
+  '.gif': 'image/gif',
+  '.webp': 'image/webp',
+  '.bmp': 'image/bmp',
+  '.ico': 'image/x-icon',
+  '.pdf': 'application/pdf',
+  '.woff': 'font/woff',
+  '.woff2': 'font/woff2',
+  '.ttf': 'font/ttf',
+  '.otf': 'font/otf'
+}
+
+export function docPreviewContentType(relativePath: string): string {
+  return (
+    DOC_PREVIEW_CONTENT_TYPES[extname(relativePath).toLowerCase()] ?? 'application/octet-stream'
+  )
+}
+
+type PreviewFileBytes = {
+  content: string
+  isBinary: boolean
+  truncated?: boolean
+  /** Set by every owner that agreed to serve the bytes, so it also survives a 0-byte file. */
+  mimeType?: string
+}
+
+function toOutcome(source: PreviewFileBytes, contentType: string): DocPreviewReadOutcome {
+  if (source.truncated) {
+    return { ok: false, status: 413, reason: 'too-large', message: TRUNCATED_PREVIEW_MESSAGE }
+  }
+  if (!source.isBinary) {
+    return { ok: true, bytes: Buffer.from(source.content, 'utf8'), contentType }
+  }
+  if (source.content) {
+    return { ok: true, bytes: Buffer.from(source.content, 'base64'), contentType }
+  }
+  // Why: an empty binary body is two different answers. A host that still named the file's type
+  // read a 0-byte file, and 0 bytes is what it should serve; a host that named no type declined
+  // the format outright and has nothing to send.
+  return source.mimeType
+    ? { ok: true, bytes: Buffer.alloc(0), contentType }
+    : {
+        ok: false,
+        status: 415,
+        reason: 'unsupported-asset',
+        message: UNSERVABLE_ASSET_PREVIEW_MESSAGE
+      }
+}
+
+async function readRuntimeDocPreviewFile(
+  environmentId: string,
+  worktreeSelector: string,
+  relativePath: string
+): Promise<PreviewFileBytes> {
+  const userDataPath = getCanonicalUserDataPath()
+  const response = await callRuntimeEnvironment(
+    userDataPath,
+    environmentId,
+    'files.read',
+    { worktree: worktreeSelector, relativePath },
+    DOC_PREVIEW_READ_TIMEOUT_MS
+  )
+  if (response.ok) {
+    const result = response.result as RuntimeFileReadResult
+    return { content: result.content, isBinary: false, truncated: result.truncated === true }
+  }
+  // Why: files.read rejects binaries with a typed error; the base64 preview RPC serves
+  // images and fonts the same way it does for markdown previews. Match the exact
+  // message so an unrelated failure can't spoof the fallback.
+  if (response.error.message !== 'binary_file') {
+    throw new Error(response.error.message)
+  }
+  const previewResponse = await callRuntimeEnvironment(
+    userDataPath,
+    environmentId,
+    'files.readPreview',
+    { worktree: worktreeSelector, relativePath },
+    DOC_PREVIEW_READ_TIMEOUT_MS
+  )
+  if (!previewResponse.ok) {
+    throw new Error(previewResponse.error.message)
+  }
+  const preview = previewResponse.result as RuntimeFilePreviewResult
+  // Why: readPreview never clamps — it rejects an over-cap asset — so its body is whole or absent.
+  return {
+    content: preview.content,
+    isBinary: preview.isBinary,
+    ...(preview.mimeType ? { mimeType: preview.mimeType } : {})
+  }
+}
+
+function notFoundOutcome(message = 'Not found'): DocPreviewReadOutcome {
+  return { ok: false, status: 404, reason: 'unreadable', message }
+}
+
+/** Reads one in-grant path over the same channel the editor uses for that owner. */
+export async function readDocPreviewFile(
+  grant: DocPreviewGrant,
+  relativePath: string
+): Promise<DocPreviewReadOutcome> {
+  const absolutePath = resolveDocPreviewTargetPath(grant, relativePath)
+  if (!absolutePath) {
+    return notFoundOutcome()
+  }
+  const contentType = docPreviewContentType(relativePath)
+  try {
+    if (grant.owner.kind === 'ssh') {
+      const provider = requireSshFilesystemProvider(grant.owner.connectionId)
+      // Why: the SSH read RPC enforces no root of its own, so containment has to survive a symlink
+      // before the read — the lexical check above only proves the requested path looked contained.
+      const canonicalPath = await resolveCanonicalDocPreviewPath(grant, absolutePath, (path) =>
+        provider.realpath(path)
+      )
+      if (!canonicalPath) {
+        return notFoundOutcome()
+      }
+      // Why: the SSH reader rejects an over-cap file outright, so its result is never partial.
+      return toOutcome(await provider.readFile(canonicalPath), contentType)
+    }
+    const worktreeRelativePath = toRuntimeWorktreeRelativePath(
+      grant.owner.worktreeRoot,
+      absolutePath
+    )
+    if (!worktreeRelativePath) {
+      // Why: files.read is worktree-scoped, so a doc outside the worktree has no client-side channel.
+      return notFoundOutcome()
+    }
+    // Why no realpath pass here: the host resolves this path through resolveAuthorizedPath, which
+    // canonicalizes and re-checks the worktree root server-side before reading.
+    return toOutcome(
+      await readRuntimeDocPreviewFile(
+        grant.owner.environmentId,
+        grant.owner.worktreeSelector,
+        worktreeRelativePath
+      ),
+      contentType
+    )
+  } catch (error) {
+    return isTooLargeReadError(error)
+      ? { ok: false, status: 413, reason: 'too-large', message: TRUNCATED_PREVIEW_MESSAGE }
+      : notFoundOutcome(error instanceof Error ? error.message : undefined)
+  }
+}

src/main/browser/doc-preview-grant-registry.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
+import {
+  getDocPreviewGrant,
+  mintDocPreviewGrant,
+  resolveCanonicalDocPreviewPath,
+  resolveDocPreviewTargetPath,
+  revokeAllDocPreviewGrants,
+  revokeDocPreviewGrant,
+  toRuntimeWorktreeRelativePath,
+  type DocPreviewGrant
+} from './doc-preview-grant-registry'
+
+const sshOwner = { kind: 'ssh', connectionId: 'ssh-1' } as const
+
+function mintPosixGrant(root = '/srv/repo/docs'): DocPreviewGrant {
+  return mintDocPreviewGrant({
+    owner: sshOwner,
+    root,
+    entryRelativePath: 'index.html',
+    browserPageId: 'page-1'
+  })
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  revokeAllDocPreviewGrants()
+})
+
+describe('doc preview grants', () => {
+  it('mints unguessable ids and looks them up', () => {
+    const first = mintPosixGrant()
+    const second = mintPosixGrant()
+
+    expect(first.id).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]{32}$/)
+    expect(first.id).not.toBe(second.id)
+    expect(getDocPreviewGrant(first.id)).toBe(first)
+  })
+
+  it('returns nothing for an unknown or revoked grant', () => {
+    const grant = mintPosixGrant()
+
+    expect(getDocPreviewGrant('0'.repeat(32))).toBeNull()
+    expect(revokeDocPreviewGrant(grant.id)).toBe(true)
+    expect(getDocPreviewGrant(grant.id)).toBeNull()
+    expect(revokeDocPreviewGrant(grant.id)).toBe(false)
+  })
+})
+
+describe('resolveDocPreviewTargetPath', () => {
+  it('resolves paths inside the grant root', () => {
+    const grant = mintPosixGrant()
+
+    expect(resolveDocPreviewTargetPath(grant, 'index.html')).toBe('/srv/repo/docs/index.html')
+    expect(resolveDocPreviewTargetPath(grant, 'assets/logo.png')).toBe(
+      '/srv/repo/docs/assets/logo.png'
+    )
+  })
+
+  it('refuses parent traversal, absolute escapes and empty paths', () => {
+    const grant = mintPosixGrant()
+
+    expect(resolveDocPreviewTargetPath(grant, '../secret.env')).toBeNull()
+    expect(resolveDocPreviewTargetPath(grant, 'assets/../../secret.env')).toBeNull()
+    expect(resolveDocPreviewTargetPath(grant, '..')).toBeNull()
+    expect(resolveDocPreviewTargetPath(grant, '')).toBeNull()
+    expect(resolveDocPreviewTargetPath(grant, 'a//b')).toBeNull()
+  })
+
+  it('refuses backslash and NUL segments that could re-split on the owning host', () => {
+    const grant = mintPosixGrant()
+
+    expect(resolveDocPreviewTargetPath(grant, '..\\secret.env')).toBeNull()
+    expect(resolveDocPreviewTargetPath(grant, 'index.html\0.png')).toBeNull()
+  })
+
+  // Why this is a traversal test and not a containment test: every request path that names a
+  // sibling directory has to climb out of the root first, so the `..` segment guard answers it
+  // before the prefix check runs. Sibling containment is exercised where it is reachable —
+  // against a canonicalized path, below.
+  it('refuses a sibling directory by refusing the traversal that reaches it', () => {
+    const grant = mintPosixGrant()
+
+    expect(resolveDocPreviewTargetPath(grant, '../docs-private/secret.html')).toBeNull()
+  })
+
+  it('keeps a Windows drive root addressable instead of turning it drive-relative', () => {
+    const grant = mintDocPreviewGrant({
+      owner: sshOwner,
+      root: 'C:\\',
+      entryRelativePath: 'index.html',
+      browserPageId: 'page-1'
+    })
+
+    expect(resolveDocPreviewTargetPath(grant, 'index.html')).toBe('C:\\index.html')
+  })
+
+  it('follows the owning host path flavor rather than this process platform', () => {
+    const windowsGrant = mintDocPreviewGrant({
+      owner: sshOwner,
+      root: 'C:\\srv\\repo\\docs',
+      entryRelativePath: 'index.html',
+      browserPageId: 'page-1'
+    })
+
+    expect(resolveDocPreviewTargetPath(windowsGrant, 'assets/logo.png')).toBe(
+      'C:\\srv\\repo\\docs\\assets\\logo.png'
+    )
+    expect(resolveDocPreviewTargetPath(windowsGrant, '../secret.env')).toBeNull()
+  })
+
+  it('normalizes a trailing separator on the root', () => {
+    const grant = mintDocPreviewGrant({
+      owner: sshOwner,
+      root: '/srv/repo/docs/',
+      entryRelativePath: 'index.html',
+      browserPageId: 'page-1'
+    })
+
+    expect(resolveDocPreviewTargetPath(grant, 'index.html')).toBe('/srv/repo/docs/index.html')
+    expect(resolveDocPreviewTargetPath(grant, '../secret.env')).toBeNull()
+  })
+})
+
+describe('resolveCanonicalDocPreviewPath', () => {
+  // Why here and not above: a canonical path is the one input that can name a sibling directory
+  // without traversing — the host resolved a symlink to it — so this is where the prefix check
+  // is the only thing standing between the grant and `/srv/repo/docs-private`.
+  it('refuses a canonical path in a sibling directory that shares the root prefix', async () => {
+    const grant = mintPosixGrant()
+
+    await expect(
+      resolveCanonicalDocPreviewPath(grant, '/srv/repo/docs/report.html', async (path) =>
+        path === grant.root ? path : '/srv/repo/docs-private/secret.html'
+      )
+    ).resolves.toBeNull()
+  })
+
+  it('answers the canonical path when it stays inside the canonical root', async () => {
+    const grant = mintPosixGrant()
+
+    await expect(
+      resolveCanonicalDocPreviewPath(grant, '/srv/repo/docs/report.html', async (path) => path)
+    ).resolves.toBe('/srv/repo/docs/report.html')
+  })
+})
+
+describe('toRuntimeWorktreeRelativePath', () => {
+  it('produces a worktree-relative path for files inside the worktree', () => {
+    expect(toRuntimeWorktreeRelativePath('/srv/repo', '/srv/repo/docs/index.html')).toBe(
+      'docs/index.html'
+    )
+  })
+
+  it('rejects paths outside the worktree, which files.read cannot address', () => {
+    expect(toRuntimeWorktreeRelativePath('/srv/repo', '/tmp/agent/report.html')).toBeNull()
+    expect(toRuntimeWorktreeRelativePath('/srv/repo', '/srv/repo')).toBeNull()
+  })
+
+  it('uses Windows semantics for a Windows worktree root', () => {
+    expect(toRuntimeWorktreeRelativePath('C:\\srv\\repo', 'C:\\srv\\repo\\docs\\index.html')).toBe(
+      'docs/index.html'
+    )
+    expect(toRuntimeWorktreeRelativePath('C:\\srv\\repo', 'D:\\other\\index.html')).toBeNull()
+  })
+})

src/main/browser/doc-preview-grant-registry.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'
+import { posix, win32 } from 'node:path'
+import { isWindowsAbsolutePathLike } from '../../shared/cross-platform-path'
+
+/**
+ * A preview grant is the only authority that turns an `orca-preview://` request
+ * into bytes: it names the host that owns the file and the single directory
+ * subtree requests may resolve inside. No grant, no bytes.
+ */
+export type DocPreviewOwner =
+  | { kind: 'ssh'; connectionId: string }
+  | {
+      kind: 'runtime'
+      environmentId: string
+      /** Selector the runtime resolves `files.read` against. */
+      worktreeSelector: string
+      /** Worktree root on the runtime host; `files.read` only accepts paths inside it. */
+      worktreeRoot: string
+    }
+
+export type DocPreviewGrant = {
+  id: string
+  owner: DocPreviewOwner
+  /** Containing directory of the opened document, on the owning host. */
+  root: string
+  /** Path of the opened document relative to `root`. */
+  entryRelativePath: string
+  /**
+   * Browser page the reader opened this document in. Main registers the guest under it once the
+   * guest commits to the grant, so the surface a tool names is the page the reader is looking at
+   * and not the grant, which a re-mint replaces underneath the same page.
+   */
+  browserPageId: string
+}
+
+const grantsById = new Map<string, DocPreviewGrant>()
+
+function pathFlavorFor(root: string): typeof posix | typeof win32 {
+  return isWindowsAbsolutePathLike(root) ? win32 : posix
+}
+
+function normalizeRootPath(root: string): string {
+  const flavor = pathFlavorFor(root)
+  const normalized =
+    flavor === win32 ? flavor.normalize(root.replace(/\//g, '\\')) : flavor.normalize(root)
+  // Why: `C:\` is the whole root, and trimming its separator would make win32.join answer the
+  // drive-relative `C:x`, which resolves against the host's cwd instead of inside the grant.
+  if (flavor === win32 && /^[a-zA-Z]:\\$/.test(normalized)) {
+    return normalized
+  }
+  // Why: a trailing separator would make the containment prefix check accept a sibling directory.
+  return normalized.length > 1 && normalized.endsWith(flavor.sep)
+    ? normalized.slice(0, -1)
+    : normalized
+}
+
+export function mintDocPreviewGrant(params: {
+  owner: DocPreviewOwner
+  root: string
+  entryRelativePath: string
+  browserPageId: string
+}): DocPreviewGrant {
+  const grant: DocPreviewGrant = {
+    id: randomBytes(16).toString('hex'),
+    owner: params.owner,
+    root: normalizeRootPath(params.root),
+    entryRelativePath: params.entryRelativePath.replace(/\\/g, '/'),
+    browserPageId: params.browserPageId
+  }
+  grantsById.set(grant.id, grant)
+  return grant
+}
+
+export function getDocPreviewGrant(grantId: string): DocPreviewGrant | null {
+  return grantsById.get(grantId) ?? null
+}
+
+/**
+ * Why anything listens at all: a grant is the only thing that names a preview's lifetime. State
+ * elsewhere in main keyed by a preview's tool target — grab intent, a queued grab chain — has no
+ * other signal telling it the surface is gone, and would otherwise accrete one entry per grant
+ * for the life of the process.
+ */
+const revocationListeners = new Set<(grant: DocPreviewGrant) => void>()
+
+/** Why the whole grant and not its id: it is already gone from the registry when listeners run. */
+export function onDocPreviewGrantRevoked(listener: (grant: DocPreviewGrant) => void): () => void {
+  revocationListeners.add(listener)
+  return () => revocationListeners.delete(listener)
+}
+
+function notifyRevoked(grant: DocPreviewGrant): void {
+  for (const listener of revocationListeners) {
+    listener(grant)
+  }
+}
+
+export function revokeDocPreviewGrant(grantId: string): boolean {
+  canonicalRootByGrantId.delete(grantId)
+  const grant = grantsById.get(grantId)
+  if (!grant) {
+    return false
+  }
+  grantsById.delete(grantId)
+  notifyRevoked(grant)
+  return true
+}
+
+export function revokeAllDocPreviewGrants(): void {
+  canonicalRootByGrantId.clear()
+  const revoked = [...grantsById.values()]
+  grantsById.clear()
+  for (const grant of revoked) {
+    notifyRevoked(grant)
+  }
+}
+
+function hasUnsafeSegment(segments: string[]): boolean {
+  return segments.some(
+    (segment) =>
+      segment.length === 0 ||
+      segment === '.' ||
+      segment === '..' ||
+      segment.includes('\0') ||
+      segment.includes('\\')
+  )
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolves a request path to an absolute path on the owning host, or null when
+ * it would escape the grant's root. Path flavor follows the root (the owning
+ * host may be Windows while this client is not), never `process.platform`.
+ */
+export function resolveDocPreviewTargetPath(
+  grant: DocPreviewGrant,
+  relativePath: string
+): string | null {
+  const segments = relativePath.split('/').filter((segment, index, all) => {
+    // Why: keep empty segments visible to the safety check except a single trailing one from `dir/`.
+    return !(segment === '' && index === all.length - 1)
+  })
+  if (segments.length === 0 || hasUnsafeSegment(segments)) {
+    return null
+  }
+  const flavor = pathFlavorFor(grant.root)
+  const resolved = flavor.normalize(flavor.join(grant.root, ...segments))
+  return isInsideRoot(grant.root, resolved, flavor) ? resolved : null
+}
+
+function isInsideRoot(
+  root: string,
+  candidate: string,
+  flavor: typeof posix | typeof win32
+): boolean {
+  const rootPrefix = root.endsWith(flavor.sep) ? root : `${root}${flavor.sep}`
+  return candidate.startsWith(rootPrefix)
+}
+
+/** Why: realpath is a host round-trip, and a grant's root is fixed for its lifetime. */
+const canonicalRootByGrantId = new Map<string, Promise<string>>()
+
+/**
+ * Second containment pass for hosts where the lexical one is not enough: a symlink
+ * inside the root can point anywhere, and the SSH read RPC applies no root of its
+ * own. Both sides are canonicalized on the owning host before the prefix re-check;
+ * a host that cannot canonicalize a path answers nothing.
+ */
+export async function resolveCanonicalDocPreviewPath(
+  grant: DocPreviewGrant,
+  absolutePath: string,
+  realpath: (path: string) => Promise<string>
+): Promise<string | null> {
+  try {
+    let canonicalRoot = canonicalRootByGrantId.get(grant.id)
+    if (!canonicalRoot) {
+      canonicalRoot = realpath(grant.root).then(normalizeRootPath)
+      canonicalRootByGrantId.set(grant.id, canonicalRoot)
+    }
+    const [root, canonicalPath] = await Promise.all([canonicalRoot, realpath(absolutePath)])
+    const flavor = pathFlavorFor(root)
+    return isInsideRoot(root, canonicalPath, flavor) ? canonicalPath : null
+  } catch {
+    // Why: a root that no longer canonicalizes must not fall back to the lexical answer.
+    canonicalRootByGrantId.delete(grant.id)
+    return null
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Path a runtime `files.read` can address, i.e. relative to the worktree root.
+ * Returns null when the grant root sits outside the worktree — the runtime file
+ * RPCs are worktree-scoped, so those documents are unreadable client-side.
+ */
+export function toRuntimeWorktreeRelativePath(
+  worktreeRoot: string,
+  absolutePath: string
+): string | null {
+  const flavor = pathFlavorFor(worktreeRoot)
+  const normalizedRoot = normalizeRootPath(worktreeRoot)
+  const relative = flavor.relative(normalizedRoot, absolutePath)
+  if (!relative || relative === '..' || relative.startsWith(`..${flavor.sep}`)) {
+    return null
+  }
+  if (flavor === win32 && /^[a-zA-Z]:/.test(relative)) {
+    return null
+  }
+  return relative.replace(/\\/g, '/')
+}

src/main/browser/doc-preview-guest-policy.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,550 @@
+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
+import {
+  getWorkspaceDocPageGuest,
+  installDocPreviewGuestPolicy,
+  readDocPreviewGuestBoundGrantId,
+  reportDocPreviewLinkClick
+} from './doc-preview-guest-policy'
+import { buildDocPreviewUrl } from '../../shared/doc-preview-scheme'
+import {
+  mintDocPreviewGrant,
+  revokeAllDocPreviewGrants,
+  revokeDocPreviewGrant
+} from './doc-preview-grant-registry'
+
+type GuestHandlers = Record<string, (...args: never[]) => void>
+
+const HOST_RENDERER_ID = 42
+
+function installOnFakeGuest(
+  hostId: number = HOST_RENDERER_ID,
+  /** What the guest is already showing when the embedder hands it over, as a real one usually is. */
+  initialUrl = ''
+): {
+  contents: object
+  handlers: GuestHandlers
+  hostId: number
+  isFocused: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>
+  send: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>
+  setWebRTCIPHandlingPolicy: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>
+  windowOpenHandler: (details: { url: string }) => { action: string }
+  /** Why without the `destroyed` event: Chromium tears the contents down before main runs it. */
+  markContentsDestroyed: () => void
+} {
+  const handlers: GuestHandlers = {}
+  let contentsDestroyed = false
+  const send = vi.fn()
+  const isFocused = vi.fn(() => true)
+  const setWebRTCIPHandlingPolicy = vi.fn()
+  let windowOpenHandler: (details: { url: string }) => { action: string } = () => ({
+    action: 'deny'
+  })
+  const register = (event: string, handler: (...args: never[]) => void): void => {
+    handlers[event] = handler
+  }
+  const guest = {
+    isFocused,
+    isDestroyed: () => contentsDestroyed,
+    getURL: () => initialUrl,
+    on: vi.fn(register),
+    once: vi.fn(register),
+    setWindowOpenHandler: vi.fn((handler: (details: { url: string }) => { action: string }) => {
+      windowOpenHandler = handler
+    }),
+    setWebRTCIPHandlingPolicy
+  }
+  installDocPreviewGuestPolicy(guest as never, { id: hostId, send })
+  return {
+    contents: guest,
+    handlers,
+    hostId,
+    isFocused,
+    send,
+    setWebRTCIPHandlingPolicy,
+    windowOpenHandler: (details) => windowOpenHandler(details),
+    markContentsDestroyed: () => {
+      contentsDestroyed = true
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+type FakeGuest = ReturnType<typeof installOnFakeGuest>
+
+function startMainFrameNavigation(guest: FakeGuest, url: string): void {
+  guest.handlers['did-start-navigation']?.({ url, isMainFrame: true } as never)
+}
+
+/** A guest already showing a document, which is the only state a link can be pressed in. */
+function boundGuest(): { grant: ReturnType<typeof mintGrant>; guest: FakeGuest } {
+  const grant = mintGrant()
+  const guest = installOnFakeGuest()
+  startMainFrameNavigation(guest, buildDocPreviewUrl(grant.id, 'index.html'))
+  return { grant, guest }
+}
+
+function reportClick(guest: FakeGuest, url: string): void {
+  reportDocPreviewLinkClick(guest.contents as never, url)
+}
+
+// Why a fresh page per grant: the registry is keyed by the page now, so two grants sharing one
+// would have the second silently replace the first rather than stand beside it.
+let nextDocPageOrdinal = 0
+
+function mintGrant(): ReturnType<typeof mintDocPreviewGrant> {
+  nextDocPageOrdinal += 1
+  return mintDocPreviewGrant({
+    owner: { kind: 'ssh', connectionId: 'ssh-1' },
+    root: '/home/alice/docs',
+    entryRelativePath: 'index.html',
+    browserPageId: `doc-page-${nextDocPageOrdinal}`
+  })
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  vi.clearAllMocks()
+  revokeAllDocPreviewGrants()
+})
+
+describe('doc preview guest policy', () => {
+  it('allows relative navigation within the bound grant', () => {
+    const { grant, guest } = boundGuest()
+    const preventDefault = vi.fn()
+
+    guest.handlers['will-navigate']?.(
+      { preventDefault } as never,
+      buildDocPreviewUrl(grant.id, 'guide.html') as never
+    )
+
+    expect(preventDefault).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    expect(guest.send).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  // Why an unlatched guest is refused rather than trusted: the renderer-set src is
+  // browser-initiated and never reaches will-navigate, so a navigation arriving before the latch is
+  // one the guest started for itself.
+  it('blocks a navigation the guest starts before a document has bound it', () => {
+    const grant = mintGrant()
+    const guest = installOnFakeGuest()
+    const preventDefault = vi.fn()
+
+    guest.handlers['will-navigate']?.(
+      { preventDefault } as never,
+      buildDocPreviewUrl(grant.id, 'index.html') as never
+    )
+
+    expect(preventDefault).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
+    expect(guest.send).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('blocks navigation into a different live grant once bound', () => {
+    const { guest } = boundGuest()
+    const otherGrant = mintGrant()
+    const preventDefault = vi.fn()
+
+    guest.handlers['will-navigate']?.(
+      { preventDefault } as never,
+      buildDocPreviewUrl(otherGrant.id, 'index.html') as never
+    )
+
+    expect(preventDefault).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
+  })
+
+  it('blocks a revoked grant even when it matches the bound id', () => {
+    const { grant, guest } = boundGuest()
+    revokeAllDocPreviewGrants()
+    const preventDefault = vi.fn()
+
+    guest.handlers['will-navigate']?.(
+      { preventDefault } as never,
+      buildDocPreviewUrl(grant.id, 'guide.html') as never
+    )
+
+    expect(preventDefault).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
+  })
+
+  it('blocks an external navigation without offering it to the renderer', () => {
+    const { guest } = boundGuest()
+    const preventDefault = vi.fn()
+
+    guest.handlers['will-navigate']?.({ preventDefault } as never, 'https://example.com/' as never)
+
+    expect(preventDefault).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
+    expect(guest.send).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('blocks a file: navigation', () => {
+    const { guest } = boundGuest()
+    const preventDefault = vi.fn()
+
+    guest.handlers['will-navigate']?.({ preventDefault } as never, 'file:///etc/passwd' as never)
+
+    expect(preventDefault).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
+    expect(guest.send).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('applies the same rule to redirects', () => {
+    const { guest } = boundGuest()
+    const preventDefault = vi.fn()
+
+    guest.handlers['will-redirect']?.({ preventDefault } as never, 'https://evil.test/' as never)
+
+    expect(preventDefault).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
+    expect(guest.send).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('denies every popup and routes none of them', () => {
+    const { guest } = boundGuest()
+
+    expect(guest.windowOpenHandler({ url: 'https://example.com/docs' })).toEqual({
+      action: 'deny'
+    })
+    expect(guest.windowOpenHandler({ url: 'file:///etc/passwd' })).toEqual({ action: 'deny' })
+    expect(guest.send).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  // Why: will-navigate never fires for a subframe, so an <iframe src="https://…"> would load
+  // off-machine even though the top frame cannot.
+  it('blocks a subframe navigating outside the grant, without opening a tab for it', () => {
+    const { guest } = boundGuest()
+    const preventDefault = vi.fn()
+
+    guest.handlers['will-frame-navigate']?.({
+      preventDefault,
+      url: 'https://tracker.test/pixel',
+      isMainFrame: false
+    } as never)
+
+    expect(preventDefault).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
+    expect(guest.send).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('lets a subframe load an in-grant asset', () => {
+    const { grant, guest } = boundGuest()
+    const preventDefault = vi.fn()
+
+    guest.handlers['will-frame-navigate']?.({
+      preventDefault,
+      url: buildDocPreviewUrl(grant.id, 'chart.html'),
+      isMainFrame: false
+    } as never)
+
+    expect(preventDefault).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  // Why this group exists: the external-link route ends in a real browser tab with full network, so
+  // a document that can read its grant and reach that route can exfiltrate it. Only a reader's own
+  // press on a link may, and only the guest's preload can tell that a press was one.
+  describe('the trusted-click route out of the preview', () => {
+    // The headline. The earlier design read a recent-input timestamp, so a script that navigated
+    // shortly after any genuine press was routed out as if the press had asked for it. Here the
+    // navigation sinks route nothing at all, so when the input happened cannot matter.
+    it('routes nothing for a scripted location change or window.open, whenever input happened', () => {
+      const { guest } = boundGuest()
+      const preventDefault = vi.fn()
+
+      // Genuine input the guest would report, delivered immediately before the document acts.
+      guest.handlers['input-event']?.({} as never, { type: 'mouseDown' } as never)
+      guest.handlers['before-input-event']?.({} as never, { type: 'keyDown' } as never)
+      guest.handlers['will-navigate']?.(
+        { preventDefault } as never,
+        'https://attacker.test/?d=secret' as never
+      )
+      const popup = guest.windowOpenHandler({ url: 'https://attacker.test/?d=secret' })
+
+      expect(preventDefault).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
+      expect(popup).toEqual({ action: 'deny' })
+      expect(guest.send).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+      // Why assert the absence of the listeners too: with them gone there is no timing a document
+      // could hit, rather than a window it merely failed to hit in this test.
+      expect(guest.handlers['input-event']).toBeUndefined()
+      expect(guest.handlers['before-input-event']).toBeUndefined()
+    })
+
+    it('routes a reported click on an external link exactly once', () => {
+      const { guest } = boundGuest()
+
+      reportClick(guest, 'https://example.com/docs')
+
+      expect(guest.send).toHaveBeenCalledExactlyOnceWith('docPreview:externalLink', {
+        url: 'https://example.com/docs'
+      })
+    })
+
+    it('drops a click reported while the guest is not the contents the reader is looking at', () => {
+      const { guest } = boundGuest()
+      guest.isFocused.mockReturnValue(false)
+
+      reportClick(guest, 'https://example.com/docs')
+
+      expect(guest.send).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    })
+
+    it('drops a click reported by a sender that is not a preview guest', () => {
+      const { guest } = boundGuest()
+
+      reportDocPreviewLinkClick({ isFocused: () => true } as never, 'https://example.com/docs')
+
+      expect(guest.send).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    })
+
+    it('drops a click reported by a guest that never bound a grant', () => {
+      mintGrant()
+      const guest = installOnFakeGuest()
+
+      reportClick(guest, 'https://example.com/docs')
+
+      expect(guest.send).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    })
+
+    it("drops a click once the guest's bound grant is revoked", () => {
+      const { guest } = boundGuest()
+      revokeAllDocPreviewGrants()
+
+      reportClick(guest, 'https://example.com/docs')
+
+      expect(guest.send).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    })
+
+    it.each([
+      'file:///etc/passwd',
+      'javascript:fetch("https://attacker.test")',
+      'orca-preview://a/b',
+      '/Users/alice/secrets.txt',
+      ''
+    ])('drops a reported click on %s, which is not the web', (url) => {
+      const { guest } = boundGuest()
+
+      reportClick(guest, url)
+
+      expect(guest.send).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    })
+
+    it('stops routing for a guest that has been destroyed', () => {
+      const { guest } = boundGuest()
+
+      guest.handlers['destroyed']?.()
+      reportClick(guest, 'https://example.com/docs')
+
+      expect(guest.send).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    })
+  })
+
+  // Why: a peer connection is UDP straight off the network stack — the response CSP and the
+  // session's request filter both miss it, so this is the only place it can be refused.
+  it('denies the guest non-proxied WebRTC UDP at attach', () => {
+    const guest = installOnFakeGuest()
+
+    expect(guest.setWebRTCIPHandlingPolicy).toHaveBeenCalledWith('disable_non_proxied_udp')
+  })
+
+  // Why: latching from a subframe would let an in-document iframe decide which grant the guest
+  // belongs to, and every later main-frame check would be measured against that.
+  it('binds the guest from the main frame only', () => {
+    const grant = mintGrant()
+    const otherGrant = mintGrant()
+    const guest = installOnFakeGuest()
+
+    guest.handlers['did-start-navigation']?.({
+      url: buildDocPreviewUrl(otherGrant.id, 'index.html'),
+      isMainFrame: false
+    } as never)
+    startMainFrameNavigation(guest, buildDocPreviewUrl(grant.id, 'index.html'))
+    const preventDefault = vi.fn()
+
+    guest.handlers['will-navigate']?.(
+      { preventDefault } as never,
+      buildDocPreviewUrl(otherGrant.id, 'index.html') as never
+    )
+
+    expect(preventDefault).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
+  })
+
+  describe('tool authorization', () => {
+    it('answers the hosting renderer for a guest bound to a live grant', () => {
+      const { grant, guest } = boundGuest()
+
+      expect(getWorkspaceDocPageGuest(grant.browserPageId, HOST_RENDERER_ID)).toBe(guest.contents)
+    })
+
+    it('refuses a renderer that does not host the preview', () => {
+      const { grant } = boundGuest()
+
+      expect(getWorkspaceDocPageGuest(grant.browserPageId, HOST_RENDERER_ID + 1)).toBeNull()
+    })
+
+    // Why this is the ordinary case and not an edge one: the embedder hands the guest over after
+    // it has already started loading its src, so the navigation that binds most previews to their
+    // grant happens before any listener here exists. Missing it leaves the tools unable to name
+    // the guest for as long as the reader stays on the page they opened.
+    it('binds a guest that is already showing its document when the policy installs', () => {
+      const grant = mintGrant()
+      const guest = installOnFakeGuest(HOST_RENDERER_ID, buildDocPreviewUrl(grant.id, 'index.html'))
+
+      expect(getWorkspaceDocPageGuest(grant.browserPageId, HOST_RENDERER_ID)).toBe(guest.contents)
+    })
+
+    // The same miss, one event later: the load started before the listener and commits after it.
+    it('binds a guest whose first navigation only reaches the commit', () => {
+      const grant = mintGrant()
+      const guest = installOnFakeGuest()
+
+      guest.handlers['did-navigate']?.(
+        {} as never,
+        buildDocPreviewUrl(grant.id, 'index.html') as never
+      )
+
+      expect(getWorkspaceDocPageGuest(grant.browserPageId, HOST_RENDERER_ID)).toBe(guest.contents)
+    })
+
+    // Why: the src commit is what proves this guest is showing that grant. Before it, the id names
+    // a document nothing has been asked to render.
+    it('refuses a guest that has not committed a document yet', () => {
+      const grant = mintGrant()
+      installOnFakeGuest()
+
+      expect(getWorkspaceDocPageGuest(grant.browserPageId, HOST_RENDERER_ID)).toBeNull()
+    })
+
+    // Why: revoking is how a closed tab withdraws its preview, and it happens while the guest is
+    // still being torn down — a tool must stop answering at revoke, not at destroy.
+    it('stops answering once the grant is revoked', () => {
+      const { grant } = boundGuest()
+
+      revokeDocPreviewGrant(grant.id)
+
+      expect(getWorkspaceDocPageGuest(grant.browserPageId, HOST_RENDERER_ID)).toBeNull()
+    })
+
+    it('drops the guest when it is destroyed', () => {
+      const { grant, guest } = boundGuest()
+
+      guest.handlers['destroyed']?.()
+
+      expect(getWorkspaceDocPageGuest(grant.browserPageId, HOST_RENDERER_ID)).toBeNull()
+    })
+
+    // Why this is separate from the destroy event: the contents die before main runs that listener,
+    // so in that window the registration still looks live and only this check refuses it.
+    it('refuses a guest whose contents died before the destroy event arrived', () => {
+      const { grant, guest } = boundGuest()
+
+      guest.markContentsDestroyed()
+
+      expect(getWorkspaceDocPageGuest(grant.browserPageId, HOST_RENDERER_ID)).toBeNull()
+    })
+
+    it('answers nothing for a grant no preview ever rendered', () => {
+      const grant = mintGrant()
+
+      expect(getWorkspaceDocPageGuest(grant.browserPageId, HOST_RENDERER_ID)).toBeNull()
+    })
+
+    // Why this is what makes three latch call sites safe: install, did-start-navigation and
+    // did-navigate all feed the same latch, so without the no-rebind guard the second and third
+    // would let a later navigation move a bound guest onto another grant — and a tool asking for
+    // that grant would be handed a guest showing someone else's document.
+    it('never rebinds a bound guest onto a second grant', () => {
+      const { grant, guest } = boundGuest()
+      const other = mintGrant()
+
+      startMainFrameNavigation(guest, buildDocPreviewUrl(other.id, 'index.html'))
+      guest.handlers['did-navigate']?.(
+        {} as never,
+        buildDocPreviewUrl(other.id, 'index.html') as never
+      )
+
+      expect(getWorkspaceDocPageGuest(other.browserPageId, HOST_RENDERER_ID)).toBeNull()
+      expect(getWorkspaceDocPageGuest(grant.browserPageId, HOST_RENDERER_ID)).toBe(guest.contents)
+    })
+
+    // Why the replacement is registered before the old guest's teardown runs: a re-mint attaches
+    // the new guest first, and Chromium runs the outgoing guest's destroyed listener afterwards. A
+    // teardown that deleted by page alone would unregister the guest the reader is now looking at.
+    it('leaves a re-minted preview registered when the guest it replaced tears down', () => {
+      const first = mintGrant()
+      const outgoing = installOnFakeGuest(
+        HOST_RENDERER_ID,
+        buildDocPreviewUrl(first.id, 'index.html')
+      )
+      const remint = mintDocPreviewGrant({
+        owner: { kind: 'ssh', connectionId: 'ssh-1' },
+        root: '/home/alice/docs',
+        entryRelativePath: 'index.html',
+        browserPageId: first.browserPageId
+      })
+      const incoming = installOnFakeGuest(
+        HOST_RENDERER_ID,
+        buildDocPreviewUrl(remint.id, 'index.html')
+      )
+      expect(getWorkspaceDocPageGuest(first.browserPageId, HOST_RENDERER_ID)).toBe(
+        incoming.contents
+      )
+
+      outgoing.handlers['destroyed']?.()
+
+      expect(getWorkspaceDocPageGuest(first.browserPageId, HOST_RENDERER_ID)).toBe(
+        incoming.contents
+      )
+    })
+
+    // Why the grant has to be live at the latch and not only at each later request: registering the
+    // page a dead grant names would put a guest that can read nothing into the registry the tool
+    // door answers from, under a page a live grant may later want.
+    it('registers nothing for a guest showing a grant that is already revoked', () => {
+      const grant = mintGrant()
+      revokeDocPreviewGrant(grant.id)
+
+      const guest = installOnFakeGuest(HOST_RENDERER_ID, buildDocPreviewUrl(grant.id, 'index.html'))
+
+      expect(getWorkspaceDocPageGuest(grant.browserPageId, HOST_RENDERER_ID)).toBeNull()
+      // The presence half: the same install does register when the grant is still live.
+      const live = mintGrant()
+      installOnFakeGuest(HOST_RENDERER_ID, buildDocPreviewUrl(live.id, 'index.html'))
+      expect(getWorkspaceDocPageGuest(live.browserPageId, HOST_RENDERER_ID)).not.toBeNull()
+      expect(guest.contents).toBeDefined()
+    })
+
+    // Why both directions: two previews open at once must not be able to drive each other's guest.
+    it('keeps two live previews on their own guests', () => {
+      const first = boundGuest()
+      const second = boundGuest()
+
+      expect(getWorkspaceDocPageGuest(first.grant.browserPageId, HOST_RENDERER_ID)).toBe(
+        first.guest.contents
+      )
+      expect(getWorkspaceDocPageGuest(second.grant.browserPageId, HOST_RENDERER_ID)).toBe(
+        second.guest.contents
+      )
+    })
+  })
+
+  // Session events name the contents and nothing else, so this is how a fence firing on the whole
+  // partition works out which preview — if any — the reader should be told about.
+  describe('naming the grant a contents is showing', () => {
+    it('answers the bound grant for a live preview guest', () => {
+      const { grant, guest } = boundGuest()
+
+      expect(readDocPreviewGuestBoundGrantId(guest.contents as never)).toBe(grant.id)
+    })
+
+    it('answers nothing for a contents that is not a preview guest', () => {
+      boundGuest()
+
+      expect(readDocPreviewGuestBoundGrantId({} as never)).toBeNull()
+    })
+
+    it('answers nothing for a preview guest that has committed no document', () => {
+      const guest = installOnFakeGuest()
+
+      expect(readDocPreviewGuestBoundGrantId(guest.contents as never)).toBeNull()
+    })
+
+    it('answers nothing once the guest is gone', () => {
+      const { guest } = boundGuest()
+
+      guest.handlers['destroyed']?.()
+
+      expect(readDocPreviewGuestBoundGrantId(guest.contents as never)).toBeNull()
+    })
+  })
+})

src/main/browser/doc-preview-guest-policy.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+import {
+  DOC_PREVIEW_EXTERNAL_LINK_CHANNEL,
+  parseDocPreviewUrl
+} from '../../shared/doc-preview-scheme'
+import { normalizeExternalBrowserUrl } from '../../shared/browser-url'
+import { enforceBrowserRouteWebRtcPolicy } from './browser-route-webrtc-policy'
+import { getDocPreviewGrant } from './doc-preview-grant-registry'
+
+/** The trusted renderer hosting the preview: the sink for link reports and the only sender allowed to drive tools on it. */
+type PreviewHostRenderer = {
+  id: number
+  send: (channel: string, payload: { url: string }) => void
+}
+
+type PreviewGuestRegistration = {
+  host: PreviewHostRenderer
+  readBoundGrantId: () => string | null
+  isFocused: () => boolean
+}
+
+/**
+ * Why a registry: the click report arrives on an IPC channel, where the only thing main holds is
+ * the sender. Without this, "is this a live preview guest, and which grant is it bound to" has no
+ * answer, and any WebContents that learned the channel name would be routed out.
+ */
+const previewGuests = new WeakMap<object, PreviewGuestRegistration>()
+
+/**
+ * The workspace-document half of the browser page registry, keyed by the page the reader opened
+ * the document in. It is deliberately a separate map from the browsing one: page management,
+ * agent commands, download routing and certificate attribution all read that map directly, in
+ * more places than a guard could be remembered in, so a document guest is simply not in it. The
+ * one door taught about both is `browserManager.getAuthorizedGuest`, because acting on the guest
+ * the reader is looking at is the single operation that legitimately spans them.
+ */
+const docGuestsByPageId = new Map<
+  string,
+  { guest: Electron.WebContents; hostId: number; grantId: string }
+>()
+
+const registrationListeners = new Set<(browserPageId: string) => void>()
+
+/** Why anything listens: a tool request can beat the guest's own attach, and the wait it parks in lives in the IPC layer. */
+export function onWorkspaceDocGuestRegistered(
+  listener: (browserPageId: string) => void
+): () => void {
+  registrationListeners.add(listener)
+  return () => registrationListeners.delete(listener)
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolve the document guest a browser tool should act on. Grants the guest nothing — it answers
+ * only whether the trusted renderer asking is the one hosting a live, grant-bound preview on that
+ * page. Reached only through `browserManager.getAuthorizedGuest`.
+ */
+export function getWorkspaceDocPageGuest(
+  browserPageId: string,
+  senderWebContentsId: number
+): Electron.WebContents | null {
+  const registration = docGuestsByPageId.get(browserPageId)
+  if (!registration || registration.hostId !== senderWebContentsId) {
+    return null
+  }
+  // Why: revocation is how a closed tab withdraws its preview, and it happens before the guest is torn down.
+  if (!getDocPreviewGrant(registration.grantId)) {
+    return null
+  }
+  if (registration.guest.isDestroyed()) {
+    docGuestsByPageId.delete(browserPageId)
+    return null
+  }
+  return registration.guest
+}
+
+/** True when the page renders a workspace document, so the browsing registry must never hold it. */
+export function isWorkspaceDocPageId(browserPageId: string): boolean {
+  return docGuestsByPageId.has(browserPageId)
+}
+
+/**
+ * The grant a live preview guest is bound to, or null for any other WebContents — the same identity
+ * question `reportDocPreviewLinkClick` asks, for a session event that hands over only the contents.
+ */
+export function readDocPreviewGuestBoundGrantId(guest: Electron.WebContents): string | null {
+  return previewGuests.get(guest)?.readBoundGrantId() ?? null
+}
+
+/**
+ * The preview guest renders a workspace document, not the web: it may only move within its own
+ * grant, and nothing it does by itself leaves the preview. The one route out is
+ * `reportDocPreviewLinkClick`, which answers for a click the reader really made.
+ *
+ * Reached only through `browserManager.attachGuestPolicies` under the workspace-doc profile, so
+ * every guest in the app is policy-attached by one door whatever it renders. Returns the disposal
+ * that door stores: without it a retired guest keeps its listeners and stays answerable through the
+ * grant-keyed authority until the WebContents itself is collected.
+ */
+export function installDocPreviewGuestPolicy(
+  guest: Electron.WebContents,
+  host: PreviewHostRenderer
+): () => void {
+  // Why: the first commit is the renderer-set src, already admitted by will-attach-webview;
+  // latching it pins every later navigation to that one grant.
+  let boundGrantId: string | null = null
+  let boundPageId: string | null = null
+
+  const latchGrantFromUrl = (rawUrl: string): void => {
+    if (boundGrantId !== null) {
+      return
+    }
+    const grantId = parseDocPreviewUrl(rawUrl)?.grantId ?? null
+    // Why the grant must still be live: registering under the page a dead grant names would put a
+    // guest nothing can read into the registry the tool door answers from.
+    const grant = grantId === null ? null : getDocPreviewGrant(grantId)
+    if (!grant) {
+      return
+    }
+    boundGrantId = grant.id
+    boundPageId = grant.browserPageId
+    docGuestsByPageId.set(boundPageId, { guest, hostId: host.id, grantId: grant.id })
+    for (const listener of registrationListeners) {
+      listener(boundPageId)
+    }
+  }
+
+  previewGuests.set(guest, {
+    host,
+    readBoundGrantId: () => boundGrantId,
+    isFocused: () => guest.isFocused()
+  })
+  const forgetGuest = (): void => {
+    previewGuests.delete(guest)
+    // Why the identity check: a re-mint registers the replacement under the same page before this
+    // guest's own teardown runs, and deleting by key alone would unregister the live one.
+    if (boundPageId !== null && docGuestsByPageId.get(boundPageId)?.guest === guest) {
+      docGuestsByPageId.delete(boundPageId)
+    }
+  }
+  guest.once('destroyed', forgetGuest)
+
+  const isAllowedPreviewNavigation = (rawUrl: string): boolean => {
+    const target = parseDocPreviewUrl(rawUrl)
+    if (!target || !getDocPreviewGrant(target.grantId)) {
+      return false
+    }
+    // Why the latch is required and not just consistent: the renderer-set src is browser-initiated,
+    // so will-navigate never fires for it. Anything reaching here before the latch is the guest
+    // moving itself, which no grant has admitted yet.
+    return boundGrantId !== null && target.grantId === boundGrantId
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Why deny-only, with nothing routed: a navigation the guest starts cannot be attributed to the
+   * reader. The document may read its whole grant over `connect-src 'self'`, so routing an
+   * unattributable URL to a real browser tab with full network is how those bytes would get out.
+   */
+  const navigationGuard = (event: Electron.Event, url: string): void => {
+    if (isAllowedPreviewNavigation(url)) {
+      return
+    }
+    event.preventDefault()
+  }
+
+  // Why here and not only on navigation events: the guest is already loading its src by the time
+  // the embedder hands it to us, so the only navigation most previews ever make has already
+  // started. Latching what it is on now is what binds the usual preview to its grant at all.
+  latchGrantFromUrl(guest.getURL())
+  const latchFromMainFrameNavigation = (details: { isMainFrame: boolean; url: string }): void => {
+    // Why: only the top document defines which grant this guest belongs to. Latching from a
+    // subframe would let an in-document iframe rebind the guest to another grant.
+    if (!details.isMainFrame) {
+      return
+    }
+    latchGrantFromUrl(details.url)
+  }
+  // Why a committed URL too: a navigation that started before this listener existed still commits
+  // after it, and a preview that never navigates again would otherwise stay bound to nothing.
+  const latchFromCommittedUrl = (_event: Electron.Event, url: string): void =>
+    latchGrantFromUrl(url)
+  // Why: will-navigate never fires for a subframe, so without this an <iframe src="https://…">
+  // inside a previewed document would load off-machine even though the top frame cannot.
+  const frameNavigationGuard = (details: {
+    isMainFrame: boolean
+    url: string
+    preventDefault: () => void
+  }): void => {
+    if (details.isMainFrame || isAllowedPreviewNavigation(details.url)) {
+      return
+    }
+    details.preventDefault()
+  }
+  guest.on('did-start-navigation', latchFromMainFrameNavigation)
+  guest.on('did-navigate', latchFromCommittedUrl)
+  guest.on('will-navigate', navigationGuard)
+  guest.on('will-redirect', navigationGuard)
+  guest.on('will-frame-navigate', frameNavigationGuard)
+  // Why deny with nothing routed: previews own no native child windows, and a popup the document
+  // asked for is the document asking, not the reader. A link the reader presses is intercepted
+  // before Chromium ever considers a popup.
+  guest.setWindowOpenHandler(() => ({ action: 'deny' }))
+  // Why a second fence for one API: WebRTC opens UDP straight from the network stack, so neither the
+  // response CSP nor the session's request filter ever sees it. This is the only layer that can.
+  enforceBrowserRouteWebRtcPolicy(guest, () => {})
+
+  return () => {
+    forgetGuest()
+    if (guest.isDestroyed()) {
+      return
+    }
+    guest.off('destroyed', forgetGuest)
+    guest.off('did-start-navigation', latchFromMainFrameNavigation)
+    guest.off('did-navigate', latchFromCommittedUrl)
+    guest.off('will-navigate', navigationGuard)
+    guest.off('will-redirect', navigationGuard)
+    guest.off('will-frame-navigate', frameNavigationGuard)
+  }
+}
+
+function isWebUrl(url: string): boolean {
+  return url.startsWith('http://') || url.startsWith('https://')
+}
+
+/**
+ * The only way a URL leaves a preview. Every condition is load-bearing: the sender must be a live
+ * preview guest still bound to a grant, it must be the contents the reader is looking at, and the
+ * target must be the web. Anything else is dropped without a trace the document could observe.
+ */
+export function reportDocPreviewLinkClick(sender: Electron.WebContents, rawUrl: string): void {
+  const registration = previewGuests.get(sender)
+  if (!registration) {
+    return
+  }
+  const boundGrantId = registration.readBoundGrantId()
+  if (boundGrantId === null || !getDocPreviewGrant(boundGrantId)) {
+    return
+  }
+  // Why focus and not just the preload's trusted-click check: that check runs inside the guest, so
+  // it holds only while the guest renderer does. Focus is the half main can verify for itself.
+  if (!registration.isFocused()) {
+    return
+  }
+  const externalUrl = normalizeExternalBrowserUrl(rawUrl)
+  if (!externalUrl || !isWebUrl(externalUrl)) {
+    return
+  }
+  registration.host.send(DOC_PREVIEW_EXTERNAL_LINK_CHANNEL, { url: externalUrl })
+}

src/main/browser/doc-preview-protocol.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
+
+const mocks = vi.hoisted(() => ({
+  readDocPreviewFile: vi.fn(),
+  installBrowserSessionPartitionPolicies: vi.fn()
+}))
+
+function createFakeSession(): {
+  protocol: { isProtocolHandled: () => boolean; handle: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn> }
+  webRequest: { onBeforeRequest: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn> }
+} {
+  return {
+    protocol: { isProtocolHandled: () => false, handle: vi.fn() },
+    webRequest: { onBeforeRequest: vi.fn() }
+  }
+}
+
+// Why one session per partition and a distinct default: installing the handler on the default
+// session instead of the preview session is otherwise invisible — every read would come back
+// from the same object.
+const previewSession = createFakeSession()
+const defaultSession = createFakeSession()
+vi.mock('electron', () => ({
+  protocol: { registerSchemesAsPrivileged: vi.fn() },
+  session: {
+    get defaultSession() {
+      return defaultSession
+    },
+    fromPartition: (partition: string) => {
+      if (partition !== 'orca-doc-preview') {
+        throw new Error(`unexpected partition ${partition}`)
+      }
+      return previewSession
+    }
+  }
+}))
+vi.mock('./doc-preview-file-reader', () => ({ readDocPreviewFile: mocks.readDocPreviewFile }))
+vi.mock('./browser-session-partition-policies', () => ({
+  installBrowserSessionPartitionPolicies: mocks.installBrowserSessionPartitionPolicies
+}))
+
+import { protocol } from 'electron'
+import {
+  getDocPreviewSession,
+  handleDocPreviewRequest,
+  installDocPreviewProtocolHandler,
+  isAllowedDocPreviewRequestUrl,
+  isDocPreviewSession,
+  registerDocPreviewSchemePrivileges
+} from './doc-preview-protocol'
+import {
+  mintDocPreviewGrant,
+  revokeAllDocPreviewGrants,
+  revokeDocPreviewGrant
+} from './doc-preview-grant-registry'
+import {
+  buildDocPreviewUrl,
+  DOC_PREVIEW_LOAD_FAILURE_CHANNEL
+} from '../../shared/doc-preview-scheme'
+import { setDocPreviewFailureSink } from './doc-preview-failure-notice'
+
+function mintGrant(): ReturnType<typeof mintDocPreviewGrant> {
+  return mintDocPreviewGrant({
+    owner: { kind: 'ssh', connectionId: 'ssh-1' },
+    root: '/home/alice/docs',
+    entryRelativePath: 'index.html',
+    browserPageId: 'page-1'
+  })
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  vi.clearAllMocks()
+  revokeAllDocPreviewGrants()
+  setDocPreviewFailureSink(null)
+  mocks.readDocPreviewFile.mockResolvedValue({
+    ok: true,
+    bytes: Buffer.from('<h1>hi</h1>', 'utf8'),
+    contentType: 'text/html; charset=utf-8'
+  })
+})
+
+describe('handleDocPreviewRequest', () => {
+  it('serves an in-grant document with no-store so reload re-reads the workspace', async () => {
+    const grant = mintGrant()
+
+    const response = await handleDocPreviewRequest(
+      new Request(buildDocPreviewUrl(grant.id, 'index.html'))
+    )
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200)
+    expect(response.headers.get('Content-Type')).toBe('text/html; charset=utf-8')
+    expect(response.headers.get('Cache-Control')).toBe('no-store')
+    expect(await response.text()).toBe('<h1>hi</h1>')
+    expect(mocks.readDocPreviewFile).toHaveBeenCalledWith(grant, 'index.html')
+  })
+
+  it('falls back to the granted entry document for a root request', async () => {
+    const grant = mintGrant()
+
+    await handleDocPreviewRequest(new Request(`orca-preview://${grant.id}/`))
+
+    expect(mocks.readDocPreviewFile).toHaveBeenCalledWith(grant, 'index.html')
+  })
+
+  it('decodes percent-encoded segments before resolving', async () => {
+    const grant = mintGrant()
+
+    await handleDocPreviewRequest(new Request(buildDocPreviewUrl(grant.id, 'a b/c#d.html')))
+
+    expect(mocks.readDocPreviewFile).toHaveBeenCalledWith(grant, 'a b/c#d.html')
+  })
+
+  it('404s an unknown grant without reading anything', async () => {
+    const response = await handleDocPreviewRequest(
+      new Request(`orca-preview://${'0'.repeat(32)}/index.html`)
+    )
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(404)
+    expect(mocks.readDocPreviewFile).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('404s a revoked grant', async () => {
+    const grant = mintGrant()
+    revokeDocPreviewGrant(grant.id)
+
+    const response = await handleDocPreviewRequest(
+      new Request(buildDocPreviewUrl(grant.id, 'index.html'))
+    )
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(404)
+    expect(mocks.readDocPreviewFile).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('404s a malformed grant id', async () => {
+    const response = await handleDocPreviewRequest(new Request('orca-preview://not-a-grant/x.html'))
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(404)
+    expect(mocks.readDocPreviewFile).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('propagates the reader status for an unservable asset', async () => {
+    const grant = mintGrant()
+    mocks.readDocPreviewFile.mockResolvedValue({
+      ok: false,
+      status: 415,
+      reason: 'unsupported-asset',
+      message: 'cannot send this file type'
+    })
+
+    const response = await handleDocPreviewRequest(
+      new Request(buildDocPreviewUrl(grant.id, 'a.woff2'))
+    )
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(415)
+    expect(await response.text()).toBe('cannot send this file type')
+  })
+
+  // Why: previewed documents are agent-authored, so an outbound request is an exfiltration channel
+  // for everything else the grant can read.
+  it('serves documents under a self-only content security policy', async () => {
+    const grant = mintGrant()
+
+    const response = await handleDocPreviewRequest(
+      new Request(buildDocPreviewUrl(grant.id, 'index.html'))
+    )
+
+    const policy = response.headers.get('Content-Security-Policy') ?? ''
+    expect(policy).toContain("default-src 'self'")
+    expect(policy).toContain("connect-src 'self'")
+    expect(policy).toContain("object-src 'none'")
+    expect(policy).toContain("img-src 'self' data:")
+    expect(policy).not.toContain('https:')
+    // Why assert an absence: `webrtc 'block'` is the obvious directive to reach for here and this
+    // Chromium does not implement it — it logs "Unrecognized Content-Security-Policy directive
+    // 'webrtc'" and gathers candidates regardless. Adding it back would document a fence that is
+    // not there; the guest's IP-handling policy is what actually refuses.
+    expect(policy).not.toContain('webrtc')
+  })
+
+  // Why: the guest paints a 4xx body as if it were the document, so the shell only learns the
+  // reason from this push.
+  it('pushes the failure reason for the requested path', async () => {
+    const send = vi.fn()
+    setDocPreviewFailureSink({ send })
+    const grant = mintGrant()
+    mocks.readDocPreviewFile.mockResolvedValue({
+      ok: false,
+      status: 413,
+      reason: 'too-large',
+      message: 'too large'
+    })
+
+    await handleDocPreviewRequest(new Request(buildDocPreviewUrl(grant.id, 'index.html')))
+
+    expect(send).toHaveBeenCalledWith(DOC_PREVIEW_LOAD_FAILURE_CHANNEL, {
+      grantId: grant.id,
+      relativePath: 'index.html',
+      reason: 'too-large'
+    })
+  })
+
+  it('pushes nothing when the document is served', async () => {
+    const send = vi.fn()
+    setDocPreviewFailureSink({ send })
+    const grant = mintGrant()
+
+    await handleDocPreviewRequest(new Request(buildDocPreviewUrl(grant.id, 'index.html')))
+
+    expect(send).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  // Why: a grant revoked underneath a live guest 404s like a missing file, and without this push
+  // the shell leaves the handler's "Not found" body on screen as if it were the document.
+  it('pushes a failure for a revoked grant so the shell can replace the 404 body', async () => {
+    const send = vi.fn()
+    const grant = mintGrant()
+    revokeDocPreviewGrant(grant.id)
+    setDocPreviewFailureSink({ send })
+
+    await handleDocPreviewRequest(new Request(buildDocPreviewUrl(grant.id, 'index.html')))
+
+    expect(send).toHaveBeenCalledWith(DOC_PREVIEW_LOAD_FAILURE_CHANNEL, {
+      grantId: grant.id,
+      relativePath: 'index.html',
+      reason: 'unreadable'
+    })
+  })
+})
+
+describe('installDocPreviewProtocolHandler', () => {
+  // Why the default session is named here: it is the session every other Electron API reaches for
+  // by default, and handling the scheme there would serve preview bytes to ordinary browsing.
+  it('handles the scheme on the preview session and nowhere else', () => {
+    installDocPreviewProtocolHandler()
+
+    expect(previewSession.protocol.handle).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      'orca-preview',
+      handleDocPreviewRequest
+    )
+    expect(previewSession.webRequest.onBeforeRequest).toHaveBeenCalled()
+    expect(defaultSession.protocol.handle).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    expect(defaultSession.webRequest.onBeforeRequest).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('cancels every request the preview session should never carry', () => {
+    installDocPreviewProtocolHandler()
+
+    const filter = previewSession.webRequest.onBeforeRequest.mock.calls.at(-1)?.[0] as (
+      details: { url: string },
+      callback: (response: { cancel: boolean }) => void
+    ) => void
+    const cancelled = (url: string): boolean => {
+      let response: { cancel: boolean } | null = null
+      filter({ url }, (value) => {
+        response = value
+      })
+      return (response as { cancel: boolean } | null)?.cancel === true
+    }
+
+    expect(cancelled('https://cdn.example.com/tracker.js')).toBe(true)
+    expect(cancelled(`orca-preview://${'a'.repeat(32)}/index.html`)).toBe(false)
+  })
+
+  // Why: preview guests are webviews like any other, so they must not skip the deny-by-default
+  // permission and display-media policy every browser partition gets.
+  it('applies the shared browser partition policies to the preview session', () => {
+    installDocPreviewProtocolHandler()
+
+    expect(mocks.installBrowserSessionPartitionPolicies).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.objectContaining({ partition: 'orca-doc-preview', userAgentMode: 'clean' }),
+      expect.anything()
+    )
+  })
+
+  // Why downloads and nothing else: the browser download flow attributes a file to the page that
+  // asked for it, and a previewed document is no page. Routed, it would write remote-authored bytes
+  // into this desktop's Downloads folder with no prompt and no tab to name as the source.
+  it('asks for downloads to be denied on the preview partition', () => {
+    installDocPreviewProtocolHandler()
+
+    expect(mocks.installBrowserSessionPartitionPolicies).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.anything(), {
+      downloads: 'deny'
+    })
+  })
+})
+
+describe('registerDocPreviewSchemePrivileges', () => {
+  // Why the whole literal and not a subset: every privilege this scheme does not claim is one the
+  // document cannot use to escape it. `allowServiceWorkers` would outlive the tab that was granted
+  // the read, and `bypassCSP` would undo the self-only policy the handler serves with.
+  it('claims exactly the privileges the preview document needs', () => {
+    registerDocPreviewSchemePrivileges()
+
+    expect(protocol.registerSchemesAsPrivileged).toHaveBeenCalledWith([
+      {
+        scheme: 'orca-preview',
+        privileges: {
+          standard: true,
+          secure: true,
+          supportFetchAPI: true,
+          corsEnabled: true,
+          stream: true
+        }
+      }
+    ])
+  })
+})
+
+describe('isAllowedDocPreviewRequestUrl', () => {
+  // Why: the session refuses to carry the request at all, so a CSP bypass in one element type
+  // still reaches nothing off-machine.
+  it('admits in-document schemes and refuses everything that leaves the machine', () => {
+    expect(isAllowedDocPreviewRequestUrl(`orca-preview://${'a'.repeat(32)}/index.html`)).toBe(true)
+    expect(isAllowedDocPreviewRequestUrl('devtools://devtools/bundled/inspector.html')).toBe(true)
+    expect(isAllowedDocPreviewRequestUrl('')).toBe(true)
+    expect(isAllowedDocPreviewRequestUrl('blob:orca-preview://abc/123')).toBe(true)
+    expect(isAllowedDocPreviewRequestUrl('https://cdn.example.com/app.css')).toBe(false)
+    expect(isAllowedDocPreviewRequestUrl('http://127.0.0.1:9999/exfil')).toBe(false)
+    expect(isAllowedDocPreviewRequestUrl('ws://evil.example.com/socket')).toBe(false)
+    expect(isAllowedDocPreviewRequestUrl('file:///etc/passwd')).toBe(false)
+  })
+})
+
+describe('isDocPreviewSession', () => {
+  it('claims no session until the preview session has been materialized', () => {
+    expect(isDocPreviewSession({} as never)).toBe(false)
+  })
+
+  it('matches only the memoized preview session', () => {
+    const created = getDocPreviewSession()
+
+    expect(isDocPreviewSession(created)).toBe(true)
+    expect(isDocPreviewSession({} as never)).toBe(false)
+    expect(getDocPreviewSession()).toBe(created)
+  })
+})

src/main/browser/doc-preview-protocol.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+import { protocol, session } from 'electron'
+import {
+  DOC_PREVIEW_PARTITION,
+  DOC_PREVIEW_SCHEME,
+  parseDocPreviewUrl
+} from '../../shared/doc-preview-scheme'
+import { installBrowserSessionPartitionPolicies } from './browser-session-partition-policies'
+import { readDocPreviewFile } from './doc-preview-file-reader'
+import { publishDocPreviewFailure } from './doc-preview-failure-notice'
+import { getDocPreviewGrant } from './doc-preview-grant-registry'
+
+/** Must run before `app.whenReady()`; Electron freezes the privileged scheme table at ready. */
+export function registerDocPreviewSchemePrivileges(): void {
+  protocol.registerSchemesAsPrivileged([
+    {
+      scheme: DOC_PREVIEW_SCHEME,
+      privileges: {
+        standard: true,
+        secure: true,
+        supportFetchAPI: true,
+        corsEnabled: true,
+        stream: true
+      }
+    }
+  ])
+}
+
+let docPreviewSession: Electron.Session | null = null
+
+/** Non-persistent session, so preview bytes never land in a browsing profile's storage. */
+export function getDocPreviewSession(): Electron.Session {
+  docPreviewSession ??= session.fromPartition(DOC_PREVIEW_PARTITION)
+  return docPreviewSession
+}
+
+/** Pure identity check: every guest attach consults it, and none should materialize a session. */
+export function isDocPreviewSession(candidate: Electron.Session): boolean {
+  return docPreviewSession !== null && candidate === docPreviewSession
+}
+
+/**
+ * Product decision, not a hardening default: previewed documents are agent-authored, so any
+ * outbound request they can make is an exfiltration channel for whatever else the page can read.
+ * Self-contained documents — inline CSS/JS/SVG and in-grant assets — render in full; a CDN
+ * stylesheet, font, script, or analytics beacon deliberately does not load.
+ */
+const DOC_PREVIEW_CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY = [
+  "default-src 'self'",
+  "script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'",
+  "style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'",
+  "img-src 'self' data:",
+  "font-src 'self' data:",
+  "connect-src 'self'",
+  "frame-src 'self'",
+  "object-src 'none'"
+  // Why no `webrtc 'block'` here, though a peer connection is exactly the outbound channel this
+  // policy is meant to close: Chromium 43-era answers that directive with "Unrecognized
+  // Content-Security-Policy directive 'webrtc'" and gathers candidates anyway, so listing it would
+  // read as a fence while fencing nothing. The guest's IP-handling policy is the one that holds —
+  // see `installDocPreviewGuestPolicy`.
+].join('; ')
+
+function notFound(message: string): Response {
+  return new Response(message, {
+    status: 404,
+    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain; charset=utf-8' }
+  })
+}
+
+export async function handleDocPreviewRequest(request: Request): Promise<Response> {
+  const target = parseDocPreviewUrl(request.url)
+  if (!target) {
+    return notFound('Not found')
+  }
+  const grant = getDocPreviewGrant(target.grantId)
+  if (!grant) {
+    // Why: a revoked or unknown grant is indistinguishable from a missing file by design — but the
+    // shell still needs to know, or the guest paints this body where the document should be.
+    publishDocPreviewFailure({
+      grantId: target.grantId,
+      relativePath: target.relativePath,
+      reason: 'unreadable'
+    })
+    return notFound('Not found')
+  }
+  const relativePath = target.relativePath || grant.entryRelativePath
+  const outcome = await readDocPreviewFile(grant, relativePath)
+  if (!outcome.ok) {
+    publishDocPreviewFailure({ grantId: target.grantId, relativePath, reason: outcome.reason })
+    return new Response(outcome.message, {
+      status: outcome.status,
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain; charset=utf-8' }
+    })
+  }
+  return new Response(new Uint8Array(outcome.bytes), {
+    status: 200,
+    headers: {
+      'Content-Type': outcome.contentType,
+      'Content-Security-Policy': DOC_PREVIEW_CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY,
+      // Why: reload must re-read the workspace disk, so nothing may be cached.
+      'Cache-Control': 'no-store'
+    }
+  })
+}
+
+/** `data:`/`blob:` never leave the document; every other scheme would reach off-machine. */
+export function isAllowedDocPreviewRequestUrl(url: string): boolean {
+  return (
+    url.startsWith(`${DOC_PREVIEW_SCHEME}://`) ||
+    url.startsWith('devtools://') ||
+    url.startsWith('data:') ||
+    url.startsWith('blob:')
+  )
+}
+
+export function installDocPreviewProtocolHandler(): void {
+  const previewSession = getDocPreviewSession()
+  if (previewSession.protocol.isProtocolHandled(DOC_PREVIEW_SCHEME)) {
+    return
+  }
+  previewSession.protocol.handle(DOC_PREVIEW_SCHEME, handleDocPreviewRequest)
+  // Why: the response CSP is the document's own promise to obey; this is the session refusing to
+  // carry the request at all, so a CSP bypass in one element type still reaches nothing.
+  previewSession.webRequest.onBeforeRequest((details, callback) => {
+    callback({ cancel: !isAllowedDocPreviewRequestUrl(details.url) })
+  })
+  // Why: preview guests are webviews like any other, so they inherit the same deny-by-default
+  // permission, display-media and user-agent policy every browser partition gets.
+  installBrowserSessionPartitionPolicies(
+    {
+      id: DOC_PREVIEW_PARTITION,
+      scope: 'isolated',
+      partition: DOC_PREVIEW_PARTITION,
+      label: 'Document preview',
+      source: null,
+      userAgentMode: 'clean'
+    },
+    // Why downloads are the one policy that does not carry over: the browser download flow needs a
+    // page to attribute the file to, and a previewed document is not one. Routed here it would
+    // reserve a name in this desktop's Downloads folder and write remote-authored bytes into it
+    // with nothing in the UI naming the tab that asked, and no prompt in front of it.
+    { downloads: 'deny' }
+  )
+}

src/main/browser/offscreen-browser-backend-lifecycle.test.ts

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import { EventEmitter } from 'node:events'
 import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
 
 const mocks = vi.hoisted(() => ({
-  windows: [] as { webContents: MockWebContents }[],
+  windows: [] as MockBrowserWindow[],
   BrowserWindow: vi.fn(),
   finishLoads: true
 }))
@@ -50,6 +50,41 @@ vi.mock('./browser-session-registry', () => ({
 }))
 
 import { OffscreenBrowserBackend } from './offscreen-browser-backend'
+import { installDocPreviewGuestPolicy, isWorkspaceDocPageId } from './doc-preview-guest-policy'
+import { mintDocPreviewGrant } from './doc-preview-grant-registry'
+import { buildDocPreviewUrl } from '../../shared/doc-preview-scheme'
+
+/** The real door's answer, so the backend is tested against the refusal it will actually get. */
+function registerOffscreenGuestLikeBrowserManager({
+  browserPageId
+}: {
+  browserPageId: string
+}): boolean {
+  return !isWorkspaceDocPageId(browserPageId)
+}
+
+/**
+ * A page the document half of the registry really owns. Built rather than named, because the door
+ * refuses on registry membership now — a made-up id would be admitted and prove nothing.
+ */
+function registerWorkspaceDocPage(browserPageId: string): void {
+  const grant = mintDocPreviewGrant({
+    owner: { kind: 'ssh', connectionId: 'ssh-1' },
+    root: '/home/alice/docs',
+    entryRelativePath: 'index.html',
+    browserPageId
+  })
+  const guest = {
+    isFocused: () => false,
+    isDestroyed: () => false,
+    getURL: () => buildDocPreviewUrl(grant.id, grant.entryRelativePath),
+    on: vi.fn(),
+    once: vi.fn(),
+    setWindowOpenHandler: vi.fn(),
+    setWebRTCIPHandlingPolicy: vi.fn()
+  }
+  installDocPreviewGuestPolicy(guest as never, { id: 1, send: vi.fn() })
+}
 
 describe('OffscreenBrowserBackend lifecycle', () => {
   beforeEach(() => {
@@ -73,7 +108,7 @@ describe('OffscreenBrowserBackend lifecycle', () => {
     vi.useFakeTimers()
     mocks.finishLoads = false
     const browserManager = {
-      registerOffscreenGuest: vi.fn(),
+      registerOffscreenGuest: vi.fn(registerOffscreenGuestLikeBrowserManager),
       unregisterGuest: vi.fn()
     }
     const backend = new OffscreenBrowserBackend(browserManager as never)
@@ -94,9 +129,36 @@ describe('OffscreenBrowserBackend lifecycle', () => {
     vi.useRealTimers()
   })
 
+  // Why the unregister assertion and not just the destroy: a refused id is one the document half
+  // of the registry owns, and the teardown hook would cancel that preview's work on the way out.
+  it('destroys a window whose registration was refused without unregistering the id', async () => {
+    const browserManager = {
+      registerOffscreenGuest: vi.fn(registerOffscreenGuestLikeBrowserManager),
+      unregisterGuest: vi.fn()
+    }
+    const backend = new OffscreenBrowserBackend(browserManager as never)
+    registerWorkspaceDocPage('doc-page-1')
+
+    await expect(
+      backend.createTab({
+        browserPageId: 'doc-page-1',
+        url: 'https://example.com',
+        worktreeId: 'wt'
+      })
+    ).rejects.toThrow('was refused')
+
+    expect(mocks.windows[0].isDestroyed()).toBe(true)
+    expect(browserManager.unregisterGuest).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+
+    // Why shutdown and not the map: a refused id left behind is invisible until teardown walks it
+    // and hands that id to the other authority after all.
+    await backend.destroyAll()
+    expect(browserManager.unregisterGuest).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
   it('unregisters a closing page before awaiting owner retirement', async () => {
     const browserManager = {
-      registerOffscreenGuest: vi.fn(),
+      registerOffscreenGuest: vi.fn(registerOffscreenGuestLikeBrowserManager),
       unregisterGuest: vi.fn()
     }
     let releaseOwnerRetirement!: () => void
@@ -126,7 +188,7 @@ describe('OffscreenBrowserBackend lifecycle', () => {
 
   it('preserves a replacement page when the old window finishes closing', async () => {
     const browserManager = {
-      registerOffscreenGuest: vi.fn(),
+      registerOffscreenGuest: vi.fn(registerOffscreenGuestLikeBrowserManager),
       unregisterGuest: vi.fn()
     }
     let releaseOwnerRetirement!: () => void
@@ -152,7 +214,7 @@ describe('OffscreenBrowserBackend lifecycle', () => {
 
   it('retires the helper when an offscreen renderer is destroyed unexpectedly', async () => {
     const browserManager = {
-      registerOffscreenGuest: vi.fn(),
+      registerOffscreenGuest: vi.fn(registerOffscreenGuestLikeBrowserManager),
       unregisterGuest: vi.fn()
     }
     const onPageClosed = vi.fn(async () => {})
@@ -167,7 +229,7 @@ describe('OffscreenBrowserBackend lifecycle', () => {
 
   it('cleans every helper owner during backend shutdown', async () => {
     const browserManager = {
-      registerOffscreenGuest: vi.fn(),
+      registerOffscreenGuest: vi.fn(registerOffscreenGuestLikeBrowserManager),
       unregisterGuest: vi.fn()
     }
     const onPageClosed = vi.fn(async () => {})
@@ -186,7 +248,7 @@ describe('OffscreenBrowserBackend lifecycle', () => {
 
   it('rejects a concurrent create while shutdown is draining owned pages', async () => {
     const browserManager = {
-      registerOffscreenGuest: vi.fn(),
+      registerOffscreenGuest: vi.fn(registerOffscreenGuestLikeBrowserManager),
       unregisterGuest: vi.fn()
     }
     let releaseOwnerRetirement!: () => void
@@ -215,7 +277,7 @@ describe('OffscreenBrowserBackend lifecycle', () => {
 
   it('joins owner retirement started by an unexpected renderer destroy', async () => {
     const browserManager = {
-      registerOffscreenGuest: vi.fn(),
+      registerOffscreenGuest: vi.fn(registerOffscreenGuestLikeBrowserManager),
       unregisterGuest: vi.fn()
     }
     let releaseOwnerRetirement!: () => void
@@ -244,7 +306,7 @@ describe('OffscreenBrowserBackend lifecycle', () => {
 
   it('bounds concurrent helper retirements during shutdown', async () => {
     const browserManager = {
-      registerOffscreenGuest: vi.fn(),
+      registerOffscreenGuest: vi.fn(registerOffscreenGuestLikeBrowserManager),
       unregisterGuest: vi.fn()
     }
     let activeRetirements = 0
@@ -284,7 +346,10 @@ describe('OffscreenBrowserBackend lifecycle', () => {
   })
 
   it('closes the page even when daemon retirement throws', async () => {
-    const browserManager = { registerOffscreenGuest: vi.fn(), unregisterGuest: vi.fn() }
+    const browserManager = {
+      registerOffscreenGuest: vi.fn(registerOffscreenGuestLikeBrowserManager),
+      unregisterGuest: vi.fn()
+    }
     const backend = new OffscreenBrowserBackend(browserManager as never, {
       getAgentBrowserBridge: () => ({
         onPageClosed: vi.fn(async () => {

src/main/browser/offscreen-browser-backend.ts

@@ -66,9 +66,33 @@ export class OffscreenBrowserBackend implements BrowserBackend {
 
     this.windowsByPageId.set(browserPageId, win)
 
-    // Why: if the offscreen window is destroyed out from under us (crash, app
-    // teardown), drop the registry entry so commands fail cleanly instead of
-    // resolving a dead WebContents.
+    // Why: register the guest and return immediately so the new tab appears
+    // without waiting for the page to finish loading. Previously createTab
+    // awaited the full navigation, so clicking "New Browser Tab" did nothing for
+    // up to a second on real URLs. The page loads asynchronously and streams
+    // once it paints; a failed load leaves the (usable) tab open, matching how a
+    // normal browser tab survives a failed navigation.
+    const registered = this.browserManager.registerOffscreenGuest({
+      browserPageId,
+      worktreeId: params.worktreeId,
+      sessionProfileId: profile?.id ?? null,
+      userAgentMode: profile?.userAgentMode,
+      webContentsId: win.webContents.id
+    })
+    if (!registered) {
+      // Why destroy rather than carry on: the window already exists but carries none of the guest
+      // policies registration installs, so leaving it would navigate an unvalidated URL with no
+      // policy on it and hand back a page id nothing can drive. The renderer door aborts its mount
+      // the same way; this is that abort.
+      this.windowsByPageId.delete(browserPageId)
+      win.destroy()
+      throw new Error(`Browser page ${browserPageId} was refused`)
+    }
+
+    // Why only once registration took: this teardown unregisters the page id, and a refused id is
+    // one the other authority may own — cancelling its work would be the confusion we just refused.
+    // Why at all: if the window dies out from under us (crash, app teardown), drop the registry
+    // entry so commands fail cleanly instead of resolving a dead WebContents.
     win.webContents.once('destroyed', () => {
       // Explicit close removes the page first and performs awaited cleanup;
       // only an unexpected destruction still owns the bridge retirement here.
@@ -80,20 +104,6 @@ export class OffscreenBrowserBackend implements BrowserBackend {
       this.browserManager.unregisterGuest(browserPageId)
     })
 
-    // Why: register the guest and return immediately so the new tab appears
-    // without waiting for the page to finish loading. Previously createTab
-    // awaited the full navigation, so clicking "New Browser Tab" did nothing for
-    // up to a second on real URLs. The page loads asynchronously and streams
-    // once it paints; a failed load leaves the (usable) tab open, matching how a
-    // normal browser tab survives a failed navigation.
-    this.browserManager.registerOffscreenGuest({
-      browserPageId,
-      worktreeId: params.worktreeId,
-      sessionProfileId: profile?.id ?? null,
-      userAgentMode: profile?.userAgentMode,
-      webContentsId: win.webContents.id
-    })
-
     const url = params.url || 'about:blank'
     void this.loadUrl(win, url).catch((error) => {
       console.warn(

src/main/claude/hook-service.test.ts

@@ -539,12 +539,14 @@ describe('ClaudeHookService.installRemote', () => {
     expect(script!.indexOf('printf "{}\\n"')).toBe(
       script!.indexOf('#!/bin/sh') + '#!/bin/sh\n'.length
     )
-    // Why: payload is piped to curl via stdin (`payload@-`) so it never lands
-    // on the curl command line (EDR oversized-command-line false positive),
-    // matching the Windows curl.exe hook post.
+    // Why: payload stays on stdin, while metadata headers avoid URL-encoded IDS signatures.
     expect(script).toContain('printf \'%s\' "$payload" | curl')
+    expect(script).toContain('-H "Content-Type: application/json"')
+    expect(script).toContain('orca_hook_metadata=$(printf')
+    expect(script).toContain('unset ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TRANSPORT')
+    expect(script).toContain('-H "X-Orca-Agent-Hook-Meta: ${orca_hook_metadata}"')
+    expect(script).toContain('--data-binary @-')
     expect(script).toContain('--data-urlencode "payload@-"')
-    expect(script).not.toContain('--data-urlencode "payload=${payload}"')
     expect(fs.modes.get('/home/dev/.orca/agent-hooks/claude-hook.sh')).toBe(0o755)
     // Why: no remote statusLine — this path serves SSH remotes and WSL guests, whose relay
     // listener doesn't route /statusline/claude and whose accounts aren't attributable locally.

src/main/claude/hook-service.ts

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import {
   writeManagedScript,
   type HooksConfig
 } from '../agent-hooks/installer-utils'
+import { buildPosixAgentHookPostCommand } from '../agent-hooks/hook-post-command'
 import {
   readHooksJsonRemote,
   writeHooksJsonRemote,
@@ -114,25 +115,17 @@ function getManagedScript(
     // Why: refresh endpoint coordinates for PTYs surviving an Orca restart.
     // Why: suppress parse errors so they neither leak nor trip outer set -e.
     'if [ -n "$ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_ENDPOINT" ] && [ -r "$ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_ENDPOINT" ]; then',
+    '  unset ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TRANSPORT',
     '  . "$ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_ENDPOINT" 2>/dev/null || :',
     'fi',
     'if [ -z "$ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_PORT" ] || [ -z "$ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TOKEN" ] || [ -z "$ORCA_PANE_KEY" ]; then',
     '  spool_hook_event',
     '  exit 0',
     'fi',
-    // Why: post form fields because path-bearing payloads are unsafe in hand-built JSON.
-    // Why: pipe payload to curl stdin to keep large output off the command line.
-    'printf \'%s\' "$payload" | curl -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:${ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_PORT}/hook/claude" \\',
-    '  --connect-timeout 0.5 --max-time 1.5 \\',
-    '  -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \\',
-    '  -H "X-Orca-Agent-Hook-Token: ${ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TOKEN}" \\',
-    '  --data-urlencode "paneKey=${ORCA_PANE_KEY}" \\',
-    '  --data-urlencode "tabId=${ORCA_TAB_ID}" \\',
-    '  --data-urlencode "launchToken=${ORCA_AGENT_LAUNCH_TOKEN}" \\',
-    '  --data-urlencode "worktreeId=${ORCA_WORKTREE_ID}" \\',
-    '  --data-urlencode "env=${ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_ENV}" \\',
-    '  --data-urlencode "version=${ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_VERSION}" \\',
-    '  --data-urlencode "payload@-" >/dev/null 2>&1 || spool_hook_event',
+    // Why: keep full hook JSON off the command line and avoid IDS-friendly URL-encoded paths.
+    ...buildPosixAgentHookPostCommand('claude').map((line, index, lines) =>
+      index === lines.length - 1 ? `${line} >/dev/null 2>&1 || spool_hook_event` : line
+    ),
     'exit 0',
     ''
   ].join('\n')

src/main/codex/codex-trust-config-mutation-queue.test.ts

@@ -108,4 +108,36 @@ describe('runExclusivelyForCodexTrustConfig', () => {
     await queued
     expect(secondStarted).toBe(true)
   })
+
+  it('coalesces WSL UNC aliases without folding the case-sensitive Linux path', async () => {
+    const aliasGate = deferred()
+    let aliasStarted = false
+    const blockedAlias = runExclusivelyForCodexTrustConfig(
+      String.raw`\\wsl.localhost\Ubuntu\home\Alice\.codex\config.toml`,
+      () => aliasGate.promise
+    )
+    const queuedAlias = runExclusivelyForCodexTrustConfig(
+      String.raw`\\wsl$\ubuntu\home\Alice\.codex\config.toml`,
+      () => {
+        aliasStarted = true
+        return Promise.resolve()
+      }
+    )
+    await Promise.resolve()
+    expect(aliasStarted).toBe(false)
+
+    let distinctStarted = false
+    await runExclusivelyForCodexTrustConfig(
+      String.raw`\\wsl.localhost\Ubuntu\home\alice\.codex\config.toml`,
+      async () => {
+        distinctStarted = true
+      }
+    )
+    expect(distinctStarted).toBe(true)
+
+    aliasGate.resolve()
+    await blockedAlias
+    await queuedAlias
+    expect(aliasStarted).toBe(true)
+  })
 })

src/main/codex/hook-service-wsl-runtime.test.ts

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import {
   type CodexTrustEntry
 } from './config-toml-trust'
 import {
+  CodexHookService,
   _internals,
   createCodexWslRuntimeHookInstallPlan,
   type CodexWslRuntimeHookInstallPlan
@@ -82,7 +83,67 @@ function expectedManagedCommand(scriptPath: string): string {
 }
 
 describe('Codex WSL runtime hook install', () => {
-  it('plans WSL hook files with Linux command and trust paths', async () => {
+  it('coalesces aliases of one runtime home without blocking independent homes', async () => {
+    const service = new CodexHookService()
+    const releases: (() => void)[] = []
+    const started: string[] = []
+    vi.spyOn(service, 'installForRuntimeHome').mockImplementation(async (runtimeHomePath) => {
+      started.push(runtimeHomePath!)
+      await new Promise<void>((resolve) => releases.push(resolve))
+      return null
+    })
+    const firstHome = '\\\\wsl$\\Ubuntu\\home\\Alice\\.local\\share\\orca\\codex-runtime-home\\home'
+    const alias = firstHome.replace('\\\\wsl$', '\\\\wsl.localhost')
+    const independent = firstHome.replace('\\Alice\\', '\\Bob\\')
+
+    const first = service.installForRuntimeHomeSerialized(firstHome)
+    const second = service.installForRuntimeHomeSerialized(alias)
+    const third = service.installForRuntimeHomeSerialized(independent)
+    await vi.waitFor(() => expect(started).toEqual([firstHome, independent]))
+    expect(second).toBe(first)
+
+    releases.splice(0).forEach((release) => release())
+    await Promise.all([first, second, third])
+    expect(started).toEqual([firstHome, independent])
+  })
+
+  it('does not coalesce one drive-backed home across WSL distros', async () => {
+    const service = new CodexHookService()
+    const started: string[] = []
+    vi.spyOn(service, 'installForRuntimeHome').mockImplementation(async (_runtimeHome, target) => {
+      started.push(target?.wslDistro ?? '')
+      return null
+    })
+    const home = 'D:\\wsl-home\\.local\\share\\orca\\codex-runtime-home\\home'
+
+    await Promise.all([
+      service.installForRuntimeHomeSerialized(home, { runtime: 'wsl', wslDistro: 'Ubuntu' }),
+      service.installForRuntimeHomeSerialized(home, { runtime: 'wsl', wslDistro: 'Debian' })
+    ])
+
+    expect(started).toEqual(['Ubuntu', 'Debian'])
+  })
+
+  it('keeps case-distinct Linux runtime homes on separate queues', async () => {
+    const service = new CodexHookService()
+    const started: string[] = []
+    vi.spyOn(service, 'installForRuntimeHome').mockImplementation(async (runtimeHomePath) => {
+      started.push(runtimeHomePath!)
+      return null
+    })
+    const upper =
+      '\\\\wsl.localhost\\Ubuntu\\home\\Alice\\.local\\share\\orca\\codex-runtime-home\\home'
+    const lower = upper.replace('\\Alice\\', '\\alice\\')
+
+    await Promise.all([
+      service.installForRuntimeHomeSerialized(upper),
+      service.installForRuntimeHomeSerialized(lower)
+    ])
+
+    expect(started).toEqual([upper, lower])
+  })
+
+  it('plans WSL hook files with Linux command and trust paths', () => {
     const runtimeHome =
       '\\\\wsl.localhost\\Ubuntu\\home\\alice\\.local\\share\\orca\\codex-runtime-home\\home'
 
@@ -275,11 +336,15 @@ describe('Codex WSL runtime hook install', () => {
   it('generates a POSIX hook that bridges WSL loopback failures through Windows curl', async () => {
     const script = _internals.getManagedScript('posix')
     expect(script).toContain('load_hook_endpoint()')
+    expect(script).toContain('unset ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TRANSPORT')
     expect(script).toContain('"set ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TOKEN="*)')
     expect(script).toContain('post_codex_hook()')
     expect(script).toContain('is_wsl_runtime()')
     expect(script).toContain('WSL_DISTRO_NAME')
     expect(script).toContain('windows_curl=$(command -v curl.exe 2>/dev/null || true)')
+    expect(script).toContain('-H "Content-Type: application/json"')
+    expect(script).toContain('-H "X-Orca-Agent-Hook-Meta-Encoding: base64"')
+    expect(script).toContain('--data-binary @-')
     expect(script).toContain('--data-urlencode "payload@-"')
     expect(script).toContain('if post_codex_hook curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then')
     expect(script).toContain('post_codex_hook "$windows_curl" 3 5 >/dev/null 2>&1 || true')
@@ -302,6 +367,7 @@ describe('Codex WSL runtime hook install', () => {
           'set ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TOKEN=fresh-token',
           'set ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_ENV=development',
           'set ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_VERSION=1',
+          'set ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TRANSPORT=raw-json-v1',
           ''
         ].join('\r\n'),
         'utf-8'
@@ -333,6 +399,7 @@ describe('Codex WSL runtime hook install', () => {
       const posted = readFileSync(capturePath, 'utf-8')
       expect(posted).toContain('http://127.0.0.1:43210/hook/codex')
       expect(posted).toContain('X-Orca-Agent-Hook-Token: fresh-token')
+      expect(posted).toContain('Content-Type: application/json')
       expect(posted).not.toContain('stale-token')
     }
   )

src/main/codex/hook-service.ts

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import {
   writeManagedScript,
   type HookDefinition
 } from '../agent-hooks/installer-utils'
+import { buildPosixAgentHookPostCommand } from '../agent-hooks/hook-post-command'
 import { refreshManagedScriptIfPresent } from '../agent-hooks/managed-hook-script-refresh'
 import { resolveHooksJsonWritePath } from '../agent-hooks/hook-config-write-path'
 import { writeFileAtomically } from '../codex-accounts/fs-utils'
@@ -823,6 +824,7 @@ function getManagedScript(target: 'local' | 'posix' = 'local'): string {
     // Why: sourcing refreshes PORT/TOKEN/ENV/VERSION from the current Orca so a surviving PTY keeps reporting after a restart (see claude/hook-service.ts).
     'load_hook_endpoint() {',
     '  endpoint_path="$1"',
+    '  unset ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TRANSPORT',
     '  case "$endpoint_path" in',
     '    *.cmd)',
     // Why: Windows passes endpoint.cmd into WSL via WSLENV; parse only Orca's known assignments since cmd.exe `set` lines aren't shell syntax.
@@ -834,6 +836,7 @@ function getManagedScript(target: 'local' | 'posix' = 'local'): string {
     '          "set ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TOKEN="*) ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TOKEN=${endpoint_line#*=} ;;',
     '          "set ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_ENV="*) ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_ENV=${endpoint_line#*=} ;;',
     '          "set ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_VERSION="*) ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_VERSION=${endpoint_line#*=} ;;',
+    '          "set ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TRANSPORT="*) ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TRANSPORT=${endpoint_line#*=} ;;',
     '        esac',
     '      done < "$endpoint_path"',
     '      ;;',
@@ -853,20 +856,11 @@ function getManagedScript(target: 'local' | 'posix' = 'local'): string {
     '  curl_bin="$1"',
     '  connect_timeout="${2:-0.5}"',
     '  max_time="${3:-1.5}"',
-    // Why: worktreeId embeds a path, so hand-building JSON in shell is unsafe with quotes/newlines; post raw payload plus metadata as form fields instead.
-    // Why: pipe payload to curl's stdin (`payload@-`) not an inline arg, so tens-of-KB tool output stays off the command line (EDR false positives).
-    '  printf \'%s\' "$payload" | "$curl_bin" -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:${ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_PORT}/hook/codex" \\',
-    '    --connect-timeout "$connect_timeout" --max-time "$max_time" \\',
-    '    --noproxy "127.0.0.1" \\',
-    '    -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \\',
-    '    -H "X-Orca-Agent-Hook-Token: ${ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TOKEN}" \\',
-    '    --data-urlencode "paneKey=${ORCA_PANE_KEY}" \\',
-    '    --data-urlencode "tabId=${ORCA_TAB_ID}" \\',
-    '    --data-urlencode "launchToken=${ORCA_AGENT_LAUNCH_TOKEN}" \\',
-    '    --data-urlencode "worktreeId=${ORCA_WORKTREE_ID}" \\',
-    '    --data-urlencode "env=${ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_ENV}" \\',
-    '    --data-urlencode "version=${ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_VERSION}" \\',
-    '    --data-urlencode "payload@-"',
+    // Why: keep full hook JSON off the command line and avoid URL-encoding paths/commands into IDS-friendly traversal signatures.
+    ...buildPosixAgentHookPostCommand('codex', {
+      curlCommand: '"$curl_bin"',
+      indent: '    '
+    }).map((line) => `  ${line}`),
     '}',
     'is_wsl_runtime() {',
     '  [ -n "$WSL_DISTRO_NAME" ] && return 0',
@@ -1081,6 +1075,7 @@ export class CodexHookService {
   }
 
   private readonly wslReconciliationGeneration = new Map<string, number>()
+  private readonly wslInstallsInFlight = new Map<string, Promise<AgentHookInstallStatus | null>>()
 
   private supersedeWslReconciliation(runtimeHomePath: string | null | undefined): number {
     if (!runtimeHomePath) {
@@ -1177,6 +1172,30 @@ export class CodexHookService {
     }
   }
 
+  installForRuntimeHomeSerialized(
+    runtimeHomePath: string | null | undefined,
+    target?: CodexWslRuntimeHookTarget
+  ): Promise<AgentHookInstallStatus | null> {
+    if (!runtimeHomePath) {
+      return Promise.resolve(null)
+    }
+    const targetKey = target?.runtime === 'wsl' ? target.wslDistro?.trim().toLowerCase() : ''
+    const key = `${getWslReconciliationKey(runtimeHomePath)}\0${targetKey ?? ''}`
+    const active = this.wslInstallsInFlight.get(key)
+    if (active) {
+      return active
+    }
+    const install = this.installForRuntimeHome(runtimeHomePath, target)
+    this.wslInstallsInFlight.set(key, install)
+    const clear = (): void => {
+      if (this.wslInstallsInFlight.get(key) === install) {
+        this.wslInstallsInFlight.delete(key)
+      }
+    }
+    void install.then(clear, clear)
+    return install
+  }
+
   refreshRuntimeUserHooksForRuntimeHome(
     runtimeHomePath: string | null | undefined,
     target?: CodexWslRuntimeHookTarget
@@ -1492,7 +1511,13 @@ export class CodexHookService {
       options?.codexHomeDir?.replace(/\/$/, '') ?? `${remoteHome.replace(/\/$/, '')}/.codex`
     const remoteConfigPath = `${codexHomeBase}/hooks.json`
     const remoteTomlPath = `${codexHomeBase}/config.toml`
-    const remoteScriptPath = `${remoteHome.replace(/\/$/, '')}/.orca/agent-hooks/codex-hook.sh`
+    // Redirected WSL homes must use the same script location and command shape
+    // as the runtime installer; two representations of one hooks.json race
+    // into stale trust keys. Plain SSH keeps its guest-home script contract.
+    const redirectedCodexHome = options?.codexHomeDir?.replace(/\/$/, '')
+    const remoteScriptPath = redirectedCodexHome
+      ? `${redirectedCodexHome}/.orca/agent-hooks/codex-hook.sh`
+      : `${remoteHome.replace(/\/$/, '')}/.orca/agent-hooks/codex-hook.sh`
     try {
       const config = await readHooksJsonRemote(sftp, remoteConfigPath)
       if (!config) {
@@ -1505,7 +1530,9 @@ export class CodexHookService {
         }
       }
 
-      const command = wrapPosixHookCommand(remoteScriptPath)
+      const command = redirectedCodexHome
+        ? wrapReadablePosixHookCommand(remoteScriptPath)
+        : wrapPosixHookCommand(remoteScriptPath)
       const nextHooks = { ...config.hooks }
       const managedEvents = new Set<string>(CODEX_EVENTS)
       const isManagedCommand = createManagedCommandMatcher('codex-hook.sh')
@@ -1529,11 +1556,13 @@ export class CodexHookService {
         const definition: HookDefinition = {
           hooks: [buildManagedCommandHook(command)]
         }
-        nextHooks[eventName] = [...cleaned, definition]
+        nextHooks[eventName] = redirectedCodexHome
+          ? [definition, ...cleaned]
+          : [...cleaned, definition]
         trustEntries.push({
           sourcePath: remoteConfigPath,
           eventLabel: CODEX_EVENT_LABEL[eventName],
-          groupIndex: cleaned.length,
+          groupIndex: redirectedCodexHome ? 0 : cleaned.length,
           handlerIndex: 0,
           command,
           timeoutSec: MANAGED_HOOK_TIMEOUT_SECONDS

src/main/codex/managed-home-shell-preflight.test.ts

@@ -2,10 +2,25 @@ import { mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, rmSync, symlinkSync, writeFileSync } from 'node
 import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
 import { join } from 'node:path'
 import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
+
+const { wslRealpathMock } = vi.hoisted(() => ({
+  wslRealpathMock: vi.fn(async (path: string) => path)
+}))
+
+vi.mock('node:fs/promises', () => ({ realpath: wslRealpathMock }))
+
 import {
   prepareManagedCodexHomeBeforeShellLaunch,
   resolveManagedCodexShellPreflightHome
 } from './managed-home-shell-preflight'
+import {
+  prepareManagedWslCodexHomeBeforeShellLaunch,
+  resolveManagedWslCodexShellPreflightTarget
+} from './managed-wsl-home-shell-preflight'
+import {
+  _internals as managedWslHomeRegistryInternals,
+  recordManagedWslCodexHome
+} from './managed-wsl-codex-home-registry'
 
 const roots: string[] = []
 
@@ -16,6 +31,8 @@ function makeRoot(): string {
 }
 
 afterEach(() => {
+  wslRealpathMock.mockClear()
+  managedWslHomeRegistryInternals.clearRecordedManagedWslCodexHomes()
   for (const root of roots.splice(0)) {
     rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true })
   }
@@ -160,3 +177,123 @@ describe('managed Codex shell preflight', () => {
     ).toBeNull()
   })
 })
+
+describe('managed WSL Codex shell preflight', () => {
+  const home = '/home/jin/.local/share/orca/codex-runtime-home/home'
+  const runtimeHome =
+    '\\\\wsl.localhost\\Ubuntu-24.04\\home\\jin\\.local\\share\\orca\\codex-runtime-home\\home'
+  const env = {
+    CODEX_HOME: home,
+    ORCA_CODEX_HOME: home,
+    WSL_DISTRO_NAME: 'Ubuntu-24.04'
+  }
+
+  it('targets the pane-selected managed home through its UNC twin', () => {
+    recordManagedWslCodexHome('Ubuntu-24.04', runtimeHome)
+    expect(resolveManagedWslCodexShellPreflightTarget(env)).toEqual({
+      runtimeHomePath: runtimeHome,
+      wslDistro: 'Ubuntu-24.04'
+    })
+  })
+
+  it('reconstructs a validated managed home when a restarted runtime has no record', () => {
+    expect(resolveManagedWslCodexShellPreflightTarget(env)).toEqual({
+      runtimeHomePath: runtimeHome,
+      wslDistro: 'Ubuntu-24.04'
+    })
+  })
+
+  it('installs once through the WSL runtime-home lane while hooks are enabled', async () => {
+    recordManagedWslCodexHome('Ubuntu-24.04', runtimeHome)
+    const status = {
+      agent: 'codex' as const,
+      state: 'installed' as const,
+      configPath: 'config.toml',
+      managedHooksPresent: true,
+      detail: null
+    }
+    const install = vi.fn(() => status)
+
+    await expect(
+      prepareManagedWslCodexHomeBeforeShellLaunch({ env, hooksEnabled: true, install })
+    ).resolves.toBe(status)
+    expect(install).toHaveBeenCalledExactlyOnceWith(runtimeHome, {
+      runtime: 'wsl',
+      wslDistro: 'Ubuntu-24.04'
+    })
+
+    await expect(
+      prepareManagedWslCodexHomeBeforeShellLaunch({ env, hooksEnabled: false, install })
+    ).resolves.toBeNull()
+    expect(install).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
+  })
+
+  it.each([
+    [
+      'a user home',
+      { ...env, CODEX_HOME: '/home/jin/.codex', ORCA_CODEX_HOME: '/home/jin/.codex' }
+    ],
+    ['unequal routing markers', { ...env, ORCA_CODEX_HOME: `${home}-other` }],
+    [
+      'a parent traversal',
+      {
+        ...env,
+        CODEX_HOME: `/home/jin/../jin${home.slice('/home/jin'.length)}`,
+        ORCA_CODEX_HOME: `/home/jin/../jin${home.slice('/home/jin'.length)}`
+      }
+    ],
+    [
+      'a dot segment',
+      {
+        ...env,
+        CODEX_HOME: `/home/./jin${home.slice('/home/jin'.length)}`,
+        ORCA_CODEX_HOME: `/home/./jin${home.slice('/home/jin'.length)}`
+      }
+    ],
+    [
+      'a host path',
+      { ...env, CODEX_HOME: 'C:\\Users\\jin\\.codex', ORCA_CODEX_HOME: 'C:\\Users\\jin\\.codex' }
+    ],
+    ['a missing distro', { ...env, WSL_DISTRO_NAME: '' }],
+    ['a distro path escape', { ...env, WSL_DISTRO_NAME: 'Ubuntu\\..\\host' }],
+    [
+      'a repeated separator',
+      {
+        ...env,
+        CODEX_HOME: home.replace('/jin/', '/jin//'),
+        ORCA_CODEX_HOME: home.replace('/jin/', '/jin//')
+      }
+    ]
+  ])('rejects %s', (_label, candidate) => {
+    recordManagedWslCodexHome('Ubuntu-24.04', runtimeHome)
+    expect(resolveManagedWslCodexShellPreflightTarget(candidate)).toBeNull()
+  })
+
+  it('preserves a recorded runtime spelling for a managed account home', () => {
+    const directHome = '/home/jin/.local/share/orca/codex-accounts/account-1/home'
+    const directRuntimeHome =
+      '\\\\wsl$\\Ubuntu-24.04\\home\\jin\\.local\\share\\orca\\codex-accounts\\account-1\\home'
+    recordManagedWslCodexHome('Ubuntu-24.04', directRuntimeHome)
+
+    expect(
+      resolveManagedWslCodexShellPreflightTarget({
+        CODEX_HOME: directHome,
+        ORCA_CODEX_HOME: directHome,
+        WSL_DISTRO_NAME: 'ubuntu-24.04'
+      })
+    ).toEqual({ runtimeHomePath: directRuntimeHome, wslDistro: 'ubuntu-24.04' })
+  })
+
+  it('never authorizes a WSL system home even when it was offered by a PTY lane', () => {
+    const systemHome = '/home/jin/.codex'
+    recordManagedWslCodexHome('Ubuntu-24.04', '\\\\wsl.localhost\\Ubuntu-24.04\\home\\jin\\.codex')
+
+    expect(
+      resolveManagedWslCodexShellPreflightTarget({
+        CODEX_HOME: systemHome,
+        ORCA_CODEX_HOME: systemHome,
+        WSL_DISTRO_NAME: 'Ubuntu-24.04'
+      })
+    ).toBeNull()
+  })
+})

src/main/codex/managed-wsl-codex-home-registry.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+import { win32 as pathWin32 } from 'node:path'
+import {
+  foldWslUncPathCaseInsensitiveParts,
+  parseWslUncPath,
+  toWindowsWslPath
+} from '../../shared/wsl-paths'
+
+type ManagedWslCodexHome = {
+  runtimeHomePath: string
+  linuxHomePath: string
+}
+
+const managedHomesByDistro = new Map<string, Map<string, ManagedWslCodexHome>>()
+
+function distroKey(distro: string): string {
+  return distro.trim().toLowerCase()
+}
+
+export function isAbsolutePosixPathWithoutDotSegments(value: string): boolean {
+  const segments = value.split('/').slice(1)
+  return (
+    value.startsWith('/') &&
+    !value.startsWith('//') &&
+    !value.includes('\\') &&
+    segments.every((segment) => segment && segment !== '.' && segment !== '..')
+  )
+}
+
+function isOrcaManagedWslCodexHome(linuxHomePath: string): boolean {
+  const segments = linuxHomePath.split('/').filter(Boolean)
+  const orcaIndex = segments.findIndex(
+    (segment, index) =>
+      segment === 'orca' && segments[index - 1] === 'share' && segments[index - 2] === '.local'
+  )
+  if (orcaIndex === -1) {
+    return false
+  }
+  const tail = segments.slice(orcaIndex + 1)
+  return (
+    (tail.length === 2 && tail[0] === 'codex-runtime-home' && tail[1] === 'home') ||
+    (tail.length === 3 && tail[0] === 'codex-accounts' && Boolean(tail[1]) && tail[2] === 'home')
+  )
+}
+
+function linuxHomeForRuntimePath(runtimeHomePath: string, distro: string): string | null {
+  const wsl = parseWslUncPath(runtimeHomePath)
+  if (wsl) {
+    return wsl.distro.toLowerCase() === distroKey(distro) ? wsl.linuxPath : null
+  }
+  const drive = runtimeHomePath.match(/^([A-Za-z]):[/\\](.*)$/)
+  return drive ? `/mnt/${drive[1].toLowerCase()}/${drive[2].replace(/\\/g, '/')}` : null
+}
+
+export function recordManagedWslCodexHome(distro: string, runtimeHomePath: string): void {
+  const normalizedDistro = distro.trim()
+  const linuxHomePath = linuxHomeForRuntimePath(runtimeHomePath, normalizedDistro)
+  if (
+    !normalizedDistro ||
+    /[\\/\r\n]/.test(normalizedDistro) ||
+    !linuxHomePath ||
+    !isAbsolutePosixPathWithoutDotSegments(linuxHomePath) ||
+    !isOrcaManagedWslCodexHome(linuxHomePath)
+  ) {
+    return
+  }
+  const homes = managedHomesByDistro.get(distroKey(normalizedDistro)) ?? new Map()
+  homes.set(linuxHomePath, { runtimeHomePath, linuxHomePath })
+  managedHomesByDistro.set(distroKey(normalizedDistro), homes)
+}
+
+export function resolveRecordedManagedWslCodexHome(
+  distro: string,
+  linuxHomePath: string
+): string | null {
+  if (
+    !distro.trim() ||
+    /[\\/\r\n]/.test(distro) ||
+    !isAbsolutePosixPathWithoutDotSegments(linuxHomePath)
+  ) {
+    return null
+  }
+  return managedHomesByDistro.get(distroKey(distro))?.get(linuxHomePath)?.runtimeHomePath ?? null
+}
+
+export function resolveManagedWslCodexHome(distro: string, linuxHomePath: string): string | null {
+  if (
+    !distro.trim() ||
+    /[\\/\r\n]/.test(distro) ||
+    !isAbsolutePosixPathWithoutDotSegments(linuxHomePath) ||
+    !isOrcaManagedWslCodexHome(linuxHomePath)
+  ) {
+    return null
+  }
+  return (
+    resolveRecordedManagedWslCodexHome(distro, linuxHomePath) ??
+    toWindowsWslPath(linuxHomePath, distro)
+  )
+}
+
+export function wslRuntimeHomePathsEqual(left: string | undefined, right: string): boolean {
+  if (!left) {
+    return false
+  }
+  const leftWsl = foldWslUncPathCaseInsensitiveParts(left)
+  const rightWsl = foldWslUncPathCaseInsensitiveParts(right)
+  if (leftWsl || rightWsl) {
+    return leftWsl !== null && leftWsl === rightWsl
+  }
+  return pathWin32.normalize(left).toLowerCase() === pathWin32.normalize(right).toLowerCase()
+}
+
+export const _internals = {
+  clearRecordedManagedWslCodexHomes: () => managedHomesByDistro.clear(),
+  isOrcaManagedWslCodexHome
+}

src/main/codex/managed-wsl-home-shell-preflight.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+import { realpath } from 'node:fs/promises'
+import type { AgentHookInstallStatus } from '../../shared/agent-hook-types'
+import { withTimeout } from '../../shared/promise-timeout-fallback'
+import type { CodexWslRuntimeHookTarget } from './codex-wsl-hook-install-plan'
+import { codexHookService } from './hook-service'
+import {
+  isAbsolutePosixPathWithoutDotSegments,
+  resolveManagedWslCodexHome,
+  wslRuntimeHomePathsEqual
+} from './managed-wsl-codex-home-registry'
+
+type WslShellPreflightEnvironment = {
+  CODEX_HOME?: string
+  ORCA_CODEX_HOME?: string
+  WSL_DISTRO_NAME?: string
+}
+
+const WSL_MANAGED_HOME_REALPATH_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000
+
+export type ManagedWslCodexShellPreflightTarget = {
+  runtimeHomePath: string
+  wslDistro: string
+}
+
+export function resolveManagedWslCodexShellPreflightTarget(
+  env: WslShellPreflightEnvironment
+): ManagedWslCodexShellPreflightTarget | null {
+  const codexHome = env.CODEX_HOME?.trim()
+  const orcaCodexHome = env.ORCA_CODEX_HOME?.trim()
+  const wslDistro = env.WSL_DISTRO_NAME?.trim()
+  if (
+    !codexHome ||
+    codexHome !== orcaCodexHome ||
+    !wslDistro ||
+    /[\\/\r\n]/.test(wslDistro) ||
+    !isAbsolutePosixPathWithoutDotSegments(codexHome)
+  ) {
+    return null
+  }
+  const runtimeHomePath = resolveManagedWslCodexHome(wslDistro, codexHome)
+  return runtimeHomePath ? { runtimeHomePath, wslDistro } : null
+}
+
+export async function prepareManagedWslCodexHomeBeforeShellLaunch(args: {
+  env: WslShellPreflightEnvironment
+  hooksEnabled: boolean
+  install?: (
+    runtimeHomePath: string,
+    target: CodexWslRuntimeHookTarget
+  ) => AgentHookInstallStatus | Promise<AgentHookInstallStatus | null> | null
+}): Promise<AgentHookInstallStatus | null> {
+  if (!args.hooksEnabled) {
+    return null
+  }
+  const target = resolveManagedWslCodexShellPreflightTarget(args.env)
+  if (!target) {
+    return null
+  }
+  const realHome = await withTimeout(
+    realpath(target.runtimeHomePath),
+    WSL_MANAGED_HOME_REALPATH_TIMEOUT_MS,
+    null
+  )
+  if (!realHome || !wslRuntimeHomePathsEqual(realHome, target.runtimeHomePath)) {
+    return null
+  }
+  const install =
+    args.install ??
+    ((home: string, hookTarget: CodexWslRuntimeHookTarget) =>
+      codexHookService.installForRuntimeHomeSerialized(home, hookTarget))
+  return await install(target.runtimeHomePath, {
+    runtime: 'wsl',
+    wslDistro: target.wslDistro
+  })
+}

src/main/index.ts

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ import {
   type Tray,
   session
 } from 'electron'
+import { applyMacPressAndHoldDefaultAtStartup } from './macos-press-and-hold-default'
 import { initTccPromptNotice, stopTccPromptNotice } from './macos-tcc-prompt-notice'
 import { electronApp, is } from '@electron-toolkit/utils'
 import {
@@ -318,6 +319,11 @@ import { browserCertificateTrustController, browserManager } from './browser/bro
 import { RpcDispatcher } from './runtime/rpc/dispatcher'
 import { OffscreenBrowserBackend } from './browser/offscreen-browser-backend'
 import { initializeBrowserSessionsForApp } from './browser/browser-session-startup'
+import {
+  installDocPreviewProtocolHandler,
+  registerDocPreviewSchemePrivileges
+} from './browser/doc-preview-protocol'
+import { registerDocPreviewGrantHandlers } from './ipc/doc-preview-grant-ipc'
 import { initializeBrowserClientHostId } from './browser/browser-client-host-id'
 import { setUnreadDockBadgeCount } from './dock/unread-badge'
 import { AutomationService } from './automations/service'
@@ -938,6 +944,9 @@ if (hasSingleInstanceLock) {
   installDevParentSignalQuit(shouldCoupleToDevParent)
   // Why: run after configureDevUserDataPath but before app.setName('Orca') (whenReady), which changes the resolved path on case-sensitive filesystems.
   initDataPath()
+  // Why here: initDataPath above gives the canonical userData path for the record file; the write
+  // itself lands for the next launch (see macos-press-and-hold-default.ts).
+  applyMacPressAndHoldDefaultAtStartup(getCanonicalUserDataPath())
   // Why: use the canonical userData path — late app.getPath('userData') can resolve differently across restarts, defeating persistence.
   initSessionParseCachePersistence({
     filePath: join(getCanonicalUserDataPath(), 'ai-vault', 'session-parse-cache.json'),
@@ -958,6 +967,9 @@ if (hasSingleInstanceLock) {
   if (shouldApplyPreReadyAppName(devInstanceIdentity)) {
     app.setName(devInstanceIdentity.appName)
   }
+  // Why: Electron freezes the privileged scheme table at ready, so the doc-preview
+  // scheme must be declared here or its webview loses fetch/secure-origin privileges.
+  registerDocPreviewSchemePrivileges()
   // Why: must precede app.whenReady() so Crashpad is installed before the
   // first renderer spawns; a CHECK before this point is still exit-code-only.
   startCrashpadCapture()
@@ -2433,6 +2445,9 @@ void app.whenReady().then(async () => {
   } catch {
     console.warn('[proxy] Failed to apply network proxy settings')
   }
+  // Why: the preview session is protocol-scoped, so the handler must exist before any preview webview attaches.
+  installDocPreviewProtocolHandler()
+  registerDocPreviewGrantHandlers()
   // Why: browser sessions serve desktop webviews and runtime profile commands, so init at app startup rather than via a renderer IPC path.
   initializeBrowserSessionsForApp({
     orcaProfileId: activeOrcaProfile.profile.id,

src/main/ipc/browser-grab-ipc.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import { ipcMain } from 'electron'
 import { browserManager } from '../browser/browser-manager'
+import { onDocPreviewGrantRevoked } from '../browser/doc-preview-grant-registry'
 import { isTrustedBrowserRenderer } from './browser-renderer-trust'
 import { waitForNextTabRegistration } from './browser-tab-registration-wait'
 import type {
@@ -48,7 +49,25 @@ export function disposeGrabModeStateForPage(browserPageId: string): void {
   grabModeOperationByPageId.delete(browserPageId)
 }
 
+/**
+ * Why previews need their own disposal path: a browser page announces its own death on
+ * `browser:unregisterGuest`, and a preview never does — it withdraws by revoking its grant, which
+ * is also what a re-mint does. Without this, every grant leaves an intent entry behind forever.
+ */
+let disposePreviewGrantSubscription: (() => void) | null = null
+
+function subscribeToPreviewGrantRevocation(): void {
+  disposePreviewGrantSubscription?.()
+  disposePreviewGrantSubscription = onDocPreviewGrantRevoked((grant) => {
+    // Why cancel first: a grab still armed on that guest would otherwise leave the renderer's
+    // await hanging on a surface the reader has already closed.
+    browserManager.cancelGrabOp(grant.browserPageId, 'evicted')
+    disposeGrabModeStateForPage(grant.browserPageId)
+  })
+}
+
 export function registerBrowserGrabHandlers(): void {
+  subscribeToPreviewGrantRevocation()
   ipcMain.removeHandler('browser:setGrabMode')
   ipcMain.removeHandler('browser:awaitGrabSelection')
   ipcMain.removeHandler('browser:cancelGrab')

src/main/ipc/browser-guest-view-ipc.ts

@@ -85,12 +85,26 @@ export function registerBrowserGuestViewHandlers(): void {
       ) {
         return false
       }
-      return browserManager.setAnnotationViewportBridge(args.browserPageId, {
-        enabled: args.enabled,
-        emitViewport: args.emitViewport,
-        markers: args.markers,
-        token: args.token
-      })
+      // Why resolve here: this is a tool acting on a guest the reader is looking at, so it answers
+      // for a workspace document too — and routing through the authority also pins the request to
+      // the renderer that owns the target, which page-id-only resolution never checked.
+      const resolveGuest = (): Electron.WebContents | null =>
+        browserManager.getAuthorizedGuest(args.browserPageId, event.sender.id)
+      if (!resolveGuest()) {
+        return false
+      }
+      // Why hand over the resolver rather than that guest: the op is serialized per tab, and the
+      // one it finally runs against must be the one on screen then, not the one this request saw.
+      return browserManager.setAnnotationViewportBridge(
+        args.browserPageId,
+        {
+          enabled: args.enabled,
+          emitViewport: args.emitViewport,
+          markers: args.markers,
+          token: args.token
+        },
+        resolveGuest
+      )
     }
   )
 

src/main/ipc/browser-preview-tool-authorization.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,510 @@
+import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
+import type * as DocPreviewGuestPolicyModule from '../browser/doc-preview-guest-policy'
+import type * as TabRegistrationWaitModule from './browser-tab-registration-wait'
+
+const {
+  handleMock,
+  removeHandlerMock,
+  getAuthorizedGuestMock,
+  setGrabModeMock,
+  awaitGrabSelectionMock,
+  cancelGrabOpMock,
+  captureSelectionScreenshotMock,
+  extractHoverPayloadMock,
+  setAnnotationViewportBridgeMock,
+  openDevToolsMock,
+  setViewportOverrideMock,
+  previewAuthoritySpy,
+  registrationWaitSpy
+} = vi.hoisted(() => ({
+  handleMock: vi.fn(),
+  removeHandlerMock: vi.fn(),
+  getAuthorizedGuestMock: vi.fn(),
+  setGrabModeMock: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(true),
+  awaitGrabSelectionMock: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ opId: 'op', kind: 'cancelled' }),
+  cancelGrabOpMock: vi.fn(),
+  captureSelectionScreenshotMock: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(null),
+  extractHoverPayloadMock: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(null),
+  setAnnotationViewportBridgeMock: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(true),
+  openDevToolsMock: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(true),
+  setViewportOverrideMock: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(true),
+  previewAuthoritySpy: vi.fn(),
+  registrationWaitSpy: vi.fn()
+}))
+
+vi.mock('electron', () => ({
+  BrowserWindow: { fromWebContents: vi.fn() },
+  ipcMain: { removeHandler: removeHandlerMock, handle: handleMock },
+  webContents: { fromId: vi.fn(() => ({ isDestroyed: () => false })) }
+}))
+
+vi.mock('../browser/browser-manager', () => ({
+  browserCertificateTrustController: { proceed: vi.fn(() => ({ ok: true })) },
+  browserManager: {
+    registerGuest: vi.fn(() => true),
+    attachGuestPolicies: vi.fn(),
+    unregisterGuest: vi.fn(),
+    getGuestWebContentsId: vi.fn(),
+    getWebContentsIdByTabId: vi.fn(() => new Map()),
+    getWorktreeIdForTab: vi.fn(),
+    getAuthorizedGuest: getAuthorizedGuestMock,
+    setGrabMode: setGrabModeMock,
+    awaitGrabSelection: awaitGrabSelectionMock,
+    cancelGrabOp: cancelGrabOpMock,
+    captureSelectionScreenshot: captureSelectionScreenshotMock,
+    extractHoverPayload: extractHoverPayloadMock,
+    setAnnotationViewportBridge: setAnnotationViewportBridgeMock,
+    openDevTools: openDevToolsMock,
+    setViewportOverride: setViewportOverrideMock,
+    cancelDownload: vi.fn()
+  }
+}))
+
+// Why the real policy module behind a spy: the point of these tests is which half of the page
+// registry a channel reads, so a stub of it would prove nothing about what was consulted.
+vi.mock('../browser/doc-preview-guest-policy', async (importOriginal) => {
+  const actual = await importOriginal<typeof DocPreviewGuestPolicyModule>()
+  return {
+    ...actual,
+    getWorkspaceDocPageGuest: (browserPageId: string, senderWebContentsId: number) => {
+      previewAuthoritySpy(browserPageId, senderWebContentsId)
+      return actual.getWorkspaceDocPageGuest(browserPageId, senderWebContentsId)
+    }
+  }
+})
+
+// Why spy rather than stub: the wait is real machinery the browser-page path still depends on;
+// only whether a preview target enters it is under test.
+vi.mock('./browser-tab-registration-wait', async (importOriginal) => {
+  const actual = await importOriginal<typeof TabRegistrationWaitModule>()
+  return {
+    ...actual,
+    waitForNextTabRegistration: (...args: Parameters<typeof actual.waitForNextTabRegistration>) => {
+      registrationWaitSpy(args[0])
+      return actual.waitForNextTabRegistration(...args)
+    }
+  }
+})
+
+import { registerBrowserHandlers } from './browser'
+import { browserManager } from '../browser/browser-manager'
+import {
+  getWorkspaceDocPageGuest,
+  installDocPreviewGuestPolicy
+} from '../browser/doc-preview-guest-policy'
+import {
+  mintDocPreviewGrant,
+  revokeAllDocPreviewGrants,
+  revokeDocPreviewGrant
+} from '../browser/doc-preview-grant-registry'
+import { buildDocPreviewUrl } from '../../shared/doc-preview-scheme'
+
+const HOST_RENDERER_ID = 91
+const OTHER_RENDERER_ID = 92
+/** Mirrors browser-grab-ipc's own wait, so elapsing it here settles the same parked request. */
+const GRAB_REGISTRATION_WAIT_MS = 1_000
+
+/**
+ * Every `browser:*` invoke channel, split by whether it acts on a guest the reader is looking at
+ * (a tool) or manages browser-page, session and profile state. The split is asserted to be total,
+ * so a new channel cannot be added without deciding which side of the preview seam it belongs on.
+ */
+const TOOL_CHANNELS = [
+  'browser:setGrabMode',
+  'browser:awaitGrabSelection',
+  'browser:cancelGrab',
+  'browser:captureSelectionScreenshot',
+  'browser:extractHoverPayload',
+  'browser:setAnnotationViewportBridge'
+]
+
+const BROWSER_PAGE_CHANNELS = [
+  'browser:registerGuest',
+  'browser:prepareSshWorkspacePartition',
+  'browser:repairGuestRegistration',
+  'browser:isGuestRegistered',
+  'browser:unregisterGuest',
+  'browser:respondWebAuthnAccount',
+  'browser:proceedCertificate',
+  'browser:activeTabChanged',
+  'browser:openDevTools',
+  'browser:setViewportOverride',
+  'browser:publishClientPageMetadata',
+  'browser:cancelDownload',
+  'browser:session:listProfiles',
+  'browser:session:createProfile',
+  'browser:session:deleteProfile',
+  'browser:session:importCookies',
+  'browser:session:resolvePartition',
+  'browser:session:clearDefaultCookies',
+  'browser:session:importFromBrowserForClientHost',
+  'browser:session:clientRouteImportSources',
+  'browser:session:detectBrowsers',
+  'browser:session:detectBrowsersForClientHost',
+  'browser:session:importFromBrowser'
+]
+
+type Handler = (event: { sender: Electron.WebContents }, args: unknown) => unknown
+
+function registeredHandlers(): Map<string, Handler> {
+  const handlers = new Map<string, Handler>()
+  for (const [channel, handler] of handleMock.mock.calls as [string, Handler][]) {
+    handlers.set(channel, handler)
+  }
+  return handlers
+}
+
+function trustedSender(id: number): { sender: Electron.WebContents } {
+  return {
+    sender: {
+      id,
+      isDestroyed: () => false,
+      getType: () => 'window',
+      getURL: () => 'file:///renderer/index.html'
+    } as unknown as Electron.WebContents
+  }
+}
+
+let nextDocPageOrdinal = 0
+
+function grantForNewDocPage(): { id: string; browserPageId: string } {
+  nextDocPageOrdinal += 1
+  const browserPageId = `doc-page-${nextDocPageOrdinal}`
+  const grant = mintDocPreviewGrant({
+    owner: { kind: 'ssh', connectionId: 'ssh-1' },
+    root: '/home/alice/docs',
+    entryRelativePath: 'index.html',
+    browserPageId
+  })
+  return { id: grant.id, browserPageId }
+}
+
+/** A preview guest already showing its document, which is the only state a tool can act in. */
+function renderPreviewForGrant(
+  grant: { id: string; browserPageId: string },
+  hostId: number = HOST_RENDERER_ID
+): {
+  grantId: string
+  browserPageId: string
+  contents: object
+  markContentsDestroyed: () => void
+} {
+  const browserPageId = grant.browserPageId
+  const handlers: Record<string, (...args: never[]) => void> = {}
+  const register = (event: string, handler: (...args: never[]) => void): void => {
+    handlers[event] = handler
+  }
+  // Why the guest already reports its URL: the embedder hands a preview over mid-load, so this is
+  // the state the policy really installs into.
+  const documentUrl = buildDocPreviewUrl(grant.id, 'index.html')
+  let contentsDestroyed = false
+  const guest = {
+    isFocused: () => true,
+    isDestroyed: () => contentsDestroyed,
+    getURL: () => documentUrl,
+    on: vi.fn(register),
+    once: vi.fn(register),
+    setWindowOpenHandler: vi.fn(),
+    setWebRTCIPHandlingPolicy: vi.fn()
+  }
+  installDocPreviewGuestPolicy(guest as never, { id: hostId, send: vi.fn() })
+  handlers['did-start-navigation']?.({ url: documentUrl, isMainFrame: true } as never)
+  return {
+    grantId: grant.id,
+    browserPageId,
+    contents: guest,
+    // Why without the `destroyed` event: Chromium tears the contents down before main runs that
+    // listener, so this is the window the authority has to answer for on its own.
+    markContentsDestroyed: () => {
+      contentsDestroyed = true
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+function liveRenderedPreview(
+  hostId: number = HOST_RENDERER_ID
+): ReturnType<typeof renderPreviewForGrant> {
+  return renderPreviewForGrant(grantForNewDocPage(), hostId)
+}
+
+/** Minimal well-formed args per channel, so a refusal is authorization and not shape validation. */
+function toolArgs(channel: string, browserPageId: string): Record<string, unknown> {
+  switch (channel) {
+    case 'browser:setGrabMode':
+      return { browserPageId, enabled: true }
+    case 'browser:awaitGrabSelection':
+      return { browserPageId, opId: 'op-1' }
+    case 'browser:captureSelectionScreenshot':
+      return { browserPageId, rect: { x: 0, y: 0, width: 10, height: 10 } }
+    case 'browser:setAnnotationViewportBridge':
+      return {
+        browserPageId,
+        enabled: true,
+        emitViewport: true,
+        markers: [],
+        token: 'annotation-bridge-token-1'
+      }
+    default:
+      return { browserPageId }
+  }
+}
+
+/** The viewport bridge is handed a resolver rather than the contents, so unwrap one call argument. */
+function resolvesToGuest(argument: unknown, guest: object): boolean {
+  return argument === guest || (typeof argument === 'function' && argument() === guest)
+}
+
+const GUEST_RECEIVING_MOCKS = [
+  setGrabModeMock,
+  awaitGrabSelectionMock,
+  captureSelectionScreenshotMock,
+  extractHoverPayloadMock,
+  setAnnotationViewportBridgeMock
+]
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  vi.stubEnv('ELECTRON_RENDERER_URL', '')
+  // Why before clearing: revoking the previous test's grants disposes their page state through the
+  // mocked manager, and those calls belong to that test, not this one.
+  revokeAllDocPreviewGrants()
+  vi.clearAllMocks()
+  // Why the mocked manager still answers for documents: this file's subject is which channels may
+  // reach a document guest, not how the manager splits its registry — that lives in
+  // browser-manager-guest-policy-profile.test.ts, against the real manager.
+  getAuthorizedGuestMock.mockImplementation((browserPageId: string, senderWebContentsId: number) =>
+    getWorkspaceDocPageGuest(browserPageId, senderWebContentsId)
+  )
+  setGrabModeMock.mockResolvedValue(true)
+  awaitGrabSelectionMock.mockResolvedValue({ opId: 'op-1', kind: 'cancelled' })
+  captureSelectionScreenshotMock.mockResolvedValue(null)
+  extractHoverPayloadMock.mockResolvedValue(null)
+  setAnnotationViewportBridgeMock.mockResolvedValue(true)
+  registerBrowserHandlers()
+  // Why fake timers for the whole file: a tool asking for a page whose guest has not attached parks
+  // in the registration wait, and several cases here are exactly the ones that never attach. Real
+  // time would spend that wait for each of them.
+  vi.useFakeTimers()
+})
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  vi.useRealTimers()
+})
+
+/** Settles a tool request, elapsing the registration wait it may be parked in. */
+async function settle<T>(pending: Promise<T> | T | undefined): Promise<T | undefined> {
+  await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(GRAB_REGISTRATION_WAIT_MS)
+  return pending
+}
+
+describe('doc preview tool authorization', () => {
+  it('classifies every registered browser channel as a tool or a browser-page channel', () => {
+    const registered = [...registeredHandlers().keys()].sort()
+    const classified = [...TOOL_CHANNELS, ...BROWSER_PAGE_CHANNELS].sort()
+
+    expect(registered).toEqual(classified)
+  })
+
+  it.each(TOOL_CHANNELS)('drives the preview guest from %s', async (channel) => {
+    const preview = liveRenderedPreview()
+    const handler = registeredHandlers().get(channel)
+
+    await handler?.(trustedSender(HOST_RENDERER_ID), toolArgs(channel, preview.browserPageId))
+
+    // Why assert on the guest and not on a return value: the whole point of the seam is which
+    // WebContents the tool ends up acting on.
+    const receivedGuest = GUEST_RECEIVING_MOCKS.some((mock) =>
+      mock.mock.calls.some((args) => args.some((arg) => resolvesToGuest(arg, preview.contents)))
+    )
+    expect(receivedGuest || cancelGrabOpMock.mock.calls.length > 0).toBe(true)
+  })
+
+  // The load-bearing containment claim: page and session management never reads the document half
+  // of the registry, so a document page can never be resolved as, or managed like, a browsing one.
+  // Nothing here is a per-channel guard — a document guest is simply not in the map these read.
+  it.each(BROWSER_PAGE_CHANNELS)('never reads the document registry from %s', async (channel) => {
+    const preview = liveRenderedPreview()
+    const handler = registeredHandlers().get(channel)
+
+    try {
+      await handler?.(trustedSender(HOST_RENDERER_ID), {
+        browserPageId: preview.browserPageId,
+        profileId: preview.browserPageId,
+        environmentId: preview.browserPageId
+      })
+    } catch {
+      // A malformed-for-this-channel payload may throw; the claim is about which registry was read.
+    }
+
+    expect(previewAuthoritySpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it.each(TOOL_CHANNELS)(
+    'refuses %s from a renderer that does not host the preview',
+    async (channel) => {
+      const preview = liveRenderedPreview()
+      const handler = registeredHandlers().get(channel)
+
+      await settle(
+        handler?.(trustedSender(OTHER_RENDERER_ID), toolArgs(channel, preview.browserPageId))
+      )
+
+      for (const mock of [...GUEST_RECEIVING_MOCKS, cancelGrabOpMock]) {
+        expect(mock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+      }
+    }
+  )
+
+  it.each(TOOL_CHANNELS)('refuses %s for a page no preview rendered', async (channel) => {
+    const handler = registeredHandlers().get(channel)
+
+    await settle(
+      handler?.(trustedSender(HOST_RENDERER_ID), toolArgs(channel, 'doc-page-unrendered'))
+    )
+
+    for (const mock of [...GUEST_RECEIVING_MOCKS, cancelGrabOpMock]) {
+      expect(mock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    }
+  })
+
+  // Why the contents check has to be its own condition: the grant is still live and the sender is
+  // still the host, so nothing else in the authority notices that the guest is gone.
+  it.each(TOOL_CHANNELS)('refuses %s once the preview contents are destroyed', async (channel) => {
+    const preview = liveRenderedPreview()
+    preview.markContentsDestroyed()
+    const handler = registeredHandlers().get(channel)
+
+    await settle(
+      handler?.(trustedSender(HOST_RENDERER_ID), toolArgs(channel, preview.browserPageId))
+    )
+
+    for (const mock of [...GUEST_RECEIVING_MOCKS, cancelGrabOpMock]) {
+      expect(mock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    }
+  })
+
+  // Why this inverts what the split registries used to assert: a document page now registers under
+  // its own id, so the wait is reachable and useful — a tool opened while the guest is still
+  // attaching parks here instead of answering not-ready at the reader.
+  it('waits for a document page whose guest has not attached yet, and arms when it does', async () => {
+    const grant = grantForNewDocPage()
+    const handler = registeredHandlers().get('browser:setGrabMode')
+
+    const pending = handler?.(trustedSender(HOST_RENDERER_ID), {
+      browserPageId: grant.browserPageId,
+      enabled: true
+    })
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0)
+    expect(registrationWaitSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith(grant.browserPageId)
+
+    const preview = renderPreviewForGrant(grant)
+
+    await expect(pending).resolves.toEqual({ ok: true })
+    expect(setGrabModeMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(grant.browserPageId, true, preview.contents)
+  })
+
+  // The absence half, with the same presence precondition: a page nothing ever renders still gives
+  // the reader an answer rather than hanging on the full timeout.
+  it('answers not-ready once the wait for an unrendered page elapses', async () => {
+    const handler = registeredHandlers().get('browser:setGrabMode')
+
+    await expect(
+      settle(
+        handler?.(trustedSender(HOST_RENDERER_ID), {
+          browserPageId: 'doc-page-never-rendered',
+          enabled: true
+        })
+      )
+    ).resolves.toEqual({ ok: false, reason: 'not-ready' })
+  })
+
+  it('still waits for a browser page whose registration may be in flight', async () => {
+    const handler = registeredHandlers().get('browser:setGrabMode')
+
+    await settle(
+      handler?.(trustedSender(HOST_RENDERER_ID), {
+        browserPageId: 'browser-page-1',
+        enabled: true
+      })
+    )
+
+    expect(registrationWaitSpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith('browser-page-1')
+  })
+
+  // Why the grant and not the guest: a preview withdraws by revoking, which is also what a
+  // re-mint does, and nothing else tells main that this tool target will never be used again.
+  it('disposes the grab state a preview target accumulated when its grant is revoked', async () => {
+    const preview = liveRenderedPreview()
+    const handler = registeredHandlers().get('browser:setGrabMode')
+    await handler?.(trustedSender(HOST_RENDERER_ID), {
+      browserPageId: preview.browserPageId,
+      enabled: true
+    })
+    cancelGrabOpMock.mockClear()
+
+    revokeDocPreviewGrant(preview.grantId)
+
+    expect(cancelGrabOpMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(preview.browserPageId, 'evicted')
+  })
+
+  // Why both halves of this door: the manager refuses a preview id on its own, but the grab
+  // disposal beside it takes a renderer-supplied id, and the intent it drops is compared by
+  // identity — dropping it makes the grab settle ok without ever arming the guest.
+  it('leaves an in-flight preview grab armed when unregisterGuest names its target', async () => {
+    const preview = liveRenderedPreview()
+    const handlers = registeredHandlers()
+    const pending = handlers.get('browser:setGrabMode')?.(trustedSender(HOST_RENDERER_ID), {
+      browserPageId: preview.browserPageId,
+      enabled: true
+    })
+
+    // Why synchronously here: the intent is recorded before the queued operation runs, so this is
+    // the exact window in which a disposal at this door would be invisible to the caller.
+    const unregistered = handlers.get('browser:unregisterGuest')?.(
+      trustedSender(HOST_RENDERER_ID),
+      { browserPageId: preview.browserPageId }
+    )
+
+    // Why the guest and not the result: a dropped intent settles as ok either way, so only the
+    // guest actually being driven separates an armed grab from a silent no-op.
+    await expect(pending).resolves.toEqual({ ok: true })
+    expect(setGrabModeMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(preview.browserPageId, true, preview.contents)
+    expect(unregistered).toBe(false)
+    expect(vi.mocked(browserManager.unregisterGuest)).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  // The converse, so the guard above cannot be widened into a door that stops closing tabs.
+  it('still disposes a browser page grab through the same door', async () => {
+    getAuthorizedGuestMock.mockReturnValue({ isDestroyed: () => false })
+    const handlers = registeredHandlers()
+    const pending = handlers.get('browser:setGrabMode')?.(trustedSender(HOST_RENDERER_ID), {
+      browserPageId: 'browser-page-1',
+      enabled: true
+    })
+
+    const unregistered = handlers.get('browser:unregisterGuest')?.(
+      trustedSender(HOST_RENDERER_ID),
+      { browserPageId: 'browser-page-1' }
+    )
+
+    expect(unregistered).toBe(true)
+    await expect(pending).resolves.toEqual({ ok: true })
+    expect(setGrabModeMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    expect(vi.mocked(browserManager.unregisterGuest)).toHaveBeenCalledWith('browser-page-1')
+  })
+
+  // Why with a live preview standing beside it: the halves are looked up in one door now, so the
+  // thing to prove is that a browsing id is not answered by whatever document happens to be open.
+  it('never hands a browsing page id the guest of a document that is open', async () => {
+    const preview = liveRenderedPreview()
+    const handler = registeredHandlers().get('browser:extractHoverPayload')
+
+    await handler?.(trustedSender(HOST_RENDERER_ID), { browserPageId: 'browser-page-1' })
+
+    expect(getAuthorizedGuestMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('browser-page-1', HOST_RENDERER_ID)
+    expect(previewAuthoritySpy).toHaveBeenCalledWith('browser-page-1', HOST_RENDERER_ID)
+    expect(extractHoverPayloadMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    // The presence half: the same channel does reach that guest under the page it really renders.
+    await handler?.(trustedSender(HOST_RENDERER_ID), { browserPageId: preview.browserPageId })
+    expect(extractHoverPayloadMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(preview.browserPageId, preview.contents)
+  })
+})

src/main/ipc/browser-tab-registration-wait.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
+
+const mocks = vi.hoisted(() => ({
+  getWebContentsIdByTabId: vi.fn(() => new Map<string, number>()),
+  getWorktreeIdForTab: vi.fn(() => undefined as string | undefined),
+  getGuestWebContentsId: vi.fn(() => null as number | null),
+  webContentsFromId: vi.fn(() => null as unknown)
+}))
+
+vi.mock('electron', () => ({ webContents: { fromId: mocks.webContentsFromId } }))
+vi.mock('../browser/browser-manager', () => ({
+  browserManager: {
+    getWebContentsIdByTabId: mocks.getWebContentsIdByTabId,
+    getWorktreeIdForTab: mocks.getWorktreeIdForTab,
+    getGuestWebContentsId: mocks.getGuestWebContentsId
+  }
+}))
+
+import {
+  waitForAnyTabRegistration,
+  waitForNextTabRegistration,
+  waitForWorktreeTabRegistration
+} from './browser-tab-registration-wait'
+import { installDocPreviewGuestPolicy } from '../browser/doc-preview-guest-policy'
+import {
+  mintDocPreviewGrant,
+  revokeAllDocPreviewGrants
+} from '../browser/doc-preview-grant-registry'
+import { buildDocPreviewUrl } from '../../shared/doc-preview-scheme'
+
+const WAIT_MS = 1_000
+
+/** Registers a document guest the way the attach door does, which is what notifies the waiters. */
+function attachDocumentGuest(browserPageId: string): void {
+  const grant = mintDocPreviewGrant({
+    owner: { kind: 'ssh', connectionId: 'ssh-1' },
+    root: '/home/alice/docs',
+    entryRelativePath: 'index.html',
+    browserPageId
+  })
+  const guest = {
+    isFocused: () => false,
+    isDestroyed: () => false,
+    getURL: () => buildDocPreviewUrl(grant.id, grant.entryRelativePath),
+    on: vi.fn(),
+    once: vi.fn(),
+    setWindowOpenHandler: vi.fn(),
+    setWebRTCIPHandlingPolicy: vi.fn()
+  }
+  installDocPreviewGuestPolicy(guest as never, { id: 91, send: vi.fn() })
+}
+
+/** Whether a wait has settled, without letting its rejection escape as an unhandled one. */
+function track(pending: Promise<void>): () => 'pending' | 'resolved' | 'rejected' {
+  let state: 'pending' | 'resolved' | 'rejected' = 'pending'
+  pending.then(
+    () => {
+      state = 'resolved'
+    },
+    () => {
+      state = 'rejected'
+    }
+  )
+  return () => state
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  revokeAllDocPreviewGrants()
+  vi.clearAllMocks()
+  mocks.getWebContentsIdByTabId.mockReturnValue(new Map())
+  mocks.getGuestWebContentsId.mockReturnValue(null)
+  vi.useFakeTimers()
+})
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  vi.useRealTimers()
+})
+
+describe('a workspace document registering', () => {
+  it('settles a wait that already names its page', async () => {
+    const settled = track(waitForNextTabRegistration('doc-page-1', WAIT_MS))
+
+    attachDocumentGuest('doc-page-1')
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0)
+
+    expect(settled()).toBe('resolved')
+  })
+
+  // Why these two stay pending: they are how the CLI and agents ask for a browser tab to drive, and
+  // a preview is neither drivable by them nor visible to them. Satisfying either would hand the
+  // caller a surface that answers nothing, instead of letting it keep waiting for a real tab.
+  it('leaves the waits that ask for any browser tab still waiting', async () => {
+    const worktreeWait = track(waitForWorktreeTabRegistration('wt-1', WAIT_MS))
+    const anyWait = track(waitForAnyTabRegistration(WAIT_MS))
+
+    attachDocumentGuest('doc-page-2')
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(0)
+
+    expect(worktreeWait()).toBe('pending')
+    expect(anyWait()).toBe('pending')
+
+    // The presence half: those waits do settle, so a mutant that never resolves them would pass the
+    // assertions above by being uniformly stuck.
+    await vi.advanceTimersByTimeAsync(WAIT_MS)
+    expect(worktreeWait()).toBe('rejected')
+    expect(anyWait()).toBe('rejected')
+  })
+})

src/main/ipc/browser-tab-registration-wait.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import { webContents } from 'electron'
 import { browserManager } from '../browser/browser-manager'
+import { onWorkspaceDocGuestRegistered } from '../browser/doc-preview-guest-policy'
 
 // Why: CLI-driven tab creation must wait until the renderer mounts the webview
 // and calls registerGuest, so the tab has a webContentsId and is operable by
@@ -109,6 +110,18 @@ export function waitForAnyTabRegistration(timeoutMs = 8_000): Promise<void> {
   return waitForRegistrationSet(pendingAnyTabRegistrations, timeoutMs, () => {})
 }
 
+/**
+ * Why a document page resolves only its own waiters: the worktree-wide and any-tab waits are how
+ * the CLI and agents ask for a browser tab to drive, and a preview is neither drivable by them nor
+ * visible to them. Only a request already naming this page — a tool the reader opened on the
+ * document — is waiting for this.
+ */
+onWorkspaceDocGuestRegistered((browserPageId) => {
+  const pendingResolves = pendingTabRegistrations.get(browserPageId)
+  pendingTabRegistrations.delete(browserPageId)
+  resolvePendingRegistrations(pendingResolves)
+})
+
 export function resolveTabRegistrationWaiters(browserPageId: string, worktreeId: string): void {
   const pendingResolves = pendingTabRegistrations.get(browserPageId)
   pendingTabRegistrations.delete(browserPageId)

src/main/ipc/browser.test.ts

@@ -794,6 +794,8 @@ describe('registerBrowserHandlers', () => {
 
   it('validates annotation viewport bridge requests before syncing to the guest', async () => {
     registerBrowserHandlers()
+    const guest = { isDestroyed: () => false } as Electron.WebContents
+    getAuthorizedGuestMock.mockReturnValue(guest)
 
     const syncHandler = handleMock.mock.calls.find(
       ([channel]) => channel === 'browser:setAnnotationViewportBridge'
@@ -818,12 +820,52 @@ describe('registerBrowserHandlers', () => {
     )
 
     expect(result).toBe(true)
-    expect(setAnnotationViewportBridgeMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('page-1', {
-      emitViewport: false,
-      enabled: true,
-      markers: [],
-      token: 'annotationviewporttoken'
-    })
+    expect(setAnnotationViewportBridgeMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      'page-1',
+      {
+        emitViewport: false,
+        enabled: true,
+        markers: [],
+        token: 'annotationviewporttoken'
+      },
+      // Why a resolver and not the guest: the op is serialized per page, so it has to read the
+      // registry when it runs — a navigation while it waited may have swapped the contents.
+      // Which guest it then resolves is pinned in browser-manager-annotation-bridge.test.ts.
+      expect.any(Function)
+    )
+  })
+
+  // Why this is new: the channel used to hand a page id straight to the manager, so any trusted
+  // renderer could drive any page's guest. It now resolves through the same authority the grab
+  // channels use, which pins the request to the renderer that registered the page.
+  it('refuses an annotation viewport bridge request from a renderer that does not own the page', async () => {
+    registerBrowserHandlers()
+    getAuthorizedGuestMock.mockReturnValue(null)
+
+    const syncHandler = handleMock.mock.calls.find(
+      ([channel]) => channel === 'browser:setAnnotationViewportBridge'
+    )?.[1] as (event: { sender: Electron.WebContents }, args: unknown) => Promise<boolean> | boolean
+
+    const result = await syncHandler(
+      {
+        sender: {
+          id: 91,
+          isDestroyed: () => false,
+          getType: () => 'window',
+          getURL: () => 'file:///renderer/index.html'
+        } as Electron.WebContents
+      },
+      {
+        browserPageId: 'page-1',
+        emitViewport: false,
+        enabled: true,
+        markers: [],
+        token: 'annotationviewporttoken'
+      }
+    )
+
+    expect(result).toBe(false)
+    expect(setAnnotationViewportBridgeMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
   })
 
   it('rejects invalid annotation viewport bridge requests', async () => {

src/main/ipc/browser.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { ipcMain, webContents } from 'electron'
 import { browserCertificateTrustController, browserManager } from '../browser/browser-manager'
 import type { AgentBrowserBridge } from '../browser/agent-browser-bridge'
 import { browserSessionRegistry } from '../browser/browser-session-registry'
+import { isWorkspaceDocPageId } from '../browser/doc-preview-guest-policy'
 import { isTrustedBrowserRenderer } from './browser-renderer-trust'
 import {
   isLiveBrowserWebContentsId,
@@ -160,6 +161,13 @@ export function registerBrowserHandlers(): void {
     if (!isTrustedBrowserRenderer(event.sender)) {
       return false
     }
+    // Why the whole door and not just the manager call: a document page shares this renderer, and
+    // the grab disposal below drops the intent an in-flight preview grab compares by identity —
+    // that grab would then answer ok without ever arming. A document page withdraws by revoking
+    // its grant, so its id arriving here is misaddressed however it got here.
+    if (typeof args?.browserPageId !== 'string' || isWorkspaceDocPageId(args.browserPageId)) {
+      return false
+    }
     // Why: notify bridge before unregistering so it can destroy the session
     // process and proxy. Must happen before unregisterGuest clears the mapping.
     const wcId = browserManager.getGuestWebContentsId(args.browserPageId)

src/main/ipc/doc-preview-grant-ipc.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
+
+const mocks = vi.hoisted(() => ({
+  handlers: new Map<string, (event: unknown, ...args: unknown[]) => unknown>(),
+  listeners: new Map<string, (event: unknown, ...args: unknown[]) => unknown>(),
+  isTrustedBrowserRenderer: vi.fn(),
+  reportDocPreviewLinkClick: vi.fn(),
+  getGuestWebContentsId: vi.fn()
+}))
+
+vi.mock('electron', () => ({
+  ipcMain: {
+    handle: (channel: string, handler: (event: unknown, ...args: unknown[]) => unknown) => {
+      mocks.handlers.set(channel, handler)
+    },
+    on: (channel: string, listener: (event: unknown, ...args: unknown[]) => unknown) => {
+      mocks.listeners.set(channel, listener)
+    }
+  }
+}))
+vi.mock('./browser-renderer-trust', () => ({
+  isTrustedBrowserRenderer: mocks.isTrustedBrowserRenderer
+}))
+vi.mock('../browser/doc-preview-guest-policy', () => ({
+  reportDocPreviewLinkClick: mocks.reportDocPreviewLinkClick
+}))
+vi.mock('../browser/browser-manager', () => ({
+  browserManager: { getGuestWebContentsId: mocks.getGuestWebContentsId }
+}))
+
+import {
+  registerDocPreviewGrantHandlers,
+  type DocPreviewGrantRequest
+} from './doc-preview-grant-ipc'
+import {
+  getDocPreviewGrant,
+  revokeAllDocPreviewGrants
+} from '../browser/doc-preview-grant-registry'
+import {
+  DOC_PREVIEW_LINK_CLICK_CHANNEL,
+  DOC_PREVIEW_MINT_GRANT_CHANNEL,
+  DOC_PREVIEW_REVOKE_GRANT_CHANNEL,
+  parseDocPreviewUrl
+} from '../../shared/doc-preview-scheme'
+
+const REQUEST: DocPreviewGrantRequest = {
+  owner: { kind: 'ssh', connectionId: 'ssh-1' },
+  root: '/home/alice/docs',
+  entryRelativePath: 'index.html',
+  browserPageId: 'doc-page-1'
+}
+
+const sender = { id: 7 }
+
+function mint(request: DocPreviewGrantRequest = REQUEST): { grantId: string; url: string } {
+  const handler = mocks.handlers.get(DOC_PREVIEW_MINT_GRANT_CHANNEL)
+  if (!handler) {
+    throw new Error('mint handler not registered')
+  }
+  return handler({ sender }, request) as { grantId: string; url: string }
+}
+
+function revoke(grantId: string): boolean {
+  const handler = mocks.handlers.get(DOC_PREVIEW_REVOKE_GRANT_CHANNEL)
+  if (!handler) {
+    throw new Error('revoke handler not registered')
+  }
+  return handler({ sender }, grantId) as boolean
+}
+
+function reportLinkClick(url: unknown): void {
+  const listener = mocks.listeners.get(DOC_PREVIEW_LINK_CLICK_CHANNEL)
+  if (!listener) {
+    throw new Error('link click listener not registered')
+  }
+  listener({ sender }, url)
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  mocks.handlers.clear()
+  mocks.listeners.clear()
+  vi.clearAllMocks()
+  revokeAllDocPreviewGrants()
+  mocks.isTrustedBrowserRenderer.mockReturnValue(true)
+  mocks.getGuestWebContentsId.mockReturnValue(null)
+  registerDocPreviewGrantHandlers()
+})
+
+describe('document preview grant handlers', () => {
+  it('mints a grant addressable by the URL it returns', () => {
+    const result = mint()
+
+    expect(parseDocPreviewUrl(result.url)).toEqual({
+      grantId: result.grantId,
+      relativePath: 'index.html'
+    })
+    expect(getDocPreviewGrant(result.grantId)?.root).toBe('/home/alice/docs')
+    expect(mocks.isTrustedBrowserRenderer).toHaveBeenCalledWith(sender)
+  })
+
+  it('revokes a grant it minted', () => {
+    const result = mint()
+
+    expect(revoke(result.grantId)).toBe(true)
+    expect(getDocPreviewGrant(result.grantId)).toBeNull()
+  })
+
+  it('rejects a request that names no root, entry document or page', () => {
+    expect(() => mint({ ...REQUEST, root: '  ' })).toThrow(/Invalid/)
+    expect(() => mint({ ...REQUEST, entryRelativePath: '' })).toThrow(/Invalid/)
+    expect(() => mint({ ...REQUEST, browserPageId: ' ' })).toThrow(/Invalid/)
+  })
+
+  // Why this is refused here and not left to registration: this is where a page becomes a document
+  // page, and the two halves of the page registry have to stay disjoint. A page already hosting a
+  // browsing guest would otherwise resolve in both, and the tool door prefers the document one.
+  it('refuses to make a page that already hosts a browsing guest into a document page', () => {
+    mocks.getGuestWebContentsId.mockReturnValue(42)
+
+    expect(() => mint()).toThrow(/browsing page/)
+    expect(mocks.getGuestWebContentsId).toHaveBeenCalledWith('doc-page-1')
+  })
+
+  // Why: this channel hands out filesystem-read authority, so an untrusted sender must leave with
+  // nothing rather than with a grant id the scheme handler would honor.
+  it('mints nothing for a sender that is not the trusted renderer', () => {
+    mocks.isTrustedBrowserRenderer.mockReturnValue(false)
+
+    expect(() => mint()).toThrow(/Untrusted/)
+  })
+
+  it('refuses to revoke on behalf of a sender that is not the trusted renderer', () => {
+    const result = mint()
+    mocks.isTrustedBrowserRenderer.mockReturnValue(false)
+
+    expect(revoke(result.grantId)).toBe(false)
+    expect(getDocPreviewGrant(result.grantId)).not.toBeNull()
+  })
+
+  // Why this channel skips the trusted-renderer check: its sender is a preview guest rendering a
+  // workspace document, which is the untrusted side by construction. The guest policy holds the
+  // gate, so all this listener owes is the sender and a string.
+  it('hands a reported link click to the guest policy with the sender that reported it', () => {
+    reportLinkClick('https://example.com/docs')
+
+    expect(mocks.reportDocPreviewLinkClick).toHaveBeenCalledExactlyOnceWith(
+      sender,
+      'https://example.com/docs'
+    )
+    expect(mocks.isTrustedBrowserRenderer).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('ignores a reported click that is not a string at all', () => {
+    reportLinkClick({ url: 'https://example.com/docs' })
+    reportLinkClick(undefined)
+
+    expect(mocks.reportDocPreviewLinkClick).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+})

src/main/ipc/doc-preview-grant-ipc.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+import { ipcMain } from 'electron'
+import {
+  buildDocPreviewUrl,
+  DOC_PREVIEW_LINK_CLICK_CHANNEL,
+  DOC_PREVIEW_MINT_GRANT_CHANNEL,
+  DOC_PREVIEW_REVOKE_GRANT_CHANNEL
+} from '../../shared/doc-preview-scheme'
+import { browserManager } from '../browser/browser-manager'
+import { reportDocPreviewLinkClick } from '../browser/doc-preview-guest-policy'
+import {
+  mintDocPreviewGrant,
+  revokeDocPreviewGrant,
+  type DocPreviewOwner
+} from '../browser/doc-preview-grant-registry'
+import { isTrustedBrowserRenderer } from './browser-renderer-trust'
+
+export type DocPreviewGrantRequest = {
+  owner: DocPreviewOwner
+  /** Containing directory of the opened document, on the owning host. */
+  root: string
+  /** Opened document, relative to `root`. */
+  entryRelativePath: string
+  /** Browser page the reader is opening the document in; main registers the guest under it. */
+  browserPageId: string
+}
+
+export type DocPreviewGrantResult = { grantId: string; url: string }
+
+function isValidGrantRequest(request: DocPreviewGrantRequest): boolean {
+  if (!request.root.trim() || !request.entryRelativePath.trim()) {
+    return false
+  }
+  if (typeof request.browserPageId !== 'string' || !request.browserPageId.trim()) {
+    return false
+  }
+  if (request.owner.kind === 'ssh') {
+    return Boolean(request.owner.connectionId.trim())
+  }
+  return Boolean(
+    request.owner.environmentId.trim() &&
+    request.owner.worktreeSelector.trim() &&
+    request.owner.worktreeRoot.trim()
+  )
+}
+
+/**
+ * Minting never widens what the renderer can already read: an SSH grant reads
+ * through the same provider as `fs:readFile`, and a runtime grant through the
+ * same worktree-scoped `files.read` RPC the renderer can call directly.
+ */
+export function registerDocPreviewGrantHandlers(): void {
+  ipcMain.handle(
+    DOC_PREVIEW_MINT_GRANT_CHANNEL,
+    (event, request: DocPreviewGrantRequest): DocPreviewGrantResult => {
+      // Why gate a channel guests cannot reach today: this one hands out filesystem-read
+      // authority, so it holds the same sender check its sibling browser channels do rather than
+      // relying on guests never gaining an ipcRenderer.
+      if (!isTrustedBrowserRenderer(event.sender)) {
+        throw new Error('Untrusted document preview grant request')
+      }
+      if (!isValidGrantRequest(request)) {
+        throw new Error('Invalid document preview grant request')
+      }
+      // Why the other half of the registry is consulted here: this is where a page first becomes a
+      // document page, and the two halves must stay disjoint. Naming a page that already hosts a
+      // browsing guest would make one id resolve in both.
+      if (browserManager.getGuestWebContentsId(request.browserPageId) !== null) {
+        throw new Error('Document preview grant names a browsing page')
+      }
+      const grant = mintDocPreviewGrant({
+        owner: request.owner,
+        root: request.root,
+        entryRelativePath: request.entryRelativePath,
+        browserPageId: request.browserPageId
+      })
+      return {
+        grantId: grant.id,
+        url: buildDocPreviewUrl(grant.id, grant.entryRelativePath)
+      }
+    }
+  )
+
+  ipcMain.handle(DOC_PREVIEW_REVOKE_GRANT_CHANNEL, (event, grantId: string): boolean =>
+    isTrustedBrowserRenderer(event.sender) ? revokeDocPreviewGrant(grantId) : false
+  )
+
+  // Why no trusted-renderer check here: the sender is a preview guest rendering a workspace
+  // document, which is exactly the untrusted side. `reportDocPreviewLinkClick` is the gate — a
+  // live bound grant, a focused guest, a web URL — and it drops everything else silently.
+  ipcMain.on(DOC_PREVIEW_LINK_CLICK_CHANNEL, (event, url: unknown) => {
+    if (typeof url === 'string') {
+      reportDocPreviewLinkClick(event.sender, url)
+    }
+  })
+}

src/main/ipc/pty-spawn-env-terminal-basics.test.ts

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import { LocalPtyProvider } from '../providers/local-pty-provider'
 import { __resetPersistedWindowsPathCacheForTests } from '../pty/windows-environment-path'
 import { __setWindowsPathRegistryLoaderForTests } from '../pty/windows-path-registry-reader'
 import { hasLiveClaudePtys, markClaudePtySpawned } from '../claude-accounts/live-pty-gate'
+import { wslHookRelayManager } from '../agent-hooks/wsl-hook-relay-manager'
 import { registerPtyHandlers, buildPtyHostEnv, clearProviderPtyState } from './pty'
 
 vi.mock('electron', () => import('./pty-ipc-mock-registry').then((m) => m.electronModuleMock()))
@@ -57,6 +58,32 @@ describe('registerPtyHandlers', () => {
   const { handlers, mainWindow, spawnAndGetEnv, withBundledCli } = setupPtyIpcSuite()
 
   describe('spawn environment', () => {
+    it('passes the PTY-resolved Codex home to the WSL relay lane', () => {
+      const runtimeHome =
+        '\\\\wsl.localhost\\Ubuntu\\home\\jin\\.local\\share\\orca\\codex-runtime-home\\home'
+      const ensureForDistro = vi
+        .spyOn(wslHookRelayManager, 'ensureForDistro')
+        .mockImplementation(() => {})
+
+      try {
+        buildPtyHostEnv(
+          'pty-wsl',
+          {},
+          {
+            isPackaged: true,
+            userDataPath: '/tmp/orca-user-data',
+            selectedCodexHomePath: runtimeHome,
+            isWsl: true,
+            wslDistro: 'Ubuntu',
+            agentStatusHooksEnabled: true
+          }
+        )
+        expect(ensureForDistro).toHaveBeenCalledExactlyOnceWith('Ubuntu', runtimeHome)
+      } finally {
+        ensureForDistro.mockRestore()
+      }
+    })
+
     it('refreshes the outer Windows PATH for a WSL spawn without forwarding it', async () => {
       const originalPlatform = process.platform
       Object.defineProperty(process, 'platform', { configurable: true, value: 'win32' })

src/main/ipc/pty/host-env/assembly.ts

@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ export function buildPtyHostEnv(
     if (opts.isWsl === true) {
       // Why: hook POSTs to 127.0.0.1 die inside WSL's NAT namespace; use the guest-resident relay's endpoint instead of the Windows one.
       const distro = opts.wslDistro ?? null
-      wslHookRelayManager.ensureForDistro(distro)
+      wslHookRelayManager.ensureForDistro(distro, opts.selectedCodexHomePath)
       const guestEndpoint = wslHookRelayManager.getGuestEndpointFilePath(distro)
       if (guestEndpoint) {
         baseEnv.ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_ENDPOINT = guestEndpoint

src/main/ipc/pty/host-env/spawn-env-keys.ts

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ export const AGENT_HOOK_RUNTIME_ENV_KEYS = [
   'ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TOKEN',
   'ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_ENV',
   'ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_VERSION',
+  'ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TRANSPORT',
   'ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_ENDPOINT',
   // Why: PR 2778 briefly exported this path; keep deleting stale inherited values so older PTYs can't leak the reverted path.
   'ORCA_CLAUDE_AGENT_STATUS_SETTINGS'

src/main/macos-press-and-hold-default.defaults-domain.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process'
+import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto'
+import { chmodSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs'
+import { homedir, tmpdir } from 'node:os'
+import { join } from 'node:path'
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
+import { runProcessSync } from '../shared/child-process/run-process'
+import {
+  PRESS_AND_HOLD_KEY,
+  ensureMacPressAndHoldDefault,
+  interpretDefaultsRead,
+  readDomainPressAndHoldPreference,
+  writeDomainPressAndHoldPreference,
+  type PressAndHoldHost,
+  type PressAndHoldRecord
+} from './macos-press-and-hold-default'
+
+/**
+ * Runs against the real `/usr/bin/defaults` on a throwaway Orca-owned domain.
+ *
+ * The whole design rests on one claim the mocks cannot make: a domain that has never been written
+ * is distinguishable from one explicitly set to `false`. Electron's `systemPreferences` cannot tell
+ * them apart, so if `defaults` could not either, "only write when unset" would be unimplementable.
+ *
+ * Every domain used here is a throwaway UUID under Orca's own prefix, deleted along with its plist
+ * in `afterEach`; the real `com.stablyai.orca` domain is never read or written.
+ */
+
+// Why a real Orca-owned domain shape: the ownership guard rejects anything else, so a fake prefix
+// would exercise a different branch than production.
+const domains: string[] = []
+
+/** Pinned against the real binary below, then reused by the platform-agnostic unit tests. */
+const DEFAULTS_MISSING_EXIT_CODE = 1
+
+function throwawayDomain(): string {
+  const domain = `com.stablyai.orca.defaults-domain-test.${randomUUID()}`
+  domains.push(domain)
+  return domain
+}
+
+function write(domain: string, value: 'true' | 'false'): void {
+  execFileSync('/usr/bin/defaults', ['write', domain, PRESS_AND_HOLD_KEY, '-bool', value], {
+    stdio: 'ignore'
+  })
+}
+
+function rawRead(domain: string): string {
+  return execFileSync('/usr/bin/defaults', ['read', domain, PRESS_AND_HOLD_KEY], {
+    encoding: 'utf8',
+    stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'ignore']
+  }).trim()
+}
+
+function hostFor(domain: string, record: PressAndHoldRecord | null = null): PressAndHoldHost {
+  return {
+    platform: 'darwin',
+    resolveBundleIdentifier: () => domain,
+    readRecord: () => record,
+    writeRecord: () => undefined,
+    readDomainPreference: readDomainPressAndHoldPreference,
+    writeDomainPreference: writeDomainPressAndHoldPreference,
+    now: () => new Date().toISOString()
+  }
+}
+
+describe.skipIf(process.platform !== 'darwin')(
+  'press-and-hold against the real defaults binary',
+  () => {
+    afterEach(() => {
+      for (const domain of domains.splice(0)) {
+        try {
+          execFileSync('/usr/bin/defaults', ['delete', domain], { stdio: 'ignore' })
+        } catch {
+          // The domain may never have been created; nothing to clean up.
+        }
+        // Why the file too: `defaults delete` empties the domain but leaves its plist behind, so
+        // without this every run litters the developer's ~/Library/Preferences.
+        rmSync(join(homedir(), 'Library', 'Preferences', `${domain}.plist`), { force: true })
+      }
+    })
+
+    it('tells an unset key apart from an explicit false', () => {
+      const unset = throwawayDomain()
+      const explicitlyFalse = throwawayDomain()
+      write(explicitlyFalse, 'false')
+
+      expect(readDomainPressAndHoldPreference(unset)).toBe('unset')
+      expect(readDomainPressAndHoldPreference(explicitlyFalse)).toBe('set')
+      expect(rawRead(explicitlyFalse)).toBe('0')
+    })
+
+    it('reports an explicit true as set', () => {
+      const domain = throwawayDomain()
+      write(domain, 'true')
+
+      expect(readDomainPressAndHoldPreference(domain)).toBe('set')
+      expect(rawRead(domain)).toBe('1')
+    })
+
+    it('writes false into a previously unset domain', () => {
+      const domain = throwawayDomain()
+
+      expect(ensureMacPressAndHoldDefault(hostFor(domain))).toBe('applied')
+      expect(rawRead(domain)).toBe('0')
+    })
+
+    it('leaves an explicit value untouched, in either direction', () => {
+      for (const value of ['true', 'false'] as const) {
+        const domain = throwawayDomain()
+        write(domain, value)
+
+        expect(ensureMacPressAndHoldDefault(hostFor(domain))).toBe('kept-user-preference')
+        expect(rawRead(domain)).toBe(value === 'true' ? '1' : '0')
+      }
+    })
+
+    it('refuses to call a failed probe "unset"', () => {
+      // Real runs, not hand-built results: a binary that is not there must come back 'unknown'
+      // through the same path production takes, not be mistaken for "the key does not exist".
+      const spawnFailure = (): ReturnType<typeof runProcessSync> =>
+        runProcessSync({
+          program: '/usr/bin/defaults-does-not-exist',
+          args: ['read'],
+          stdio: ['ignore', 'ignore', 'ignore']
+        })
+      expect(spawnFailure).toThrow()
+      expect(interpretDefaultsRead(spawnFailure)).toBe('unknown')
+
+      const missingKey = runProcessSync({
+        program: '/usr/bin/defaults',
+        args: ['read', throwawayDomain(), PRESS_AND_HOLD_KEY],
+        stdio: ['ignore', 'ignore', 'ignore']
+      })
+      // The one exit code the whole design reads as unset; every other outcome is 'unknown'.
+      expect(missingKey.code).toBe(DEFAULTS_MISSING_EXIT_CODE)
+      expect(missingKey.timedOut).toBe(false)
+      expect(interpretDefaultsRead(() => missingKey)).toBe('unset')
+    })
+
+    // Skipped as root, where the read-only directory below would still be writable.
+    it.skipIf(process.getuid?.() === 0)('reports a write the binary refused', () => {
+      // Why a real refusal: `defaults write` exits non-zero instead of throwing, so a caller that
+      // only caught exceptions would record 'applied' for a value that never reached the plist.
+      const readOnly = join(mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'orca-press-hold-ro-')), 'locked')
+      mkdirSync(readOnly)
+      chmodSync(readOnly, 0o500)
+      try {
+        expect(writeDomainPressAndHoldPreference(join(readOnly, 'domain'), false)).toBe(false)
+      } finally {
+        chmodSync(readOnly, 0o700)
+        rmSync(readOnly, { recursive: true, force: true })
+      }
+    })
+
+    it('sees the key disappear again after the user deletes it', () => {
+      const domain = throwawayDomain()
+      write(domain, 'false')
+      execFileSync('/usr/bin/defaults', ['delete', domain, PRESS_AND_HOLD_KEY], { stdio: 'ignore' })
+
+      expect(readDomainPressAndHoldPreference(domain)).toBe('unset')
+      // A launch that already decided must not rewrite it, which is what makes the delete stick.
+      const decided: PressAndHoldRecord = {
+        version: 1,
+        decision: 'applied',
+        domain,
+        decidedAt: '2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z'
+      }
+      expect(ensureMacPressAndHoldDefault(hostFor(domain, decided))).toBe('already-decided')
+      expect(readDomainPressAndHoldPreference(domain)).toBe('unset')
+    })
+  }
+)

src/main/macos-press-and-hold-default.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
+import { mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs'
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
+import { join } from 'node:path'
+import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
+import type { ProcessResult } from '../shared/child-process/run-process'
+import {
+  ensureMacPressAndHoldDefault,
+  interpretDefaultsRead,
+  isOrcaPreferencesDomain,
+  readBundleIdentifierFromExecutablePath,
+  type PressAndHoldDecision,
+  type PressAndHoldHost,
+  type PressAndHoldRecord
+} from './macos-press-and-hold-default'
+
+const ORCA_DOMAIN = 'com.stablyai.orca'
+
+type HostOverrides = Partial<PressAndHoldHost> & { record?: PressAndHoldRecord | null }
+
+/** A macOS host whose domain has no explicit value — the state every affected user is in. */
+function createHost(overrides: HostOverrides = {}): {
+  host: PressAndHoldHost
+  writes: { domain: string; value: boolean }[]
+  records: PressAndHoldRecord[]
+} {
+  const writes: { domain: string; value: boolean }[] = []
+  const records: PressAndHoldRecord[] = []
+  let stored = overrides.record ?? null
+  const host: PressAndHoldHost = {
+    platform: 'darwin',
+    resolveBundleIdentifier: () => ORCA_DOMAIN,
+    readRecord: () => stored,
+    writeRecord: (record) => {
+      stored = record
+      records.push(record)
+    },
+    readDomainPreference: () => 'unset',
+    writeDomainPreference: (domain, value) => {
+      writes.push({ domain, value })
+      return true
+    },
+    now: () => '2026-08-20T00:00:00.000Z',
+    ...overrides
+  }
+  return { host, writes, records }
+}
+
+function terminalRecord(decision: PressAndHoldDecision): PressAndHoldRecord {
+  return { version: 1, decision, domain: ORCA_DOMAIN, decidedAt: '2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z' }
+}
+
+describe('ensureMacPressAndHoldDefault', () => {
+  it('writes the opt-out when the domain has no explicit value', () => {
+    const { host, writes, records } = createHost()
+
+    expect(ensureMacPressAndHoldDefault(host)).toBe('applied')
+    expect(writes).toEqual([{ domain: ORCA_DOMAIN, value: false }])
+    expect(records.at(-1)?.decision).toBe('applied')
+  })
+
+  describe('platform guard', () => {
+    for (const platform of ['win32', 'linux'] as const) {
+      it(`does nothing at all on ${platform}`, () => {
+        const probe = vi.fn(() => 'unset' as const)
+        const readRecord = vi.fn(() => null)
+        const { host, writes, records } = createHost({
+          platform,
+          readDomainPreference: probe,
+          readRecord
+        })
+
+        expect(ensureMacPressAndHoldDefault(host)).toBe('not-macos')
+        // Why assert the reads too: "inert" means no `defaults` subprocess and no userData I/O,
+        // not merely no write.
+        expect(probe).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+        expect(readRecord).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+        expect(writes).toEqual([])
+        expect(records).toEqual([])
+      })
+    }
+  })
+
+  describe('respects an explicit user setting', () => {
+    it('leaves the domain alone when the user already set a value', () => {
+      // One arm covers both `true` and `false`: the probe deliberately reports only presence, so
+      // whichever way the user's value points it is theirs. That the probe really does report
+      // presence for both is pinned against the real binary in the .defaults-domain test.
+      const { host, writes, records } = createHost({ readDomainPreference: () => 'set' })
+
+      expect(ensureMacPressAndHoldDefault(host)).toBe('kept-user-preference')
+      expect(writes).toEqual([])
+      expect(records.at(-1)?.decision).toBe('kept-user-preference')
+    })
+
+    it('never re-applies after a launch already decided', () => {
+      for (const decision of ['applied', 'kept-user-preference'] as const) {
+        const probe = vi.fn(() => 'unset' as const)
+        const { host, writes } = createHost({
+          record: terminalRecord(decision),
+          readDomainPreference: probe
+        })
+
+        expect(ensureMacPressAndHoldDefault(host)).toBe('already-decided')
+        expect(probe).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+        expect(writes).toEqual([])
+      }
+    })
+
+    it('stays out of the way after the user deletes the key we wrote', () => {
+      // The documented way back to the accent picker is `defaults delete`, which returns the
+      // domain to "unset". Without the recorded decision the next launch would rewrite it.
+      const { host, writes } = createHost({
+        record: terminalRecord('applied'),
+        readDomainPreference: () => 'unset'
+      })
+
+      expect(ensureMacPressAndHoldDefault(host)).toBe('already-decided')
+      expect(writes).toEqual([])
+    })
+  })
+
+  describe('domains we do not own', () => {
+    it('skips a bare Electron bundle rather than writing into a shared domain', () => {
+      const probe = vi.fn(() => 'unset' as const)
+      const { host, writes, records } = createHost({
+        resolveBundleIdentifier: () => 'com.github.Electron',
+        readDomainPreference: probe
+      })
+
+      expect(ensureMacPressAndHoldDefault(host)).toBe('foreign-bundle')
+      expect(probe).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+      expect(writes).toEqual([])
+      expect(records.at(-1)?.domain).toBe('com.github.Electron')
+    })
+
+    it('skips when the bundle identifier cannot be resolved', () => {
+      const { host, writes } = createHost({ resolveBundleIdentifier: () => null })
+
+      expect(ensureMacPressAndHoldDefault(host)).toBe('foreign-bundle')
+      expect(writes).toEqual([])
+    })
+
+    it('accepts Orca and its channel-scoped bundles, and nothing else', () => {
+      expect(isOrcaPreferencesDomain('com.stablyai.orca')).toBe(true)
+      expect(isOrcaPreferencesDomain('com.stablyai.orca.dev')).toBe(true)
+      expect(isOrcaPreferencesDomain('com.github.Electron')).toBe(false)
+      // Why: a prefix test without the dot would accept a lookalike bundle id.
+      expect(isOrcaPreferencesDomain('com.stablyai.orcafake')).toBe(false)
+    })
+  })
+
+  describe('failures leave the decision open', () => {
+    it('does not write when the probe cannot tell unset from user-set', () => {
+      const { host, writes, records } = createHost({ readDomainPreference: () => 'unknown' })
+
+      expect(ensureMacPressAndHoldDefault(host)).toBe('probe-failed')
+      expect(writes).toEqual([])
+      expect(records.at(-1)?.decision).toBe('probe-failed')
+    })
+
+    it('retries on the next launch after a failed write', () => {
+      const { host, records } = createHost({ writeDomainPreference: () => false })
+      expect(ensureMacPressAndHoldDefault(host)).toBe('write-failed')
+
+      const retry = createHost({ record: records.at(-1) })
+      expect(ensureMacPressAndHoldDefault(retry.host)).toBe('applied')
+      expect(retry.writes).toEqual([{ domain: ORCA_DOMAIN, value: false }])
+    })
+  })
+
+  it('does not rewrite an unchanged non-terminal record', () => {
+    const first = createHost({ resolveBundleIdentifier: () => 'com.github.Electron' })
+    expect(ensureMacPressAndHoldDefault(first.host)).toBe('foreign-bundle')
+
+    const second = createHost({
+      record: first.records.at(-1),
+      resolveBundleIdentifier: () => 'com.github.Electron'
+    })
+    expect(ensureMacPressAndHoldDefault(second.host)).toBe('foreign-bundle')
+    expect(second.records).toEqual([])
+  })
+})
+
+/**
+ * Why here and not only in the .defaults-domain file: that file is macOS-only and CI has no macOS
+ * runner, so this three-way rule would otherwise be enforced nowhere in CI. These cases need no
+ * `defaults` binary — the sibling file pins that the real binary produces them.
+ */
+describe('interpretDefaultsRead', () => {
+  function probe(overrides: Partial<ProcessResult>): () => ProcessResult {
+    return () => ({ code: 0, signal: null, stdout: '', stderr: '', timedOut: false, ...overrides })
+  }
+
+  it('reads a clean exit as an explicit value', () => {
+    expect(interpretDefaultsRead(probe({ code: 0 }))).toBe('set')
+  })
+
+  it('reads only "does not exist" as unset', () => {
+    expect(interpretDefaultsRead(probe({ code: 1 }))).toBe('unset')
+  })
+
+  describe('refuses to call a failed probe unset', () => {
+    // Each of these would otherwise overwrite a value the user deliberately set.
+    const failures: [string, () => ProcessResult][] = [
+      ['killed before it exited', probe({ code: null, signal: 'SIGTERM' })],
+      ['timed out', probe({ code: null, timedOut: true })],
+      [
+        'timed out after somehow reporting the missing-key code',
+        probe({ code: 1, timedOut: true })
+      ],
+      ['exited with some other error', probe({ code: 2 })],
+      ['exited with a negative status', probe({ code: -1 })],
+      [
+        'never started at all',
+        () => {
+          throw Object.assign(new Error('spawn ENOENT'), { code: 'ENOENT' })
+        }
+      ]
+    ]
+    for (const [name, failing] of failures) {
+      it(name, () => {
+        expect(interpretDefaultsRead(failing)).toBe('unknown')
+      })
+    }
+  })
+})
+
+describe('readBundleIdentifierFromExecutablePath', () => {
+  const roots: string[] = []
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    for (const root of roots.splice(0)) {
+      rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true })
+    }
+  })
+
+  function bundleWithPlist(body: string): string {
+    const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'orca-press-hold-'))
+    roots.push(root)
+    mkdirSync(join(root, 'Orca.app', 'Contents', 'MacOS'), { recursive: true })
+    writeFileSync(join(root, 'Orca.app', 'Contents', 'Info.plist'), body)
+    return join(root, 'Orca.app', 'Contents', 'MacOS', 'Orca')
+  }
+
+  it('reads CFBundleIdentifier from the plist beside the executable', () => {
+    const exe = bundleWithPlist(
+      '<plist><dict>\n<key>CFBundleName</key>\n<string>Orca</string>\n' +
+        '<key>CFBundleIdentifier</key>\n\t<string>com.stablyai.orca</string>\n</dict></plist>'
+    )
+
+    expect(readBundleIdentifierFromExecutablePath(exe)).toBe('com.stablyai.orca')
+  })
+
+  it('returns null when the plist is missing or carries no identifier', () => {
+    expect(readBundleIdentifierFromExecutablePath('/nonexistent/App.app/Contents/MacOS/App')).toBe(
+      null
+    )
+    expect(readBundleIdentifierFromExecutablePath(bundleWithPlist('<plist><dict/></plist>'))).toBe(
+      null
+    )
+    expect(
+      readBundleIdentifierFromExecutablePath(
+        bundleWithPlist('<key>CFBundleIdentifier</key><string></string>')
+      )
+    ).toBe(null)
+  })
+})
+
+describe('startup wiring', () => {
+  const source = readFileSync(join(process.cwd(), 'src/main/index.ts'), 'utf8')
+
+  it('runs before app.whenReady(), which is the last point AppKit could still see it', () => {
+    const callIndex = source.indexOf(
+      'applyMacPressAndHoldDefaultAtStartup(getCanonicalUserDataPath())'
+    )
+    const initDataPathIndex = source.indexOf('initDataPath()')
+    const readyIndex = source.indexOf('app.whenReady().then(')
+
+    expect(callIndex).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0)
+    expect(readyIndex).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0)
+    // Why after initDataPath: the record lives beside orca-data.json, and the canonical userData
+    // path is only captured there.
+    expect(callIndex).toBeGreaterThan(initDataPathIndex)
+    expect(callIndex).toBeLessThan(readyIndex)
+  })
+})

src/main/macos-press-and-hold-default.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+import { mkdirSync, readFileSync } from 'node:fs'
+import { dirname, join } from 'node:path'
+import { runProcessSync, type ProcessResult } from '../shared/child-process/run-process'
+import { writeFileAtomically } from './codex-accounts/fs-utils'
+
+/**
+ * Turns off the macOS accent picker for Orca's own preferences domain (#14746).
+ *
+ * macOS routes press-and-hold to the accent popup unless an app opts out via
+ * `ApplePressAndHoldEnabled`, so holding `j` in vim inserts one character instead of repeating.
+ * The key is unset by default, which is why every terminal-hosting Mac app ships this opt-out.
+ *
+ * Written once and never again: a user who wants the accent picker back sets
+ * `defaults write com.stablyai.orca ApplePressAndHoldEnabled -bool true` (or deletes the key), and
+ * the recorded decision below keeps a later launch from overwriting that choice.
+ *
+ * A fresh write is assumed to land for the *next* launch, not the current one: it goes out through
+ * a separate `defaults` process, so this app's own cached copy may not observe it. Whether AppKit
+ * re-reads sooner is untested, so the conservative assumption is the one encoded here.
+ *
+ * If this is ever reverted, delete the key as well — AppKit reads the plist, not this file, so
+ * removing the code alone leaves press-and-hold disabled forever for everyone who ran an affected
+ * build, with nothing left in the tree to explain it.
+ *
+ * The `defaults`-binary behaviour this relies on is pinned by the sibling test file, which runs
+ * only on a developer Mac: CI has no macOS test runner, so those tests never execute there.
+ */
+
+export const PRESS_AND_HOLD_KEY = 'ApplePressAndHoldEnabled'
+export const PRESS_AND_HOLD_RECORD_FILE = 'macos-press-and-hold-default.json'
+export const PRESS_AND_HOLD_RECORD_VERSION = 1
+
+/** Why not `systemPreferences.getUserDefault`: it reads through the whole NSUserDefaults search
+ *  list and is typed non-nullable, so an unset key and an explicit `false` both come back `false` —
+ *  and the system default is unset, so it reports `false` on a Mac where press-and-hold is on.
+ *  `defaults read <domain> <key>` is domain-scoped and exits 1 when the key is absent. */
+const DEFAULTS_BINARY = '/usr/bin/defaults'
+/** A hang cutoff, not a latency budget: the probe measures ~6ms, and cutting a slow-but-working
+ *  `defaults` short costs the user the feature for that launch. The shared 30s default is what
+ *  must not apply — this runs before `ready`, so a 30s block is a hung app. */
+const DEFAULTS_TIMEOUT_MS = 5_000
+/** Why: `defaults` exits 1 for "does not exist"; anything else means the probe itself failed. */
+const DEFAULTS_MISSING_STATUS = 1
+
+const ORCA_BUNDLE_ID = 'com.stablyai.orca'
+
+export type PressAndHoldDecision =
+  /** Not macOS — nothing is read or written. */
+  | 'not-macos'
+  /** A previous launch already decided; the domain is never touched again. */
+  | 'already-decided'
+  /** The running bundle is not Orca's (e.g. a bare `Electron.app`), whose domain we do not own. */
+  | 'foreign-bundle'
+  /** `defaults read` could not answer, so we cannot tell an unset key from a user's choice. */
+  | 'probe-failed'
+  /** `defaults write` failed. */
+  | 'write-failed'
+  /** The domain already carries an explicit value; the user's choice stands. */
+  | 'kept-user-preference'
+  /** The key was unset and we wrote `false`. */
+  | 'applied'
+
+/** Decisions about the domain itself. Anything else is a condition that can change by next launch. */
+const TERMINAL_DECISIONS = new Set<PressAndHoldDecision>(['applied', 'kept-user-preference'])
+
+export type PressAndHoldRecord = {
+  version: number
+  decision: PressAndHoldDecision
+  domain: string | null
+  decidedAt: string
+}
+
+export type PressAndHoldHost = {
+  platform: NodeJS.Platform
+  resolveBundleIdentifier: () => string | null
+  readRecord: () => PressAndHoldRecord | null
+  writeRecord: (record: PressAndHoldRecord) => void
+  readDomainPreference: (domain: string) => 'set' | 'unset' | 'unknown'
+  writeDomainPreference: (domain: string, value: boolean) => boolean
+  now: () => string
+}
+
+/** Only Orca's own bundle: an unpackaged run is `com.github.Electron`, shared with every other
+ *  unpackaged Electron app on the machine. */
+export function isOrcaPreferencesDomain(domain: string): boolean {
+  return domain === ORCA_BUNDLE_ID || domain.startsWith(`${ORCA_BUNDLE_ID}.`)
+}
+
+/** `<bundle>/Contents/MacOS/<exe>` → `<bundle>/Contents/Info.plist`. */
+export function readBundleIdentifierFromExecutablePath(execPath: string): string | null {
+  try {
+    const plist = readFileSync(join(dirname(dirname(execPath)), 'Info.plist'), 'utf8')
+    const match = /<key>CFBundleIdentifier<\/key>\s*<string>([^<]*)<\/string>/.exec(plist)
+    const identifier = match?.[1]?.trim()
+    return identifier ? identifier : null
+  } catch {
+    return null
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Why this distinction carries the whole design: only a real "does not exist" answer may be read as
+ * unset. A killed or timed-out probe never answered, and calling that unset would let a broken
+ * probe overwrite a value the user chose.
+ */
+export function interpretDefaultsRead(probe: () => ProcessResult): 'set' | 'unset' | 'unknown' {
+  let result: ProcessResult
+  try {
+    result = probe()
+  } catch {
+    // `runProcessSync` throws only when the child never started, which answers nothing at all.
+    return 'unknown'
+  }
+  // Why before the code: a timeout kills mid-run, so any exit it leaves behind is not an answer.
+  if (result.timedOut) {
+    return 'unknown'
+  }
+  if (result.code === 0) {
+    return 'set'
+  }
+  return result.code === DEFAULTS_MISSING_STATUS ? 'unset' : 'unknown'
+}
+
+export function readDomainPressAndHoldPreference(domain: string): 'set' | 'unset' | 'unknown' {
+  // Why no captured output: the exit code is the whole answer, and reading only presence is what
+  // makes an explicit `true` and an explicit `false` both count as the user's.
+  return interpretDefaultsRead(() =>
+    runProcessSync({
+      program: DEFAULTS_BINARY,
+      args: ['read', domain, PRESS_AND_HOLD_KEY],
+      timeoutMs: DEFAULTS_TIMEOUT_MS,
+      stdio: ['ignore', 'ignore', 'ignore']
+    })
+  )
+}
+
+export function writeDomainPressAndHoldPreference(domain: string, value: boolean): boolean {
+  try {
+    // Why the code check: a non-zero `defaults write` returns rather than throwing, so treating a
+    // completed run as success would record 'applied' for a write that never landed.
+    return (
+      runProcessSync({
+        program: DEFAULTS_BINARY,
+        args: ['write', domain, PRESS_AND_HOLD_KEY, '-bool', value ? 'true' : 'false'],
+        timeoutMs: DEFAULTS_TIMEOUT_MS,
+        stdio: ['ignore', 'ignore', 'ignore']
+      }).code === 0
+    )
+  } catch {
+    return false
+  }
+}
+
+export function pressAndHoldRecordPath(userDataPath: string): string {
+  return join(userDataPath, PRESS_AND_HOLD_RECORD_FILE)
+}
+
+function parseRecord(raw: string): PressAndHoldRecord | null {
+  const parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as Partial<PressAndHoldRecord>
+  if (parsed.version !== PRESS_AND_HOLD_RECORD_VERSION || typeof parsed.decision !== 'string') {
+    return null
+  }
+  return {
+    version: PRESS_AND_HOLD_RECORD_VERSION,
+    decision: parsed.decision as PressAndHoldDecision,
+    domain: typeof parsed.domain === 'string' ? parsed.domain : null,
+    decidedAt: typeof parsed.decidedAt === 'string' ? parsed.decidedAt : ''
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Apply Orca's press-and-hold default at most once, leaving any explicit user value alone.
+ *
+ * Returns the decision so startup can log it; the same value is persisted for support triage.
+ */
+export function ensureMacPressAndHoldDefault(host: PressAndHoldHost): PressAndHoldDecision {
+  // Why first and without touching disk: Windows and Linux must do no work at all here.
+  if (host.platform !== 'darwin') {
+    return 'not-macos'
+  }
+
+  const previous = host.readRecord()
+  if (previous && TERMINAL_DECISIONS.has(previous.decision)) {
+    return 'already-decided'
+  }
+
+  const record = (decision: PressAndHoldDecision, domain: string | null): PressAndHoldDecision => {
+    // Why skip an unchanged rewrite: the non-terminal decisions are re-evaluated every launch.
+    if (!previous || previous.decision !== decision || previous.domain !== domain) {
+      host.writeRecord({
+        version: PRESS_AND_HOLD_RECORD_VERSION,
+        decision,
+        domain,
+        decidedAt: host.now()
+      })
+    }
+    return decision
+  }
+
+  const domain = host.resolveBundleIdentifier()
+  if (!domain || !isOrcaPreferencesDomain(domain)) {
+    return record('foreign-bundle', domain)
+  }
+
+  const existing = host.readDomainPreference(domain)
+  if (existing === 'unknown') {
+    return record('probe-failed', domain)
+  }
+  if (existing === 'set') {
+    return record('kept-user-preference', domain)
+  }
+  if (!host.writeDomainPreference(domain, false)) {
+    return record('write-failed', domain)
+  }
+  return record('applied', domain)
+}
+
+/** Why log: silently rewriting a macOS default for the user's login account should leave a trace,
+ *  and the failure paths are otherwise invisible. The quiet decisions are the steady state. */
+const REPORTED_DECISIONS: Partial<Record<PressAndHoldDecision, string>> = {
+  applied: `set ${PRESS_AND_HOLD_KEY}=false so held keys repeat; takes effect next launch`,
+  'probe-failed': `could not read ${PRESS_AND_HOLD_KEY}; leaving it alone`,
+  'write-failed': `could not write ${PRESS_AND_HOLD_KEY}; held keys will not repeat`
+}
+
+/** Wires {@link ensureMacPressAndHoldDefault} to the real bundle, `defaults`, and userData. */
+export function applyMacPressAndHoldDefaultAtStartup(userDataPath: string): PressAndHoldDecision {
+  const recordPath = pressAndHoldRecordPath(userDataPath)
+  const decision = ensureMacPressAndHoldDefault({
+    platform: process.platform,
+    resolveBundleIdentifier: () => readBundleIdentifierFromExecutablePath(process.execPath),
+    readRecord: () => {
+      try {
+        return parseRecord(readFileSync(recordPath, 'utf8'))
+      } catch {
+        return null
+      }
+    },
+    writeRecord: (record) => {
+      try {
+        // Why: this runs before `ready`, and Electron has not necessarily created userData yet.
+        mkdirSync(userDataPath, { recursive: true })
+        writeFileAtomically(recordPath, `${JSON.stringify(record, null, 2)}\n`)
+      } catch {
+        // Best-effort: an unwritten record only costs one repeated probe next launch.
+      }
+    },
+    readDomainPreference: readDomainPressAndHoldPreference,
+    writeDomainPreference: writeDomainPressAndHoldPreference,
+    now: () => new Date().toISOString()
+  })
+  const reported = REPORTED_DECISIONS[decision]
+  if (reported) {
+    console.log(`[press-and-hold] ${reported}`)
+  }
+  return decision
+}

src/main/orca-profiles/profile-project-state-file.ts

@@ -3,8 +3,11 @@ import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, renameSync, writeFileSync } from '
 import { homedir } from 'node:os'
 import { dirname } from 'node:path'
 import { getDefaultPersistedState, getDefaultWorkspaceSession } from '../../shared/constants'
-import type { ExecutionHostId } from '../../shared/execution-host'
 import { projectHostSetupProjectionFromRepos } from '../../shared/project-host-setup-projection'
+import {
+  normalizeProjectHostSetupRows,
+  normalizeProjectRows
+} from '../../shared/project-catalog-row-normalization'
 import { carryProjectStateThroughIdentityChange } from '../../shared/project-identity-succession'
 import type { PersistedState } from '../../shared/persisted-state-types'
 import type { Project, ProjectHostSetup } from '../../shared/project-types'
@@ -16,16 +19,16 @@ import { getOrcaProfileDataFile } from './profile-index-store'
 
 export type TransferProfileState = PersistedState
 
-function isRecord(value: unknown): value is Record<string, unknown> {
+function isRecord<T>(value: unknown): value is Record<string, T> {
   return typeof value === 'object' && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value)
 }
 
 function arrayOrEmpty<T>(value: unknown): T[] {
-  return Array.isArray(value) ? (value as T[]) : []
+  return Array.isArray(value) ? value : []
 }
 
 function recordOrEmpty<T>(value: unknown): Record<string, T> {
-  return isRecord(value) ? (value as Record<string, T>) : {}
+  return isRecord<T>(value) ? value : {}
 }
 
 export function readProfileState(profileId: string, userDataPath: string): TransferProfileState {
@@ -34,13 +37,17 @@ export function readProfileState(profileId: string, userDataPath: string): Trans
   if (!existsSync(dataFile)) {
     return structuredClone(defaults)
   }
-  const parsed = JSON.parse(readFileSync(dataFile, 'utf-8')) as Partial<PersistedState>
+  const parsed: Partial<PersistedState> = JSON.parse(readFileSync(dataFile, 'utf-8'))
   return rebuildRepoBackedProjectState({
     ...defaults,
     ...parsed,
     repos: arrayOrEmpty<Repo>(parsed.repos),
-    projects: arrayOrEmpty<Project>(parsed.projects),
-    projectHostSetups: arrayOrEmpty<ProjectHostSetup>(parsed.projectHostSetups),
+    // Why normalize: another profile's file is untrusted JSON, and a null repoId/path here would be
+    // carried straight into the importing app's state.
+    projects: normalizeProjectRows(arrayOrEmpty<Project>(parsed.projects)),
+    projectHostSetups: normalizeProjectHostSetupRows(
+      arrayOrEmpty<ProjectHostSetup>(parsed.projectHostSetups)
+    ),
     projectGroups: arrayOrEmpty(parsed.projectGroups),
     folderWorkspaces: arrayOrEmpty(parsed.folderWorkspaces),
     sparsePresetsByRepo: recordOrEmpty<SparsePreset[]>(parsed.sparsePresetsByRepo),
@@ -59,17 +66,15 @@ export function readProfileState(profileId: string, userDataPath: string): Trans
     ui: isRecord(parsed.ui) ? { ...defaults.ui, ...parsed.ui } : defaults.ui,
     githubCache: isRecord(parsed.githubCache)
       ? {
-          pr: recordOrEmpty((parsed.githubCache as PersistedState['githubCache']).pr),
-          issue: recordOrEmpty((parsed.githubCache as PersistedState['githubCache']).issue)
+          pr: recordOrEmpty(parsed.githubCache.pr),
+          issue: recordOrEmpty(parsed.githubCache.issue)
         }
       : defaults.githubCache,
     workspaceSession: isRecord(parsed.workspaceSession)
       ? { ...getDefaultWorkspaceSession(), ...parsed.workspaceSession }
       : defaults.workspaceSession,
-    workspaceSessionsByHostId: isRecord(parsed.workspaceSessionsByHostId)
-      ? (parsed.workspaceSessionsByHostId as Partial<
-          Record<ExecutionHostId, WorkspaceSessionState>
-        >)
+    workspaceSessionsByHostId: isRecord<WorkspaceSessionState>(parsed.workspaceSessionsByHostId)
+      ? parsed.workspaceSessionsByHostId
       : {},
     sshTargets: arrayOrEmpty(parsed.sshTargets),
     sshRemotePtyLeases: arrayOrEmpty(parsed.sshRemotePtyLeases),

src/main/persistence/loading-store/normalize-loaded-profile-state.ts

@@ -21,7 +21,8 @@ import { normalizeLoadedUiState } from './normalize-loaded-ui-state'
 import {
   normalizeLoadedAutomationRuns,
   normalizeLoadedHostSessions,
-  normalizeLoadedLocalSession
+  normalizeLoadedLocalSession,
+  normalizeLoadedProjectCatalog
 } from './normalize-loaded-state-collections'
 import { normalizeRetiredNameRegistryMap } from './retired-name-registry-normalization'
 
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@ export function normalizeLoadedProfileState(
 ): PersistedState {
   const { defaults, migratedExternalVisibility, osc52ClipboardNoticePending } = terminal
   const { normalizedOnboarding, normalizedProjectGroups, loadedCompactWorktreeCards } = profile
+  const projectCatalog = normalizeLoadedProjectCatalog(parsed, markNeedsSave)
 
   return {
     ...defaults,
@@ -42,6 +44,9 @@ export function normalizeLoadedProfileState(
     ),
     projectGroups: normalizedProjectGroups,
     repos: migratedExternalVisibility.repos,
+    // Why: persisted catalog rows are untrusted JSON; consumers call string methods on fields the type says are strings.
+    projects: projectCatalog.projects,
+    projectHostSetups: projectCatalog.projectHostSetups,
     folderWorkspaces: normalizeFolderWorkspaces(parsed.folderWorkspaces, normalizedProjectGroups),
     folderWorkspaceDiffComments: normalizeFolderWorkspaceDiffComments(
       parsed.folderWorkspaceDiffComments

src/main/persistence/loading-store/normalize-loaded-project-catalog.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
+import type { PersistedState } from '../../../shared/persisted-state-types'
+import type { Project, ProjectHostSetup } from '../../../shared/project-types'
+import { normalizeLoadedProjectCatalog } from './normalize-loaded-state-collections'
+
+// Why Reflect.set and not a cast: these rows deliberately violate their declared types, which is
+// exactly what a stale on-disk catalog does.
+function corrupt<T extends object>(row: T, overrides: Record<string, unknown>): T {
+  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(overrides)) {
+    Reflect.set(row, key, value)
+  }
+  return row
+}
+
+function makeParsed(
+  setups: ProjectHostSetup[],
+  projects: Project[] = []
+): Partial<Pick<PersistedState, 'projects' | 'projectHostSetups'>> {
+  return { projects, projectHostSetups: setups }
+}
+
+function makeBadSetup(): ProjectHostSetup {
+  const setup: ProjectHostSetup = {
+    id: 'setup-1',
+    projectId: 'project-1',
+    hostId: 'local',
+    repoId: 'repo-1',
+    path: '/Users/alice/orca',
+    displayName: 'orca',
+    setupState: 'ready',
+    setupMethod: 'legacy-repo',
+    createdAt: 1,
+    updatedAt: 1
+  }
+  return corrupt(setup, { repoId: null, path: null })
+}
+
+describe('normalizeLoadedProjectCatalog', () => {
+  it('repairs stored rows whose field types do not match the declared ones', () => {
+    const result = normalizeLoadedProjectCatalog(makeParsed([makeBadSetup()]), vi.fn())
+    expect(result.projectHostSetups[0]?.repoId).toBe('')
+    expect(result.projectHostSetups[0]?.path).toBe('')
+  })
+
+  // Why: without a save the bad rows stay on disk, get repaired again every launch, and this
+  // host keeps publishing them to paired clients. Marking dirty is the migration.
+  it('marks the profile dirty so the repair is persisted', () => {
+    const markNeedsSave = vi.fn()
+    normalizeLoadedProjectCatalog(makeParsed([makeBadSetup()]), markNeedsSave)
+    expect(markNeedsSave).toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('leaves a conforming catalog untouched and does not schedule a save', () => {
+    const markNeedsSave = vi.fn()
+    const setups = [{ ...makeBadSetup(), repoId: 'repo-1', path: '/repo' }]
+    const parsed = makeParsed(setups)
+    const result = normalizeLoadedProjectCatalog(parsed, markNeedsSave)
+    expect(result.projectHostSetups).toBe(setups)
+    expect(markNeedsSave).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('tolerates missing or non-array collections', () => {
+    const result = normalizeLoadedProjectCatalog({}, vi.fn())
+    expect(result.projects).toEqual([])
+    expect(result.projectHostSetups).toEqual([])
+  })
+})

src/main/persistence/loading-store/normalize-loaded-state-collections.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
 import type { PersistedState } from '../../../shared/persisted-state-types'
+import {
+  normalizeProjectHostSetupRows,
+  normalizeProjectRows
+} from '../../../shared/project-catalog-row-normalization'
 import type { WorkspaceSessionState } from '../../../shared/workspace-session-state-types'
 import { parseWorkspaceSessionSalvaging } from '../../../shared/workspace-session-salvage'
 import {
@@ -64,3 +68,21 @@ export function normalizeLoadedAutomationRuns(
   }
   return runs
 }
+
+/**
+ * Repairs project/setup rows whose stored field types do not match the declared ones — a null
+ * `repoId` or `path` written by an older build reaches every consumer that calls `.trim()` on it.
+ * Marking dirty is the migration: without a save the bad rows stay on disk and are repaired again
+ * every launch, and this host keeps publishing them to paired clients over the wire.
+ */
+export function normalizeLoadedProjectCatalog(
+  parsed: Partial<Pick<PersistedState, 'projects' | 'projectHostSetups'>>,
+  markNeedsSave: () => void
+): Pick<PersistedState, 'projects' | 'projectHostSetups'> {
+  const projects = normalizeProjectRows(parsed.projects ?? [])
+  const projectHostSetups = normalizeProjectHostSetupRows(parsed.projectHostSetups ?? [])
+  if (projects !== parsed.projects || projectHostSetups !== parsed.projectHostSetups) {
+    markNeedsSave()
+  }
+  return { projects, projectHostSetups }
+}

src/main/pty/codex-preflight-profile-path-rewrite.test.ts

@@ -162,13 +162,13 @@ describe.skipIf(!bashAvailable)('Codex preflight under a profile-rewritten PATH'
     expect(readFileSync(fixture.codexMarker, 'utf-8').trim()).toBe('--alias-flag --version')
   })
 
-  // Why: pins the defect itself, so a regression back to an unqualified name fails here.
-  it('would run the impostor if the preflight carried an unqualified command name', () => {
+  // Why: an unqualified preflight is rejected so profile PATH entries cannot hijack it.
+  it('skips an unqualified preflight value while still launching codex', () => {
     const fixture = buildFixture()
 
     launchCodexThroughRcfile(fixture, 'orca')
 
-    expect(existsSync(fixture.hijackMarker)).toBe(true)
+    expect(existsSync(fixture.hijackMarker)).toBe(false)
     expect(existsSync(fixture.intendedMarker)).toBe(false)
     expect(existsSync(fixture.codexMarker)).toBe(true)
   })

src/main/pty/codex-shell-launch-preflight.test.ts

@@ -170,6 +170,30 @@ describe.skipIf(process.platform === 'win32')('Codex shell launch preflight', ()
     )
   })
 
+  it('does not trigger a preflight outside an Orca terminal', () => {
+    const root = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'orca-codex-plain-shell-'))
+    roots.push(root)
+    const bin = join(root, 'bin')
+    const marker = join(root, 'preflight-ran')
+    mkdirSync(bin)
+    writeExecutable(join(bin, 'codex'), '#!/bin/sh\nprintf launched\n')
+    writeExecutable(join(bin, 'orca-test'), `#!/bin/sh\nprintf ran > ${JSON.stringify(marker)}\n`)
+
+    const output = execFileSync(
+      '/bin/bash',
+      ['--noprofile', '--norc', '-c', `${getPosixCodexShellLaunchPreflight()}\ncodex`],
+      {
+        encoding: 'utf-8',
+        env: {
+          PATH: `${bin}${delimiter}${process.env.PATH ?? ''}`
+        }
+      }
+    )
+
+    expect(output.trim()).toBe('launched')
+    expect(existsSync(marker)).toBe(false)
+  })
+
   // Why a loop over it.each: an early `return` reported green on hosts without the
   // shell, so the zsh half silently never ran on Linux. skipIf reports it as a skip.
   for (const [shell, strict] of [
@@ -319,6 +343,24 @@ describe('Codex shell launch preflight command', () => {
     ).toBe(launcherPath)
   })
 
+  it('carries the packaged Windows launcher for WSLENV path translation', () => {
+    const { userDataPath, resourcesPath } = makeCliRoot()
+    const launcherPath = join(resourcesPath, 'bin', 'orca.exe')
+    writeExecutable(launcherPath, '#!/bin/sh\nexit 0\n')
+
+    expect(
+      resolveCodexShellLaunchPreflightCommand({
+        hooksEnabled: true,
+        isPackaged: true,
+        isWsl: true,
+        managedHomePath: '/home/jin/.local/share/orca/codex-runtime-home/home',
+        userDataPath,
+        resourcesPath,
+        platform: 'win32'
+      })
+    ).toBe(launcherPath)
+  })
+
   it('never returns an unqualified command name that a profile-rewritten PATH could hijack', () => {
     const { userDataPath, resourcesPath } = makeCliRoot()
     writeExecutable(join(resourcesPath, 'bin', 'orca'), '#!/bin/sh\nexit 0\n')
@@ -340,16 +382,12 @@ describe('Codex shell launch preflight command', () => {
 
   it.each([
     { label: 'the launcher file is missing', create: null },
-    { label: 'the launcher is not executable', create: 0o644 },
     { label: 'the launcher path is a directory', create: 'directory' as const }
   ])('skips the preflight when $label', (config) => {
     const { userDataPath, resourcesPath } = makeCliRoot()
     const launcherPath = join(resourcesPath, 'bin', 'orca')
     if (config.create === 'directory') {
       mkdirSync(launcherPath)
-    } else if (config.create !== null) {
-      writeFileSync(launcherPath, '#!/bin/sh\nexit 0\n')
-      chmodSync(launcherPath, config.create)
     }
 
     expect(
@@ -364,6 +402,27 @@ describe('Codex shell launch preflight command', () => {
     ).toBeNull()
   })
 
+  it.skipIf(process.platform === 'win32')(
+    'skips the preflight when the launcher is not executable',
+    () => {
+      const { userDataPath, resourcesPath } = makeCliRoot()
+      const launcherPath = join(resourcesPath, 'bin', 'orca')
+      writeFileSync(launcherPath, '#!/bin/sh\nexit 0\n')
+      chmodSync(launcherPath, 0o644)
+
+      expect(
+        resolveCodexShellLaunchPreflightCommand({
+          hooksEnabled: true,
+          isPackaged: true,
+          managedHomePath: '/managed/home',
+          userDataPath,
+          resourcesPath,
+          platform: 'darwin'
+        })
+      ).toBeNull()
+    }
+  )
+
   it('skips the preflight when the packaged build exposes no resources root', () => {
     const { userDataPath } = makeCliRoot()
 
@@ -381,7 +440,7 @@ describe('Codex shell launch preflight command', () => {
 
   it.each([
     { hooksEnabled: false, isWsl: false, managedHomePath: '/managed/home' },
-    { hooksEnabled: true, isWsl: true, managedHomePath: '/managed/home' },
+    { hooksEnabled: true, isWsl: true, managedHomePath: '/managed/home', isPackaged: false },
     { hooksEnabled: true, isWsl: false, managedHomePath: null }
   ])('does not enable an unsupported preflight for %o', (options) => {
     const { userDataPath, resourcesPath } = makeCliRoot()
@@ -390,7 +449,7 @@ describe('Codex shell launch preflight command', () => {
     expect(
       resolveCodexShellLaunchPreflightCommand({
         ...options,
-        isPackaged: true,
+        isPackaged: options.isPackaged ?? true,
         userDataPath,
         resourcesPath,
         platform: 'darwin'

src/main/pty/codex-shell-launch-preflight.ts

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ export type CodexShellLaunchPreflightCommandOptions = {
 export function resolveCodexShellLaunchPreflightCommand(
   options: CodexShellLaunchPreflightCommandOptions
 ): string | null {
-  if (!options.hooksEnabled || options.isWsl || !options.managedHomePath) {
+  if (!options.hooksEnabled || !options.managedHomePath) {
     return null
   }
   const platform = options.platform ?? process.platform
@@ -42,7 +42,14 @@ export function resolveCodexShellLaunchPreflightCommand(
         ...DEV_LAUNCHER_DIR,
         platform === 'win32' ? `${DEV_COMMAND_NAME}.cmd` : DEV_COMMAND_NAME
       )
-  return candidate && isExecutableFileOnDisk(candidate, platform) ? candidate : null
+  if (!candidate || !isExecutableFileOnDisk(candidate, platform)) {
+    return null
+  }
+  if (!options.isWsl) {
+    return candidate
+  }
+  // Why: WSLENV /p translates the verified Windows launcher with the distro's configured automount root.
+  return platform === 'win32' && options.isPackaged ? candidate : null
 }
 
 function isExecutableFileOnDisk(path: string, platform: NodeJS.Platform): boolean {
@@ -65,7 +72,7 @@ export function getPosixCodexShellLaunchPreflight(): string {
 # Why || : twice — zsh alone aborts inside the substitution, but every shell's
 # assignment adopts its exit status, so an absent codex trips set -e in bash too.
 __orca_codex_binary="$(unalias codex 2>/dev/null || :; command -v codex 2>/dev/null || :)"
-if [[ -n "\${ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT:-}" && -n "\${__orca_codex_binary:-}" && -x "\${__orca_codex_binary}" ]]; then
+if [[ -n "\${ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT:-}" && -x "\${ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT}" && -n "\${__orca_codex_binary:-}" && -x "\${__orca_codex_binary}" ]]; then
   # Why the function reserved word: it suppresses alias expansion of the name,
   # which otherwise rewrites this header at parse time and aborts the whole file.
   function codex {
@@ -78,7 +85,7 @@ unset __orca_codex_binary
 }
 
 export function getFishCodexShellLaunchPreflight(): string {
-  return `if test -n "$ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT"; and test (type -t codex 2>/dev/null) = file
+  return `if test -x "$ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT"; and test (type -t codex 2>/dev/null) = file
   function codex
     command "$ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT" agent hooks prepare-codex >/dev/null 2>&1; or true
     command codex $argv

src/main/pty/wsl-orca-env.test.ts

@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ describe('addOrcaWslInteropEnv', () => {
       ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TOKEN: 'token',
       ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_ENV: 'dev',
       ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_VERSION: '1',
+      ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TRANSPORT: 'raw-json-v1',
       ORCA_WSL_HOOK_INSTANCE: 'testinstance',
       ORCA_ORCHESTRATION_COMPATIBILITY_HOST_KIND: 'wsl',
       ORCA_ORCHESTRATION_COMPATIBILITY_HOST_ID: 'local',
@@ -84,7 +85,7 @@ describe('addOrcaWslInteropEnv', () => {
     expect(env.WSLENV).toContain('ORCA_TERMINAL_HANDLE/u')
     expect(env.WSLENV).toContain('ORCA_USER_DATA_PATH/p')
     expect(env.WSLENV).toContain('ORCA_CLI_COMMAND/u')
-    expect(env.WSLENV).not.toContain('ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT')
+    expect(env.WSLENV).toContain('ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT/p')
     expect(env.WSLENV).toContain('ORCA_OMP_STATUS_EXTENSION/p')
     expect(env.WSLENV).not.toContain('ORCA_PRIME_AGENT_STATUS_EXTENSION')
     expect(env.WSLENV).toContain('ORCA_PANE_KEY/u')
@@ -95,6 +96,7 @@ describe('addOrcaWslInteropEnv', () => {
     expect(env.WSLENV).toContain('ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TOKEN/u')
     expect(env.WSLENV).toContain('ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_ENV/u')
     expect(env.WSLENV).toContain('ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_VERSION/u')
+    expect(env.WSLENV).toContain('ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TRANSPORT/u')
     expect(env.WSLENV).toContain('ORCA_WSL_HOOK_INSTANCE/u')
     expect(env.WSLENV).toContain('ORCA_ORCHESTRATION_COMPATIBILITY_HOST_KIND/u')
     expect(env.WSLENV).toContain('ORCA_ORCHESTRATION_COMPATIBILITY_HOST_ID/u')

src/main/pty/wsl-orca-env.ts

@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ export function addOrcaWslInteropEnv(env: Record<string, string>): void {
     // and it cannot derive the hash segment from ORCA_USER_DATA_PATH alone.
     'ORCA_SHELL_READY_ROOT/p',
     'ORCA_CLI_COMMAND/u',
+    'ORCA_CODEX_LAUNCH_PREFLIGHT/p',
     'ORCA_PANE_KEY/u',
     'ORCA_TAB_ID/u',
     'ORCA_WORKTREE_ID/u',
@@ -90,6 +91,7 @@ export function addOrcaWslInteropEnv(env: Record<string, string>): void {
     'ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TOKEN/u',
     'ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_ENV/u',
     'ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_VERSION/u',
+    'ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TRANSPORT/u',
     `ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_ENDPOINT/${endpointFlag}`,
     ...opencodeOverlayEntries,
     'ORCA_WSL_HOOK_RELAY_VERSION/u',

src/main/runtime/orca-runtime.ts

@@ -2845,6 +2845,7 @@ const AGENT_HOOK_RUNTIME_ENV_KEYS = [
   'ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TOKEN',
   'ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_ENV',
   'ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_VERSION',
+  'ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TRANSPORT',
   'ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_ENDPOINT'
 ] as const
 

src/main/runtime/rpc/methods/agent-hooks.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
+import type { OrcaRuntimeService } from '../../orca-runtime'
+import { isStreamingMethod, type RpcContext } from '../core'
+
+const { installForRuntimeHomeSerializedMock, realpathMock } = vi.hoisted(() => ({
+  installForRuntimeHomeSerializedMock: vi.fn(),
+  realpathMock: vi.fn()
+}))
+
+vi.mock('../../../codex/hook-service', () => ({
+  codexHookService: { installForRuntimeHomeSerialized: installForRuntimeHomeSerializedMock }
+}))
+vi.mock('node:fs/promises', () => ({ realpath: realpathMock }))
+
+import { AGENT_HOOK_METHODS } from './agent-hooks'
+import {
+  _internals as managedWslHomeRegistryInternals,
+  recordManagedWslCodexHome
+} from '../../../codex/managed-wsl-codex-home-registry'
+
+const LINUX_HOME = '/home/jin/.local/share/orca/codex-runtime-home/home'
+const RUNTIME_HOME =
+  '\\\\wsl.localhost\\Ubuntu-24.04\\home\\jin\\.local\\share\\orca\\codex-runtime-home\\home'
+
+function prepareMethod() {
+  const method = AGENT_HOOK_METHODS.find(
+    (candidate) => candidate.name === 'agentHooks.prepareCodexForWslPane'
+  )
+  if (!method || isStreamingMethod(method)) {
+    throw new Error('Missing agentHooks.prepareCodexForWslPane request method')
+  }
+  return method
+}
+
+function runtimeWithSettings(enabled = true, disabledTuiAgents: string[] = []): OrcaRuntimeService {
+  return {
+    getClientSettings: vi.fn(() => ({
+      agentStatusHooksEnabled: enabled,
+      disabledTuiAgents
+    }))
+  } as unknown as OrcaRuntimeService
+}
+
+describe('agent hook RPC methods', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    installForRuntimeHomeSerializedMock.mockReset()
+    realpathMock.mockReset()
+    realpathMock.mockImplementation(async (path: string) => path)
+    managedWslHomeRegistryInternals.clearRecordedManagedWslCodexHomes()
+    recordManagedWslCodexHome('Ubuntu-24.04', RUNTIME_HOME)
+  })
+
+  it('installs the pane-selected WSL home once and returns its status', async () => {
+    const status = { agent: 'codex', state: 'installed' }
+    installForRuntimeHomeSerializedMock.mockResolvedValue(status)
+    const method = prepareMethod()
+    const params = method.params!.parse({
+      codexHome: LINUX_HOME,
+      orcaCodexHome: LINUX_HOME,
+      wslDistro: 'Ubuntu-24.04'
+    })
+
+    await expect(method.handler(params, { runtime: runtimeWithSettings() })).resolves.toBe(status)
+    expect(installForRuntimeHomeSerializedMock).toHaveBeenCalledExactlyOnceWith(RUNTIME_HOME, {
+      runtime: 'wsl',
+      wslDistro: 'Ubuntu-24.04'
+    })
+  })
+
+  it.each([
+    [false, []],
+    [true, ['codex']]
+  ])('does not install when hooks are disabled (%s, %j)', async (enabled, disabledTuiAgents) => {
+    const method = prepareMethod()
+    const params = method.params!.parse({
+      codexHome: '/home/jin/.local/share/orca/codex-runtime-home/home',
+      orcaCodexHome: '/home/jin/.local/share/orca/codex-runtime-home/home',
+      wslDistro: 'Ubuntu-24.04'
+    })
+
+    await expect(
+      method.handler(params, { runtime: runtimeWithSettings(enabled, disabledTuiAgents) })
+    ).resolves.toBeNull()
+    expect(installForRuntimeHomeSerializedMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it.each(['runtime', 'mobile'] as const)('rejects non-local %s callers', async (clientKind) => {
+    const method = prepareMethod()
+    const params = method.params!.parse({
+      codexHome: '/home/jin/.local/share/orca/codex-runtime-home/home',
+      orcaCodexHome: '/home/jin/.local/share/orca/codex-runtime-home/home',
+      wslDistro: 'Ubuntu-24.04'
+    })
+
+    await expect(
+      method.handler(params, {
+        runtime: runtimeWithSettings(),
+        clientKind
+      } as RpcContext)
+    ).rejects.toThrow(/only available to the local Orca CLI/)
+    expect(installForRuntimeHomeSerializedMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('propagates an attempted installer failure', async () => {
+    installForRuntimeHomeSerializedMock.mockRejectedValue(new Error('install failed'))
+    const method = prepareMethod()
+    const params = method.params!.parse({
+      codexHome: '/home/jin/.local/share/orca/codex-runtime-home/home',
+      orcaCodexHome: '/home/jin/.local/share/orca/codex-runtime-home/home',
+      wslDistro: 'Ubuntu-24.04'
+    })
+
+    await expect(method.handler(params, { runtime: runtimeWithSettings() })).rejects.toThrow(
+      'install failed'
+    )
+    expect(installForRuntimeHomeSerializedMock).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
+  })
+
+  it('rejects a managed-looking home that resolves through a symlink', async () => {
+    realpathMock.mockResolvedValue(
+      '\\\\wsl.localhost\\Ubuntu-24.04\\home\\jin\\outside-managed-home'
+    )
+    const method = prepareMethod()
+    const params = method.params!.parse({
+      codexHome: LINUX_HOME,
+      orcaCodexHome: LINUX_HOME,
+      wslDistro: 'Ubuntu-24.04'
+    })
+
+    await expect(method.handler(params, { runtime: runtimeWithSettings() })).resolves.toBeNull()
+    expect(installForRuntimeHomeSerializedMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('rejects malformed distro names at the RPC schema', () => {
+    const method = prepareMethod()
+
+    expect(() =>
+      method.params!.parse({
+        codexHome: '/home/jin/.local/share/orca/codex-runtime-home/home',
+        orcaCodexHome: '/home/jin/.local/share/orca/codex-runtime-home/home',
+        wslDistro: 'Ubuntu\\..\\host'
+      })
+    ).toThrow()
+  })
+})

src/main/runtime/rpc/methods/agent-hooks.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+import { z } from 'zod'
+import { prepareManagedWslCodexHomeBeforeShellLaunch } from '../../../codex/managed-wsl-home-shell-preflight'
+import { defineMethod, type RpcMethod } from '../core'
+
+const PrepareCodexForWslPaneParams = z
+  .object({
+    codexHome: z.string().max(4_096),
+    orcaCodexHome: z.string().max(4_096),
+    wslDistro: z
+      .string()
+      .trim()
+      .min(1)
+      .max(255)
+      .regex(/^[^\\/\r\n]+$/)
+  })
+  .strict()
+
+export const AGENT_HOOK_METHODS: readonly RpcMethod[] = [
+  defineMethod({
+    name: 'agentHooks.prepareCodexForWslPane',
+    params: PrepareCodexForWslPaneParams,
+    handler: async (params, { runtime, clientKind }) => {
+      if (clientKind !== undefined) {
+        throw new Error('Codex hook preparation is only available to the local Orca CLI.')
+      }
+      const settings = runtime.getClientSettings()
+      return await prepareManagedWslCodexHomeBeforeShellLaunch({
+        env: {
+          CODEX_HOME: params.codexHome,
+          ORCA_CODEX_HOME: params.orcaCodexHome,
+          WSL_DISTRO_NAME: params.wslDistro
+        },
+        hooksEnabled:
+          settings.agentStatusHooksEnabled && !settings.disabledTuiAgents.includes('codex')
+      })
+    }
+  })
+]

src/main/runtime/rpc/methods/index.ts

@@ -43,12 +43,14 @@ import { PAIRING_METHODS } from './pairing'
 import { UPDATER_METHODS } from './updater'
 import { AGENT_SESSION_METHODS } from './agent-session'
 import { ARTIFACT_METHODS } from './artifacts'
+import { AGENT_HOOK_METHODS } from './agent-hooks'
 
 // Why: a flat manifest keeps registration order explicit and provides one
 // grep-point for "what methods does the RPC server expose?" — useful when
 // auditing the security boundary or wiring new CLI commands.
 export const ALL_RPC_METHODS: readonly RpcAnyMethod[] = [
   ...STATUS_METHODS,
+  ...AGENT_HOOK_METHODS,
   ...AI_VAULT_METHODS,
   ...ARTIFACT_METHODS,
   ...AUTOMATION_METHODS,

src/main/window/main-window-webview-security.test.ts

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ const mocks = vi.hoisted(() => ({
   attachGuestPolicies: vi.fn(),
   installNavigationPolicy: vi.fn(),
   isAllowedPartition: vi.fn(),
+  attachRouteGuest: vi.fn(),
   registerPluginGuard: vi.fn()
 }))
 
@@ -20,20 +21,61 @@ vi.mock('../plugins/plugin-panel-navigation-guard', () => ({
 vi.mock('./privileged-window-navigation', () => ({
   installPrivilegedWindowNavigationPolicy: mocks.installNavigationPolicy
 }))
+vi.mock('../browser/browser-route-session-runtime', () => ({
+  browserRouteSessionRegistry: { isAllowedPartition: () => false },
+  browserRouteWebContentsRegistry: { attachGuest: mocks.attachRouteGuest }
+}))
+vi.mock('../browser/local-ssh-browser-partitions', () => ({
+  isLocalSshBrowserPartition: () => false,
+  enforceLocalSshWebRtcPolicyForGuest: vi.fn()
+}))
+vi.mock('../browser/doc-preview-protocol', () => ({
+  isDocPreviewSession: (candidate: unknown) => candidate === 'doc-preview-session'
+}))
 
 import { installMainWindowWebviewSecurity } from './main-window-webview-security'
+import {
+  getDocPreviewGrant,
+  mintDocPreviewGrant,
+  revokeAllDocPreviewGrants
+} from '../browser/doc-preview-grant-registry'
+import {
+  publishDocPreviewFailure,
+  setDocPreviewFailureSink
+} from '../browser/doc-preview-failure-notice'
+import { buildDocPreviewUrl, DOC_PREVIEW_PARTITION } from '../../shared/doc-preview-scheme'
+
+function installOnFakeWindow(): {
+  handlers: Record<string, (...args: never[]) => void>
+  webContents: { on: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn> }
+} {
+  const handlers: Record<string, (...args: never[]) => void> = {}
+  const webContents = {
+    on: vi.fn((event: string, handler: (...args: never[]) => void) => {
+      handlers[event] = handler
+    })
+  }
+  installMainWindowWebviewSecurity({ webContents } as never)
+  return { handlers, webContents }
+}
+
+function mintPreviewGrant(): ReturnType<typeof mintDocPreviewGrant> {
+  return mintDocPreviewGrant({
+    owner: { kind: 'ssh', connectionId: 'ssh-1' },
+    root: '/home/alice/docs',
+    entryRelativePath: 'index.html',
+    browserPageId: 'page-1'
+  })
+}
 
 describe('main window webview security', () => {
-  beforeEach(() => vi.clearAllMocks())
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    vi.clearAllMocks()
+    revokeAllDocPreviewGrants()
+  })
 
   it('fails closed before applying hardened guest preferences', () => {
-    const handlers: Record<string, (...args: never[]) => void> = {}
-    const webContents = {
-      on: vi.fn((event: string, handler: (...args: never[]) => void) => {
-        handlers[event] = handler
-      })
-    }
-    installMainWindowWebviewSecurity({ webContents } as never)
+    const { handlers, webContents } = installOnFakeWindow()
     mocks.isAllowedPartition.mockReturnValue(false)
     const preventDefault = vi.fn()
 
@@ -49,13 +91,7 @@ describe('main window webview security', () => {
   })
 
   it('removes renderer preload input and restores every hardened preference', () => {
-    const handlers: Record<string, (...args: never[]) => void> = {}
-    const webContents = {
-      on: vi.fn((event: string, handler: (...args: never[]) => void) => {
-        handlers[event] = handler
-      })
-    }
-    installMainWindowWebviewSecurity({ webContents } as never)
+    const { handlers } = installOnFakeWindow()
     mocks.isAllowedPartition.mockReturnValue(true)
     const params = { src: 'https://example.com', preload: 'attacker.js' }
     const preferences: Record<string, unknown> = {
@@ -85,3 +121,198 @@ describe('main window webview security', () => {
     expect(String(preferences.preload)).toMatch(/browser-window-close-preload\.js$/)
   })
 })
+
+describe('orca-preview scheme admission', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    vi.clearAllMocks()
+    revokeAllDocPreviewGrants()
+  })
+
+  it('admits a preview URL only on the preview partition and only with a live grant', () => {
+    // Install first, as the window does: installation itself clears the registry.
+    const { handlers } = installOnFakeWindow()
+    const grant = mintPreviewGrant()
+    mocks.isAllowedPartition.mockReturnValue(false)
+    const preventDefault = vi.fn()
+    const preferences: Record<string, unknown> = {
+      partition: DOC_PREVIEW_PARTITION,
+      preload: 'attacker.js',
+      sandbox: false
+    }
+
+    handlers['will-attach-webview']?.(
+      { preventDefault } as never,
+      preferences as never,
+      { src: buildDocPreviewUrl(grant.id, 'index.html'), preload: 'attacker.js' } as never
+    )
+
+    expect(preventDefault).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    expect(preferences).toMatchObject({
+      partition: DOC_PREVIEW_PARTITION,
+      contextIsolation: true,
+      nodeIntegration: false,
+      sandbox: true,
+      webSecurity: true
+    })
+    expect(preferences).not.toHaveProperty('preloadURL')
+  })
+
+  // Why both directions: the preview preload is the only script that can turn a press into a
+  // browser tab, so a browsing guest must never receive it — and a preview must never receive
+  // anything else, least of all a value the renderer supplied.
+  it('pins the preview preload onto a preview attach, replacing whatever the renderer asked for', () => {
+    const { handlers } = installOnFakeWindow()
+    const grant = mintPreviewGrant()
+    mocks.isAllowedPartition.mockReturnValue(false)
+    const params = { src: buildDocPreviewUrl(grant.id, 'index.html'), preload: 'attacker.js' }
+    const preferences: Record<string, unknown> = {
+      partition: DOC_PREVIEW_PARTITION,
+      preload: 'attacker.js'
+    }
+
+    handlers['will-attach-webview']?.(
+      { preventDefault: vi.fn() } as never,
+      preferences as never,
+      params as never
+    )
+
+    expect(params).not.toHaveProperty('preload')
+    expect(String(preferences.preload)).toMatch(/doc-preview-link-preload\.js$/)
+  })
+
+  it('keeps the preview preload off a browsing attach', () => {
+    const { handlers } = installOnFakeWindow()
+    mocks.isAllowedPartition.mockReturnValue(true)
+    const preferences: Record<string, unknown> = { partition: 'persist:orca-browser' }
+
+    handlers['will-attach-webview']?.(
+      { preventDefault: vi.fn() } as never,
+      preferences as never,
+      { src: 'https://example.com' } as never
+    )
+
+    expect(String(preferences.preload)).toMatch(/browser-window-close-preload\.js$/)
+  })
+
+  it('denies a preview URL whose grant is unknown or revoked', () => {
+    const { handlers } = installOnFakeWindow()
+    mocks.isAllowedPartition.mockReturnValue(false)
+    const preventDefault = vi.fn()
+
+    handlers['will-attach-webview']?.(
+      { preventDefault } as never,
+      { partition: DOC_PREVIEW_PARTITION } as never,
+      { src: `orca-preview://${'0'.repeat(32)}/index.html` } as never
+    )
+
+    expect(preventDefault).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
+  })
+
+  it('denies a preview URL smuggled onto a browsing partition', () => {
+    const { handlers } = installOnFakeWindow()
+    const grant = mintPreviewGrant()
+    // Even an allowlisted browsing partition must not load the preview scheme.
+    mocks.isAllowedPartition.mockReturnValue(true)
+    const preventDefault = vi.fn()
+
+    handlers['will-attach-webview']?.(
+      { preventDefault } as never,
+      { partition: 'persist:orca-browser' } as never,
+      { src: buildDocPreviewUrl(grant.id, 'index.html') } as never
+    )
+
+    expect(preventDefault).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
+  })
+
+  it('denies a web URL on the preview partition', () => {
+    const { handlers } = installOnFakeWindow()
+    mocks.isAllowedPartition.mockReturnValue(false)
+    const preventDefault = vi.fn()
+
+    handlers['will-attach-webview']?.(
+      { preventDefault } as never,
+      { partition: DOC_PREVIEW_PARTITION } as never,
+      { src: 'https://example.com' } as never
+    )
+
+    expect(preventDefault).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
+  })
+
+  // Why the host is asserted and not just the profile: it is the renderer that minted the grant,
+  // and it is the only sink a link the reader presses can be reported to. A preview attached
+  // against another window's contents would report its clicks to a reader who is not there.
+  it('attaches a preview guest under the workspace-doc profile, hosted by this window', () => {
+    const { handlers, webContents } = installOnFakeWindow()
+
+    handlers['did-attach-webview']?.({} as never, { session: 'doc-preview-session' } as never)
+
+    expect(mocks.attachGuestPolicies).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      { session: 'doc-preview-session' },
+      null,
+      {
+        profile: 'workspace-doc',
+        host: webContents
+      }
+    )
+    expect(mocks.attachRouteGuest).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('keeps browser guests on the browsing profile and its route registration', () => {
+    const { handlers } = installOnFakeWindow()
+
+    handlers['did-attach-webview']?.({} as never, { session: 'browser-session' } as never)
+
+    expect(mocks.attachGuestPolicies).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
+    expect(mocks.attachGuestPolicies.mock.calls[0]?.[2]).toBeUndefined()
+    expect(mocks.attachRouteGuest).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
+  })
+
+  // Why: every live preview belongs to this window, so its teardown is the one moment no grant can
+  // still have a reader — and the failure sink must stop pointing at dead WebContents.
+  it('drops the failure sink and every grant when the window contents are destroyed', () => {
+    const { handlers } = installOnFakeWindow()
+    const grant = mintPreviewGrant()
+    const send = vi.fn()
+    setDocPreviewFailureSink({ send })
+    expect(getDocPreviewGrant(grant.id)).not.toBeNull()
+
+    handlers['destroyed']?.()
+    publishDocPreviewFailure({
+      grantId: grant.id,
+      relativePath: 'index.html',
+      reason: 'unreadable'
+    })
+
+    expect(getDocPreviewGrant(grant.id)).toBeNull()
+    expect(send).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  // Why: the renderer is the only side that remembers which preview owns which grant, so a grant
+  // that outlives its renderer is a read authority nobody can release.
+  it('clears grants a previous renderer left behind when the window is created', () => {
+    const stranded = mintPreviewGrant()
+
+    installOnFakeWindow()
+
+    expect(getDocPreviewGrant(stranded.id)).toBeNull()
+  })
+
+  it('clears grants the renderer forgot across a reload', () => {
+    const { handlers } = installOnFakeWindow()
+    const grant = mintPreviewGrant()
+
+    handlers['did-start-navigation']?.({ isMainFrame: true, isSameDocument: false } as never)
+
+    expect(getDocPreviewGrant(grant.id)).toBeNull()
+  })
+
+  it('keeps grants across an in-document or subframe navigation, which keeps the renderer', () => {
+    const { handlers } = installOnFakeWindow()
+    const grant = mintPreviewGrant()
+
+    handlers['did-start-navigation']?.({ isMainFrame: true, isSameDocument: true } as never)
+    handlers['did-start-navigation']?.({ isMainFrame: false, isSameDocument: false } as never)
+
+    expect(getDocPreviewGrant(grant.id)).not.toBeNull()
+  })
+})

src/main/window/main-window-webview-security.ts

@@ -13,16 +13,56 @@ import {
   browserRouteWebContentsRegistry
 } from '../browser/browser-route-session-runtime'
 import { ORCA_BROWSER_BLANK_URL } from '../../shared/constants'
+import { DOC_PREVIEW_PARTITION, parseDocPreviewUrl } from '../../shared/doc-preview-scheme'
+import { setDocPreviewFailureSink } from '../browser/doc-preview-failure-notice'
+import {
+  getDocPreviewGrant,
+  revokeAllDocPreviewGrants
+} from '../browser/doc-preview-grant-registry'
+import { isDocPreviewSession } from '../browser/doc-preview-protocol'
 import { registerPluginPanelNavigationGuard } from '../plugins/plugin-panel-navigation-guard'
 import { installPrivilegedWindowNavigationPolicy } from './privileged-window-navigation'
 
+/**
+ * Why a separate admission rule: `normalizeBrowserNavigationUrl` answers only for
+ * http(s) and `file:`, so `orca-preview://` can only ever attach here — and only
+ * on the doc-preview partition, carrying a grant the main process minted for a
+ * deliberate user preview action. Web content has no way to reach either.
+ */
+function isAdmissibleDocPreviewAttach(partition: string, src: string): boolean {
+  if (partition !== DOC_PREVIEW_PARTITION) {
+    return false
+  }
+  const target = parseDocPreviewUrl(src)
+  return target !== null && getDocPreviewGrant(target.grantId) !== null
+}
+
 export function installMainWindowWebviewSecurity(mainWindow: BrowserWindow): void {
   installPrivilegedWindowNavigationPolicy(mainWindow.webContents)
+  // Why here and on every fresh shell document: the renderer holds the only record of which
+  // preview owns which grant, and a reload throws that record away. Grants it can no longer
+  // release would stay live read authorities for the rest of the process.
+  revokeAllDocPreviewGrants()
+  mainWindow.webContents.on('did-start-navigation', (details) => {
+    if (details.isMainFrame && !details.isSameDocument) {
+      revokeAllDocPreviewGrants()
+    }
+  })
+  // Why these contents and not the window: every live preview is a guest of this WebContents, and
+  // it is also the failure sink itself — once it is destroyed no grant it minted has a reader left.
+  mainWindow.webContents.on('destroyed', () => {
+    setDocPreviewFailureSink(null)
+    revokeAllDocPreviewGrants()
+  })
   // Why: containment must be listening before any plugin panel frame is created,
   // so register it with the window's other navigation policy.
   registerPluginPanelNavigationGuard(mainWindow.webContents)
 
   const browserWindowClosePreload = join(__dirname, 'browser-window-close-preload.js')
+  // Why a preview gets a preload at all: it is our own editor surface, not a browsing guest. This
+  // one only decides what a click on a link means, and it is pinned here so no renderer-supplied
+  // value can reach a preview guest and no other attach path can acquire it.
+  const docPreviewLinkPreload = join(__dirname, 'doc-preview-link-preload.js')
   mainWindow.webContents.on('will-attach-webview', (event, webPreferences, params) => {
     const src = typeof params.src === 'string' ? params.src : ''
     const normalizedSrc = normalizeBrowserNavigationUrl(src)
@@ -33,12 +73,14 @@ export function installMainWindowWebviewSecurity(mainWindow: BrowserWindow): voi
     // so admission here can never race an unproxied session. They navigate like
     // profile partitions — the renderer owns their URLs, no main-side grants.
     const isLocalSshPartition = isLocalSshBrowserPartition(partition)
+    const isDocPreviewAttach = isAdmissibleDocPreviewAttach(partition, src)
 
     // Why: fail closed — deny any src or partition not in the registry allowlist so a renderer bug can't smuggle preload/Node into an unprivileged guest.
     if (
-      !normalizedSrc ||
-      (!isProfilePartition && !isRoutePartition && !isLocalSshPartition) ||
-      (isRoutePartition && normalizedSrc !== ORCA_BROWSER_BLANK_URL)
+      !isDocPreviewAttach &&
+      (!normalizedSrc ||
+        (!isProfilePartition && !isRoutePartition && !isLocalSshPartition) ||
+        (isRoutePartition && normalizedSrc !== ORCA_BROWSER_BLANK_URL))
     ) {
       event.preventDefault()
       return
@@ -46,7 +88,7 @@ export function installMainWindowWebviewSecurity(mainWindow: BrowserWindow): voi
 
     delete params.preload
     // Why: preload runs in the page's main world before inline scripts can call window.close().
-    webPreferences.preload = browserWindowClosePreload
+    webPreferences.preload = isDocPreviewAttach ? docPreviewLinkPreload : browserWindowClosePreload
     // Why: older Electron builds expose preloadURL alongside preload; delete both so the guest can't inherit the main preload bridge.
     delete (webPreferences as Record<string, unknown>).preloadURL
     // Why delete something Electron does not set: 43 does not pass the embedder's
@@ -68,6 +110,17 @@ export function installMainWindowWebviewSecurity(mainWindow: BrowserWindow): voi
   })
 
   mainWindow.webContents.on('did-attach-webview', (_event, guest) => {
+    if (isDocPreviewSession(guest.session)) {
+      // Why: preview guests never join browser-tab routing, popups or anti-detection; the
+      // workspace-doc profile is what refuses all three. The attach is also the point a live window
+      // exists to receive read failures for that guest.
+      setDocPreviewFailureSink(mainWindow.webContents)
+      browserManager.attachGuestPolicies(guest, null, {
+        profile: 'workspace-doc',
+        host: mainWindow.webContents
+      })
+      return
+    }
     // Why: attach guest popup/nav policy at creation; waiting for renderer registration races target=_blank/early redirects past it.
     browserManager.attachGuestPolicies(guest)
     // Why: route guests override the generic popup fallback and stay blank until exact main-owned registration.

src/preload/api-types.ts

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ import type { BrowserApi } from './api/browser-api'
 import type { CliApi } from './api/cli-install-api'
 import type { CrashReportsApi, FeedbackApi } from './api/crash-report-api'
 import type { DashboardApi, TerminalPreviewApi } from './api/dashboard-api'
+import type { DocPreviewApi } from './api/doc-preview-api'
 import type { EmulatorApi } from './api/emulator-api'
 import type { EphemeralVmApi } from './api/ephemeral-vm-api'
 import type { ExportApi, FilesystemApi } from './api/filesystem-api'
@@ -125,6 +126,7 @@ export type PreloadApi = {
   remoteWorkspace: WorkspaceSessionApi['remoteWorkspace']
   updater: UpdaterApi
   notebook: FilesystemApi['notebook']
+  docPreview: DocPreviewApi['docPreview']
   stats: StatsApi
   memory: MemoryApi
   claudeUsage: ClaudeUsageApi

src/preload/api/doc-preview-api.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+import type { DocPreviewFailure } from '../../shared/doc-preview-scheme'
+
+export type DocPreviewGrantOwner =
+  | { kind: 'ssh'; connectionId: string }
+  | {
+      kind: 'runtime'
+      environmentId: string
+      worktreeSelector: string
+      worktreeRoot: string
+    }
+
+export type DocPreviewGrantRequest = {
+  owner: DocPreviewGrantOwner
+  root: string
+  entryRelativePath: string
+  /** Browser page the document is being opened in; main registers its guest under this id. */
+  browserPageId: string
+}
+
+export type DocPreviewApi = {
+  docPreview: {
+    mintGrant: (request: DocPreviewGrantRequest) => Promise<{ grantId: string; url: string }>
+    revokeGrant: (grantId: string) => Promise<boolean>
+    /** External link the preview guest tried to open; the renderer turns it into a browser tab. */
+    onExternalLink: (callback: (payload: { url: string }) => void) => () => void
+    /** Why the guest is showing an error body instead of the document. */
+    onLoadFailure: (callback: (payload: DocPreviewFailure) => void) => () => void
+  }
+}

src/preload/doc-preview-link-interception.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+// @vitest-environment happy-dom
+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
+import { DOC_PREVIEW_LINK_CLICK_CHANNEL } from '../shared/doc-preview-scheme'
+import {
+  handleDocPreviewLinkAuxClick,
+  handleDocPreviewLinkClick,
+  installDocPreviewLinkInterception,
+  PRELOAD_DOC_PREVIEW_LINK_CLICK_CHANNEL
+} from './doc-preview-link-interception'
+
+const PREVIEW_GRANT_ID = 'a'.repeat(32)
+
+let report: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn<(url: string) => void>>
+
+/** The URL the guest is actually on, which is what decides whether an href is a pure fragment. */
+function documentUrl(): string {
+  return window.location.href
+}
+
+function loadPreviewDocument(body: string): void {
+  document.body.innerHTML = body
+  report = vi.fn<(url: string) => void>()
+}
+
+/**
+ * An SVG anchor around a hit target, built rather than parsed: the href is an SVGAnimatedString
+ * carrying the raw attribute, which is what a plain string read misses and the environment does
+ * not model.
+ */
+function loadSvgAnchorDocument(href: string): void {
+  loadPreviewDocument('<div id="host"></div>')
+  const svgNamespace = 'http://www.w3.org/2000/svg'
+  const anchor = document.createElementNS(svgNamespace, 'a')
+  anchor.setAttribute('href', href)
+  Object.defineProperty(anchor, 'href', { value: { baseVal: href } })
+  const hit = document.createElementNS(svgNamespace, 'rect')
+  hit.setAttribute('id', 'svg-hit')
+  anchor.appendChild(hit)
+  const svg = document.createElementNS(svgNamespace, 'svg')
+  svg.appendChild(anchor)
+  document.getElementById('host')!.appendChild(svg)
+}
+
+/**
+ * Dispatches through the same capture-phase listener the preload installs, but registered for one
+ * press only — a document-level listener left behind would answer every later test's clicks too.
+ */
+function dispatch(selector: string, event: MouseEvent): MouseEvent {
+  const onClick = (candidate: Event): void => handleDocPreviewLinkClick(candidate, report)
+  const onAuxClick = (candidate: Event): void =>
+    handleDocPreviewLinkAuxClick(candidate as MouseEvent)
+  document.addEventListener('click', onClick, true)
+  document.addEventListener('auxclick', onAuxClick, true)
+  try {
+    document.querySelector(selector)!.dispatchEvent(event)
+  } finally {
+    document.removeEventListener('click', onClick, true)
+    document.removeEventListener('auxclick', onAuxClick, true)
+  }
+  return event
+}
+
+/** Chromium's own press. Nothing a document can dispatch carries this. */
+function pressTrusted(selector: string, init: MouseEventInit = {}): MouseEvent {
+  const event = new MouseEvent('click', { bubbles: true, cancelable: true, ...init })
+  Object.defineProperty(event, 'isTrusted', { configurable: true, value: true })
+  return dispatch(selector, event)
+}
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  // Why: the module decides "sibling document" and "pure fragment" against the URL the guest is
+  // really on, which in a preview is always the preview scheme.
+  ;(window as never as { happyDOM: { setURL: (url: string) => void } }).happyDOM.setURL(
+    `orca-preview://${PREVIEW_GRANT_ID}/index.html`
+  )
+  vi.restoreAllMocks()
+})
+
+describe('doc preview link interception', () => {
+  it('sends on exactly the channel main listens on', () => {
+    expect(PRELOAD_DOC_PREVIEW_LINK_CLICK_CHANNEL).toBe(DOC_PREVIEW_LINK_CLICK_CHANNEL)
+  })
+
+  it('listens for both press kinds in the capture phase, so the document cannot consume them first', () => {
+    // Why not let it register: a document-level listener would survive into every later press here.
+    const addEventListener = vi.spyOn(document, 'addEventListener').mockImplementation(() => {})
+
+    installDocPreviewLinkInterception(vi.fn())
+
+    expect(addEventListener.mock.calls.map(([type, , options]) => [type, options])).toEqual([
+      ['click', true],
+      ['auxclick', true]
+    ])
+  })
+
+  // Why the headline: this is the whole point of the design. A document that can read its grant
+  // must not be able to hand it to a browser tab by synthesizing the reader's click.
+  it('routes nothing for a click the document dispatched itself', () => {
+    loadPreviewDocument('<a id="external" href="https://attacker.test/?d=secret">go</a>')
+
+    const scripted = new MouseEvent('click', { bubbles: true, cancelable: true })
+    // Why set it: this is what Chromium stamps on anything a document dispatches, and the test
+    // environment leaves the property off entirely.
+    Object.defineProperty(scripted, 'isTrusted', { configurable: true, value: false })
+
+    const event = dispatch('#external', scripted)
+
+    expect(event.isTrusted).toBe(false)
+    expect(report).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    expect(event.defaultPrevented).toBe(false)
+  })
+
+  it('reports a trusted press on an external anchor exactly once and stops the navigation', () => {
+    loadPreviewDocument('<a id="external" href="https://example.com/docs">go</a>')
+
+    const event = pressTrusted('#external')
+
+    expect(report).toHaveBeenCalledExactlyOnceWith('https://example.com/docs')
+    expect(event.defaultPrevented).toBe(true)
+  })
+
+  it('reports the anchor even when the press landed on what it wraps', () => {
+    loadPreviewDocument('<a href="https://example.com/docs"><span id="inner">go</span></a>')
+
+    pressTrusted('#inner')
+
+    expect(report).toHaveBeenCalledExactlyOnceWith('https://example.com/docs')
+  })
+
+  // Why: an SVG anchor's href is an SVGAnimatedString, so reading it as a string finds nothing and
+  // the link would fall through to the guest's navigation guard and die there.
+  it('reports an SVG anchor by its animated href', () => {
+    loadSvgAnchorDocument('https://example.com/chart')
+
+    pressTrusted('#svg-hit')
+
+    expect(report).toHaveBeenCalledExactlyOnceWith('https://example.com/chart')
+  })
+
+  // Why these three: baseVal is the raw attribute, so an unresolved read sends a relative sibling
+  // out to a browser tab, drops SVG fragment links on the floor, and turns a rooted path into a
+  // file URL the guest refuses — each one a divergence from the identical HTML anchor.
+  it('leaves a relative SVG link to the guest, the same as the HTML anchor beside it', () => {
+    loadSvgAnchorDocument('guide.html')
+
+    const event = pressTrusted('#svg-hit')
+
+    expect(report).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    expect(event.defaultPrevented).toBe(false)
+  })
+
+  it('scrolls to an SVG fragment target instead of routing it', () => {
+    loadSvgAnchorDocument('#section-2')
+    const target = document.createElement('h2')
+    target.id = 'section-2'
+    document.body.appendChild(target)
+    const scrollIntoView = vi.spyOn(target, 'scrollIntoView')
+
+    const event = pressTrusted('#svg-hit')
+
+    expect(scrollIntoView).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
+    expect(report).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    expect(event.defaultPrevented).toBe(true)
+  })
+
+  it('scrolls to the top for a bare # on an SVG anchor', () => {
+    loadSvgAnchorDocument('#')
+    const scrollTo = vi.spyOn(window, 'scrollTo').mockImplementation(() => {})
+
+    pressTrusted('#svg-hit')
+
+    expect(scrollTo).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
+    expect(report).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('keeps a rooted SVG link inside the preview rather than reading it as a filesystem path', () => {
+    loadSvgAnchorDocument('/assets/a.html')
+
+    const event = pressTrusted('#svg-hit')
+
+    expect(report).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    expect(event.defaultPrevented).toBe(false)
+  })
+
+  it('leaves a sibling preview document to the guest, which its policy already permits', () => {
+    loadPreviewDocument(
+      `<a id="sibling" href="orca-preview://${PREVIEW_GRANT_ID}/guide.html">guide</a>`
+    )
+
+    const event = pressTrusted('#sibling')
+
+    expect(report).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    expect(event.defaultPrevented).toBe(false)
+  })
+
+  it('scrolls to a fragment target in the document instead of routing it', () => {
+    loadPreviewDocument(
+      `<a id="jump" href="${documentUrl()}#section">jump</a><h2 id="section">s</h2>`
+    )
+    const scrollIntoView = vi.spyOn(document.getElementById('section')!, 'scrollIntoView')
+
+    const event = pressTrusted('#jump')
+
+    expect(scrollIntoView).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
+    expect(report).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    expect(event.defaultPrevented).toBe(true)
+  })
+
+  it('finds a fragment target whose id the href percent-encoded', () => {
+    loadPreviewDocument(`<a id="jump" href="${documentUrl()}#a%20b">jump</a><h2 id="a b">s</h2>`)
+    const scrollIntoView = vi.spyOn(document.getElementById('a b')!, 'scrollIntoView')
+
+    pressTrusted('#jump')
+
+    expect(scrollIntoView).toHaveBeenCalledOnce()
+    expect(report).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('scrolls to the top for a bare # and for #top with nothing carrying that id', () => {
+    loadPreviewDocument(
+      `<a id="hash" href="#">top</a><a id="named" href="${documentUrl()}#top">top</a>`
+    )
+    const scrollTo = vi.spyOn(window, 'scrollTo').mockImplementation(() => {})
+
+    pressTrusted('#hash')
+    pressTrusted('#named')
+
+    expect(scrollTo).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2)
+    expect(report).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+  })
+
+  it('routes a fragment href that belongs to another document', () => {
+    loadPreviewDocument('<a id="other" href="https://example.com/page#section">go</a>')
+
+    pressTrusted('#other')
+
+    expect(report).toHaveBeenCalledExactlyOnceWith('https://example.com/page#section')
+  })
+
+  it('opens nothing for a middle click on a link', () => {
+    loadPreviewDocument('<a id="external" href="https://example.com/docs">go</a>')
+    const event = new MouseEvent('auxclick', { bubbles: true, button: 1, cancelable: true })
+    Object.defineProperty(event, 'isTrusted', { configurable: true, value: true })
+
+    dispatch('#external', event)
+
+    expect(report).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    expect(event.defaultPrevented).toBe(true)
+  })
+
+  it('leaves a middle click the document dispatched itself alone', () => {
+    loadPreviewDocument('<a id="external" href="https://example.com/docs">go</a>')
+    const event = new MouseEvent('auxclick', { bubbles: true, button: 1, cancelable: true })
+    Object.defineProperty(event, 'isTrusted', { configurable: true, value: false })
+
+    dispatch('#external', event)
+
+    expect(event.defaultPrevented).toBe(false)
+  })
+
+  it('ignores a press that is not on a link at all', () => {
+    loadPreviewDocument('<p id="text">nothing here</p>')
+
+    const event = pressTrusted('#text')
+
+    expect(report).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    expect(event.defaultPrevented).toBe(false)
+  })
+})

src/preload/doc-preview-link-interception.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+/**
+ * Decides what a click inside a preview guest means. This is the only way a URL leaves the
+ * preview, so it answers for a click the reader really made: navigation the document starts by
+ * itself never reaches here, and the guest's navigation policy refuses it outright.
+ *
+ * Runs in the guest's isolated world and exposes nothing to page script — the document cannot see
+ * these listeners, remove them, or call what they call.
+ */
+export type DocPreviewExternalLinkReporter = (url: string) => void
+
+/**
+ * Why the channel name is written out rather than imported: this module is bundled into a
+ * sandboxed preload, whose `require` resolves only 'electron', so an import of shared code emits a
+ * chunk require the guest cannot load. The test pins it to the constant main listens on.
+ */
+export const PRELOAD_DOC_PREVIEW_LINK_CLICK_CHANNEL = 'docPreview:linkClick'
+
+/** Why not `instanceof HTMLAnchorElement`: an SVG `<a>` is an anchor too, and carries an SVGAnimatedString href. */
+function readAnchorHref(node: EventTarget): string | null {
+  const element = node as { tagName?: unknown; href?: unknown }
+  if (typeof element.tagName !== 'string' || element.tagName.toUpperCase() !== 'A') {
+    return null
+  }
+  if (typeof element.href === 'string') {
+    return element.href.length > 0 ? element.href : null
+  }
+  const baseVal = (element.href as { baseVal?: unknown } | null | undefined)?.baseVal
+  if (typeof baseVal !== 'string' || baseVal.length === 0) {
+    return null
+  }
+  // Why resolved here: baseVal is the raw attribute, unlike an HTML anchor's absolute href, so
+  // every branch below would read an SVG link differently from the identical HTML one.
+  try {
+    return new URL(baseVal, window.location.href).toString()
+  } catch {
+    return null
+  }
+}
+
+/** Why the composed path and not `event.target`: the press lands on whatever the anchor wraps, shadow roots included. */
+function findClickedAnchor(event: Event): { element: EventTarget; href: string } | null {
+  for (const node of event.composedPath()) {
+    const href = readAnchorHref(node)
+    if (href !== null) {
+      return { element: node, href }
+    }
+  }
+  return null
+}
+
+function scrollToDocumentTop(): void {
+  window.scrollTo(0, 0)
+}
+
+function readAttribute(element: EventTarget, name: string): string | null {
+  const candidate = element as { getAttribute?: (attribute: string) => string | null }
+  return typeof candidate.getAttribute === 'function' ? candidate.getAttribute(name) : null
+}
+
+function scrollToFragment(fragment: string): void {
+  let target = document.getElementById(fragment)
+  if (!target) {
+    try {
+      target = document.getElementById(decodeURIComponent(fragment))
+    } catch {
+      target = null
+    }
+  }
+  if (target) {
+    target.scrollIntoView()
+    return
+  }
+  // Why: `#top` names the top of the document even when nothing carries that id.
+  if (fragment === 'top') {
+    scrollToDocumentTop()
+  }
+}
+
+/** True when the href only moves within the document already on screen, which this handles itself. */
+function handleInDocumentFragment(element: EventTarget, href: string): boolean {
+  if (readAttribute(element, 'href') === '#') {
+    scrollToDocumentTop()
+    return true
+  }
+  const hashIndex = href.indexOf('#')
+  if (hashIndex === -1) {
+    return false
+  }
+  const currentHref = window.location.href
+  const currentHashIndex = currentHref.indexOf('#')
+  const currentBase = currentHashIndex === -1 ? currentHref : currentHref.slice(0, currentHashIndex)
+  if (href.slice(0, hashIndex) !== currentBase) {
+    return false
+  }
+  scrollToFragment(href.slice(hashIndex + 1))
+  return true
+}
+
+function isSameSchemeAsDocument(href: string): boolean {
+  try {
+    return new URL(href).protocol === window.location.protocol
+  } catch {
+    return false
+  }
+}
+
+export function handleDocPreviewLinkClick(
+  event: Event,
+  report: DocPreviewExternalLinkReporter
+): void {
+  // Why first: a click the page dispatched is the document asking to leave, not the reader.
+  if (!event.isTrusted) {
+    return
+  }
+  const anchor = findClickedAnchor(event)
+  if (!anchor) {
+    return
+  }
+  if (handleInDocumentFragment(anchor.element, anchor.href)) {
+    event.preventDefault()
+    return
+  }
+  // Why left alone: a link served the way this document was is a sibling preview document, which
+  // the guest policy already answers for — it navigates natively and the preview keeps its history.
+  if (isSameSchemeAsDocument(anchor.href)) {
+    return
+  }
+  event.preventDefault()
+  report(anchor.href)
+}
+
+export function handleDocPreviewLinkAuxClick(event: MouseEvent): void {
+  if (!event.isTrusted || event.button !== 1) {
+    return
+  }
+  if (!findClickedAnchor(event)) {
+    return
+  }
+  // Why swallowed rather than routed: a middle click asks for a background tab, and honouring it
+  // would let one press the reader barely registered open a browser tab.
+  event.preventDefault()
+}
+
+export function installDocPreviewLinkInterception(report: DocPreviewExternalLinkReporter): void {
+  // Why capture: the document's own handlers must not be able to consume the press first.
+  document.addEventListener('click', (event) => handleDocPreviewLinkClick(event, report), true)
+  document.addEventListener(
+    'auxclick',
+    (event) => handleDocPreviewLinkAuxClick(event as MouseEvent),
+    true
+  )
+}

src/preload/doc-preview-link.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+import {
+  installDocPreviewLinkInterception,
+  PRELOAD_DOC_PREVIEW_LINK_CLICK_CHANNEL
+} from './doc-preview-link-interception'
+
+// Why: raw require keeps the sandboxed preload standalone in the main-process CJS build.
+const { ipcRenderer } = require('electron') as {
+  ipcRenderer: { send: (channel: string, ...args: unknown[]) => void }
+}
+
+// Why no contextBridge: the document must not be able to call this. The listeners live in the
+// isolated world, and main still refuses any report that does not come from a focused preview guest.
+installDocPreviewLinkInterception((url) => {
+  ipcRenderer.send(PRELOAD_DOC_PREVIEW_LINK_CLICK_CHANNEL, url)
+})

src/preload/index.ts

@@ -8,6 +8,14 @@ import type {
   SkillDeleteRequest,
   SkillDeleteResult
 } from '../shared/skill-delete-contract'
+import {
+  DOC_PREVIEW_EXTERNAL_LINK_CHANNEL,
+  DOC_PREVIEW_LOAD_FAILURE_CHANNEL,
+  DOC_PREVIEW_MINT_GRANT_CHANNEL,
+  DOC_PREVIEW_REVOKE_GRANT_CHANNEL,
+  type DocPreviewFailure
+} from '../shared/doc-preview-scheme'
+import type { DocPreviewGrantRequest } from './api/doc-preview-api'
 import type { AppIdentity } from '../shared/app-identity'
 import type { MacCapturedDigitRowChord } from '../shared/macos-symbolic-hotkeys'
 import type { ComputerAwakeStatus } from '../shared/computer-awake-mode'
@@ -3322,6 +3330,25 @@ const api = {
     }
   } satisfies PreloadApi['updater'],
 
+  docPreview: {
+    mintGrant: (request: DocPreviewGrantRequest): Promise<{ grantId: string; url: string }> =>
+      ipcRenderer.invoke(DOC_PREVIEW_MINT_GRANT_CHANNEL, request),
+    revokeGrant: (grantId: string): Promise<boolean> =>
+      ipcRenderer.invoke(DOC_PREVIEW_REVOKE_GRANT_CHANNEL, grantId),
+    onExternalLink: (callback: (payload: { url: string }) => void): (() => void) => {
+      const listener = (_event: Electron.IpcRendererEvent, payload: { url: string }): void =>
+        callback(payload)
+      ipcRenderer.on(DOC_PREVIEW_EXTERNAL_LINK_CHANNEL, listener)
+      return () => ipcRenderer.removeListener(DOC_PREVIEW_EXTERNAL_LINK_CHANNEL, listener)
+    },
+    onLoadFailure: (callback: (payload: DocPreviewFailure) => void): (() => void) => {
+      const listener = (_event: Electron.IpcRendererEvent, payload: DocPreviewFailure): void =>
+        callback(payload)
+      ipcRenderer.on(DOC_PREVIEW_LOAD_FAILURE_CHANNEL, listener)
+      return () => ipcRenderer.removeListener(DOC_PREVIEW_LOAD_FAILURE_CHANNEL, listener)
+    }
+  },
+
   notebook: {
     runPythonCell: (args: {
       filePath: string

src/relay/agent-hook-endpoint-coordinates.ts

@@ -4,7 +4,10 @@
 import { basename, dirname, join } from 'node:path'
 import { homedir } from 'node:os'
 
-import { ORCA_HOOK_PROTOCOL_VERSION } from '../shared/agent-hook-types'
+import {
+  ORCA_HOOK_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+  ORCA_HOOK_RAW_JSON_TRANSPORT
+} from '../shared/agent-hook-types'
 
 // Why: relay's userData equivalent under $HOME so each user on a shared dev box gets their own 0o700 dir.
 const RELAY_HOOKS_DIR_NAME = '.orca-relay'
@@ -49,7 +52,8 @@ export function buildRelayHookPtyEnv(coordinates: {
     ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_PORT: String(coordinates.port),
     ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TOKEN: coordinates.token,
     ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_ENV: coordinates.env,
-    ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_VERSION: ORCA_HOOK_PROTOCOL_VERSION
+    ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_VERSION: ORCA_HOOK_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+    ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TRANSPORT: ORCA_HOOK_RAW_JSON_TRANSPORT
   }
   if (coordinates.endpointFileWritten) {
     env.ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_ENDPOINT = coordinates.endpointFilePath

src/relay/agent-hook-server.test.ts

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import { endpointDirForRelaySocket } from './agent-hook-endpoint-coordinates'
 import type { AgentHookRelayEnvelope } from '../shared/agent-hook-relay'
 import { makePaneKey } from '../shared/stable-pane-id'
 import * as agentHookListener from '../shared/agent-hook-listener/grok-result-discovery'
+import { HOOK_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES } from '../shared/agent-hook-listener/request-body'
 
 const LEAF_ID = '11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111'
 const PANE_KEY = makePaneKey('tab-1', LEAF_ID)
@@ -42,7 +43,7 @@ describe('RelayAgentHookServer', () => {
     expect(endpointDir).not.toContain('\\\\.\\pipe')
   })
 
-  it('forwards a parsed Claude UserPromptSubmit POST as a normalized envelope', async () => {
+  it('forwards a raw Claude JSON POST with base64 metadata headers', async () => {
     const forward = vi.fn<(envelope: AgentHookRelayEnvelope) => void>()
     const server = new RelayAgentHookServer({ endpointDir: dir, forward })
     await server.start()
@@ -52,16 +53,13 @@ describe('RelayAgentHookServer', () => {
         method: 'POST',
         headers: {
           'Content-Type': 'application/json',
-          'X-Orca-Agent-Hook-Token': token
+          'X-Orca-Agent-Hook-Token': token,
+          'X-Orca-Agent-Hook-Meta-Encoding': 'base64',
+          'X-Orca-Agent-Hook-Meta': Buffer.from(
+            [PANE_KEY, 'tab-1', '', 'wt-1', 'remote', '1'].join('\x1f')
+          ).toString('base64')
         },
-        body: JSON.stringify({
-          paneKey: PANE_KEY,
-          tabId: 'tab-1',
-          worktreeId: 'wt-1',
-          env: 'remote',
-          version: '1',
-          payload: { hook_event_name: 'UserPromptSubmit', prompt: 'hi' }
-        })
+        body: JSON.stringify({ hook_event_name: 'UserPromptSubmit', prompt: 'hi' })
       })
       expect(res.status).toBe(204)
       expect(forward).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
@@ -330,6 +328,27 @@ describe('RelayAgentHookServer', () => {
     }
   })
 
+  it('rejects unknown hook paths before parsing the request body', async () => {
+    const forward = vi.fn()
+    const server = new RelayAgentHookServer({ endpointDir: dir, forward })
+    await server.start()
+    try {
+      const { port, token } = server.getCoordinates()
+      const res = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/hook/unknown`, {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: {
+          'Content-Type': 'application/json',
+          'X-Orca-Agent-Hook-Token': token
+        },
+        body: JSON.stringify({ value: 'x'.repeat(HOOK_REQUEST_MAX_BYTES + 1) })
+      })
+      expect(res.status).toBe(404)
+      expect(forward).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    } finally {
+      server.stop()
+    }
+  })
+
   it('replays cached payloads on demand', async () => {
     const forward = vi.fn<(envelope: AgentHookRelayEnvelope) => void>()
     const server = new RelayAgentHookServer({ endpointDir: dir, forward })
@@ -492,6 +511,7 @@ describe('RelayAgentHookServer', () => {
       expect(env.ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TOKEN).toBeTruthy()
       expect(env.ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_ENV).toBe('remote')
       expect(env.ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_VERSION).toBe('1')
+      expect(env.ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_TRANSPORT).toBe('raw-json-v1')
       expect(env.ORCA_AGENT_HOOK_ENDPOINT).toBeTruthy()
     } finally {
       server.stop()

src/relay/agent-hook-server.ts

@@ -2,7 +2,10 @@ import { createServer, type IncomingMessage, type ServerResponse } from 'node:ht
 import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto'
 import { join } from 'node:path'
 
-import { ORCA_HOOK_PROTOCOL_VERSION } from '../shared/agent-hook-types'
+import {
+  ORCA_HOOK_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+  ORCA_HOOK_RAW_JSON_TRANSPORT
+} from '../shared/agent-hook-types'
 import {
   clearAllListenerCaches,
   clearPaneCacheState,
@@ -15,6 +18,7 @@ import {
 } from '../shared/agent-hook-listener/endpoint-publication'
 import { HOOK_REQUEST_SLOWLORIS_MS } from '../shared/agent-hook-listener/listener-limits'
 import { normalizeHookPayload } from '../shared/agent-hook-listener'
+import { mergeAgentHookRequestHeaders } from '../shared/agent-hook-listener/hook-envelope'
 import { readRequestBody } from '../shared/agent-hook-listener/request-body'
 import { resolveHookSource } from '../shared/agent-hook-listener/source-routing'
 import type { AgentHookEventPayload } from '../shared/agent-hook-listener/listener-event'
@@ -174,7 +178,8 @@ export class RelayAgentHookServer {
       port: this.port,
       token: this.token,
       env: this.env,
-      version: ORCA_HOOK_PROTOCOL_VERSION
+      version: ORCA_HOOK_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+      transport: ORCA_HOOK_RAW_JSON_TRANSPORT
     })
     return this.endpointFileWritten
   }
@@ -252,7 +257,6 @@ export class RelayAgentHookServer {
       req.destroy()
     })
     try {
-      const body = await readRequestBody(req)
       const pathname = new URL(req.url ?? '/', 'http://127.0.0.1').pathname
       const source = resolveHookSource(pathname)
       if (!source) {
@@ -260,16 +264,18 @@ export class RelayAgentHookServer {
         res.end()
         return
       }
-      const event = normalizeHookPayload(this.state, source, body, this.env, {
+      const body = await readRequestBody(req)
+      const hookBody = mergeAgentHookRequestHeaders(body, req.headers)
+      const event = normalizeHookPayload(this.state, source, hookBody, this.env, {
         deferCompactOwnershipToClient: true
       })
       if (event) {
         // TODO: once normalizeHookPayload returns validated env/version, drop bodyEnv/bodyVersion and source them from the listener result.
-        const env = hookBodyEnv(body)
-        const version = hookBodyVersion(body)
+        const env = hookBodyEnv(hookBody)
+        const version = hookBodyVersion(hookBody)
         this.applyEvent(event, source, env, version)
-        this.retryScheduler.scheduleAssistantMessageRetry(source, body, event, env, version)
-        this.retryScheduler.scheduleCodexSubagentPoll(source, body, event, env, version)
+        this.retryScheduler.scheduleAssistantMessageRetry(source, hookBody, event, env, version)
+        this.retryScheduler.scheduleCodexSubagentPoll(source, hookBody, event, env, version)
       }
       res.writeHead(204)
       res.end()

src/renderer/src/components/browser-pane/ClientHostedBrowserPagePane.tsx

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import { ClientHostedBrowserUnavailableNotice } from './client-hosted-browser-un
 import { useRestoredClientHostedRecoveryWindow } from './restored-client-hosted-recovery-window'
 import BrowserFind from './assemble-chrome/BrowserFind'
 import { BrowserNavigationControlRow } from './assemble-chrome/browser-navigation-control-row'
+import BrowserAddressBar from './assemble-chrome/BrowserAddressBar'
 import { BrowserPageContextMenu } from './assemble-chrome/browser-page-context-menu'
 import { useBrowserPageChromeFocus } from './assemble-chrome/use-browser-page-chrome-focus'
 import { useBrowserAddressBarEditSession } from './assemble-chrome/use-browser-address-bar-edit-session'
@@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ export function ClientHostedBrowserPagePane({
 
   const navigateToUrl = useCallback(
     (value: string) => {
-      const submission = resolveBrowserAddressBarSubmission(value)
+      const submission = resolveBrowserAddressBarSubmission(value, { allowFileUrls: false })
       if (submission.status === 'invalid') {
         onUpdatePageState(browserTab.id, { loadError: submission.loadError })
         return
@@ -367,18 +368,23 @@ export function ClientHostedBrowserPagePane({
             reload: () => reload.runReloadTrigger('button'),
             navigate: navigateToUrl
           }}
-          addressBarValue={addressBarValue}
-          onAddressBarChange={setAddressBarValue}
-          onSubmitAddressBar={() => navigateToUrl(addressBarValue)}
-          addressBarInputRef={addressBarInputRef}
-          addressBarEditSession={addressBarEditSession}
-          reloadLabel={reload.reloadButtonLabel}
-          addressBarLeadingIcon={
-            <RemoteRuntimeEgressIndicator
-              runtimeEnvironmentId={runtimeEnvironmentId}
-              presentation="client-hosted"
+          addressSlot={
+            <BrowserAddressBar
+              value={addressBarValue}
+              onChange={setAddressBarValue}
+              onSubmit={() => navigateToUrl(addressBarValue)}
+              onNavigate={navigateToUrl}
+              inputRef={addressBarInputRef}
+              editSession={addressBarEditSession}
+              leadingIcon={
+                <RemoteRuntimeEgressIndicator
+                  runtimeEnvironmentId={runtimeEnvironmentId}
+                  presentation="client-hosted"
+                />
+              }
             />
           }
+          reloadLabel={reload.reloadButtonLabel}
         />
       </div>
       <div ref={viewportRef} className="relative min-h-0 flex-1 overflow-hidden bg-background">

src/renderer/src/components/browser-pane/annotate/browser-guest-annotate-overlays.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,189 @@
+import type { MutableRefObject, RefObject } from 'react'
+import { Copy, Image } from 'lucide-react'
+import {
+  DropdownMenu,
+  DropdownMenuContent,
+  DropdownMenuItem,
+  DropdownMenuSeparator,
+  DropdownMenuShortcut,
+  DropdownMenuTrigger
+} from '@/components/ui/dropdown-menu'
+import { translate } from '@/i18n/i18n'
+import { MarkupOverlay } from './MarkupOverlay'
+import type { MarkupModeController } from './useMarkupMode'
+import type { GrabModeHook } from './useGrabMode'
+import {
+  getBrowserOverlayAnchor,
+  type BrowserOverlayViewport
+} from '../describe-page/browser-annotation-geometry'
+import { BrowserPageAnnotationTray } from './browser-page-annotation-tray'
+import { BrowserPageGrabToast } from './browser-page-grab-toast'
+import { PendingBrowserAnnotationCard } from './pending-browser-annotation-card'
+import type { useBrowserPageAnnotationSend } from './use-browser-page-annotation-send'
+import type { useBrowserPageGrabAnnotations } from './use-browser-page-grab-annotations'
+
+/**
+ * Everything the annotate and markup tools paint over a guest: the draw surface, the pending
+ * comment card, the annotation tray, the right-click grab menu and the inline confirmation toast.
+ *
+ * Shared because these overlays are the other half of the toolbar's tool cluster — a surface that
+ * offers the tools but not these would arm a picker whose result the reader could never see.
+ */
+export function BrowserGuestAnnotateOverlays({
+  markup,
+  grab,
+  annotationSend,
+  grabAnnotations,
+  containerRef,
+  webviewRef,
+  browserOverlayViewport,
+  worktreeId
+}: {
+  markup: MarkupModeController
+  grab: GrabModeHook
+  annotationSend: ReturnType<typeof useBrowserPageAnnotationSend>
+  grabAnnotations: ReturnType<typeof useBrowserPageGrabAnnotations>
+  containerRef: RefObject<HTMLDivElement | null>
+  webviewRef: MutableRefObject<Electron.WebviewTag | null>
+  browserOverlayViewport: BrowserOverlayViewport
+  worktreeId: string
+}): React.JSX.Element {
+  const {
+    pendingAnnotationPayload,
+    handleAddBrowserAnnotation,
+    handleCancelPendingBrowserAnnotation,
+    grabIntent,
+    grabMenuActionTakenRef,
+    handleGrabCopy,
+    handleGrabCopyScreenshot,
+    grabToast,
+    grabToastTimerRef,
+    dismissGrabToast,
+    setGrabToast
+  } = grabAnnotations
+  const {
+    browserAnnotations,
+    browserAnnotationTrayOpen,
+    annotationTraySendOpen,
+    handleAnnotationTraySendOpenChange,
+    activeGroupId,
+    browserAnnotationsPrompt,
+    handleBrowserAnnotationsSentToAgent,
+    handleCopyBrowserAnnotations,
+    browserAnnotationsCopied,
+    handleClearBrowserAnnotations,
+    handleDeleteBrowserAnnotation
+  } = annotationSend
+
+  return (
+    <>
+      {markup.isActive && markup.baseImage ? (
+        <MarkupOverlay
+          baseImage={markup.baseImage}
+          busy={markup.state === 'composing'}
+          onComplete={(input) => void markup.complete(input)}
+          onCancel={markup.cancel}
+        />
+      ) : null}
+      {pendingAnnotationPayload ? (
+        <PendingBrowserAnnotationCard
+          payload={pendingAnnotationPayload}
+          anchor={getBrowserOverlayAnchor(
+            pendingAnnotationPayload,
+            containerRef.current,
+            webviewRef.current,
+            browserOverlayViewport
+          )}
+          portalContainer={containerRef.current}
+          onAdd={handleAddBrowserAnnotation}
+          onCancel={handleCancelPendingBrowserAnnotation}
+        />
+      ) : null}
+      {browserAnnotations.length > 0 && browserAnnotationTrayOpen ? (
+        <BrowserPageAnnotationTray
+          browserAnnotations={browserAnnotations}
+          annotationTraySendOpen={annotationTraySendOpen}
+          handleAnnotationTraySendOpenChange={handleAnnotationTraySendOpenChange}
+          worktreeId={worktreeId}
+          activeGroupId={activeGroupId}
+          browserAnnotationsPrompt={browserAnnotationsPrompt}
+          handleBrowserAnnotationsSentToAgent={handleBrowserAnnotationsSentToAgent}
+          handleCopyBrowserAnnotations={handleCopyBrowserAnnotations}
+          browserAnnotationsCopied={browserAnnotationsCopied}
+          handleClearBrowserAnnotations={handleClearBrowserAnnotations}
+          handleDeleteBrowserAnnotation={handleDeleteBrowserAnnotation}
+        />
+      ) : null}
+      {/* Right-click context dropdown, positioned at the grabbed element's center. */}
+      <DropdownMenu
+        open={grab.state === 'confirming' && grab.contextMenu && grabIntent === 'copy'}
+        onOpenChange={(open) => {
+          if (!open && grab.state === 'confirming') {
+            // Why: skip rearm if a menu action already handled it — see grabMenuActionTakenRef.
+            if (grabMenuActionTakenRef.current) {
+              grabMenuActionTakenRef.current = false
+              return
+            }
+            grab.rearm()
+          }
+        }}
+      >
+        <DropdownMenuTrigger asChild>
+          <button
+            aria-hidden
+            tabIndex={-1}
+            className="pointer-events-none absolute size-px opacity-0"
+            style={(() => {
+              if (!grab.payload) {
+                return { left: 0, top: 0 }
+              }
+              const rect = grab.payload.target.rectViewport
+              const webview = webviewRef.current
+              const webviewRect = webview?.getBoundingClientRect()
+              const cRect = containerRef.current?.getBoundingClientRect()
+              const offsetX = (webviewRect?.left ?? 0) - (cRect?.left ?? 0)
+              const offsetY = (webviewRect?.top ?? 0) - (cRect?.top ?? 0)
+              return {
+                left: offsetX + rect.x + rect.width / 2,
+                top: offsetY + rect.y + rect.height / 2
+              }
+            })()}
+          />
+        </DropdownMenuTrigger>
+        <DropdownMenuContent align="start" sideOffset={4}>
+          <DropdownMenuItem onSelect={handleGrabCopy}>
+            <Copy className="size-3.5" />
+            {translate('auto.components.browser.pane.BrowserPane.c2ef0359b9', 'Copy Contents')}
+            <DropdownMenuShortcut>C</DropdownMenuShortcut>
+          </DropdownMenuItem>
+          {grab.payload?.screenshot?.dataUrl?.startsWith('data:image/png;base64,') ? (
+            <DropdownMenuItem onSelect={handleGrabCopyScreenshot}>
+              <Image className="size-3.5" />
+              {translate('auto.components.browser.pane.BrowserPane.1ded0d3168', 'Copy Screenshot')}
+              <DropdownMenuShortcut>S</DropdownMenuShortcut>
+            </DropdownMenuItem>
+          ) : null}
+          <DropdownMenuSeparator />
+          <DropdownMenuItem
+            onSelect={() => {
+              grabMenuActionTakenRef.current = true
+              grab.cancel()
+            }}
+          >
+            {translate('auto.components.browser.pane.BrowserPane.fa6ea61de3', 'Cancel')}
+          </DropdownMenuItem>
+        </DropdownMenuContent>
+      </DropdownMenu>
+
+      {/* Inline toast bubble; flips above the element when near the viewport bottom so it doesn't occlude it. */}
+      {grabToast ? (
+        <BrowserPageGrabToast
+          grabToast={grabToast}
+          grabToastTimerRef={grabToastTimerRef}
+          dismissGrabToast={dismissGrabToast}
+          setGrabToast={setGrabToast}
+        />
+      ) : null}
+    </>
+  )
+}

src/renderer/src/components/browser-pane/annotate/browser-page-grab-action.ts

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ export function runBrowserGrabActionShortcut({
   grabIntent,
   grab,
   grabPayloadRef,
-  browserTabIdRef,
+  toolTargetIdRef,
   recordFeatureInteraction,
   showGrabToast
 }: {
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ export function runBrowserGrabActionShortcut({
   grabIntent: GrabIntent
   grab: GrabModeHook
   grabPayloadRef: MutableRefObject<BrowserGrabPayload | null>
-  browserTabIdRef: MutableRefObject<string>
+  toolTargetIdRef: MutableRefObject<string>
   recordFeatureInteraction: (feature: 'browser-grab') => void | Promise<void>
   showGrabToast: (
     message: string,
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ export function runBrowserGrabActionShortcut({
       let result: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof window.api.browser.extractHoverPayload>>
       try {
         result = await window.api.browser.extractHoverPayload({
-          browserPageId: browserTabIdRef.current
+          browserPageId: toolTargetIdRef.current
         })
       } catch {
         // Why: the guest can be destroyed or the IPC channel torn down mid-shortcut; surface it like a miss instead of an unhandled rejection.
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ export function runBrowserGrabActionShortcut({
       if (key === 's') {
         try {
           const ssResult = await window.api.browser.captureSelectionScreenshot({
-            browserPageId: browserTabIdRef.current,
+            browserPageId: toolTargetIdRef.current,
             rect: payload.target.rectViewport
           })
           if (ssResult.ok) {

src/renderer/src/components/browser-pane/annotate/guest-annotation-viewport-bridge.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+import type {
+  BrowserGrabPayload,
+  BrowserPageAnnotation
+} from '../../../../../shared/browser-grab-types'
+
+/**
+ * Push the current annotation set into the guest, where badges render in-page so they track scroll
+ * without a message per frame. Shared by every surface that annotates a guest — the payload is
+ * derived only from the annotations themselves, so the two surfaces cannot disagree about it.
+ */
+export function syncGuestAnnotationViewportBridge({
+  toolTargetId,
+  annotations,
+  pendingPayload,
+  surfaceActive,
+  token
+}: {
+  toolTargetId: string
+  annotations: BrowserPageAnnotation[]
+  pendingPayload: BrowserGrabPayload | null
+  surfaceActive: boolean
+  token: string
+}): void {
+  // Why: existing badges render in-guest for smooth scroll; only the pending dialog needs viewport messages.
+  const markers = annotations.map((annotation, index) => ({
+    id: annotation.id,
+    index,
+    isFixed: annotation.payload.target.isFixed === true,
+    rectPage: annotation.payload.target.rectPage,
+    rectViewport: annotation.payload.target.rectViewport
+  }))
+  void window.api.browser
+    .setAnnotationViewportBridge({
+      browserPageId: toolTargetId,
+      emitViewport: pendingPayload !== null,
+      enabled: surfaceActive && (pendingPayload !== null || markers.length > 0),
+      markers,
+      token
+    })
+    .catch(() => {
+      // The viewport bridge is visual-only; stale markers beat breaking the surface on a destroyed guest.
+    })
+}

src/renderer/src/components/browser-pane/annotate/use-browser-page-grab-annotations.ts

@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ const annotationAddedGrabToastMessage = (): string =>
 
 export function useBrowserPageGrabAnnotations({
   browserTabId,
+  toolTargetId = browserTabId,
   isActive,
   grab,
   containerRef,
@@ -51,7 +52,14 @@ export function useBrowserPageGrabAnnotations({
   browserAnnotationsLength,
   setBrowserAnnotationTrayOpen
 }: {
+  /** Scopes the stored annotations. Stable for the life of the surface. */
   browserTabId: string
+  /**
+   * The id main resolves to a guest. Defaults to the annotation scope, which is the same string
+   * for a browser page — a preview re-mints this on recovery, and its annotations must not be
+   * orphaned when it does.
+   */
+  toolTargetId?: string
   isActive: boolean
   grab: GrabModeHook
   containerRef: MutableRefObject<HTMLDivElement | null>
@@ -75,7 +83,7 @@ export function useBrowserPageGrabAnnotations({
   handleCancelPendingBrowserAnnotation: () => void
   handleGrabActionShortcut: (key: 'c' | 's') => void
 } {
-  const browserTabIdRef = useRef(browserTabId)
+  const toolTargetIdRef = useRef(toolTargetId)
   const grabToastTimerRef = useRef<ReturnType<typeof setTimeout>>(undefined)
   const [grabIntent, setGrabIntent] = useState<GrabIntent>('copy')
   const grabIntentRef = useRef(grabIntent)
@@ -88,12 +96,12 @@ export function useBrowserPageGrabAnnotations({
   const grabPayloadRef = useRef(grab.payload)
 
   useLayoutEffect(() => {
-    browserTabIdRef.current = browserTabId
+    toolTargetIdRef.current = toolTargetId
     grabIntentRef.current = grabIntent
     pendingAnnotationPayloadRef.current = pendingAnnotationPayload
     grabRef.current = grab
     grabPayloadRef.current = grab.payload
-  }, [browserTabId, grab, grabIntent, pendingAnnotationPayload])
+  }, [grab, grabIntent, pendingAnnotationPayload, toolTargetId])
   // Why: Radix fires onOpenChange(false) before onSelect, so this flag lets onOpenChange skip the rearm that would clear the payload first.
   const grabMenuActionTakenRef = useRef(false)
   const recordFeatureInteraction = useAppStore((s) => s.recordFeatureInteraction)
@@ -225,7 +233,7 @@ export function useBrowserPageGrabAnnotations({
         grabIntent,
         grab,
         grabPayloadRef,
-        browserTabIdRef,
+        toolTargetIdRef,
         recordFeatureInteraction,
         showGrabToast
       })