Commit Graph
916 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Neil 362b8b32bb Merge remote-tracking branch 'private/cloud/integration' into cloud/dev-seed-gate
# Conflicts:
#	cloud/apps/sandbox-control/src/index.ts
2026-11-16 01:40:20 -08:00
Neil 1d95740dc5 fix(cloud): every dev-only route and behavior is on only where SANDBOX_ENV is dev, local or test (devOnly allowlist; was 'anything but prod') 2026-11-16 01:34:35 -08:00
Neil 3fee610d06 fix(cloud): the dev GitHub seed route exists only where SANDBOX_ENV is dev, local or test (allowlist; was 'anything but prod') 2026-11-16 01:32:20 -08:00
Neil 80fdb67d64 Merge remote-tracking branch 'private/cloud/integration' into cloud/team-sharing-hold 2026-11-16 01:30:35 -08:00
Neil 6057044fd3 feat(cloud): TEAM-SHARING capability on the single-workspace response too 2026-11-16 01:11:48 -08:00
Neil 3e12a58b15 fix(cloud): TEAM-SHARING a revoke queued while the workspace slept leaves the next session private (queue-time stamp kept; no session = not shared for it) 2026-11-16 01:07:26 -08:00
Neil a7df7fbbc8 fix(cloud): Make private keeps shared credential mode until the next boot too (a private row with a grant revoked this session); tests for it and concurrent sweeps 2026-11-16 01:06:01 -08:00
Neil 62881cb01e test(cloud): GIT-ACTOR read-count test's synthetic ids can no longer collide with the real one (flaky)
(cherry picked from commit e735f41be6)
2026-11-16 01:05:51 -08:00
Neil b99fa165c1 fix(cloud): TEAM-SHARING hold keeps shared credential mode for the session a teammate's grant was revoked in (M1); sweep only team workspaces (L1) 2026-11-16 01:04:38 -08:00
Neil 3aa45164f0 fix(cloud): GH-SOLO a teammate whose grant is still being revoked keeps the workspace from being solo 2026-11-16 01:01:02 -08:00
Neil ce48b4769f fix(cloud): GH-SOLO solo is decided from the people set (owner without a grant counts), never from no expiry; re-check after the VM write and drop the mark if a grant began 2026-11-16 00:59:46 -08:00
Neil 05fe1508f2 feat(cloud): TEAM-SHARING hold sweep revokes non-owner grants (team_sharing_held); credential mode follows effective visibility once no teammate grants remain 2026-11-16 00:58:26 -08:00
Neil e735f41be6 test(cloud): GIT-ACTOR read-count test's synthetic ids can no longer collide with the real one (flaky) 2026-11-16 00:57:33 -08:00
Neil c122522e53 fix(cloud): GH-SOLO a one-person workspace's gh and git act as that member with no attested sender (a TUI typed into directly), matching the control plane 2026-11-16 00:54:03 -08:00
Neil 79781e805c feat(cloud): TEAM-SHARING hold: TEAM_SHARING (default off) refuses sharing with the team and makes stored team workspaces act private 2026-11-16 00:50:25 -08:00
Neil a66b711d81 perf(cloud): GIT-ACTOR the workspace list reads grants, sends and GitHub connections once per request, not per row (one pure rule, pickActing) 2026-11-15 22:54:50 -08:00
Neil 8769dddccc fix(cloud): a device id claimed by more than one member maps to nobody in the VM's devices map (no last-wins attestation as another member) 2026-11-15 22:52:34 -08:00
Neil bf0f77f791 feat(cloud): GIT-ACTOR as githubActing + you on the workspace view (list and detail), with the desktop wire schema 2026-11-15 22:51:11 -08:00
Neil d3bd6a8475 feat(cloud): GIT-ACTOR who pushes and PRs go out as right now, on GET status (owner) and GET team workspace (members), behind feature git-actor 2026-11-15 22:48:20 -08:00
Neil 9a770d4686 feat(cloud): GIT-COAUTHOR a commit that falls back to the workspace identity while a known member drove it carries Co-authored-by for them 2026-11-15 22:48:20 -08:00
Neil 36303ac480 fix(cloud): GH-AS-MEMBER gh wrapper actually runs: the real gh moves off PATH (tools/gh/bin) and tools/bin/gh links to the wrapper; older images migrated at entry-point install 2026-11-15 22:37:07 -08:00
Neil e994d835ba fix(cloud): GH-AS-MEMBER approve/merge path checks case-insensitive with optional trailing slash; an unread review body counts as an approval 2026-11-15 21:24:54 -08:00
Neil 3d96f7d720 fix(cloud): GH-AS-MEMBER approvals never as a member (any workspace); merges as a member only in a one-person workspace (incl. REST branch merges); approve event case-insensitive; shared cap default 60 min 2026-11-15 21:23:00 -08:00
Neil 730334b4f5 fix(cloud): GH-AS-MEMBER PRs, comments and pushes from a cloud workspace show as the member, not the bot
stablyai/orca#42960 (Neil, dev) was authored by orca-cloud-dev[bot]. Neil had connected GitHub; member
identities only reached git: gh ran on the workspace placeholder (the App's installation token), and
the Worker's member route on api.github.com allowed only REST under the repo while gh pr create is
GraphQL.

- VM: a gh wrapper runs gh with the attested sender's own placeholder (orcad attests, as for git);
  plain gh otherwise. Behind GH_AS_MEMBER=on (dev on).
- Worker, api.github.com with a member placeholder: the member's own token only for REST under the
  workspace repo and for allowlisted authorship mutations whose every target resolves to it
  (repositoryId equals its node id; other ids looked up with the installation token, cached per repo,
  failures not cached). graphql-js parse; variable defaults, owner-level projectIds, duplicate
  top-level keys and anything unexpected are not member requests. Everything else goes out on the
  installation token as before; an out-of-repo pinned mutation is refused with a GraphQL error.
- Shared workspaces never approve or merge as a member (GraphQL and REST): those go out on the
  installation token, so branch protection still applies.
- Identity rule: the only person who can use a workspace always acts; in a shared one the latest
  sender acts until another member sends, for at most MEMBER_GIT_SHARED_MAX_MINUTES (default 480).
- A GitHub connect or disconnect mid-session reaches the running VM's identities now.
- Tokens never enter the VM.
2026-11-15 21:18:00 -08:00
Neil 3136c355a9 feat(cloud): dev-only session-token-free probe route
Puts the token-free compile on a probe account's LIVE session, so the probe can see whether a
header-matched respond rule answers at all (separating 'respond not enforced' from 'resume restored
something else').
2026-11-15 16:04:50 -08:00
Neil 6314a21518 fix(cloud): provider-policy audit breaks rules down per domain; echo-probe reports the HTTP status
egress-docs' A4 run: after resume-raw the echo to the custom base-URL host answered 200 where the
token-free record should answer the placeholder 403. The Worker's token-free compile is right (the
host keeps its respond rules: checked in the harness), so the probe needs to see what Vercel holds
per host and what status came back:
- the audit adds domains: {host: {injection, forward, response}} (hostnames only);
- echo-probe returns the HTTP status again. The echoed body stays in a shell variable, never a file.
2026-11-15 16:04:05 -08:00
Neil 7b3ff2df30 feat(sandbox-control): EGRESS-REFRESH central credential refresh and push outbox 2026-11-15 15:38:30 -08:00
Neil 5a6532ca93 Merge remote-tracking branch 'private/cloud/integration' into cloud/egress-a4-scrub 2026-11-15 15:33:20 -08:00
Neil 602f923f1e Merge pull request #805 from nwparker/cloud/policy-audit-fixes
fix(cloud): provider-policy audit counts injection/forward/response rules; dev resume-raw and echo-probe
2026-11-15 15:33:08 -08:00
Neil 5210eca04f fix(cloud): echo-probe writes nothing in the VM; resume-raw/echo-probe only on probe accounts
egress-docs' review of #805: the echoed request goes straight into grep -c (a swapped value never
touches the VM's disk), and both routes refuse any row outside the throwaway probe accounts
(account_id dev:egress-…).
2026-11-15 15:03:50 -08:00
Neil 7da2415f79 fix(cloud): A4 review R2: a record scrub never strips a workspace that resumed meanwhile; R4 note
scrubStoppedRecord re-reads the row right before the PATCH and only scrubs one that is still
suspended or archived with no session; if the row resumed while the PATCH was in flight, the live
policy is re-applied at once (reason scrub_race). Failed rows are left out of the sweep on purpose:
failAndRelease destroys their provider sandbox.
2026-11-15 15:02:05 -08:00
Neil 326340b8cd fix(cloud): provider-policy audit counts injection/forward/response rules; dev resume-raw and echo-probe
egress-docs' probe 2 re-run through #803 found transformRuleCount always 0: Vercel's redacted shapes
name header swaps injectionRules (session) next to forwardRules and responseRules. The audit now
reports each kind separately (count + header names), so a scrubbed policy is checkable: 0 injection
rules, response rules only.

Two more dev-only operator routes so the probe needs no personal Vercel login:
- POST …/resume-raw: resume the provider session from its stored record with no policy write of
  ours (the row is left as it was; dev throwaways only).
- POST …/echo-probe?marker=orcaprobebogus…: one fixed request from inside the VM to httpbin.org
  or postman-echo.com carrying a placeholder header (placeholders only, validated); the answer
  is whether the echo contained the marker. No body comes back or is logged.
2026-11-15 15:00:25 -08:00
Neil 97c12b73f7 fix(cloud): A4 the post-resume policy write retries with backoff, and a lasting failure is visible
A wake resumes from the scrubbed record, so until its policy write lands the firewall answers the
placeholders itself (the keys-withheld or signed-out errors agents print). The write now retries
(250 ms, 1 s, 3 s); if it never lands, the wake still completes (fail closed, never a hang), logs
policy_apply_failed {reason: boot} by code, and marks policy_stale_at for reconcile's next tick.
2026-11-15 14:58:22 -08:00
Neil a5deecca4b cloud: renumber the archive hook migration to 0064 (0063 landed concurrently) 2026-11-15 14:57:55 -08:00
Neil 4b311e95f3 fix(cloud): unattended archives bound the hook to 30 s; an archived workspace is never offered a wake for it 2026-11-15 14:57:54 -08:00
Neil 24de08a2a5 fix(cloud): a failed archive hook run after a successful one makes it pending again 2026-11-15 14:57:52 -08:00
Neil cc5211efd9 cloud: renumber the archive hook migration to 0063 (0062 landed concurrently) 2026-11-15 14:57:51 -08:00
Neil a2551a3190 fix(cloud): archive hook picks checkouts in git's worktree order (the primary is listed under its real path) 2026-11-15 14:57:51 -08:00
Neil 0cd490186d feat(cloud): run the repo's orca.yaml archive hook in the VM before archiving or deleting a cloud workspace
Archive and delete stop the VM but nothing it started elsewhere (a preview
database branch keeps billing). The control plane now runs scripts.archive
on the still-running VM: bash with set -e, as the user, with the session's
env and secrets, 2 min for all checkouts, output per checkout and in
~/.orca-sandbox/archive-hook/archive.log.

- POST/GET /v1/sandboxes/:id/archive-hook; migration 0062 remembers whether
  the repo has a hook (learned at each sleep) so an asleep archive/delete can
  offer a wake for it, and never wakes one without a hook.
- Desktop archive runs it before the Sleep; a failure shows the output with
  Archive anyway / Keep it. Asleep: the Undo toast says it wakes first and
  offers Skip hook.
- Asleep/unreachable delete runs it through the control plane; a failure
  refuses with the usual Delete anyway waiver.
- Unattended archives (public API, team list) run it on a running VM and
  archive even if it fails (logged).
- Docs: orca.yaml scripts.archive for Orca Cloud workspaces.
2026-11-15 14:57:51 -08:00
Neil 4df5205c66 feat(cloud): A4 stopped sandboxes keep no credential at rest in the provider
Probe 2 (egress-docs): a session's last network policy survives a stop or a timeout on the
persistent record and is re-applied on resume, so firewall-mode values would sit at rest in Vercel
while a workspace sleeps.

- After every voluntary stop (sleep, rollover, restart, archive) and when reconcile finds the
  provider stopped a session (timeout), the record is PATCHed with the token-free compile (same
  routes, every firewall value answered by the firewall, no App token). A failed PATCH sets
  policy_scrub_pending.
- Reconcile scrubs stopped rows that are pending, or whose last policy carried a firewall class and
  was written after their last scrub (timeouts, crashes, and a one-time sweep on deploy).
- A wake PATCHes the record with the full policy right before resuming (no gap); the post-resume
  apply stays as the backstop.
- Boots stamp policy_config_hash (and a generation one below now), so create and wake writes are
  covered like applies. Proxy-only policies hold no values: nothing to scrub, no record writes.
- Migration 0067 (0064 and 0066 are held by #783 and #792): policy_scrubbed_at,
  policy_scrub_pending.
2026-11-15 14:56:20 -08:00
Neil 7ea40ac042 feat(cloud): dev-only redacted provider-policy audit, and A4's record scrub primitive
For egress-docs' probe 2, re-run on the Worker's own Vercel token (dev only; elsewhere these routes
don't exist; operator token):
- GET /v1/internal/sandboxes/:id/provider-policy-audit?marker=orcaprobebogus…: the raw record and
  session read from Vercel, answered as redacted facts only (state, session status, whether a
  network policy is present, transform rule count, header names, markerFound by substring test).
  No value or body is returned or logged.
- POST /v1/internal/sandboxes/:id/provider-policy-scrub-test: A4's primitive, scrubRecordPolicy,
  which PATCHes the persistent record with the token-free compile (every firewall value answered by
  the firewall, no App token; proxy routes hold no values anyway).

compileSandboxPolicy gains { tokenFree }; the provider gains updateRecordNetworkPolicy and a
dev-audit raw read.
2026-11-15 14:27:41 -08:00
Neil c90ba953af fix(cloud): WORKER-XREQ-PROMISE sweep: JWKS, the policy chain, the keyring, and a guard
Follow-up to #801: the rest of the Workers' shared in-flight promises.

- Auth (sandbox-control desktop, staging and dev keys; billing) and the egress proxy's OIDC keys used
  jose's createRemoteJWKSet, which shares one in-flight JWKS fetch across every caller: a request
  cancelled mid-fetch hung every token check behind it, and jose refetches after ten minutes. That
  fits the 'Start sandbox' creates stuck before any log 10–15 min after a deploy and cleared by a
  redeploy. settledRemoteJWKSet keeps the key set as a value; a request that needs a fresh one
  fetches it for itself (refetch every 10 min, an unknown kid at most every 30 s).
- applySandboxPolicy no longer chains writes per sandbox in the isolate (a chained promise from a
  cancelled request would hang every later write for that sandbox); the D1 generation orders them.
- The KMS keyring cache keeps the loaded keyring and the last failure as values; no in-flight load
  is stored at all.
- Guard (both Workers): a unit test fails on createRemoteJWKSet, or a module-level Map, variable
  or object holding a Promise, unless the line says why it is safe ('xreq-ok:', e.g. a WebCrypto
  import).
2026-11-15 14:24:44 -08:00
Neil fc5c502bb5 fix(cloud): WORKER-XREQ-PROMISE module caches hold settled values, never another request's in-flight promise
Egress proxy secret routes (custom-base-URL keys, OPENAI_BASE_URL) hung until the client gave up
(dev, proxy mode, 2026-11-15). The Worker was invoked (tail: `canceled`, wall 65 s, CPU 3 ms, no log
line) and was waiting, never reaching its upstream fetch. GitHub routes on the same sandbox answered.

An isolate serves many requests, and a promise one request starts is bound to that request's I/O. If
that request is cancelled while the promise waits on D1, KMS or fetch, the promise never settles, and
every later request awaiting the same cached promise hangs. Several module-level caches shared
in-flight promises: the KMS keyring (forever, per isolate), decrypted provider keys and account
credentials (per minute), the relay's ID token mint, the App's pending-request owners, create timing
and share-link lookups.

They now cache settled values only (settled-cache.ts and the same pattern inline). A request that
misses loads for itself; a cold isolate may run a few duplicate loads.
2026-11-15 14:20:14 -08:00
Neil cd778ffc80 Merge pull request #800 from nwparker/cloud/egress-probe-modes
ci(cloud): egress probe in proxy and firewall modes (streams, uploads, WS, git, latency)
2026-11-15 13:57:15 -08:00
Neil 46a1c8d79f ci(cloud): egress probe in proxy and firewall modes, with streams, uploads, WebSocket, git and latency
Workstream C of the egress migration. `scripts/egress-probe.ts --mode proxy|firewall|both` flips the
same two dev workspaces with the operator egress-mode route and runs every check in each mode. Each
request is a Node fetch (undici, like the agents) with a 30 s limit, so the transform body hang shows
up as a named failure. New coverage:
- a chunked stream, a 1 MB upload and a WebSocket upgrade through the swap;
- a placeholder sent to an unrelated host must arrive unswapped;
- the WebSocket host fails closed;
- the LFS batch API, git fetch, push and delete;
- the App-repo clone through the desktop's create.
Latency is reported per class (median/p90). The terminal wait is now 15 min, and a project whose
clone failed is registered as a folder, so the checks still run.

On dev at 2cc12610 (A2+A3), firewall mode passes 22/22. Proxy-mode findings went to gh-access.
2026-11-15 13:54:30 -08:00
Neil 99ae1d0be7 fix(cloud): EGRESS review F1–F3 before any firewall canary
Security review of A1/A2 (egress-docs):
- F1: the Copilot PAT never reaches the firewall. Eligibility is decided per secret
  (firewallEligibleSecret): no credential the proxy narrows on any host (response filtering,
  paths, per-host paths). Before, its Copilot API host entries had no paths and compiled to
  transforms, putting a user's GitHub PAT in the policy store.
- F2: claims are ordered but landed writes weren't. After a write, if a newer generation was
  claimed meanwhile, the write is redone from current state, so a stale compile (say from before a
  share) is never the last to land.
- F3: a config-hash change fails closed only when it removes access or custody (firewall to proxy,
  a firewall class removed, an account provider turned off, open to limited). Anything else retries
  via policy_stale_at, so a deploy during a provider blip can't sleep every workspace. The stamp now
  carries the deciding inputs; a pre-F3 bare-hash stamp is retried.
2026-11-15 13:32:38 -08:00
Neil 1d93777378 Merge pull request #798 from nwparker/cloud/egress-firewall-a3
feat(cloud): EGRESS firewall mode puts every Codex call on the firewall (no relay)
2026-11-15 13:28:57 -08:00
Neil 9d2210f681 Merge pull request #797 from nwparker/cloud/codex-swap-off-dev
chore(cloud): CODEX-FIREWALL-SWAP off on dev until the transform-hijack probe passes
2026-11-15 13:26:24 -08:00
Neil b96f01598a feat(cloud): EGRESS firewall mode puts every Codex call on the firewall (no relay)
Egress firewall migration, workstream A3 (design §1). In EGRESS_SWAP_MODE=firewall the Codex account
token is swapped at the firewall on every Codex path, exact paths only (the hot calls plus the
catalog GETs); anything else with the placeholder gets the 403. Nothing forwards to the egress proxy,
so the ChatGPT relay is unused for these sandboxes.

Codex's own refresh of its placeholder login (POST auth.openai.com/oauth/token) is answered by the
firewall itself with the placeholder login again; the real token is refreshed centrally on schedule.
The #776 alias (CODEX_EGRESS_SWAP=firewall in proxy mode) is unchanged: hot paths at the firewall,
the rest through the proxy.
2026-11-15 13:22:57 -08:00
Neil 7df451ae3a Merge pull request #796 from nwparker/cloud/egress-firewall-a2
feat(cloud): EGRESS firewall mode for model keys, the Claude sign-in and the GitHub App token
2026-11-15 13:22:40 -08:00