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orca/cloud/docs/relay-database-failure-diagnostics.md
Jinwoo Hong a3046cd27b fix(relay): treat database pool connect failures as transient, not director faults (#21243)
* fix(relay): treat pool connect failures as transient, not director faults

pg-pool raises connection-acquire failures as a plain Error with no SQLSTATE,
so the transient classifier matched only one of the three messages it can
produce. The other two reached the routes unclassified and became HTTP 500s,
which is what the rollout safety gate counts.

The acquire boundary now marks the errors it produces, so "Connection
terminated unexpectedly" counts as transient when the socket died during the
handshake and stays a hard failure mid-statement, where a retry could repeat a
commit whose outcome is unknown.

/v1/regions and /v1/admin/evacuation-status gain the transient handling
/v1/assign and /v1/resolve already had.

* fix(relay): mirror the pool-connect verdict in failure diagnostics

The query-failure event's connectionTimeout boolean matched one of the two
messages connectionTimeoutMillis can produce, so the 210 dialling timeouts in
the last day logged as false and were invisible to the field meant to find them.

The pool-connect vocabulary now lives beside the acquire boundary that owns it,
and both the router's classifier and the diagnostics read it from there, so the
two cannot drift. The event also carries the routing verdict the caller already
computed, making "how much of this burst reached users as a 500" one field.

* fix(relay): null-safe transient classification and honest transient docs

The classifier now runs inside the query catch, where a thrown null or
undefined would have turned a database failure into a TypeError that buried it.

The diagnostics doc claimed transient maps to a 503 or a 500. Sweeps, startup
reconciliation, and admin routes that answer 409 all emit the same event, so
counting the false ones over-states user-facing hard failures.
2026-09-17 12:26:22 -04:00

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Markdown

# Relay database failure phases
`orca_relay_postgres_query_failed` separates failure to acquire a pooled connection
(`phase=acquire`) from failure after acquisition (`phase=execute`). It covers
`PostgresDatabase.query`, including the single-statement control-renewal CTE.
Statements inside explicit transactions use a different query path and are not
covered. These events are diagnostic evidence, not a replacement for total SQL
failure counters.
The event contains only an allowlisted error code, a connection-timeout boolean,
a transient boolean, the operation category (`control-renewal` or `other`), total
elapsed milliseconds, and pool total/idle/waiting counts at failure. Total elapsed
time includes acquisition. An acquisition timeout can mean either waiting in the
queue or establishing a new connection; `connectionTimeout` covers both, and the
pool counts separate them: a queue wait has waiters, a dial does not.
Unknown error codes stay `unknown`.
`transient` is the classification the request routes act on, not a second
opinion: true means retryable, false means terminal. It is not a count of HTTP
responses. Every caller of `PostgresDatabase.query` emits this event, including
background sweeps, startup reconciliation, and admin routes that map a failure
to 409, and none of those produces a 503 or a 500. Counting `transient=false`
therefore over-counts user-facing hard failures; narrow by operation, or join
against the route's own rejection logs, before reading it that way. A pool that
cannot hand out a client carries no error code at all, so `code` stays `unknown`
for that whole class and only these two booleans separate it from a genuine
fault such as a rejected password.
Query text, parameters, error messages, and identifiers are never emitted.
Successful queries emit no additional event.
Use structured GCE logs with `jsonPayload.event="orca_relay_postgres_query_failed"`.
Compare counts by phase, operation, and code with the same cell's renewal outcomes
and pool pressure, and with independent PostgreSQL wait samples. Establishing the
failure phase does not by itself establish why the pool backed up.
For production observation, use an immutable image through the same-cap workflow
on one cell, with fresh monitor evidence and the exact predecessor digest. Verify
the serving digest and health, then inspect these events during a naturally
occurring failure. Do not deliberately induce a production database failure.
Rollback uses the same workflow and predecessor image; no schema or database
configuration changes are involved. Do not change rehome limits, timeouts, pool
sizes, or renewal scheduling merely to collect this evidence.