fix: apply the data: URI allowlist to media tags too

ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP excludes image/svg+xml on purpose - DOMPurify cannot
inspect the bytes inside a data: URI, so an SVG payload can carry
<script>/<foreignObject> the surrounding sanitizer never sees. That
exclusion never took effect on <img>, <video>, <audio>, <source> and
<track>: DOMPurify's attribute check short-circuits on DATA_URI_TAGS
before ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP is consulted, and that set can only be extended
via ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS, never trimmed. Any data: URI reached those tags,
including image/svg+xml and text/html; <a href> behaved as documented.

Not a live script vector - browsers render SVG-in-<img> in secure static
mode - but the sanitizer promised something it did not enforce, and the
print window renders sanitized bodies without the iframe sandbox and CSP
that otherwise back it up.

restrictDataUriResourcesOnNode re-applies the raster allowlist on those
tags, wired in through the existing afterSanitizeAttributes hooks. The
blocked-external-image placeholder becomes a 1x1 GIF: it is set in the
same hook pass, so an SVG placeholder would depend on hook order.

The three viewer call sites that hand-rolled
DOMPurify.sanitize(html, EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG) now use
sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe, which is the same thing and picks up the
guard automatically.

components/email/email-viewer.tsx

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import DOMPurify from "dompurify";
 import { Email, ContactCard, Mailbox } from "@/lib/jmap/types";
 import { emailExportFilename, attachmentDownloadFilename, attachmentsBundleFilename, DEFAULT_EMAIL_TEMPLATE, DEFAULT_ATTACHMENT_TEMPLATE } from "@/lib/download-filename";
 import { EML_IMPORT_ACCEPT, expandImportableEmails } from "@/lib/eml-import";
-import { EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG, applyNewTabToAnchor, blockExternalResourcesOnNode, collapseBlockedImageContainers, escapeHtml, plainTextToSafeHtml, sanitizeEmailHtml, sanitizePlainTextRenderedHtml } from "@/lib/email-sanitization";
+import { EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG, applyNewTabToAnchor, blockExternalResourcesOnNode, collapseBlockedImageContainers, escapeHtml, plainTextToSafeHtml, restrictDataUriResourcesOnNode, sanitizeEmailHtml, sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe, sanitizePlainTextRenderedHtml } from "@/lib/email-sanitization";
 import { hasMeaningfulHtmlBody } from "@/lib/signature-utils";
 import { collapsePlainTextQuotes, setupQuoteCollapse } from "@/lib/quote-collapse";
 import { withBasePath } from "@/lib/browser-navigation";
@@ -1694,6 +1694,9 @@ export function EmailViewer({
           // http(s) links open in a new tab; other schemes keep their default.
           applyNewTabToAnchor(node);
 
+          // Re-apply the data:-URI allowlist DOMPurify skips on media tags.
+          restrictDataUriResourcesOnNode(node);
+
           // No dark mode color transforms - emails render true-to-life in iframe
         });
 
@@ -1786,7 +1789,7 @@ export function EmailViewer({
           return cidBlobUrls[cidRef] || '';
         }
       );
-      const cleanHtml = DOMPurify.sanitize(htmlWithCidUrls, EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG);
+      const cleanHtml = sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe(htmlWithCidUrls);
       return { html: cleanHtml, isHtml: true, hasStyleTag: /<style[\s>]/i.test(pluginRenderedHtml), externalBlocked: false };
     }
     if (pluginRenderedText) {
@@ -1794,7 +1797,7 @@ export function EmailViewer({
     }
     // TNEF (winmail.dat) extracted content
     if (tnefHtml) {
-      const cleanHtml = DOMPurify.sanitize(tnefHtml, EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG);
+      const cleanHtml = sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe(tnefHtml);
       return { html: cleanHtml, isHtml: true, hasStyleTag: /<style[\s>]/i.test(tnefHtml), externalBlocked: false };
     }
     if (tnefText) {
@@ -1802,7 +1805,7 @@ export function EmailViewer({
     }
     // Embedded message/rfc822 unwrapped content
     if (embeddedEmailHtml) {
-      const cleanHtml = DOMPurify.sanitize(embeddedEmailHtml, EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG);
+      const cleanHtml = sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe(embeddedEmailHtml);
       return { html: cleanHtml, isHtml: true, hasStyleTag: /<style[\s>]/i.test(embeddedEmailHtml), externalBlocked: false };
     }
     if (embeddedEmailText) {

components/email/thread-conversation-view.tsx

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 import { useState, useEffect, useMemo, useRef, useCallback } from "react";
 import DOMPurify from "dompurify";
 import { Email, ThreadGroup } from "@/lib/jmap/types";
-import { EMAIL_SANITIZE_CONFIG, collapseBlockedImageContainers, plainTextToSafeHtml, sanitizePlainTextRenderedHtml } from "@/lib/email-sanitization";
+import { EMAIL_SANITIZE_CONFIG, collapseBlockedImageContainers, plainTextToSafeHtml, restrictDataUriResourcesOnNode, sanitizePlainTextRenderedHtml } from "@/lib/email-sanitization";
 import { hasMeaningfulHtmlBody } from "@/lib/signature-utils";
 import { collapsePlainTextQuotes, setupQuoteCollapse } from "@/lib/quote-collapse";
 import { transformInlineStyles, transformColorForDarkMode, transformBgColorForDarkMode } from "@/lib/color-transform";
@@ -364,6 +364,9 @@ function EmailCard({
         DOMPurify.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', (node) => {
           const htmlNode = node as HTMLElement;
 
+          // Re-apply the data:-URI allowlist DOMPurify skips on media tags.
+          restrictDataUriResourcesOnNode(node);
+
           if (!allowExternal) {
             if (node.tagName === 'IMG') {
               const src = node.getAttribute('src');

lib/__tests__/email-sanitization.test.ts

@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ import {
   stripExternalCssUrls,
   stripExternalStyleSheetCss,
   blockExternalResourcesOnNode,
+  restrictDataUriResourcesOnNode,
+  sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe,
   TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL,
 } from '../email-sanitization';
 
@@ -786,4 +788,58 @@ describe('email-sanitization', () => {
       expect(sanitizePluginBodyHtml('   ')).toBe('');
     });
   });
+
+  // ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP excludes image/svg+xml on purpose (DOMPurify cannot see
+  // inside a data: URI), but its media-tag carve-out short-circuits that check
+  // before the regexp runs - so every data: URI reached <img> and friends.
+  describe('restrictDataUriResourcesOnNode', () => {
+    const blocked = [
+      ['svg base64', ''],
+      ['svg inline', ''],
+      ['javascript', 'data:application/javascript,alert(1)'],
+      ['svg, leading space', ' data:image/svg+xml,x'],
+      ['svg, control chars in scheme', 'da\tta:image/svg+xml,x'],
+    ] as const;
+
+    for (const [label, uri] of blocked) {
+      it(`drops ${label} from an img src`, () => {
+        expect(sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe(`<img src="${uri}">`)).not.toContain('data:');
+        expect(sanitizeEmailHtml(`<img src="${uri}">`)).not.toContain('data:');
+      });
+    }
+
+    it('covers the other media tags DOMPurify waves through', () => {
+      for (const tag of ['video', 'audio', 'source', 'track']) {
+        const html = `<${tag} src="data:image/svg+xml,x"></${tag}>`;
+        expect(sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe(html)).not.toContain('data:');
+      }
+      // <image> is rewritten to <img> by the parser, href included.
+      expect(sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe('<image href="data:image/svg+xml,x">')).not.toContain('data:');
+    });
+
+    it('keeps inline raster images and every other allowed scheme', () => {
+      expect(sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe('<img src="">')).toContain('data:image/png');
+      expect(sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe('<img src="">')).toContain('data:image/gif');
+      expect(sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe('<img src="">')).toContain('data:image/jpeg');
+      expect(sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe('<img src="cid:part1">')).toContain('cid:part1');
+      expect(sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe('<img src="https://example.com/a.png">')).toContain('https://example.com/a.png');
+      expect(sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe('<img src="blob:https://example.com/x">')).toContain('blob:');
+    });
+
+    it('leaves non-media elements to ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP', () => {
+      const node = parseHtmlSafely('<a href="data:image/svg+xml,x">x</a>').querySelector('a')!;
+      restrictDataUriResourcesOnNode(node);
+      expect(node.getAttribute('href')).toBe('data:image/svg+xml,x');
+    });
+
+    // The blocked-external placeholder shares this hook pass, so it must not be
+    // a data: URI the restriction would strip right back out.
+    it('preserves the blocked-image placeholder', () => {
+      const node = parseHtmlSafely('<img src="https://tracker.example/p.gif">').querySelector('img')!;
+      blockExternalResourcesOnNode(node);
+      restrictDataUriResourcesOnNode(node);
+      expect(node.getAttribute('src')).toBe(TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL);
+    });
+  });
 });

lib/email-sanitization.ts

@@ -34,13 +34,27 @@ export const EMAIL_SANITIZE_CONFIG = {
   ],
 };
 
+/**
+ * Sanitize with `restrictDataUriResourcesOnNode` applied - the config alone
+ * cannot express it, because DOMPurify's data:-URI carve-out for media tags
+ * short-circuits ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP and is not removable via config.
+ */
+function sanitizeWithDataUriGuard(html: string, config: typeof EMAIL_SANITIZE_CONFIG): string {
+  DOMPurify.addHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', restrictDataUriResourcesOnNode);
+  try {
+    return DOMPurify.sanitize(html, config);
+  } finally {
+    DOMPurify.removeAllHooks();
+  }
+}
+
 /**
  * Sanitize email HTML content
  * @param html - Raw HTML content from email
  * @returns Sanitized HTML safe for rendering
  */
 export function sanitizeEmailHtml(html: string): string {
-  return DOMPurify.sanitize(html, EMAIL_SANITIZE_CONFIG);
+  return sanitizeWithDataUriGuard(html, EMAIL_SANITIZE_CONFIG);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -60,7 +74,7 @@ export const EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG = {
  * Preserves <style> tags so the email's own CSS is applied.
  */
 export function sanitizeEmailHtmlForIframe(html: string): string {
-  return DOMPurify.sanitize(html, EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG);
+  return sanitizeWithDataUriGuard(html, EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -221,12 +235,55 @@ export function sanitizePlainTextRenderedHtml(html: string): string {
 }
 
 /**
- * 1x1 transparent SVG used to replace a blocked external <img> so the layout
+ * 1x1 transparent GIF used to replace a blocked external <img> so the layout
  * doesn't reflow to a broken-image icon. The real URL is stashed in
  * `data-blocked-src` for restore.
+ *
+ * Deliberately a raster GIF, not an SVG: `restrictDataUriResourcesOnNode`
+ * removes every non-raster data: URI from media elements, and it runs in the
+ * same afterSanitizeAttributes pass as the external-content blocking above.
+ * An SVG placeholder would depend on which of the two happens to run first.
  */
 export const TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL =
-  '';
+  '';
+
+/**
+ * Media elements where DOMPurify waves any `data:` URI through. Its attribute
+ * check short-circuits on `DATA_URI_TAGS` *before* ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP is
+ * consulted, and the set can only be extended via config (ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS),
+ * never trimmed - so the regexp's careful SVG exclusion is unreachable for
+ * these tags and has to be re-applied by hand. `<image>` is absent on purpose:
+ * the HTML parser rewrites it to `<img>`.
+ */
+const DATA_URI_BYPASS_TAGS = new Set(['IMG', 'VIDEO', 'AUDIO', 'SOURCE', 'TRACK']);
+
+/** Raster image types that stay allowed as a data: URI (mirrors ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP). */
+const RASTER_IMAGE_DATA_URI =
+  /^data:image\/(?:png|jpe?g|gif|webp|bmp|avif|x-icon|vnd\.microsoft\.icon)[;,]/i;
+
+/**
+ * Drop `data:` URIs that aren't inline raster images from media elements.
+ * DOMPurify cannot inspect the bytes inside a data: URI, so an SVG payload can
+ * carry <script>/<foreignObject> that the surrounding sanitizer never sees -
+ * the same reason ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP excludes image/svg+xml for every other
+ * element. Browsers render SVG-in-<img> in secure static mode, so this closes
+ * the gap between what the sanitizer promises and what it enforces rather than
+ * a live script vector.
+ */
+export function restrictDataUriResourcesOnNode(node: Element): void {
+  if (!DATA_URI_BYPASS_TAGS.has(node.tagName)) return;
+  for (const attr of ['src', 'href', 'xlink:href']) {
+    const value = node.getAttribute(attr);
+    if (!value) continue;
+    // Mirror the URL parser (and isExternalResourceUrl): C0 controls and
+    // spaces are ignored, so they can't be used to hide the scheme.
+    // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
+    const normalized = value.replace(/[\u0000-\u0020]+/g, '');
+    if (/^data:/i.test(normalized) && !RASTER_IMAGE_DATA_URI.test(normalized)) {
+      node.removeAttribute(attr);
+    }
+  }
+}
 
 /**
  * True if a resource URL would trigger an external (network) fetch once the