fix: keep security headers on dotted app paths and neutralise cid: blobs (GHSA-xvjh-v9c6-qcvc)

components/email/email-viewer.tsx

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import { useState, useEffect, useLayoutEffect, useMemo, useRef, useCallback, use
 import { Email, ContactCard, Mailbox } from "@/lib/jmap/types";
 import { emailExportFilename, attachmentDownloadFilename, attachmentsBundleFilename, DEFAULT_EMAIL_TEMPLATE, DEFAULT_ATTACHMENT_TEMPLATE } from "@/lib/download-filename";
 import { EML_IMPORT_ACCEPT, expandImportableEmails } from "@/lib/eml-import";
-import { applyNewTabToAnchor, escapeHtml, plainTextToSafeHtml, sanitizeEmailBodyForIframe, sanitizeEmailHtml, sanitizePlainTextRenderedHtml } from "@/lib/email-sanitization";
+import { applyNewTabToAnchor, escapeHtml, isOpenableLinkHref, plainTextToSafeHtml, sanitizeEmailBodyForIframe, sanitizeEmailHtml, sanitizePlainTextRenderedHtml } from "@/lib/email-sanitization";
 import { getRenderableHtmlBody } from "@/lib/email-body-selection";
 import { collectReferencedCids, isEmbeddedInBody } from "@/lib/attachment-visibility";
 import { collapsePlainTextQuotes, setupQuoteCollapse } from "@/lib/quote-collapse";
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ import { useMenuNavigation } from "@/hooks/use-menu-navigation";
 import { findCalendarAttachment, isCalendarMimeType } from "@/lib/calendar-invitation";
 import { RecipientPopover } from "./recipient-popover";
 import { MailtoLink } from "@/components/ui/mailto-link";
-import { isFilePreviewable, isMimeTypeSafeForInlinePreview } from "@/lib/file-preview";
+import { inertBlobType, isFilePreviewable, isMimeTypeSafeForInlinePreview, toInertBlob } from "@/lib/file-preview";
 import { parseTnef, isTnefAttachment } from "@/lib/tnef";
 import { debug } from "@/lib/debug";
 import type { TnefAttachment } from "@/lib/tnef";
@@ -677,6 +677,8 @@ export function EmailViewer({
   const messageSpacing = useSettingsStore((state) => state.messageSpacing);
   const plainTextFont = useSettingsStore((state) => state.plainTextFont);
   const mailAttachmentAction = useSettingsStore((state) => state.mailAttachmentAction);
+  const mailAttachmentActionRef = useRef(mailAttachmentAction);
+  mailAttachmentActionRef.current = mailAttachmentAction;
   const attachmentPosition = useSettingsStore((state) => state.attachmentPosition);
   const addTrustedSender = useSettingsStore((state) => state.addTrustedSender);
   const isSenderTrusted = useSettingsStore((state) => state.isSenderTrusted);
@@ -810,6 +812,11 @@ export function EmailViewer({
   const [allowExternalContent, setAllowExternalContent] = useState(false);
   const [hasBlockedContent, setHasBlockedContent] = useState(false);
   const [cidBlobUrls, setCidBlobUrls] = useState<Record<string, string>>({});
+  // blob: URL -> the cid: part behind it, so a click on a link the body points
+  // at a part can be routed through the attachment preview/download gate
+  // instead of window.open() (GHSA-xvjh-v9c6-qcvc). A ref because the iframe
+  // click handler is bound once per document.
+  const cidBlobPartsRef = useRef<Map<string, { name: string; type?: string }>>(new Map());
   const [quickReplyText, setQuickReplyText] = useState("");
   const [isQuickReplyFocused, setIsQuickReplyFocused] = useState(false);
   const [isSendingQuickReply, setIsSendingQuickReply] = useState(false);
@@ -1518,6 +1525,8 @@ export function EmailViewer({
   useEffect(() => {
     let cancelled = false;
     const objectUrls: string[] = [];
+    // The Map itself is never replaced, so the cleanup can hold it directly.
+    const cidBlobParts = cidBlobPartsRef.current;
 
     const decryptedCidAttachments = pluginRenderedAttachments.filter(att => att.contentId);
     if (decryptedCidAttachments.length > 0) {
@@ -1528,17 +1537,23 @@ export function EmailViewer({
         if (!bytes) return;
         const cidValue = att.contentId!.replace(/^<|>$/g, '');
         const buffer = bytes.buffer.slice(bytes.byteOffset, bytes.byteOffset + bytes.byteLength) as ArrayBuffer;
-        const blob = new Blob([buffer], { type: att.mimeType || 'application/octet-stream' });
+        // Sender-typed part: never let a script-bearing MIME type reach a
+        // blob: URL in our origin (GHSA-xvjh-v9c6-qcvc).
+        const blob = new Blob([buffer], { type: inertBlobType(att.mimeType) });
         const objectUrl = URL.createObjectURL(blob);
         urls[cidValue] = objectUrl;
         objectUrls.push(objectUrl);
+        cidBlobParts.set(objectUrl, { name: att.filename || cidValue, type: att.mimeType });
       });
 
       setCidBlobUrls(urls);
 
       return () => {
         cancelled = true;
-        objectUrls.forEach(url => URL.revokeObjectURL(url));
+        objectUrls.forEach(url => {
+          URL.revokeObjectURL(url);
+          cidBlobParts.delete(url);
+        });
       };
     }
 
@@ -1558,10 +1573,15 @@ export function EmailViewer({
       await Promise.all(cidAttachments.map(async (att) => {
         const cidValue = att.cid!.replace(/^<|>$/g, '');
         try {
-          const objectUrl = await blobClient!.fetchBlobAsObjectUrl(att.blobId, att.name || 'inline', att.type, blobAccountId);
+          // The download URL echoes the sender-declared Content-Type back as
+          // the Blob type; re-type anything that could execute as our origin
+          // before it becomes a blob: URL (GHSA-xvjh-v9c6-qcvc).
+          const blob = await blobClient!.fetchBlob(att.blobId, att.name || 'inline', att.type, blobAccountId);
+          const objectUrl = URL.createObjectURL(toInertBlob(blob));
           if (!cancelled) {
             urls[cidValue] = objectUrl;
             objectUrls.push(objectUrl);
+            cidBlobParts.set(objectUrl, { name: att.name || cidValue, type: att.type });
           } else {
             URL.revokeObjectURL(objectUrl);
           }
@@ -1578,7 +1598,10 @@ export function EmailViewer({
 
     return () => {
       cancelled = true;
-      objectUrls.forEach(url => URL.revokeObjectURL(url));
+      objectUrls.forEach(url => {
+        URL.revokeObjectURL(url);
+        cidBlobParts.delete(url);
+      });
     };
   }, [client, blobClient, blobAccountId, email?.id, pluginRenderedAttachments, email?.attachments]);
 
@@ -2359,6 +2382,27 @@ export function EmailViewer({
     staleDocRef.current = iframeRef.current?.contentDocument ?? null;
   }, [emailIframeSrcDoc]);
 
+  // Open a blob: link the rendered body points at a cid: part. Mirrors the
+  // attachment-chip gate: inert previewable types open in a tab, everything
+  // else (and any blob: URL we did not mint) is downloaded under its part name.
+  const openCidPartLink = useCallback((href: string) => {
+    const part = cidBlobPartsRef.current.get(href);
+    const opensPreview = !!part
+      && mailAttachmentActionRef.current === 'preview'
+      && isFilePreviewable(part.name, part.type)
+      && isMimeTypeSafeForInlinePreview(part.type);
+    if (opensPreview) {
+      window.open(href, '_blank', 'noopener,noreferrer');
+      return;
+    }
+    const anchor = document.createElement('a');
+    anchor.href = href;
+    anchor.download = part?.name || 'download';
+    document.body.appendChild(anchor);
+    anchor.click();
+    anchor.remove();
+  }, []);
+
   const handleIframeLoad = useCallback(() => {
     const iframe = iframeRef.current;
     if (!iframe) return;
@@ -2459,13 +2503,25 @@ export function EmailViewer({
           if (!href || href.startsWith('#') || href.startsWith('mailto:')) return;
           ev.preventDefault();
           ev.stopPropagation();
+          // A link at a cid: part now carries the blob: URL we minted for it.
+          // Blob URLs inherit our origin, so it goes through the same
+          // preview/download gate as an attachment chip rather than
+          // window.open() (GHSA-xvjh-v9c6-qcvc).
+          if (href.startsWith('blob:')) {
+            openCidPartLink(href);
+            return;
+          }
+          // Only web links and external protocol handlers may be opened;
+          // data:, unresolved cid: and relative paths would land inside our
+          // own origin.
+          if (!isOpenableLinkHref(href)) return;
           const ctx = {
             href,
             target: targetEl.getAttribute('target') ?? undefined,
             emailId: email?.id,
           };
           const ok = await uiHooks.onBeforeExternalLink.intercept(ctx);
-          if (!ok) return;
+          if (!ok || !isOpenableLinkHref(ctx.href)) return;
           window.open(ctx.href, '_blank', 'noopener,noreferrer');
         };
         doc.addEventListener('click', onLinkClick, true);
@@ -2569,7 +2625,7 @@ export function EmailViewer({
     } catch {
       // Cross-origin restrictions - iframe will still display content
     }
-  }, [isDark, emailHasNativeDarkMode, email?.id, t]);
+  }, [isDark, emailHasNativeDarkMode, email?.id, t, openCidPartLink]);
 
   // Wire up the iframe as soon as its sandboxed document has parsed, rather than
   // waiting for the iframe 'load' event. 'load' also waits on every subresource,

components/email/thread-conversation-view.tsx

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ import { useTranslations } from "next-intl";
 import { useSettingsStore } from "@/stores/settings-store";
 import { useContactStore } from "@/stores/contact-store";
 import { useAuthStore } from "@/stores/auth-store";
-import { isFilePreviewable } from "@/lib/file-preview";
+import { isFilePreviewable, toInertBlob } from "@/lib/file-preview";
 
 interface ThreadConversationViewProps {
   thread: ThreadGroup;
@@ -299,7 +299,9 @@ function EmailCard({
       await Promise.all(cidAttachments.map(async (att) => {
         const cidValue = att.cid!.replace(/^<|>$/g, '');
         try {
-          const objectUrl = await client!.fetchBlobAsObjectUrl(att.blobId, att.name || 'inline', att.type);
+          // Re-type sender-declared script-bearing parts before they become a
+          // blob: URL in our origin (GHSA-xvjh-v9c6-qcvc).
+          const objectUrl = URL.createObjectURL(toInertBlob(await client!.fetchBlob(att.blobId, att.name || 'inline', att.type)));
           if (!cancelled) {
             urls[cidValue] = objectUrl;
             objectUrls.push(objectUrl);

lib/__tests__/email-sanitization.test.ts

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import {
   EMAIL_IFRAME_SANITIZE_CONFIG,
   isExternalResourceUrl,
   isHttpLinkHref,
+  isOpenableLinkHref,
   applyNewTabToAnchor,
   sanitizeI18nHtml,
   sanitizePluginBodyHtml,
@@ -967,3 +968,32 @@ describe('email-sanitization', () => {
     });
   });
 });
+
+describe('isOpenableLinkHref (message-body click -> window.open gate, GHSA-xvjh-v9c6-qcvc)', () => {
+  it('lets web links and external protocol handlers through', () => {
+    expect(isOpenableLinkHref('https://example.com/x')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isOpenableLinkHref('HTTP://example.com')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isOpenableLinkHref('//example.com/x')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isOpenableLinkHref('tel:+4912345')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isOpenableLinkHref('sms:+4912345')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isOpenableLinkHref('ftp://example.com/f')).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('refuses anything that would open inside the webmail origin', () => {
+    expect(isOpenableLinkHref('blob:https://mail.example/0f3d-ab12')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isOpenableLinkHref('data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isOpenableLinkHref('')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isOpenableLinkHref('statement.pdf')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isOpenableLinkHref('/en/mail/folder/inbox/statement.pdf')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isOpenableLinkHref('./x')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isOpenableLinkHref('cid:unresolved')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isOpenableLinkHref('javascript:alert(1)')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isOpenableLinkHref('')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isOpenableLinkHref(null)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('ignores leading control characters and whitespace when reading the scheme', () => {
+    expect(isOpenableLinkHref('
blob:https://mail.example/x')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isOpenableLinkHref(' 	tel:123')).toBe(true);
+  });
+});

lib/__tests__/file-preview.test.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
 
-import { getFilePreviewKind, isFilePreviewable } from '../file-preview';
+import { getFilePreviewKind, inertBlobType, isFilePreviewable, toInertBlob } from '../file-preview';
 
 describe('file preview detection', () => {
   it('detects browser-renderable image attachments', () => {
@@ -29,4 +29,32 @@ describe('file preview detection', () => {
     expect(getFilePreviewKind('archive.zip', 'application/zip')).toBe('unsupported');
     expect(isFilePreviewable('archive.zip', 'application/zip')).toBe(false);
   });
-});
+});
+
+describe('inert blob typing for cid: parts (GHSA-xvjh-v9c6-qcvc)', () => {
+  it('keeps inert media types so inline images and media still render', () => {
+    expect(inertBlobType('image/png')).toBe('image/png');
+    expect(inertBlobType('image/jpeg; name=a.jpg')).toBe('image/jpeg; name=a.jpg');
+    expect(inertBlobType('video/mp4')).toBe('video/mp4');
+    expect(inertBlobType('application/pdf')).toBe('application/pdf');
+  });
+
+  it('neutralises every sender-declared type that could execute as our origin', () => {
+    for (const type of ['text/html', 'TEXT/HTML; charset=utf-8', 'application/xhtml+xml', 'image/svg+xml', 'application/xml', 'text/xml', 'application/javascript']) {
+      expect(inertBlobType(type)).toBe('application/octet-stream');
+    }
+    expect(inertBlobType(undefined)).toBe('application/octet-stream');
+    expect(inertBlobType('')).toBe('application/octet-stream');
+  });
+
+  it('re-types a fetched Blob without touching its bytes', async () => {
+    const html = new Blob(['<script>alert(1)</script>'], { type: 'text/html' });
+    const inert = toInertBlob(html);
+    expect(inert.type).toBe('application/octet-stream');
+    expect(inert.size).toBe(html.size);
+    expect(await inert.text()).toBe('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+
+    const png = new Blob([new Uint8Array([137, 80, 78, 71])], { type: 'image/png' });
+    expect(toInertBlob(png)).toBe(png);
+  });
+});

lib/__tests__/proxy-security-headers.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+/**
+ * @vitest-environment node
+ *
+ * The proxy used to treat every path whose last segment contains a dot as a
+ * static asset and return before setting the CSP, X-Content-Type-Options and
+ * the other security headers. This app routes [[...segments]] catch-alls
+ * under /<locale>/mail, /calendar, /contacts and /files, so
+ * /en/mail/folder/inbox/statement.pdf is a real, signed-in page - and it was
+ * served without a CSP, which let a sender-typed blob: URL opened from that
+ * document execute in the webmail origin (GHSA-xvjh-v9c6-qcvc). Only what
+ * Next genuinely serves from public/ may skip the headers now.
+ */
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from 'vitest';
+import { NextRequest } from 'next/server';
+
+vi.mock('@/lib/admin/config-manager', () => ({
+  configManager: {
+    ensureLoaded: vi.fn(async () => {}),
+    get: vi.fn((_key: string, fallback: unknown) => fallback),
+    getPolicy: vi.fn(() => ({ features: { pluginsEnabled: false } })),
+  },
+}));
+vi.mock('@/lib/setup/state', () => ({ detectSetupState: vi.fn(() => 'configured') }));
+vi.mock('@/lib/admin/csp-frame-origins', () => ({ getEnabledPluginFrameOrigins: vi.fn(async () => []) }));
+vi.mock('next-intl/middleware', async () => {
+  const { NextResponse } = await import('next/server');
+  return { default: () => () => NextResponse.next() };
+});
+
+import { proxy, isStaticAssetPath } from '@/proxy';
+
+function load(path: string): Promise<Response> {
+  return proxy(new NextRequest('http://localhost:3000' + path, {
+    headers: { 'sec-fetch-dest': 'document', 'sec-fetch-mode': 'navigate', 'sec-fetch-site': 'none' },
+  }));
+}
+
+const SECURITY_HEADERS = ['content-security-policy', 'x-content-type-options', 'x-frame-options', 'referrer-policy', 'permissions-policy'];
+
+// Signed-in pages whose last segment happens to contain a dot.
+const DOTTED_APP_PATHS = [
+  '/en/mail/folder/inbox/statement.pdf',
+  '/de/mail/folder/inbox/statement.pdf',
+  '/en/calendar/2026/09/17.ics',
+  '/en/contacts/jan.kahmen',
+  '/en/files/reports/q3.xlsx',
+  '/en/settings/account.json',
+  '/mail/folder/inbox/statement.pdf',
+  '/en/.well-known/security.txt',
+];
+
+// What public/ (and Next's own route handlers at the root) actually serve.
+const STATIC_ASSETS = [
+  '/sw.js',
+  '/favicon.ico',
+  '/manifest.webmanifest',
+  '/icon-192x192.png',
+  '/branding/logo.png',
+  '/notification/cheerful-527.mp3',
+];
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  vi.clearAllMocks();
+});
+
+describe('security headers on dotted app paths (GHSA-xvjh-v9c6-qcvc)', () => {
+  it.each(DOTTED_APP_PATHS)('serves %s with the full security header set', async (path) => {
+    const response = await load(path);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    for (const header of SECURITY_HEADERS) {
+      expect(response.headers.get(header), header).not.toBeNull();
+    }
+    const csp = response.headers.get('content-security-policy') ?? '';
+    expect(csp).toMatch(/script-src 'self' 'nonce-[^']+'/);
+    expect(csp).not.toContain("'unsafe-eval'");
+    expect(response.headers.get('x-content-type-options')).toBe('nosniff');
+    // The nonce reaches the layout the same way it does on /en/mail/folder/inbox.
+    expect(response.headers.get('x-middleware-request-x-nonce')).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(response.headers.get('x-middleware-request-x-pathname')).toBe(path);
+  });
+
+  it('gives a dotted app path the same policy as its canonical sibling', async () => {
+    const dotted = await load('/en/mail/folder/inbox/statement.pdf');
+    const canonical = await load('/en/mail/folder/inbox');
+
+    const strip = (csp: string | null) => (csp ?? '').replace(/'nonce-[^']+'/g, "'nonce-X'");
+    expect(strip(dotted.headers.get('content-security-policy'))).toBe(strip(canonical.headers.get('content-security-policy')));
+    for (const header of SECURITY_HEADERS.filter((h) => h !== 'content-security-policy')) {
+      expect(dotted.headers.get(header)).toBe(canonical.headers.get(header));
+    }
+  });
+
+  it.each(STATIC_ASSETS)('still passes %s straight through untouched', async (path) => {
+    const response = await load(path);
+
+    expect(response.status).toBe(200);
+    expect(response.headers.get('content-security-policy')).toBeNull();
+    expect(response.headers.get('x-middleware-request-x-nonce')).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it.each(['/api/auth/session', '/_next/static/chunks/main.js', '/_next/image'])('still skips %s', async (path) => {
+    const response = await load(path);
+
+    expect(response.headers.get('content-security-policy')).toBeNull();
+  });
+});
+
+describe('isStaticAssetPath', () => {
+  it('matches only root-level files and the public/ asset folders', () => {
+    for (const path of STATIC_ASSETS) expect(isStaticAssetPath(path), path).toBe(true);
+    for (const path of DOTTED_APP_PATHS) expect(isStaticAssetPath(path), path).toBe(false);
+    expect(isStaticAssetPath('/en')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isStaticAssetPath('/en/mail')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isStaticAssetPath('/brandingx/logo.png')).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

lib/email-sanitization.ts

@@ -419,6 +419,21 @@ export function isHttpLinkHref(href: string | null | undefined): boolean {
   return /^(?:https?:\/\/|\/\/)/i.test(normalized);
 }
 
+/**
+ * Whether a clicked message-body link may be handed to window.open(). Web links
+ * and links to external protocol handlers (tel:, sms:, ...) are fine. Anything
+ * that resolves inside our own origin is not: blob: URLs (a cid: part re-typed
+ * by the sender, GHSA-xvjh-v9c6-qcvc), data:, and bare relative paths, which
+ * would open a webmail route of the sender's choosing in a new tab.
+ */
+export function isOpenableLinkHref(href: string | null | undefined): boolean {
+  if (!href) return false;
+  if (isHttpLinkHref(href)) return true;
+  // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
+  const normalized = href.replace(/[\u0000-\u0020]+/g, '');
+  return /^(?:ftps?|tel|sms|callto|xmpp):/i.test(normalized);
+}
+
 /**
  * Give one `<a>` the new-tab treatment uniformly across the iframe render paths
  * (the DOMPurify hook and the post-render DOM walk in email-viewer): http(s)

lib/file-preview.ts

@@ -89,4 +89,23 @@ export function isMimeTypeSafeForInlinePreview(type?: string): boolean {
   if (INLINE_PREVIEW_UNSAFE_MIME_TYPES.has(mimeType)) return false;
   if (INLINE_PREVIEW_SAFE_MIME_TYPES.has(mimeType)) return true;
   return INLINE_PREVIEW_SAFE_MIME_PREFIXES.some((prefix) => mimeType.startsWith(prefix));
+}
+
+const INERT_BLOB_TYPE = 'application/octet-stream';
+
+/**
+ * MIME type for a Blob whose blob: URL ends up inside untrusted markup (the
+ * cid: parts of a rendered message body). Blob URLs inherit the creating
+ * document's origin, so a sender-declared text/html or image/svg+xml part
+ * navigated to as a top-level document would run script as the webmail origin
+ * (GHSA-xvjh-v9c6-qcvc). Inert types keep their MIME so img/video/audio keep
+ * rendering them; anything else becomes octet-stream, which no browser executes.
+ */
+export function inertBlobType(type?: string): string {
+  return type && isMimeTypeSafeForInlinePreview(type) ? type : INERT_BLOB_TYPE;
+}
+
+/** Re-type a fetched Blob per inertBlobType() without copying its bytes. */
+export function toInertBlob(blob: Blob): Blob {
+  return isMimeTypeSafeForInlinePreview(blob.type) ? blob : blob.slice(0, blob.size, INERT_BLOB_TYPE);
 }

proxy.ts

@@ -51,7 +51,21 @@ function withMatchedChineseAcceptLanguage(request: NextRequest): NextRequest {
 // (e.g. `export const config = { matcher }`) is no longer allowed in the
 // proxy file. We replicate the previous matcher inline by short-circuiting
 // requests for API routes, Next internals and static assets.
-const PROXY_SKIP_PATTERN = /^\/(?:api|_next)(?:\/|$)|\.[^/]+$/;
+const PROXY_SKIP_PATTERN = /^\/(?:api|_next)(?:\/|$)/;
+
+// What Next serves from public/: a single dotted segment at the root
+// (/sw.js, /favicon.ico, /manifest.webmanifest) and the branding/ and
+// notification/ asset folders. The upstream matcher treated EVERY path whose
+// last segment has a dot as a static file, but the [[...segments]] catch-alls
+// under /<locale>/mail, /calendar, /contacts and /files make
+// /en/mail/folder/inbox/statement.pdf a real signed-in page, and it rendered
+// without a CSP or any other security header (GHSA-xvjh-v9c6-qcvc). Only what
+// is genuinely static may skip locale routing and the headers.
+const STATIC_ASSET_PATTERN = /^\/[^/]+\.[^/]+$|^\/(?:branding|notification)\//;
+
+export function isStaticAssetPath(pathname: string): boolean {
+  return STATIC_ASSET_PATTERN.test(pathname);
+}
 
 /**
  * Hand the route every request header the client sent, plus `extra`.
@@ -128,7 +142,7 @@ export async function proxy(request: NextRequest) {
       // Public read endpoint - serves wizard-uploaded branding assets so
       // image previews work during the wizard. No auth on the GET route.
       pathname.startsWith("/api/admin/branding/") ||
-      /\.[^/]+$/.test(pathname);
+      isStaticAssetPath(pathname);
 
     if (!allowed) {
       if (pathname.startsWith("/api/")) {
@@ -163,7 +177,7 @@ export async function proxy(request: NextRequest) {
     return NextResponse.json({ error: "Cross-origin request rejected" }, { status: 403 });
   }
 
-  if (PROXY_SKIP_PATTERN.test(pathname)) {
+  if (PROXY_SKIP_PATTERN.test(pathname) || isStaticAssetPath(pathname)) {
     return NextResponse.next();
   }