fix: revoke api tokens and mcp oauth grants on leave_instance (#12430)

* fix: revoke api tokens and mcp oauth grants on leave_instance

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin token deletion on leave_instance

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ruben Fiszel
2026-11-13 19:04:49 +01:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent 495e4435db
commit 2c39bf044a
4 changed files with 61 additions and 13 deletions
+45
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
//! Leaving the instance ends every credential of the account, as deleting it does: a token kept
//! past the leave would authenticate as whoever later takes the address.
use sqlx::{Pool, Postgres};
use windmill_test_utils::*;
#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))]
async fn test_leave_instance_deletes_tokens(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let base = format!("http://localhost:{}/api/users", server.addr.port());
let client = reqwest::Client::new();
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO token (token_hash, token_prefix, token, email, label, super_admin)
VALUES (encode(sha256('OTHER_TOKEN_2'::bytea), 'hex'), 'OTHER_TOKE', 'OTHER_TOKEN_2',
'test2@windmill.dev', 'api', false)",
)
.execute(&db)
.await?;
let resp = client
.post(format!("{base}/leave_instance"))
.bearer_auth("SECRET_TOKEN_2")
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200, "{}", resp.text().await?);
let left: i64 =
sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT count(*) FROM token WHERE email = 'test2@windmill.dev'")
.fetch_one(&db)
.await?;
assert_eq!(left, 0, "tokens of the account survived the leave");
let whoami = |token: &'static str| {
client
.get(format!("{base}/whoami"))
.bearer_auth(token)
.send()
};
assert_eq!(whoami("OTHER_TOKEN_2").await?.status(), 401);
assert_eq!(whoami("SECRET_TOKEN_3").await?.status(), 200);
Ok(())
}
+4
View File
@@ -1315,6 +1315,10 @@ async fn join_workspace<'c>(
async fn leave_instance(Extension(db): Extension<DB>, authed: ApiAuthed) -> Result<String> {
forbid_job_token_account_destruction(&authed)?;
let mut tx = db.begin().await?;
revoke_mcp_oauth_grants(&mut *tx, &authed.email, None).await?;
sqlx::query!("DELETE FROM token WHERE email = $1", &authed.email)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
sqlx::query!("DELETE FROM password WHERE email = $1", &authed.email)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
@@ -462,9 +462,9 @@ async fn connect(
// No lock against removals, target changes or key rotations: `load_connection` voids a row
// that lands after one of them. A disconnect or a newer connect stamps the row itself, which
// this one then leaves alone. Without a membership to bind to, the row is bound to the account
// through the credential making this request, which deleting the account removes (except
// through `leave_instance`, which leaves its tokens): the address could otherwise be deleted
// and taken by a new account while the remote call runs, and the foreign key would accept it.
// through the credential making this request, which deleting or leaving the account removes:
// the address could otherwise be deleted and taken by a new account while the remote call
// runs, and the foreign key would accept it.
let mut tx = db.begin().await?;
let connected_at = sqlx::query_scalar!(
"INSERT INTO remote_deploy_token
+9 -10
View File
@@ -18,13 +18,13 @@ Symbols, not line numbers, are cited: they drift less.
token's 7 days therefore has no row left to delete: what ends a user's access calls
`revoke_mcp_oauth_grants` (`windmill-api-users`), which also deletes grants without a live
token and codes not yet exchanged — a password change or reset, disabling or deleting the
account, offboarding, SCIM deactivation and removal, and (for the grants bound to that
workspace) removal from a workspace. The grant lock (`lock_mcp_oauth_grants`) is the user's
`password` row, shared while issuing a grant and exclusive while revoking, because every path
account, leaving the instance, offboarding, SCIM deactivation and removal, and (for the
grants bound to that workspace) removal from a workspace. The grant lock
(`lock_mcp_oauth_grants`) is the user's `password` row, shared while issuing a grant and exclusive while revoking, because every path
that changes a user locks that row before their tokens: a refresh takes it, then its
access-token row, then its grant, the order the trigger also follows. A new path that writes a
user's tokens and may revoke must lock that row first too. `leave_workspace` and `leave_instance`
delete no tokens and revoke nothing.
user's tokens and may revoke must lock that row first too. `leave_workspace` deletes no tokens
and revokes nothing; `leave_instance` deletes every token of the account, as `delete_user` does.
- **Sessions** are `token` rows with `label='session'` plus the HttpOnly `token` cookie, minted only
by `create_session_token` (`windmill-api-users/src/users.rs`). `GET /api/users/refresh_token`
mints one for any non-job token but returns plain text, no redirect.
@@ -140,11 +140,10 @@ Symbols, not line numbers, are cited: they drift less.
the same (or the owner is a superadmin) and it decrypts. So a target set A → B → A, or a
removal and re-add, voids it whatever the clocks say. A superadmin with no membership is bound
through the credential making the request instead: the insert requires its `token` row to
still exist, and `delete_user`, offboarding and SCIM removal delete an account's tokens, so an
address deleted that way and re-created during the call does not inherit the connection (a JWT,
having no row, cannot connect a workspace its owner is not a member of). `leave_instance`
deletes only the `password` row, leaving the tokens and the memberships, which is not covered.
Neither is a member's connect across an account re-creation: an address is not expected to pass
still exist, and `delete_user`, `leave_instance`, offboarding and SCIM removal delete an
account's tokens, so an address deleted that way and re-created during the call does not
inherit the connection (a JWT, having no row, cannot connect a workspace its owner is not a
member of). A member's connect across an account re-creation is not covered: an address is not expected to pass
to another person. A disconnect empties and stamps the row
(inserting one if needed) rather than deleting it, `connected_at` is when a connect started,
and the connect's upsert leaves a row stamped after that alone, so an older connect cannot undo