fix: revoke api tokens and mcp oauth grants on leave_instance (#12430)

* fix: revoke api tokens and mcp oauth grants on leave_instance

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin token deletion on leave_instance

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ruben Fiszel
2026-11-13 19:04:49 +01:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent 495e4435db
commit 2c39bf044a
4 changed files with 61 additions and 13 deletions
+9 -10
View File
@@ -18,13 +18,13 @@ Symbols, not line numbers, are cited: they drift less.
token's 7 days therefore has no row left to delete: what ends a user's access calls
`revoke_mcp_oauth_grants` (`windmill-api-users`), which also deletes grants without a live
token and codes not yet exchanged — a password change or reset, disabling or deleting the
account, offboarding, SCIM deactivation and removal, and (for the grants bound to that
workspace) removal from a workspace. The grant lock (`lock_mcp_oauth_grants`) is the user's
`password` row, shared while issuing a grant and exclusive while revoking, because every path
account, leaving the instance, offboarding, SCIM deactivation and removal, and (for the
grants bound to that workspace) removal from a workspace. The grant lock
(`lock_mcp_oauth_grants`) is the user's `password` row, shared while issuing a grant and exclusive while revoking, because every path
that changes a user locks that row before their tokens: a refresh takes it, then its
access-token row, then its grant, the order the trigger also follows. A new path that writes a
user's tokens and may revoke must lock that row first too. `leave_workspace` and `leave_instance`
delete no tokens and revoke nothing.
user's tokens and may revoke must lock that row first too. `leave_workspace` deletes no tokens
and revokes nothing; `leave_instance` deletes every token of the account, as `delete_user` does.
- **Sessions** are `token` rows with `label='session'` plus the HttpOnly `token` cookie, minted only
by `create_session_token` (`windmill-api-users/src/users.rs`). `GET /api/users/refresh_token`
mints one for any non-job token but returns plain text, no redirect.
@@ -140,11 +140,10 @@ Symbols, not line numbers, are cited: they drift less.
the same (or the owner is a superadmin) and it decrypts. So a target set A → B → A, or a
removal and re-add, voids it whatever the clocks say. A superadmin with no membership is bound
through the credential making the request instead: the insert requires its `token` row to
still exist, and `delete_user`, offboarding and SCIM removal delete an account's tokens, so an
address deleted that way and re-created during the call does not inherit the connection (a JWT,
having no row, cannot connect a workspace its owner is not a member of). `leave_instance`
deletes only the `password` row, leaving the tokens and the memberships, which is not covered.
Neither is a member's connect across an account re-creation: an address is not expected to pass
still exist, and `delete_user`, `leave_instance`, offboarding and SCIM removal delete an
account's tokens, so an address deleted that way and re-created during the call does not
inherit the connection (a JWT, having no row, cannot connect a workspace its owner is not a
member of). A member's connect across an account re-creation is not covered: an address is not expected to pass
to another person. A disconnect empties and stamps the row
(inserting one if needed) rather than deleting it, `connected_at` is when a connect started,
and the connect's upsert leaves a row stamped after that alone, so an older connect cannot undo