fix: bound the JWKS cache by retained bytes on the usable keys

The key-count cap did not bound retained memory (from_jwk decodes n/e/x/y with
no length limit, so 50 keys could still carry ~1 MiB), and it counted raw
entries, refusing a valid mixed-use set with many encryption keys wholesale.
Replace it with a cap on the serialized size of the usable, retained keys
(JWKS_MAX_RETAINED_BYTES = 64 KiB), measured after filtering. Cache ceiling is
now bounded (200 entries x 64 KiB); a real set retains a few KB.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
This commit is contained in:
Ruben Fiszel
2026-09-04 15:39:38 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
parent 7d3a9fd5cd
commit badc996ab9
+24 -14
View File
@@ -241,10 +241,11 @@ const JWKS_NEGATIVE_TTL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
/// but the server it names may be attacker-controlled, and a real key set is a few KB.
const JWKS_MAX_BYTES: usize = 1 << 20;
/// A real JWKS carries a handful of keys. A set larger than this is refused so one cache
/// entry cannot retain a densely packed body (the byte cap alone allows thousands of minimal
/// JWKs), which a workspace admin rotating URLs could otherwise use to grow the shared process.
const JWKS_MAX_KEYS: usize = 50;
/// A cache entry retains only the usable signing keys, but nothing else bounds their combined
/// size: the response cap is 1 MiB and `from_jwk` decodes `n`/`e`/`x`/`y` without a length
/// limit, so one entry could retain ~1 MiB (a few hundred MB across the 200-entry LRU). Cap the
/// retained material instead; a real set is a few KB, so this is invisible to a legitimate one.
const JWKS_MAX_RETAINED_BYTES: usize = 64 * 1024;
/// Fetch a JWKS, keeping only the keys usable here. The URL was set by a workspace
/// admin, so it is validated against private ranges and the connect is pinned to the
@@ -298,11 +299,6 @@ fn parse_jwks_keys(body: &[u8]) -> Result<HashMap<String, Jwk>> {
.get("keys")
.and_then(|k| k.as_array())
.ok_or_else(|| Error::BadRequest("JWKS has no `keys` array".to_string()))?;
if entries.len() > JWKS_MAX_KEYS {
return Err(Error::BadRequest(format!(
"JWKS holds more than {JWKS_MAX_KEYS} keys"
)));
}
let keys: HashMap<String, Jwk> = entries
.iter()
.filter_map(|entry| serde_json::from_value::<Jwk>(entry.clone()).ok())
@@ -315,6 +311,17 @@ fn parse_jwks_keys(body: &[u8]) -> Result<HashMap<String, Jwk>> {
"JWKS holds no RSA or EC signing key with a kid".to_string(),
));
}
// Bound the retained material by bytes, measured after filtering so a large mixed-use set
// (many encryption keys, few signing) is not refused for its size.
let retained: usize = keys
.values()
.filter_map(|jwk| serde_json::to_vec(jwk).ok().map(|v| v.len()))
.sum();
if retained > JWKS_MAX_RETAINED_BYTES {
return Err(Error::BadRequest(format!(
"JWKS signing keys retain more than {JWKS_MAX_RETAINED_BYTES} bytes"
)));
}
Ok(keys)
}
@@ -529,11 +536,14 @@ mod tests {
}
#[test]
fn an_oversized_jwks_is_refused() {
// The byte cap alone allows thousands of minimal keys in one entry; the count cap
// bounds what a single cache entry can retain.
let keys: Vec<_> = (0..=JWKS_MAX_KEYS)
.map(|i| serde_json::json!({"kty":"RSA","kid":format!("k{i}"),"n":"aa","e":"AQAB"}))
fn a_jwks_retaining_too_many_bytes_is_refused() {
// Every key has real coordinates, so all are usable and this exercises the
// retained-bytes cap rather than the empty-set path: their combined material exceeds
// JWKS_MAX_RETAINED_BYTES, which the byte-per-response and entry-count caps do not bound.
let keys: Vec<_> = (0..600)
.map(|i| {
serde_json::json!({"kty":"EC","crv":"P-256","kid":format!("k{i}"),"x":PUB1_X,"y":PUB1_Y})
})
.collect();
let body = serde_json::json!({ "keys": keys }).to_string();
assert!(parse_jwks_keys(body.as_bytes()).is_err());