refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings

Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.

The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.

One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.

Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

backend/.sqlx/query-71ee2cb6661cca1fa4d8874a7f6d368347c59f36fd87df6dc7996152ccb84af0.json

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+{
+  "db_name": "PostgreSQL",
+  "query": "SELECT id, name, enabled, pwd FROM datatable_role",
+  "describe": {
+    "columns": [
+      {
+        "ordinal": 0,
+        "name": "id",
+        "type_info": "Varchar"
+      },
+      {
+        "ordinal": 1,
+        "name": "name",
+        "type_info": "Varchar"
+      },
+      {
+        "ordinal": 2,
+        "name": "enabled",
+        "type_info": "Bool"
+      },
+      {
+        "ordinal": 3,
+        "name": "pwd",
+        "type_info": "Text"
+      }
+    ],
+    "parameters": {
+      "Left": []
+    },
+    "nullable": [
+      false,
+      false,
+      false,
+      true
+    ]
+  },
+  "hash": "71ee2cb6661cca1fa4d8874a7f6d368347c59f36fd87df6dc7996152ccb84af0"
+}

backend/.sqlx/query-86af9d51a158ea5cb6161461ecddf2a63695f8cbf8af648da5a0a77a5b9d02ba.json

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+{
+  "db_name": "PostgreSQL",
+  "query": "INSERT INTO datatable_role (id, name, enabled, pwd) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4)",
+  "describe": {
+    "columns": [],
+    "parameters": {
+      "Left": [
+        "Varchar",
+        "Varchar",
+        "Bool",
+        "Text"
+      ]
+    },
+    "nullable": []
+  },
+  "hash": "86af9d51a158ea5cb6161461ecddf2a63695f8cbf8af648da5a0a77a5b9d02ba"
+}

backend/.sqlx/query-c85d362fe2e652d4ac01a35bf470e80b993020a2ff5dcb5849dc570d52798587.json

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "db_name": "PostgreSQL",
+  "query": "DELETE FROM datatable_role WHERE id = $1",
+  "describe": {
+    "columns": [],
+    "parameters": {
+      "Left": [
+        "Text"
+      ]
+    },
+    "nullable": []
+  },
+  "hash": "c85d362fe2e652d4ac01a35bf470e80b993020a2ff5dcb5849dc570d52798587"
+}

backend/.sqlx/query-fcb34e643b888122766e115a01394ab31ac856252aaa76c75ea27a447009c363.json

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+{
+  "db_name": "PostgreSQL",
+  "query": "UPDATE datatable_role SET name = $2, enabled = $3, pwd = $4 WHERE id = $1",
+  "describe": {
+    "columns": [],
+    "parameters": {
+      "Left": [
+        "Text",
+        "Varchar",
+        "Bool",
+        "Text"
+      ]
+    },
+    "nullable": []
+  },
+  "hash": "fcb34e643b888122766e115a01394ab31ac856252aaa76c75ea27a447009c363"
+}

backend/migrations/20260908142148_datatable_role_catalog.down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+DROP TABLE IF EXISTS datatable_role;

backend/migrations/20260908142148_datatable_role_catalog.up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-- The instance's data table role catalog: one row per Postgres login Windmill created for data
+-- table access.
+--
+-- A table rather than a `global_settings` key, because the value is a set of live cluster
+-- credentials and that table has generic read, list, write and CLI round-trip paths that know
+-- nothing about what they are carrying. Every one of them is a way to leak the passwords or to
+-- overwrite the catalog with a copy that has none, and a row nothing generic touches has none of
+-- those. One row per role also makes two concurrent creates two inserts rather than a
+-- read-modify-write over one document.
+CREATE TABLE datatable_role (
+    id VARCHAR(50) PRIMARY KEY,
+    -- The Postgres role name, verbatim. Unique because it is the cluster's own key.
+    name VARCHAR(63) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+    enabled BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
+    -- Generated by Windmill, never entered by anyone, and never leaves the server.
+    pwd TEXT,
+    created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
+);
+
+GRANT ALL ON datatable_role TO windmill_user;
+GRANT ALL ON datatable_role TO windmill_admin;

backend/windmill-api-integration-tests/tests/datatable_roles.rs

@@ -341,9 +341,9 @@ async fn concurrent_role_creations_both_survive(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::R
     let suffix: String = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple().to_string()[..8].to_string();
     let names = [format!("wmtest_a_{suffix}"), format!("wmtest_b_{suffix}")];
 
-    // The catalog is one JSON document, so create is read-modify-write. Unserialized, both of
-    // these read the same snapshot, both `CREATE ROLE` succeeds, and the second write drops the
-    // first entry — leaving a live cluster login nobody recorded.
+    // The cluster DDL is not visible to another transaction until commit, so without the lock both
+    // of these pass their `pg_roles` existence check and one loses — leaving a live cluster login
+    // the catalog never recorded.
     let create = |name: String| async move {
         let resp = authed(
             client().post(format!(

backend/windmill-api-integration-tests/tests/fixtures/datatable_roles.sql

@@ -2,15 +2,14 @@
 -- carrying a copy. `test-user-2` is a non-admin of the parent and an admin of the fork: the shape
 -- the pointer exists for.
 
+-- Empty registry: role provisioning grants CONNECT on every database named here, and the data
+-- table's `dt_main` is a name in workspace settings, not a database that exists.
 INSERT INTO global_settings (name, value) VALUES
-    -- Empty registry: role provisioning grants CONNECT on every database named here, and the
-    -- data table's `dt_main` is a name in workspace settings, not a database that exists.
-    ('custom_instance_pg_databases', '{"user_pwd": "pw", "databases": {}}'::jsonb),
-    -- The role catalog has its own row: it holds generated credentials and must stay out of the
-    -- operator-facing config the neighbouring row belongs to.
-    ('datatable_roles', '{"role1": {"name": "analytics", "enabled": true, "pwd": "pw"}}'::jsonb)
+    ('custom_instance_pg_databases', '{"user_pwd": "pw", "databases": {}}'::jsonb)
     ON CONFLICT (name) DO UPDATE SET value = EXCLUDED.value;
 
+INSERT INTO datatable_role (id, name, enabled, pwd) VALUES ('role1', 'analytics', true, 'pw');
+
 UPDATE workspace_settings SET datatable = '{
     "datatables": {
         "main": {

backend/windmill-api-settings/src/lib.rs

@@ -1325,7 +1325,6 @@ pub async fn get_global_setting(
         .await?
         .map(|x| x.value);
 
-    let value = value.map(|v| windmill_common::datatable_roles::redact_role_catalog_setting(&key, v));
     Ok(Json(value.unwrap_or_else(|| serde_json::Value::Null)))
 }
 
@@ -1363,13 +1362,7 @@ async fn list_global_settings(
     require_super_admin(&db, &authed).await?;
     let settings = sqlx::query_as!(GlobalSetting, "SELECT name, value FROM global_settings")
         .fetch_all(&db)
-        .await?
-        .into_iter()
-        .map(|s| GlobalSetting {
-            value: windmill_common::datatable_roles::redact_role_catalog_setting(&s.name, s.value),
-            name: s.name,
-        })
-        .collect();
+        .await?;
 
     Ok(Json(settings))
 }
@@ -2604,9 +2597,8 @@ async fn create_datatable_role(
     require_super_admin(&db, &authed).await?;
     windmill_common::datatable_roles::validate_role_name(&req.name)?;
 
-    // The catalog is one JSON document, so read, DDL and write are one critical section: two
-    // concurrent creates would otherwise both land in the cluster and the second write would drop
-    // the first, leaving a live login nobody recorded.
+    // The cluster DDL and the row that records it are one transaction under one lock, so a
+    // half-done create cannot leave a live login the catalog does not know about.
     let mut tx = db.begin().await?;
     windmill_common::datatable_roles::lock_role_catalog(&mut tx).await?;
     let mut catalog = windmill_common::datatable_roles::read_role_catalog_tx(&mut tx).await?;
@@ -2621,15 +2613,13 @@ async fn create_datatable_role(
     let pwd = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
     windmill_common::datatable_roles::create_instance_role(&mut tx, &req.name, &pwd).await?;
 
-    catalog.insert(
-        id.clone(),
-        windmill_common::datatable_roles::InstanceDatatableRole {
-            name: req.name.clone(),
-            enabled: true,
-            pwd: Some(pwd),
-        },
-    );
-    windmill_common::datatable_roles::write_role_catalog(&mut tx, &catalog).await?;
+    let entry = windmill_common::datatable_roles::InstanceDatatableRole {
+        name: req.name.clone(),
+        enabled: true,
+        pwd: Some(pwd),
+    };
+    windmill_common::datatable_roles::insert_role_catalog_entry(&mut tx, &id, &entry).await?;
+    catalog.insert(id.clone(), entry);
     tx.commit().await?;
     converge_connect_grants_everywhere(&db, &catalog).await;
     windmill_common::feature_usage::log_feature_usage("datatable", "role_created", "");
@@ -2685,8 +2675,8 @@ async fn update_datatable_role(
         updated.enabled = enabled;
     }
 
+    windmill_common::datatable_roles::update_role_catalog_entry(&mut tx, &id, &updated).await?;
     catalog.insert(id.clone(), updated.clone());
-    windmill_common::datatable_roles::write_role_catalog(&mut tx, &catalog).await?;
     tx.commit().await?;
     converge_connect_grants_everywhere(&db, &catalog).await;
 
@@ -2721,15 +2711,14 @@ async fn delete_datatable_role(
     require_super_admin(&db, &authed).await?;
     let mut tx = db.begin().await?;
     windmill_common::datatable_roles::lock_role_catalog(&mut tx).await?;
-    let mut catalog = windmill_common::datatable_roles::read_role_catalog_tx(&mut tx).await?;
+    let catalog = windmill_common::datatable_roles::read_role_catalog_tx(&mut tx).await?;
     let role = catalog
         .get(&id)
         .cloned()
         .ok_or_else(|| error::Error::NotFound(format!("No data table role with id '{id}'")))?;
 
     windmill_common::datatable_roles::drop_instance_role(&db, &mut tx, &role.name).await?;
-    catalog.remove(&id);
-    windmill_common::datatable_roles::write_role_catalog(&mut tx, &catalog).await?;
+    windmill_common::datatable_roles::delete_role_catalog_entry(&mut tx, &id).await?;
     tx.commit().await?;
     // After the drop commits: a tenant naming a role that still exists is harmless, one naming a
     // role that is gone is not, so this only ever runs once the cluster agrees it is gone.

backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces.rs

@@ -3575,6 +3575,43 @@ async fn edit_datatable_config(
     for r in &new_config.renames {
         crate::datatable_migrations::validate_datatable_path_segment(&r.from)?;
         crate::datatable_migrations::validate_new_datatable_name(&r.to)?;
+        // A rename is a claim about what this save is doing, and other workspaces' pointers are
+        // rewritten from it. Unchecked, a caller could submit an unchanged configuration with
+        // `main -> missing` and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing has.
+        if !old_datatables.contains_key(&r.from) {
+            return Err(Error::BadRequest(format!(
+                "Cannot rename data table '{}': this workspace has no such data table",
+                r.from
+            )));
+        }
+        if !new_config.settings.datatables.contains_key(&r.to) {
+            return Err(Error::BadRequest(format!(
+                "Cannot rename data table '{}' to '{}': the save does not contain '{}'",
+                r.from, r.to, r.to
+            )));
+        }
+    }
+    // `A -> B` and `B -> C` applied one after another would move what pointed at `A` all the way
+    // to `C`. Each pointer moves once, from what it named before this save.
+    if new_config.renames.len() > 1 {
+        let mut seen = std::collections::HashSet::new();
+        for r in &new_config.renames {
+            if !seen.insert(r.from.as_str()) {
+                return Err(Error::BadRequest(format!(
+                    "Data table '{}' is renamed twice in one save",
+                    r.from
+                )));
+            }
+        }
+        for r in &new_config.renames {
+            if seen.contains(r.to.as_str()) && r.to != r.from {
+                return Err(Error::BadRequest(format!(
+                    "Data table '{}' is both renamed and the target of another rename in one \
+                     save; do them one at a time",
+                    r.to
+                )));
+            }
+        }
     }
 
     // Map new name -> old name so a renamed data table inherits the previous

backend/windmill-common/src/datatable_roles.rs

@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 
 use crate::{
     error::{Error, Result},
-    global_settings::DATATABLE_ROLES_SETTING,
     DB,
 };
 
@@ -34,8 +33,8 @@ pub const ADMIN_DATATABLE_ROLE: &str = "admin";
 /// membership is what later lets it `ALTER ... OWNER TO` a role and drop it.
 pub const CUSTOM_INSTANCE_USER: &str = "custom_instance_user";
 
-/// One catalog entry. The password is per role and instance-wide, and lives in the instance's own
-/// [`DATATABLE_ROLES_SETTING`] row rather than in any workspace's settings.
+/// One catalog entry, as stored in `datatable_role`. The password is per role and instance-wide;
+/// it belongs to the instance, not to any workspace's settings.
 #[derive(Deserialize, Serialize, Clone)]
 pub struct InstanceDatatableRole {
     /// The Postgres role name, verbatim.
@@ -45,11 +44,11 @@ pub struct InstanceDatatableRole {
     /// Absent only for a role whose provisioning did not finish; resolving as it then errors
     /// rather than falling back to admin.
     ///
-    /// A plain string rather than a `StringOrSecretRef` like the instance user's password beside
-    /// it: that one is a secret ref because an operator supplies it and may want it to come from
-    /// their own backend, while this one is minted here and never entered by anyone, so there is
-    /// nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated secrets at rest is a separate change
-    /// that would take the replication password with it.
+    /// A plain string rather than a `StringOrSecretRef` like the instance user's password: that
+    /// one is a secret ref because an operator supplies it and may want it to come from their own
+    /// backend, while this one is minted here and never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for
+    /// a ref to point at. Encrypting generated secrets at rest is a separate change that would
+    /// take the replication password with it.
     #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
     pub pwd: Option<String>,
 }
@@ -114,29 +113,14 @@ fn quote_literal(value: &str) -> String {
     format!("'{}'", value.replace('\'', "''"))
 }
 
-/// The catalog as a settings reader may see it: every entry, no password.
+/// Serialize the mutations that are not already serialized by the row itself.
 ///
-/// `GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing hand back whatever is in the row, so the
-/// one key whose value is a set of live cluster credentials has to be filtered on the way out.
-/// Applied by name, since those endpoints do not know what they are returning.
-pub fn redact_role_catalog_setting(name: &str, value: serde_json::Value) -> serde_json::Value {
-    if name != DATATABLE_ROLES_SETTING {
-        return value;
-    }
-    let mut catalog = parse_role_catalog(Some(value));
-    for role in catalog.values_mut() {
-        role.pwd = None;
-    }
-    serde_json::to_value(&catalog).unwrap_or(serde_json::Value::Null)
-}
-
-/// Serialize every mutation of the catalog, from the read through the cluster DDL to the write.
-///
-/// The catalog is one JSON document, so create/rename/enable/delete are all read-modify-write.
-/// Without this, two concurrent creates both read the same snapshot, both succeed in the cluster,
-/// and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password nobody
-/// recorded, which is exactly the state the whole delete path exists to avoid. Held for the
-/// transaction, so the DDL has to run on that same transaction to be covered.
+/// A create is an insert and a delete is a delete, which Postgres orders for us — the unique index
+/// on `name` is what makes two concurrent creates of the same name one winner and one error. What
+/// still needs it is the window between the cluster DDL and the row: `CREATE ROLE` is not visible
+/// to another transaction's `pg_roles` check until commit, so without this two creates of the same
+/// name both pass their existence check and one fails on the index having already made the login.
+/// Held for the transaction, so the DDL has to run on that same transaction to be covered.
 pub async fn lock_role_catalog(tx: &mut sqlx::Transaction<'_, sqlx::Postgres>) -> Result<()> {
     sqlx::query!("SELECT pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtext('datatable_role_catalog'))")
         .execute(&mut **tx)
@@ -150,13 +134,18 @@ pub async fn lock_role_catalog(tx: &mut sqlx::Transaction<'_, sqlx::Postgres>) -
 /// or an export. Nothing about who may call it: the credential is the whole risk, and `Debug` is
 /// hand-written to redact it for the same reason.
 pub async fn read_role_catalog(db: &DB) -> Result<DatatableRoleCatalog> {
-    let value = sqlx::query_scalar!(
-        "SELECT value FROM global_settings WHERE name = $1",
-        DATATABLE_ROLES_SETTING
-    )
-    .fetch_optional(db)
-    .await?;
-    Ok(parse_role_catalog(value))
+    let rows = sqlx::query!("SELECT id, name, enabled, pwd FROM datatable_role")
+        .fetch_all(db)
+        .await?;
+    Ok(rows
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(|r| {
+            (
+                r.id,
+                InstanceDatatableRole { name: r.name, enabled: r.enabled, pwd: r.pwd },
+            )
+        })
+        .collect())
 }
 
 /// As [`read_role_catalog`], reading inside the caller's transaction so the value is the one
@@ -164,44 +153,70 @@ pub async fn read_role_catalog(db: &DB) -> Result<DatatableRoleCatalog> {
 pub async fn read_role_catalog_tx(
     tx: &mut sqlx::Transaction<'_, sqlx::Postgres>,
 ) -> Result<DatatableRoleCatalog> {
-    let value = sqlx::query_scalar!(
-        "SELECT value FROM global_settings WHERE name = $1",
-        DATATABLE_ROLES_SETTING
-    )
-    .fetch_optional(&mut **tx)
-    .await?;
-    Ok(parse_role_catalog(value))
+    let rows = sqlx::query!("SELECT id, name, enabled, pwd FROM datatable_role")
+        .fetch_all(&mut **tx)
+        .await?;
+    Ok(rows
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(|r| {
+            (
+                r.id,
+                InstanceDatatableRole { name: r.name, enabled: r.enabled, pwd: r.pwd },
+            )
+        })
+        .collect())
 }
 
-/// Persist the catalog, in the caller's transaction so it commits with the cluster DDL it
-/// describes. Upserts: the row does not exist until the first role is created.
+/// Record a role, in the caller's transaction so it commits with the `CREATE ROLE` it describes.
 ///
-/// Authorization: writes generated Postgres credentials. Callers MUST restrict this to superadmin
+/// Authorization: writes a generated Postgres credential. Callers MUST restrict this to superadmin
 /// paths and MUST hold [`lock_role_catalog`] on `tx`.
-pub async fn write_role_catalog(
+pub async fn insert_role_catalog_entry(
     tx: &mut sqlx::Transaction<'_, sqlx::Postgres>,
-    catalog: &DatatableRoleCatalog,
+    id: &str,
+    role: &InstanceDatatableRole,
 ) -> Result<()> {
-    let value = serde_json::to_value(catalog)
-        .map_err(|e| Error::internal_err(format!("serializing the role catalog: {e}")))?;
     sqlx::query!(
-        "INSERT INTO global_settings (name, value) VALUES ($1, $2)
-         ON CONFLICT (name) DO UPDATE SET value = $2, updated_at = now()",
-        DATATABLE_ROLES_SETTING,
-        value
+        "INSERT INTO datatable_role (id, name, enabled, pwd) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4)",
+        id,
+        role.name,
+        role.enabled,
+        role.pwd,
     )
     .execute(&mut **tx)
     .await?;
     Ok(())
 }
 
-/// A catalog that will not deserialize is an empty one, which fails closed: tenants are keyed by
-/// id independently of it, so every role then resolves to "no longer exists on this instance"
-/// rather than to admin.
-fn parse_role_catalog(value: Option<serde_json::Value>) -> DatatableRoleCatalog {
-    value
-        .map(|v| serde_json::from_value(v).unwrap_or_default())
-        .unwrap_or_default()
+/// Update a role's recorded name, login flag and password. Same contract as
+/// [`insert_role_catalog_entry`].
+pub async fn update_role_catalog_entry(
+    tx: &mut sqlx::Transaction<'_, sqlx::Postgres>,
+    id: &str,
+    role: &InstanceDatatableRole,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    sqlx::query!(
+        "UPDATE datatable_role SET name = $2, enabled = $3, pwd = $4 WHERE id = $1",
+        id,
+        role.name,
+        role.enabled,
+        role.pwd,
+    )
+    .execute(&mut **tx)
+    .await?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Forget a role. Same contract as [`insert_role_catalog_entry`]; run it in the transaction that
+/// drops the cluster login, so the two cannot disagree.
+pub async fn delete_role_catalog_entry(
+    tx: &mut sqlx::Transaction<'_, sqlx::Postgres>,
+    id: &str,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    sqlx::query!("DELETE FROM datatable_role WHERE id = $1", id)
+        .execute(&mut **tx)
+        .await?;
+    Ok(())
 }
 
 /// Resolve the role a caller named to its catalog id. A disabled role is an error rather than a

backend/windmill-common/src/global_settings.rs

@@ -243,18 +243,8 @@ pub const AGENT_WORKER_BLOCKED_SETTINGS: &[&str] = &[
     // resolve datatable connections through the dedicated datatable endpoints, never these.
     "custom_instance_pg_databases",
     "custom_instance_replication_pwd",
-    // The data table role catalog: one generated Postgres password per role.
-    DATATABLE_ROLES_SETTING,
 ];
 
-/// The instance's data table role catalog, `{ "<id>": { name, enabled, pwd } }`.
-///
-/// Its own row rather than a field of `custom_instance_pg_databases`, for the same reason
-/// `custom_instance_replication_pwd` is: it holds generated credentials and is written only by the
-/// server, so the config machinery must not be able to read it into an export, rewrite it, or drop
-/// it on a full-row upsert of a neighbour.
-pub const DATATABLE_ROLES_SETTING: &str = "datatable_roles";
-
 /// Whether an agent worker may read the given global setting over HTTP.
 /// Deny-by-exception: everything is readable except [`AGENT_WORKER_BLOCKED_SETTINGS`].
 pub fn is_setting_readable_by_agent_worker(name: &str) -> bool {
@@ -687,7 +677,6 @@ mod tests {
             OTEL_TRACING_PROXY_SETTING,
             "custom_instance_pg_databases",
             "custom_instance_replication_pwd",
-            DATATABLE_ROLES_SETTING,
         ] {
             assert!(
                 !is_setting_readable_by_agent_worker(key),

backend/windmill-common/src/instance_config.rs

@@ -959,7 +959,6 @@ pub const PROTECTED_SETTINGS: &[&str] = &[
     "ducklake_settings",
     "custom_instance_pg_databases",
     "custom_instance_replication_pwd",
-    crate::global_settings::DATATABLE_ROLES_SETTING,
     "uid",
     "rsa_keys",
     "jwt_secret",
@@ -985,9 +984,6 @@ pub const HIDDEN_SETTINGS: &[&str] = &[
     // Server-only (written by setup/refresh via direct SQL), never operator-authored —
     // hidden so the config machinery can't read, rewrite, or drop it.
     "custom_instance_replication_pwd",
-    // The data table role catalog, one generated Postgres password per role. Same reasoning as
-    // the line above: server-written, never operator-authored, and it must not reach an export.
-    crate::global_settings::DATATABLE_ROLES_SETTING,
 ];
 
 /// Top-level settings whose entire value is sensitive and must be fully redacted in logs.

frontend/src/lib/components/sidebar/DeleteForkedWorkspaceModal.svelte

@@ -122,7 +122,12 @@
 			}
 		}
 
-		await WorkspaceService.deleteWorkspace({ workspace })
+		const result = await WorkspaceService.deleteWorkspace({ workspace })
+		// The server names any data table in another workspace that this delete left governed by
+		// nothing. Only surfaced when there is something to say.
+		if (typeof result === 'string' && result.includes('no longer resolve')) {
+			sendUserToast(result, 'warning', [], undefined, 20000)
+		}
 		await deleteSessionsForWorkspace(workspace).catch((e) =>
 			console.error('Session cleanup after workspace delete failed', e)
 		)

frontend/src/lib/components/workspaceSettings/DataTableSettings.svelte

@@ -223,12 +223,21 @@
 			const deleted_datatables = dataTableSettings.dataTables
 				.filter((d) => !tempIds.has(d.id))
 				.map((d) => d.name)
-			await WorkspaceService.editDataTableConfig({
+			const result = await WorkspaceService.editDataTableConfig({
 				workspace: $workspaceStore!,
 				requestBody: { settings, renames, deleted_datatables }
 			})
 			dataTableSettings = clone(tempSettings)
-			sendUserToast('Data table settings saved successfully')
+			// The server says here when a delete left another workspace's data table pointing at
+			// nothing. Swallowing it is what made that failure silent for the person who caused it.
+			const stranded = typeof result === 'string' && result.includes('no longer resolve')
+			sendUserToast(
+				stranded ? result : 'Data table settings saved successfully',
+				stranded ? 'warning' : 'success',
+				[],
+				undefined,
+				stranded ? 20000 : 5000
+			)
 		} catch (e) {
 			sendUserToast(e, true)
 			console.error('Error saving data table settings', e)