feat: workspace protection rule to restrict anonymous app deployment (#9509)

* feat: restrict anonymous app execution mode to admins

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: add regression test for anonymous app admin gate

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: gate anonymous app mode behind workspace protection rule

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: lock app row on anonymous-mode check, fail closed while rules load

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ruben Fiszel
2026-06-10 13:47:19 +00:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by Claude Fable 5
parent 7fc5340da3
commit cf9ad54181
7 changed files with 403 additions and 2 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT policy->>'execution_mode' = 'anonymous' FROM app WHERE path = $1 AND workspace_id = $2 FOR UPDATE",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "?column?",
"type_info": "Bool"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": [
null
]
},
"hash": "3e82929b365a6aa7ccc39fc5615c4110e1d740e0cb0509b1c58bc6636d83cafd"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
//! Test for the `RestrictAnonymousAppDeployment` workspace protection rule.
//!
//! By default (no rule), any user with write access can deploy an app with
//! `execution_mode: anonymous` (no login required) — the historical
//! behavior. When a workspace protection ruleset enables
//! `RestrictAnonymousAppDeployment`, only workspace admins and the
//! ruleset's bypass users/groups can create an anonymous app or flip an
//! existing app to anonymous. To avoid breaking existing workflows,
//! restricted users can still redeploy an app that is already anonymous
//! (no exposure change) and can downgrade it back to `publisher`
//! (exposure reduction).
//!
//! Users from the `base` fixture:
//! test-user (admin, token SECRET_TOKEN)
//! test-user-2 (non-admin, token SECRET_TOKEN_2)
use serde_json::json;
use sqlx::{Pool, Postgres};
use windmill_common::workspaces::invalidate_protection_rules_cache;
use windmill_test_utils::*;
const ADMIN_TOKEN: &str = "SECRET_TOKEN";
const USER_TOKEN: &str = "SECRET_TOKEN_2";
fn client() -> reqwest::Client {
reqwest::Client::new()
}
fn authed(builder: reqwest::RequestBuilder, token: &str) -> reqwest::RequestBuilder {
builder.header("Authorization", format!("Bearer {}", token))
}
fn app_payload(path: &str, execution_mode: &str) -> serde_json::Value {
json!({
"path": path,
"summary": "Test app",
"value": {},
"policy": { "execution_mode": execution_mode, "triggerables": {} }
})
}
fn policy_update(execution_mode: &str) -> serde_json::Value {
json!({
"policy": { "execution_mode": execution_mode, "triggerables": {} }
})
}
/// Single test to avoid interference through the process-global protection
/// rules cache (keyed by workspace id, shared across parallel tests).
#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))]
async fn test_restrict_anonymous_app_deployment_rule(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
invalidate_protection_rules_cache("test-workspace");
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let port = server.addr.port();
let ws = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/w/test-workspace");
// ========================================
// 1. Default behavior (no rule): a non-admin can create an anonymous
// app and flip an app to anonymous, as before.
// ========================================
let resp = authed(client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/create")), USER_TOKEN)
.json(&app_payload("u/test-user-2/anon_default", "anonymous"))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(
resp.status(),
201,
"without the rule, non-admin creating an anonymous app must succeed: {}",
resp.text().await?
);
let resp = authed(client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/create")), USER_TOKEN)
.json(&app_payload("u/test-user-2/test_app", "publisher"))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201, "{}", resp.text().await?);
let resp = authed(
client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/update/u/test-user-2/test_app")),
USER_TOKEN,
)
.json(&policy_update("anonymous"))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(
resp.status(),
200,
"without the rule, non-admin flipping an app to anonymous must succeed: {}",
resp.text().await?
);
// back to publisher for the gated scenarios below
let resp = authed(
client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/update/u/test-user-2/test_app")),
USER_TOKEN,
)
.json(&policy_update("publisher"))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200, "{}", resp.text().await?);
// ========================================
// 2. Admin enables the RestrictAnonymousAppDeployment rule.
// ========================================
let resp = authed(
client().post(format!("{ws}/workspaces/protection_rules")),
ADMIN_TOKEN,
)
.json(&json!({
"name": "no-public-apps",
"rules": ["RestrictAnonymousAppDeployment"],
"bypass_users": [],
"bypass_groups": []
}))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(
resp.status(),
200,
"admin should create the protection rule: {}",
resp.text().await?
);
// ========================================
// 3. With the rule, a non-admin cannot create an anonymous app...
// ========================================
let resp = authed(client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/create")), USER_TOKEN)
.json(&app_payload("u/test-user-2/anon_blocked", "anonymous"))
.send()
.await?;
let status = resp.status();
let body = resp.text().await?;
assert_eq!(
status, 403,
"with the rule, non-admin creating an anonymous app must be rejected: {body}"
);
assert!(
body.contains("no-public-apps"),
"error should name the blocking ruleset, got: {body}"
);
// ... nor flip an existing app to anonymous ...
let resp = authed(
client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/update/u/test-user-2/test_app")),
USER_TOKEN,
)
.json(&policy_update("anonymous"))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(
resp.status(),
403,
"with the rule, non-admin flipping an app to anonymous must be rejected"
);
// ... while a publisher create still works.
let resp = authed(client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/create")), USER_TOKEN)
.json(&app_payload("u/test-user-2/pub_ok", "publisher"))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201, "{}", resp.text().await?);
// ========================================
// 4. An admin is never blocked by the rule.
// ========================================
let resp = authed(
client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/update/u/test-user-2/test_app")),
ADMIN_TOKEN,
)
.json(&policy_update("anonymous"))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(
resp.status(),
200,
"admin flipping an app to anonymous must succeed: {}",
resp.text().await?
);
// ========================================
// 5. A restricted user can still redeploy an app that is already
// anonymous — keeping it anonymous does not change its exposure, and
// blocking it would prevent non-admin editors from deploying public
// apps at all (the frontend always sends the full policy on deploy).
// ========================================
let resp = authed(
client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/update/u/test-user-2/test_app")),
USER_TOKEN,
)
.json(&json!({
"value": { "edited": true },
"policy": { "execution_mode": "anonymous", "triggerables": {} }
}))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(
resp.status(),
200,
"restricted user redeploying an already-anonymous app must succeed: {}",
resp.text().await?
);
// ========================================
// 6. A restricted user can downgrade the app back to publisher
// (reduces exposure), but cannot re-flip it to anonymous.
// ========================================
let resp = authed(
client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/update/u/test-user-2/test_app")),
USER_TOKEN,
)
.json(&policy_update("publisher"))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(
resp.status(),
200,
"restricted user downgrading anonymous to publisher must succeed: {}",
resp.text().await?
);
let resp = authed(
client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/update/u/test-user-2/test_app")),
USER_TOKEN,
)
.json(&policy_update("anonymous"))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(
resp.status(),
403,
"restricted user re-flipping to anonymous must be rejected"
);
// ========================================
// 7. Bypass users are exempt from the rule.
// ========================================
let resp = authed(
client().post(format!("{ws}/workspaces/protection_rules/no-public-apps")),
ADMIN_TOKEN,
)
.json(&json!({
"rules": ["RestrictAnonymousAppDeployment"],
"bypass_users": ["test-user-2"],
"bypass_groups": []
}))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(
resp.status(),
200,
"admin should update the protection rule: {}",
resp.text().await?
);
let resp = authed(
client().post(format!("{ws}/apps/update/u/test-user-2/test_app")),
USER_TOKEN,
)
.json(&policy_update("anonymous"))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(
resp.status(),
200,
"bypass user flipping an app to anonymous must succeed: {}",
resp.text().await?
);
Ok(())
}
+1
View File
@@ -28245,6 +28245,7 @@ components:
- DisableDirectDeployment
- DisableWorkspaceForking
- RestrictDeployToDeployers
- RestrictAnonymousAppDeployment
RuleBypasserGroups:
type: array
description: Groups that can bypass this ruleset
+48 -1
View File
@@ -65,7 +65,9 @@ use windmill_common::{
},
variables::{build_crypt, build_crypt_with_key_suffix, encrypt},
worker::{to_raw_value, CLOUD_HOSTED},
workspaces::{check_deploy_rules, RuleCheckResult},
workspaces::{
check_deploy_rules, check_user_against_rule, ProtectionRuleKind, RuleCheckResult,
},
HUB_BASE_URL,
};
#[cfg(feature = "parquet")]
@@ -1348,6 +1350,20 @@ async fn create_app_internal<'a>(
));
}
}
if matches!(app.policy.execution_mode, ExecutionMode::Anonymous) {
if let RuleCheckResult::Blocked(msg) = check_user_against_rule(
w_id,
&ProtectionRuleKind::RestrictAnonymousAppDeployment,
&authed.username,
&authed.groups,
authed.is_admin,
&db,
)
.await?
{
return Err(Error::PermissionDenied(msg));
}
}
// CLI / git-sync deploys ask us to preserve any existing user draft at this
// path instead of wiping it as part of the deploy.
if !app.skip_draft_deletion.unwrap_or(false) {
@@ -1866,6 +1882,37 @@ async fn update_app_internal<'a>(
}
if let Some(mut npolicy) = ns.policy {
if matches!(npolicy.execution_mode, ExecutionMode::Anonymous) && !authed.is_admin {
// Restricted users may keep deploying an app that is already
// public, but flipping an app to anonymous (public) access is
// gated by the RestrictAnonymousAppDeployment protection rule.
// FOR UPDATE locks the row until this transaction's policy
// UPDATE commits, so a concurrent admin downgrade cannot be
// silently overwritten by a stale redeploy keeping anonymous.
let already_anonymous = sqlx::query_scalar!(
"SELECT policy->>'execution_mode' = 'anonymous' FROM app WHERE path = $1 AND workspace_id = $2 FOR UPDATE",
path,
w_id
)
.fetch_optional(&mut *tx)
.await?
.flatten()
.unwrap_or(false);
if !already_anonymous {
if let RuleCheckResult::Blocked(msg) = check_user_against_rule(
w_id,
&ProtectionRuleKind::RestrictAnonymousAppDeployment,
&authed.username,
&authed.groups,
authed.is_admin,
&db,
)
.await?
{
return Err(Error::PermissionDenied(msg));
}
}
}
let should_preserve = ns.preserve_on_behalf_of.unwrap_or(false)
&& windmill_common::can_preserve_on_behalf_of(&authed)
&& npolicy.on_behalf_of.is_some();
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ bitflags::bitflags! {
const DISABLE_DIRECT_DEPLOYMENT = 1 << 0;
const DISABLE_WORKSPACE_FORKING = 1 << 1;
const RESTRICT_DEPLOY_TO_DEPLOYERS = 1 << 2;
const RESTRICT_ANONYMOUS_APP_DEPLOYMENT = 1 << 3;
}
}
@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ pub enum ProtectionRuleKind {
DisableDirectDeployment,
DisableWorkspaceForking,
RestrictDeployToDeployers,
RestrictAnonymousAppDeployment,
}
impl ProtectionRuleKind {
@@ -92,6 +94,9 @@ impl ProtectionRuleKind {
ProtectionRuleKind::RestrictDeployToDeployers => {
ProtectionRules::RESTRICT_DEPLOY_TO_DEPLOYERS
}
ProtectionRuleKind::RestrictAnonymousAppDeployment => {
ProtectionRules::RESTRICT_ANONYMOUS_APP_DEPLOYMENT
}
}
}
@@ -104,6 +109,9 @@ impl ProtectionRuleKind {
ProtectionRuleKind::RestrictDeployToDeployers => {
"Only workspace admins and members of wm_deployers can deploy to this workspace"
}
ProtectionRuleKind::RestrictAnonymousAppDeployment => {
"Making an app publicly accessible without login (anonymous execution mode) is restricted in this workspace"
}
}
}
}
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
import OnBehalfOfSelector, {
type OnBehalfOfChoice
} from '$lib/components/OnBehalfOfSelector.svelte'
import { canUserBypassRuleKind, protectionRulesState } from '$lib/workspaceProtectionRules.svelte'
const WM_DEPLOYERS_GROUP = 'wm_deployers'
@@ -60,6 +61,16 @@
} = $props()
let isDeployer = $derived($userStore?.groups?.includes(WM_DEPLOYERS_GROUP) ?? false)
// Admins always pass the backend check. For everyone else, fail closed
// while the workspace protection rules are still loading so the toggle
// is never briefly enabled for a user the rules will end up restricting.
let rulesetsLoaded = $derived(protectionRulesState.rulesets !== undefined)
let canSetAnonymous = $derived(
!!$userStore?.is_admin ||
!!$userStore?.is_super_admin ||
(rulesetsLoaded &&
canUserBypassRuleKind('RestrictAnonymousAppDeployment', $userStore ?? undefined))
)
let canPreserve = $derived(!!$userStore?.is_admin || !!$userStore?.is_super_admin || isDeployer)
let savedOnBehalfOfEmail = $derived(savedApp?.policy?.on_behalf_of_email)
let savedOnBehalfOf = $derived(savedApp?.policy?.on_behalf_of)
@@ -253,6 +264,13 @@
<h2>Public URL</h2>
<div class="my-6">
{#if rulesetsLoaded && !canSetAnonymous}
<Alert type="warning" title="Restricted by a workspace protection rule" size="xs">
Making this app publicly accessible without login is restricted to workspace admins and
bypass users by a workspace protection rule
</Alert>
<div class="mb-2"></div>
{/if}
<div class="flex gap-2 items-center mb-2">
<Toggle
options={{
@@ -264,7 +282,7 @@
policy.execution_mode = e.detail ? 'anonymous' : 'publisher'
setPublishState()
}}
disabled={!savedApp}
disabled={!savedApp || (!canSetAnonymous && policy.execution_mode != 'anonymous')}
/>
</div>
{#if !savedApp}
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
let disableDirectDeployment = $state(hasRule('DisableDirectDeployment'))
let disableFork = $state(hasRule('DisableWorkspaceForking'))
let restrictDeployToDeployers = $state(hasRule('RestrictDeployToDeployers'))
let restrictAnonymousAppDeployment = $state(hasRule('RestrictAnonymousAppDeployment'))
let selectedGroups = $state<string[]>(
untrack(() => rule)?.bypass_groups?.map((g) => g.replace('g/', '')) ?? []
)
@@ -49,6 +50,7 @@
let initialDisableDirectDeployment = $state(hasRule('DisableDirectDeployment'))
let initialDisableFork = $state(hasRule('DisableWorkspaceForking'))
let initialRestrictDeployToDeployers = $state(hasRule('RestrictDeployToDeployers'))
let initialRestrictAnonymousAppDeployment = $state(hasRule('RestrictAnonymousAppDeployment'))
let initialSelectedGroups = $state<string[]>(
untrack(() => rule)?.bypass_groups
? untrack(() => rule)!.bypass_groups.map((g) => g.replace('g/', ''))
@@ -115,12 +117,14 @@
disableDirectDeployment ||
disableFork ||
restrictDeployToDeployers ||
restrictAnonymousAppDeployment ||
selectedGroups.length > 0 ||
selectedUsers.length > 0
: name !== initialName ||
disableDirectDeployment !== initialDisableDirectDeployment ||
disableFork !== initialDisableFork ||
restrictDeployToDeployers !== initialRestrictDeployToDeployers ||
restrictAnonymousAppDeployment !== initialRestrictAnonymousAppDeployment ||
JSON.stringify([...selectedGroups].sort()) !==
JSON.stringify([...initialSelectedGroups].sort()) ||
JSON.stringify([...selectedUsers].sort()) !==
@@ -160,6 +164,9 @@
...(disableFork ? ['DisableWorkspaceForking' as ProtectionRuleKind] : []),
...(restrictDeployToDeployers
? ['RestrictDeployToDeployers' as ProtectionRuleKind]
: []),
...(restrictAnonymousAppDeployment
? ['RestrictAnonymousAppDeployment' as ProtectionRuleKind]
: [])
],
bypass_groups: selectedGroups,
@@ -188,6 +195,9 @@
...(disableFork ? ['DisableWorkspaceForking' as ProtectionRuleKind] : []),
...(restrictDeployToDeployers
? ['RestrictDeployToDeployers' as ProtectionRuleKind]
: []),
...(restrictAnonymousAppDeployment
? ['RestrictAnonymousAppDeployment' as ProtectionRuleKind]
: [])
],
bypass_groups: selectedGroups,
@@ -202,6 +212,7 @@
initialDisableDirectDeployment = disableDirectDeployment
initialDisableFork = disableFork
initialRestrictDeployToDeployers = restrictDeployToDeployers
initialRestrictAnonymousAppDeployment = restrictAnonymousAppDeployment
initialSelectedGroups = clone(selectedGroups)
initialSelectedUsers = clone(selectedUsers)
@@ -335,6 +346,20 @@
Non-deployers can still fork, browse, and request a review.
</div>
</div>
<!-- Restrict anonymous app deployment -->
<div class="flex flex-col gap-2">
<Toggle
bind:checked={restrictAnonymousAppDeployment}
options={{
right: 'Restrict public app access'
}}
/>
<div class="text-xs text-secondary ml-6">
Only workspace admins and bypass users can make an app publicly accessible without login
(anonymous execution mode). Apps that are already public can still be redeployed.
</div>
</div>
</div>
</Section>