519 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 0eb6320faa test: make the import refusal reach the handler guard (#11502)
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-03 09:42:09 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 013b302d48 perf: keep a pg executor connection per database (#11492)
* fix: stop the pg executor cache from pinning a pooler slot

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: retry while the evicted pg backend exits

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf: keep a pg executor connection per database

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KHjj2iG8kKPCaFuK6bqXvi

* fix: close a pg connection whose query was cut off by a timeout or cancel

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KHjj2iG8kKPCaFuK6bqXvi

* fix: keep a pg connection only after its query read every result

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KHjj2iG8kKPCaFuK6bqXvi

* fix: free idle pg connections and retry when a connect is refused

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KHjj2iG8kKPCaFuK6bqXvi

* fix: retry a pg connect only when a connection cap refused it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KHjj2iG8kKPCaFuK6bqXvi

* fix: detect pg connection caps by SQLSTATE and label cloud connections as new

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KHjj2iG8kKPCaFuK6bqXvi

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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-03 09:34:10 +02:00
e7fc1b2e2e feat: restricted job tokens per script and flow (#11484)
* feat: restricted job tokens (job_token_scopes on scripts and flows)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: admit flow-run reads, skip dedicated workers, gate on worker version

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep restricted jobs off flow runners, preserve scopes on rename and promotion

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep restricted jobs off every dedicated handoff, confine progress flow id

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: exclude restricted runnables from dedicated worker startup

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: gate restrictions on the release after 1.821.0

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: store per-job scopes on job_perms instead of v2_job, pin inline runs to the checked version

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: step-level job_token_scopes for flow steps and agent tools

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL

* fix: fail closed on perms read errors, refuse restricted queue imports, gate step scopes in previews

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL

* fix: carry a job's scopes on its completion so a re-run keeps the caller's cap

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL

* fix: carry a zombie job's scopes into its completion

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL

* fix: leave a zombie for the next sweep when its scopes cannot be read

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL

* docs: correct the QueuedJobV2 completion comment

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL

* fix: validate step scopes in batch flows, fail closed on unvalidated step scopes

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL

* fix: refuse flows with step or tool restrictions at push while an older worker is live

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL

* fix: apply the step-scope worker gate to flow restarts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL

* fix: list the job token toggle with the other step and flow settings

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL

* chore: pin the EE companion merged with EE main

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL

* perf: skip scope lookups for unrestricted jobs; list job token setting last

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL

* style: rustfmt scopes tests

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL

* fix: confine restricted job tokens to their own run lineage; drop remaining extra lookups

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FHGE3ynoAu6yrgeg4kLwL

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 259ad3bfeef5285ba80eedc86309b11dca001220

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #843 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 2b77c0225dca441235daf7bf0a06ba968df0c927

New ee-repo-ref: 259ad3bfeef5285ba80eedc86309b11dca001220

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-03 09:33:44 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 b7f74cd562 fix: never reuse a pg connection a script left inside a transaction (#11497)
* fix: never reuse a pg connection a script left inside a transaction

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KHjj2iG8kKPCaFuK6bqXvi

* fix: close a pg connection whose job failed instead of caching it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KHjj2iG8kKPCaFuK6bqXvi

* docs: describe every caller of PgConnectionLease::discard

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KHjj2iG8kKPCaFuK6bqXvi

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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-03 09:03:44 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 eed7e7d9e6 fix: stop the pg executor cache from pinning a pooler slot (#11490)
* fix: stop the pg executor cache from pinning a pooler slot

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: retry while the evicted pg backend exits

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 22:21:58 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 920771b598 keep tagged binary prebuilds off the dependency job tag (#11489)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 19:07:50 +02:00
4beb1f9420 feat: add trigger, tag, run-as and digest claims to job OIDC tokens (#11481)
* feat: add trigger, tag, run-as and digest claims to job OIDC tokens

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: parse digest floats exactly and derive the codebase digest like push

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: give flows that reference flow nodes no digest and keep --json clean

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: list flow step digests from module positions only

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: skip the pulled module-script digest check on windows

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 71b8c1042fd8188c2d2882476f12b671cb5ba421

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #840 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: ba1870536789a43c5b6ec18522a93edb9cb07f3d

New ee-repo-ref: 71b8c1042fd8188c2d2882476f12b671cb5ba421

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-02 19:02:17 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 3d1d249556 feat: add an instance setting routing all dependency jobs to one tag (#11486)
* feat: add an instance setting routing all dependency jobs to one tag

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep bunnative locks on bun and explain the default dependency routing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-02 18:40:32 +02:00
227e934210 feat: harden job OIDC tokens with version claims, jti and a lifetime cap (#11457)
* feat: harden job OIDC tokens with version claims, jti and a lifetime cap

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: count restarted flow nodes as latest only if the current version uses them

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: follow stored loop and branch bodies when resolving current flow nodes

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: bind current flow nodes to their step id and skip non-numeric node keys

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: derive flow step currency from the flow above it and restarts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: treat every restarted job but a version-checked flow as not latest

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: count a restarted body as latest when the run it came from was current

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to b469efc9ceddfaaa1040e4cb2c18993822f92c78

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #838 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 25e0b9ae1c6c60419a479fa38d5dc5928832790a

New ee-repo-ref: b469efc9ceddfaaa1040e4cb2c18993822f92c78

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-01 14:09:36 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 d2830cb4a0 fix: stop running deleted script versions from worker caches (#11456)
* fix: stop running deleted script versions from worker caches

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: reuse script cache invalidate and test the deletion notify payload

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep a deleted copy from shadowing the same hash in another workspace

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: drop deletions missed while down and fills racing the eviction

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: batch deletion events, evict path caches and cover version pruning

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: evict the raw-import cache on both passes and split large deletion events

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 13:37:00 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 5bd2c2c254 drop unused mut that breaks the backend integration test build (#11462)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 11:13:45 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 a8e65ab1e6 fix: lost suspend decrement when concurrent approvals resume a flow (#11450)
* fix: make RunForm schedule props optional and expect 403 for operator drafts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: serialize concurrent approval resumes on the flow's queue row

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: read flow status after taking the resume lock

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: route every approval decrement through one helper

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-01 10:41:25 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5.5 8c7dcbbda5 feat: agents as a standalone kind with home listing, detail and editor pages (#11332)
* feat: list agents on the home page and create them from the new menu

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep runnables out of the agents view and anchor a new agent once saved

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: autosave a new agent's first edit and list agents past one page

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add agent detail and editor pages

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: explain when an agent cannot be run and drop the broken agent move

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep query params and a unique path when creating an agent

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: lead the home list with agents and keep rows while the agent view loads

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: treat a loading agent as undeployed when leaving the editor page

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: agent detail page config panel, run page on form runs, chat badge

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: agent configuration modal and draft paths like other new items

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep a new agent draft-free until the first input, land agents with runnables

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: place AI agent after apps in the new menu and describe chat and flow use

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: new agents start with managed memory, editor form says how to turn it off

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: clearer managed memory hint in the agent editor form

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: share the agent editor's pane notice as a PaneNotice component

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: name a new agent after a path no resource holds

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: tell repeated tool names apart and hide permissions on draft-only agents

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: agent configuration beside the model in the chat composer and above the form

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: center the agent run form, configuration beside its Run button

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: icon-only agent configuration button beside Run

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: agents run on behalf of their deployer through a run-by-path endpoint

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: agents keep their run-as identity in their value, preserved by the CLI

The identity an agent runs as lives in `value.on_behalf_of` instead of a column. Every write
of an agent resolves it server-side as a flow's is: the writer's own, unless an admin or
wm_deployers member asks to keep it, and a folder default on create. Retyping a resource into
an agent resolves its value the same way. Export leaves it out; the run endpoint reads it and
drops it from the step's inputs.

The CLI follows the app model: a pushed agent never takes its identity from the tracked file,
an unchanged agent compares equal to the deployed one, and an admin or deployer push claims
the deployed identity back. The owner-change pre-check lists agents.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: deploying an agent draft from review keeps its deployed identity

As for an app: an agent draft carries no identity, so the review page claims the deployed one
back, which the backend honours for an admin or wm_deployers member. The draft diff leaves the
deployed identity out, since a draft never holds one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: deploying an agent to another workspace offers the run-as choice

An agent deployed to prod/staging, merged from a fork or promoted with `wmill workspace merge`
gets the same identity choice as a flow or an app: the target's current one, the deployer, or
a picked user, sent as a principal the way a trigger's is. The source workspace's principal is
never copied, and a difference in identity alone is not a change in the workspace compare or
its diff.

The frontend consumes the published windmill-utils-internal, so its deploy provider carries the
same rewrite until that version ships.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: agent identity on fork, agent-scoped job reads, and the run license gate

A fork re-points an agent's identity at its creator when they may not preserve someone else's,
and at the creator when it names nobody in the fork, as it does an app's. A token scoped to
`jobs:run:agents:<path>` reads back the runs it starts, chat turns included. The agent run
endpoint checks the enterprise license like every other run entrypoint.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a CLI push decides agent identity handling by the tracked file's type

An agent retyped into another resource by a push kept neither its value's `on_behalf_of` as the
file stated it nor clear of the old agent's identity. The file's type now decides, and only a
deployed agent's identity is claimed back.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: agents run as the caller, with a note on what a shared one needs

Drops the agent run-as identity: its storage in the agent value, the backfill, the resolution
on every write, and its handling in export, the CLI, draft and cross-workspace deploys, forks
and the workspace compare. The run endpoint runs as the caller, so an operator or reader runs an
agent with their own access. The editor tells the author of a folder agent that anyone running
it needs access to its AI resource and to what its tools use.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: agent editor comments describe runs as the caller

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: agent editor pane notes use Alert

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: agent editor pane notes render as Alert

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: agent editor notes as regular Alerts, not banners

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: agent path as its own editor level, and evals on the agent page

The path leaves the agent form: the editor dialog opens it as a level, as it does evals, and the
editor page in a drawer. The agent page gains Evals, in a dialog. The page supplies the run
form, keeping it out of the editor the flow editor reaches.

The draft edit gate no longer throws when a focused, changed field is removed: the `change` that
removal fires lands mid-teardown, so the gate opens just after instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: agent settings as the resource editor's header fields, behind a cog

The agent's own settings (path, labels, workspace specific, description) open from a cog as
the flow and script editors' do, laid out as the top of the resource editor. The folder note is
gone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: agent settings fields and cog, completing the rename

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: evals open as a dialog over the agent editor page

The editor page opens an agent's evals over itself, as the agent page does, with the unsaved
edits offered to a run; the editor dialog keeps evals as a level of its own. The two pages share
the dialog.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the unreachable model provider note reads like the unreachable agent one

Same warning level and wording as the note above it, with the path inline rather than in
parentheses that lost their spaces.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the unreachable model provider note offers editing the agent too

Editing the agent to use a provider the reader can access is often the simpler way out; offered
when the reader can write the agent, with Unlink and asking for access.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: provider note lists asking for access as its own option

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: shorter provider note, without the header's buttons repeated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: evals only for those who can edit the agent

Evaluating builds datasets and runs against the agent, which is authoring: the agent page and the
editor offer it only with write access to the agent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: agent page actions ordered as the script and flow pages

The menu leads and Edit comes last, as DetailPageHeader lays them out.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the agent editor dialog's levels slide in built on the first visit

Warmed, as the evals pane's levels are, so settings and evals are mounted before the first
navigation rather than inside its transition. Evals are only in the strip where they can be
opened.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the agent's settings report path errors, and hold nothing a reader can edit

The path field reads its error back, so it shows it and keeps deploy blocked on it.
Labels are shown rather than editable without write access. Evals wait for the load
to know they can be opened, and the page layout builds no levels it never shows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: one builder for an agent's run flow, and the agent page on the shared header

The run endpoint and evals build the agent's one-step flow through the same function.
The agent page uses DetailPageHeader, whose error handler, tag and trigger context are
now optional, and whose menu items keep their disabled state. The home row and the
page share the agent's menu and delete.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the agent page's menu is built from its current path

Deploy settings are the workspace's, so they load once and the menu is derived from
them rather than fetched per path, where a superseded fetch could land after a
navigation. The shared run-flow builder lives with agent runs rather than evals.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the scoped-read comment names the run-flow builder as it is

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-30 18:40:05 +02:00
ca44043e12 feat: let operators compose flows when the workspace grants the right (#11228)
* feat: let a workspace withdraw operator schedule and trigger writes

Operators can create, edit and delete schedules and triggers today through the
API, CLI and MCP, while the operator_settings flags beside them only hide those
pages. An admin who wants operators to see what is scheduled without letting
them change it cannot express that. Add manage_schedules and manage_triggers as
enforced settings, gated at the schedule handlers and at the generic TriggerCrud
routes so every trigger kind is covered by one check.

They name capabilities operators already hold, so they are granted unless
withdrawn, and absence has to mean "never configured" rather than a value. The
read coalesces to true; the update endpoint merges into the stored jsonb with
the two fields as Option<bool>, so an omitted key keeps what is stored.
operator_settings is git-synced as a whole object, so a settings file written
before these keys existed reaches the endpoint on every pull, and a serde or SQL
default of either polarity would turn that pull into a silent withdrawal or
restoration.

The rights are read through a per-process cache, so withdrawing one publishes a
notify_event that drops the entry on every replica.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dsf6VC4MVLisiEoeQkgbr4

* feat: let operators compose flows when the workspace grants the right

Adds operator_settings.builder_flows: a workspace setting that lets every
operator compose flows out of runnables that already exist. It does not make
them authors. The boundary the operator role draws is authoring code and running
arbitrary code, and this does not move it: check_flow_is_composition_only walks
the value and refuses anything carrying code, including the shapes an obvious
walk misses (code hoisted into a flow_node, an AI agent step's tools, and a
linked ai_agent resource whose tool list is resolved at run time).

What the walk cannot settle it returns for the caller to authorize under RLS:
the worker tags the steps pin, every runnable they reference, and the (path,
hash) of every version-pinned step. Composing a path is enough to run it and to
run it as whoever it runs as, since the worker resolves a step's path with the
root DB handle and adopts that runnable's on_behalf_of. A pinned hash needs its
own check because dispatch ignores the path beside it.

The gate runs on every write and on both request-supplied-value paths, flow
preview and flow dependencies, or either becomes the way to run what the write
path refuses.

Operators of a builder workspace consume a full author seat; the EE companion
carries the counting.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dsf6VC4MVLisiEoeQkgbr4

* feat: enforce operator write rights on the router and in the UI

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: close the capture gap and gate the trigger editors' write actions

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: gate acl writes and the native trigger drawer behind manage rights

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: refuse operator writes with 403 and gate sharing at the drawer

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf: resolve identity in the operator write gate only for writes

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: gate the suspended-jobs actions and stop the route check refusing reads

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: explain the empty-state create button when operator writes are withdrawn

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: audit operator settings changes and fold path writes into native rows

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: open locked editors read-only and group the operator settings

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: skip email and azure lookups on editor open while triggers are locked

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: state each operator-rights rationale once in comments

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address CI review findings on operator write rights

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep capture move gated and skip it in the builders while locked

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: refuse builder-rights violations with 403 so operators stay logged in

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: trim duplication in the operator builder gates

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: hide build app from builder operators on the flow page

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: point at the companion EE PR merged with EE main

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep a builder's drafts list loading past drafts they cannot write

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: hide saved agents from builder operators in the step picker

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: note the inlined seat rule and drop orphaned sqlx entries

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: stop a builder's step test from logging them out

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: refuse a builder's dependency job on a path it cannot write

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep builders from adding dynamic dropdown code to a flow

A flow's dropdown code runs as whoever loads its form, so a builder may keep or drop the code stored on the flow it updates, never add or change it. The builder's editor hides the dropdown types and code, and previews options through the deployed flow; the inline dropdown refusal is a 403 so it no longer logs operators out. Also trims rationale comments repeated across sites.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: show why saving operator settings failed

The seat-cap refusal on granting builder rights explains what to do; the toast now carries the server's message instead of a generic failure.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: check builder flow drafts like deploys and treat dropdown code as code

A developer who loads a builder's flow draft in the editor runs its dynamic dropdown code as themselves, so a builder's draft now passes the same checks as a deploy. Dropdown code is refused like step code rather than kept or dropped, which also removes the exact-match comparison that refused builders over whitespace.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: bill a builder workspace's operators as developers on cloud

The cloud seat count behind the Premium page, the sidebar usage and the fork cap still weighed every operator at half a seat, while the builder right makes them authors. The out-of-repo invoicing job must follow the same rule.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: check a builder's flow draft as it will be stored

Draft storage strips NUL escapes after the builder check, so a key ending in one (value\u0000, x-windmill-dyn-select-code\u0000) passed the check as an unknown field and was stored under its plain name. The check now reads the sanitized text.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: list a builder's flow drafts and hide hub imports from builders

A builder's undeployed flows now appear in the home list, the flow list and the folder counts. Hub project imports and templates bring scripts and apps along, so builders are no longer offered them. The docs record builders' JavaScript expressions as an accepted risk.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep the stored builder right when a settings payload omits it

A git-synced settings file written before the key existed withdrew the right on every push. builder_flows now follows the manage_* rights: an omitted key leaves the stored value, and the CLI does not count it as a difference.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: word builder refusals by what the flow contains, test the tag refusal

A builder refused on a developer's flow never changed its code, so the refusals now describe the flow ("has inline code, so only a developer can edit this flow") rather than an authoring attempt. The grant confirmation uses the neutral dialog: granting changes billing but destroys nothing. The integration test pins the refusal of a worker tag the workspace cannot use.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: read builder rights from the operating workspace, gate the flow page's audit logs entry

Builder rights now come from useOperatorBuilderFlows(), next to the schedule and trigger locks, so an editor embedded for another workspace answers about that workspace; the legacy AI chat, one instance for the whole app, reads the navigation workspace. The flow page's Audit logs entry follows the operator audit_logs setting now that builders open that menu. Operator settings reset every value on load, null settings included, so nothing carries over from the previous workspace.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: pick a dynamic dropdown's code source by the operating user's role

The flow input editor, the flow test panel and the flow chat send the dropdown request to the operating workspace, so they now also choose inline versus deployed code by the role held there, through useOperatingUser(), instead of the navigation workspace's.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 40ac1c5f8cbce3843b582d9b392d3f3cc7eca3e6

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #815 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 31c9e66884b8ca805b20bbfad41fc428fbedbc0e

New ee-repo-ref: 40ac1c5f8cbce3843b582d9b392d3f3cc7eca3e6

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-30 18:09:14 +02:00
hugocasa 94ac34a489 fix: await async def main in python scripts (#11437)
* fix: await async main and preprocessor in python scripts

* fix: reuse one event loop per python process for async main

* fix: reuse the event loop a python script sets at import

* docs: clarify python await helper comment
2026-09-30 13:02:30 +02:00
hugocasa 039f49ef12 feat: dispatch ai agent tools through the worker queue (#11227)
* feat: dispatch ai agent tools through the worker queue

* fix: respect worker tags when executing ai agent tools locally

* fix: cancel only direct-child tool jobs on agent failure

* fix: cancel queued descendant tool jobs on agent failure

* fix: route ai agent tools by the flow's tag rule
2026-09-29 22:30:50 +02:00
0fdf17d339 feat: data table cards and a managed-first add wizard (#11419)
* fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename

A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles

The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition

Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.

Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition

The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition

The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it

Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license

Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition

The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4

New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): data table roles in the DB manager and raw apps

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: never add a role to the reference of a data table whose name contains '?'

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: read the roles of a data table whose name contains '?'

The generated client leaves a '?' in a path param unencoded, so the lookup
404'd and the raw-app picker blocked Start on such a data table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix(datatables): refuse a reference naming both a legacy data table and a role

When a workspace stores both `sales` and a legacy `sales?role=analytics`, the
reference resolved to the legacy entry without a role, so browsing `sales` as
`analytics` reached another data table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: declare the default role in migrations written for a data table whose name contains '?'

Such a data table connects as its default role without naming it, so the
migrations the manager wrote for it declared no role and ran as admin.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* feat(datatables): set up an external instance cluster for data tables

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): send external cluster passwords as SCRAM verifiers

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): scope external cluster credential readers to the crate

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* [ee] feat(datatables): external_instance data tables on the external cluster

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix(datatables): compare the external cluster settings under a row lock before storing setup

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): only drop external databases Windmill marked, and check use under the lock

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry

Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles

A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection,
`custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say
this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table.

A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the
instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares
`-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch —
grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from
the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`.
A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before.

Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint,
`get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when
there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could
`RESET ROLE` its way out of.

A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a
copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the
parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a
pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the
governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and
ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not
where an access decision should be made.

Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing
workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a
replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin

Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a
caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema
export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the
connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table
under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing
workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant.

All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a
restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the
only right answer for the copy paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping

A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin
putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the
host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and
`CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the
permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials
on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read.

Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration
generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration
rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or
removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after
which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the
entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it
calls a data table changes nothing about the data table.

Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an
entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than
living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's
tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename
dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded

Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo.

Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an
`UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a
live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because
the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so
the operation is retryable once the row is restored.

Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are
left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy
would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it
stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table
this workspace never had.

`InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now
hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line.

Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the
governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that
predates this and sends no job id.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code

The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that
matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line
form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence.

`list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop
it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin
check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not
and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the
check runs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract

The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all
read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the
cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password
nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation
now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the
write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL
helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them.

Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely
multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the
transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway.

The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns
plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and
`converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's
raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at
the definition, which is where the next caller looks.

Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip
that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and
`resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing
resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker.

Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a
`StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an
operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and
never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated
secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now
said at the field.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery

Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways.
The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the
operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML
editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either.
Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of
that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every
login it described.

`custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret,
written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot
read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape:
`datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist.
No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to
take it out.

Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables
outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save
committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And
`set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its
transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the
default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings
row across validation and write.

Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish:
`read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole
job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and
`converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's.

Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but
`extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so
code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced

The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all
three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now
drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names.
Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it
fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot".

The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than
none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it.
`read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any
workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while
`set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the
rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record
or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same
treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every
resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions`
— it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing

The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own
`global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles`
and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The
neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it
predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a
consequence of this change.

Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing:

A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across
as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save
succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step,
and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose.

Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table
disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to
suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction.

Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what
it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which
workspace is gone.

Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions
handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed);
the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog`
was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its
roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings

Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.

The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.

One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.

Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks

Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved.

A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any
lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a
PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in
which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed
nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state.

Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which
still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows
onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual
old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a
target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one
target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so
a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The
pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade
one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once
from what it named before the save.

The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named,
with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal.
Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint.

Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of
a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole
document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical
value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from
the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically

The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call
`/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which
deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining
therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the
username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually
calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant".

The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's
admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role
check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check
when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any
connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role
a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that.

Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in
separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect
as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now
runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles

pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied
data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role.
The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass
Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by
Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing.

Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork
path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is
what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the
copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data

A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only
the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one
created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed —
and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops
entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one.

Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* nit worker error msg

* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it

`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.

A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.

Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it

`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.

The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry

The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".

Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands

Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.

The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test

Two review findings, both real.

`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.

`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy

Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.

Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.

Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist

The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.

Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created

A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.

That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.

Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database

A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.

`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"

This reverts commit 7dd3275a10.

The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the
database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork
request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open
connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it
dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at
the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization
with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it
did before this PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation

A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a
failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_*` behind, as it did
before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes
away once the clone is a single server-side operation.

The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover
on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully
copied database between its import and its final fork request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted

Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected
the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture
already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection
it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the
governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection
happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry
did the same.

Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own
transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a
listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is
split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal

Three fixes from review.

`edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so
the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and
an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is
still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable,
but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request.

The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional
`deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing
a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived
from the stored configuration against the saved one.

`delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork
committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside
the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share
locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on
the missing parent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart

A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's
roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than
chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a
data table now carries one or the other:

- a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data
  table under roles;
- roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads
  the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names
  each one to disable.

This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace
deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline
fix from the same review round is kept.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved

Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was
accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30
seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a
data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its
listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it

Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered
database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it
goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and
able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it.
The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete
leaves a disabled role to retry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting

Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once,
without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in
that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a
healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one
advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and
trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared
while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener
connects after roles are committed and refuses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing `?`

Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture
once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication
connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose
listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a
listener for, now still counts as streaming.

Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such
entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them:
`a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at
a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole
reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH
and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep
the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers

A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only
for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends.
The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the
CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns.

Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check
makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is
refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename

A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles

The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition

Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.

Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition

The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition

The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it

Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license

Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition

The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4

New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry

Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* feat(datatables): Ducklake catalogs on the external instance cluster

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): never grant CREATEROLE to custom_instance_user on the external cluster

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): state the authorization contract of external database usage lookups

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): drop a DuckDB data table secret once its ATTACH has used it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf(datatables): resolve a workspace's data tables per pointer hop, not per entry

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): hold the parent's settings while a fork points at its data tables

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse repointing the external cluster while it is in use, and keep verify-ca working for pg_dump

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): protect external databases pending fork cleanup, and describe Ducklake usage in the API

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): per-cluster data table role catalogs, with roles on the external instance cluster

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): write the external cluster setting under the lifecycle lock, and check fork targets are registered

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): register external fork catalogs under the lifecycle lock, and keep certificate verification in DuckDB attaches

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep certificate verification when DuckDB attaches an external data table

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep certificate verification when DuckDB attaches an external data table

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse fork cleanup of an external database another workspace uses

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse rolling back while external data tables are under roles, and type external_instance in the CLI

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): stop counting storage-only fork cleanup rows as uses of an external database

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): bind fork database copies to their workspace, and count every use before dropping one

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): authenticate instance database setup before writing its status, and keep a fork reservation across it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): create external databases only on a cluster setup succeeded on, and document the registry reader

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep only the most recently used DuckDB root certificate files

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): migrate fork reservations on workspace rename, and lock the parent's data tables for the whole fork

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): take the fork data table lock once, before the external cluster's

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): describe the external instance cluster and how to run one locally

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep fork reservations private, drop a cleaned-up entry with its database, and serialize cleanup with settings saves

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): hold the fork lock across a fork import, and carry the reservation inside the setup write

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): check the external cluster setting on its own transaction, and gate the registry probe

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry

Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #787 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 0edd40979cf36bfba59323f3f6a0811ae1369cf5

New ee-repo-ref: 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): keep DuckDB root certificate files in the job directory

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: drop the unused json import from the settings crate

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): drop the serde_json::json import left unused by the fork setup write

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): accept external_instance data tables in the settings form type

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize fork database reservations, cleanup, setup and Ducklake saves on the database

- A fork copy is created and registered under its workspace's fork lock, and refused once the
  workspace is archived; a rename re-migrates reservations under that lock after archiving.
- Ducklake saves lock every instance database they newly name, as data table saves do.
- Instance database setup holds the database's lock until its entry is written.
- Fork import also holds the database's lock across the restore.
- Cleanup re-reads the entry under its locks before dropping anything.
- Non-superadmins no longer see fork copies reserved for workspaces they are not in.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): state the authorization contract of the external cluster status and write check

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): lock the fork copy at finalization, and order cleanup's registry write after its settings row

- Fork finalization holds the copy's database lock from its availability check to the commit.
- Cleanup removes the registry entry in its own transaction, in a task of its own, instead of on a
  second connection; a rename migrates reservations after its settings rewrites, so both take the
  settings rows before the registry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): hold the fork lock across a rename's settings copy

Fork cleanup of the old id could otherwise drop a copy the renamed workspace goes on using. Also
states the authorization contract of the instance database drop helpers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse moving the external cluster to another host or port while it holds databases

Every settings writer goes through the same check as removal: the login, TLS and maintenance
database may still change, the cluster may not.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): clone a data table under roles with its owners and grants (#11120)

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UbrtwiYNfayrmqouBJHwGV

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: open the raw app data table drawer when the workspace has none

Selecting the first data table of an empty list passed undefined to the name
check, which threw instead of opening the drawer on no data table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): offer cloning a data table under roles where its grants can be replayed

The server clones such a data table and replays the source's owners and grants,
which only the Enterprise Edition does, so the fork wizard hid both clone
options everywhere instead of on a build that cannot replay them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: name the placeholder the empty raw app data drawer renders

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): replace a job directory file at the DuckDB root certificate path instead of trusting it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin the enterprise refusal the role pickers read as 'not under roles'

The server's sentence and the frontend's copy of it were coupled by nothing,
so rewording either one turned every role picker on a community build into a
failed lookup.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): type Ducklake catalogs on the external instance cluster in the settings form

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): read a roles answer only for the workspace it was asked in

A fork and its parent each have their own roles on a data table of the same
name, so an answer stamped with the name alone settled the role from the
workspace the editor was acting on before.

Also derive the AI table creation flag from the data replaced into the editor:
data naming no data table left the flag on from before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep an instance database a settings save is waiting to name

Cleanup for a database whose setup failed took the lock first, read no user,
and dropped it while a save blocked on that same lock was about to commit a
reference to it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): check the workspace stamp in the default database selector too

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): read what a save racing instance-database cleanup committed

A transaction blocked on the lock may still roll back, so keeping the database
for it stranded one whose name then blocks every retry: it is let through and
its outcome read instead. The waiter query also matches this database's locks
only, since pg_locks spans the cluster.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): tell a waiting request apart from the workspaces using a database

Both callers render what cleanup returns as the workspaces that keep the
database, so a waiting request's pid read as one of them. Each now words that
case itself, and the give-up comment names where the kept name actually goes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): take the cleanup lock on a connection the pool cannot reclaim

A session lock outlives the future holding it, so a cancellation between
taking it and releasing it handed a locked session back to the pool, where
every later settings save waits on it. Detached, the connection closes when it
is dropped and the server releases the lock with the session.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): close the cleanup connection on drop instead of detaching it

Detaching released the pool permit while the session stayed alive, so
concurrent cleanups waiting on their locks could open as many connections as
they liked. Closing on drop covers the same cancellation and keeps them
counted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 179d2454a063ee818a9387a1eafdd354a217a16c

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #802 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: c2e43f5b5ff753d339b70e232fd17b6ffecb054d

New ee-repo-ref: 179d2454a063ee818a9387a1eafdd354a217a16c

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to fd5b8af748f2c985b13e18d9ea30894f3bd7e9a3

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #798 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 3145e422d61d580f0a82804f075285c112879da0

New ee-repo-ref: fd5b8af748f2c985b13e18d9ea30894f3bd7e9a3

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): classify a fork import's target from the resolution that built its connection

A second read could see the entry flipped to a resource and skip the reservation check while the
connection already built still reached the instance cluster.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): run external database lifecycle on the caller's transaction, one lock order for fork cleanup

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): check a fork copy's reservation on the locked transaction's connection

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): make and drop fork copies of external data tables on the external cluster

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse a fork whose external copy something already names

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): check an external fork copy's uses before removing its entry, so child fork pointers still count

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): migrate external cluster fork reservations on workspace rename

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): configure the external instance cluster and pick its databases from the UI

Instance settings gets an External Postgres tab: the cluster's connection, the setup run
with its report, and the databases Windmill created there. Data table and Ducklake settings
offer the external_instance kind, with a picker over those databases.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep the external cluster form out of the instance settings the page bulk-saves

The form seeded its key into the settings store after the page snapshotted them, so merely
opening the tab made the page send a setting the validator refuses, failing an admin's
unrelated save. The form is local state now, and only the setup writes the key.

The database picker also treats a superadmin-only listing as authoritative: a workspace
admin, who cannot list, no longer sees a saved database as missing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(tests): app paths are validated, so a guest app cannot be renamed to one with a space

Path validation on apps landed after this test, which still expected a space to be accepted
and created its fixture on a ':' path. The scopable-path guard it exists for is kept by
planting that path on the row, which is now the only way an app can hold one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): one Managed Postgres tab, and a switch for Windmill's own database

The instance settings tab covers both substrates Windmill administers: the external cluster,
which can now be disabled once nothing sits on it, and Windmill's own database, which an
operator can turn off so the cluster is the only one a workspace may newly name. A save that
names it then refuses, as the create endpoint does.

Workspace settings name them the way an admin meets them: Postgres Resource, and Managed
instance, qualified as Internal or External only while both are on offer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): offer the external cluster in the add-data-table wizard, and give Ducklake its room back

The wizard gets the external cluster as a fourth substrate: pick a database it already holds
or name a new one, which the run creates before writing the entry, so Try again does not trip
on a database the last attempt made.

Ducklake's maintenance column moves into the settings popover next to the extra args, which
the wider catalog select had squeezed the name box out of.

A setting a component saves itself now also moves the page's baseline, or Discard would
restore what it replaced and a later save would send that stale value back.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): only a database this wizard run made makes its retry idempotent

A retry skipped the create whenever the name was registered, which let a run adopt a database
another superadmin had made and share their data without the warning the existing-database
branch shows. The run tracks what it created instead, and reports it so Discard can say the
database is still there. Creating one now refreshes the registry the next run's default name
and its validation read, and that default counts the external cluster's databases rather than
the instance's.

Row ownership carries the substrate: "instance" and "external_instance" can hold the same name,
and a row repointed between them while a run probes must not read as that run's own.

Also fixes the merge leftovers in the DuckDB executor's tests, which cargo check never compiles:
the new PgDatabase field and the attach helper's job directory.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): shorten the picked managed kind, and say what an empty database list means

The closed select has room for the qualifier, not the whole name, so a picked managed kind
reads "Managed (Internal)". An external entry gets the tooltip its internal counterpart has,
and a database picker with nothing in it says to type a name rather than "No items found".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep the wizard's external-database bookkeeping optional and parked

The run deps gained a required field, which every existing caller of runSetup -- the sibling
test suite included -- does not pass. It defaults to empty instead, the parked payload carries
it across a Supabase redirect as it claims to, and a resumed run counts it as something left
behind. Two regressions pin the create: made on a first attempt, skipped only for a database
this run made.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): review an external-cluster database as one, not as a Postgres resource

The review step fell through to the resource branch for the new provider, so it announced a
connection already in the workspace for a database that does not exist yet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): show the server's refusal instead of an object in the toast

Saving data table settings passed the whole error to the toast, which rendered the request
and response as JSON, and the instance-database wizard replaced it with "check console".
Both surface the message the API sent, through the helper that exists for it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: point at the EE commit dropping the unused import

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): define a role on the cluster its data table sits on

The permissions drawer created and listed roles without naming a cluster, so a role defined
from an external data table became a login on Windmill's own, and the refresh then replaced
the correct catalog with the internal one. The drawer passes the data table's cluster to both.

The wizard also read a database it had just created as a name collision, which blocked
returning to the failed attempt and finishing under the same name.

And the merge had left the CONNECT-grant pass and its log in both the caller and the callee.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): manage the external cluster's role catalog, and name the cluster in the copy

The roles drawer offered one catalog, so the external cluster's roles could only be reached
through a data table sitting on it — and became unreachable once the last one was gone, while
the cluster could not be unset until they were dropped. Opened from the page it now offers the
clusters the instance has; a data table's own drawer still pins its cluster, and its copy names
that cluster rather than "the instance".

A DuckDB attach also decides whether to verify certificates the way every other Postgres
connection does, so a resource carrying a root certificate is no longer downgraded to require
here alone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): bind the roles list to the cluster it was read for

Switching catalogs left the previous cluster's rows on screen and applied whichever response
landed last, so a slower read could seat one cluster's logins under the other's heading while
every control acted on the wrong id — invisible where a name exists on both. The switch clears
the rows, a token discards a response the selection has moved past, and the controls stay inert
while a catalog is being read.

The drop confirmation also names the cluster whose databases it reaches.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: show data tables as cards and enable the add wizard by default

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: offer managed vs resource in the data table wizard, with external setup hints

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: move the external database hint next to the wizard's primary action

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: open managed postgres settings in place, prefilled from the picked resource

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: preview data table usage in python, duckdb and typescript in the wizard review

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: lay a data table card's fields out on one row, with manage set apart

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: hide data table grants while the data table is not under roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: default a new data table to the workspace name, and frame the usage preview

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: warn when disabling the internal instance while data still sits on it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: disable the unavailable cluster in the instance roles toggle

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: make the data table manage buttons accent

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: stop resolving data tables on windmill's database once it is disabled

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: hint superadmins that typing in the add-role picker creates a role

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* style: border the assets page cards instead of elevating them

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: confirm data table deletions on save, and show no success when a save is called off

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin that instance data tables stop resolving once disabled

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: give the import wizard real managed availability, and lock the roles catalog when no cluster is on offer

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: mark the managed database as recommended in the data table wizard

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: skip the data table wizard's first step when a resource is the only option

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-29 20:26:23 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 c5f59d6ccc fix: drop caller-supplied _MODULES at push for every job (#11418)
* fix: drop caller-supplied _MODULES at push for every job

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: never interpolate _MODULES into a tag and drop unused mut

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 20:17:32 +02:00
d1260d7c5a feat: refuse OIDC tokens to previews that impersonate a path their user cannot write (#11396)
* feat: add provenance claims to job OIDC tokens and mark preview sub

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: require a flow or script job's version to belong to its path for deployed

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: derive app script paths server-side and test job provenance in CE

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: count an app script as deployed only when a deployed app run stamped it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: state the deployed condition for the preview sub prefix

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: keep the plain OIDC sub for previews by users who can write the path

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: refuse OIDC tokens to previews by users who cannot write the path

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: keep OIDC token issuance unchanged, leaving provenance to the claims

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: name the root job's trigger claim root_trigger_kind

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: report the request-supplied paths in a job's provenance

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: count a worker-pushed preview under deployed code as deployed

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: drop the claimed parent of a restarted flow preview

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: only read a job's modules from its args when it is a preview

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: never count a preview whose modules came in its args as deployed

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to dba91044a174f8c9275fefea2619dc966b0f9250

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #832 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: a703cb17776d0858255fbfd817dce132377d3e80

New ee-repo-ref: dba91044a174f8c9275fefea2619dc966b0f9250

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-29 19:09:48 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5 cf5c49c3dc feat: restart perpetual runs on the version a deploy makes runnable (#11200)
* feat: opt-in move of perpetual runs to a newly deployed script version

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep the perpetual-run opt-in across relocks and check the new version's tag

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin the tag check on a perpetual version switch

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: count perpetual runs past the first queue page in the deploy prompt

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: restart perpetual runs on the version a deploy makes runnable

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: claim a perpetual run and queue its replacement in one transaction

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: honour a cancel that lands after the worker last read its queue row

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: leave the lost-cancel fix to its own PR and match the scale down to 0 wording

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: run a preprocessor the deployed version adds over the arguments carried over

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* style: shorten the wording of the modal's argument warning

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: never preprocess a restarted perpetual run, as every other restart does

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: preprocess for a replacement whose run had not been through one

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: push a perpetual replacement without the deployed debounce settings

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: name the runs the deploy button restarts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf: skip the perpetual restart lookups on a deploy that is not perpetual

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: move perpetual runs before anything that can fail after the deploy commits

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: report cancellation on the queue listing so the deploy prompt can skip it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: pass the tag workspace to the availability check after the merge

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* style: say which arguments are defined differently and which values are kept

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: resolve a dynamic tag before checking it for a restarted run

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin that a deployed dynamic tag is checked as it resolves

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 18:03:43 +02:00
bda00c6cad fix: run custom schedule handlers as the schedule (#11398)
* fix: run custom schedule handlers as the schedule

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: correct handler identity comment and pin preset path check

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: pin preset handler paths instead of matching their name

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: warn on unpinned preset-named schedule handlers

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 12a83524b81368043bc939caeb3764fd27a32523

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #833 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: bcfb0838f105d5bffbe49c6ed787116662ebe796

New ee-repo-ref: 12a83524b81368043bc939caeb3764fd27a32523

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-29 18:01:34 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel 3936191f46 Revert "feat: add pull_batch to claim jobs for many waiting workers at once (…" (#11412)
This reverts commit 9f40cdca62.
2026-09-29 15:25:35 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 9f40cdca62 feat: add pull_batch to claim jobs for many waiting workers at once (#11350)
* feat: add pull_batch to claim jobs for many waiting workers at once

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep jobs admitted by earlier batch passes when a re-pull fails

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep suspended flows first on every batch re-pull pass

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 15:24:39 +02:00
AlexRV12 c34abf7330 fix: refuse flow preview restarts from runs the caller cannot read (#11407) 2026-09-29 14:46:51 +02:00
8741843d2e feat: external instance cluster for data tables and Ducklake catalogs (#11197)
* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it

`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.

A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.

Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it

`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.

The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry

The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".

Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands

Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.

The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test

Two review findings, both real.

`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.

`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy

Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.

Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.

Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist

The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.

Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created

A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.

That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.

Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database

A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.

`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"

This reverts commit 7dd3275a10.

The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the
database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork
request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open
connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it
dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at
the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization
with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it
did before this PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation

A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a
failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_*` behind, as it did
before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes
away once the clone is a single server-side operation.

The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover
on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully
copied database between its import and its final fork request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted

Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected
the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture
already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection
it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the
governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection
happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry
did the same.

Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own
transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a
listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is
split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal

Three fixes from review.

`edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so
the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and
an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is
still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable,
but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request.

The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional
`deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing
a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived
from the stored configuration against the saved one.

`delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork
committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside
the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share
locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on
the missing parent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart

A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's
roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than
chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a
data table now carries one or the other:

- a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data
  table under roles;
- roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads
  the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names
  each one to disable.

This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace
deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline
fix from the same review round is kept.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved

Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was
accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30
seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a
data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its
listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it

Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered
database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it
goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and
able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it.
The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete
leaves a disabled role to retry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting

Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once,
without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in
that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a
healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one
advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and
trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared
while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener
connects after roles are committed and refuses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing `?`

Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture
once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication
connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose
listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a
listener for, now still counts as streaming.

Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such
entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them:
`a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at
a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole
reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH
and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep
the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers

A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only
for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends.
The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the
CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns.

Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check
makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is
refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename

A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles

The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition

Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.

Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition

The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition

The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it

Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license

Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition

The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4

New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): data table roles in the DB manager and raw apps

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: never add a role to the reference of a data table whose name contains '?'

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: read the roles of a data table whose name contains '?'

The generated client leaves a '?' in a path param unencoded, so the lookup
404'd and the raw-app picker blocked Start on such a data table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix(datatables): refuse a reference naming both a legacy data table and a role

When a workspace stores both `sales` and a legacy `sales?role=analytics`, the
reference resolved to the legacy entry without a role, so browsing `sales` as
`analytics` reached another data table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: declare the default role in migrations written for a data table whose name contains '?'

Such a data table connects as its default role without naming it, so the
migrations the manager wrote for it declared no role and ran as admin.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* feat(datatables): set up an external instance cluster for data tables

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): send external cluster passwords as SCRAM verifiers

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): scope external cluster credential readers to the crate

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* [ee] feat(datatables): external_instance data tables on the external cluster

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix(datatables): compare the external cluster settings under a row lock before storing setup

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): only drop external databases Windmill marked, and check use under the lock

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry

Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles

A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection,
`custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say
this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table.

A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the
instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares
`-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch —
grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from
the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`.
A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before.

Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint,
`get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when
there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could
`RESET ROLE` its way out of.

A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a
copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the
parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a
pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the
governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and
ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not
where an access decision should be made.

Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing
workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a
replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin

Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a
caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema
export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the
connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table
under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing
workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant.

All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a
restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the
only right answer for the copy paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping

A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin
putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the
host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and
`CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the
permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials
on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read.

Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration
generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration
rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or
removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after
which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the
entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it
calls a data table changes nothing about the data table.

Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an
entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than
living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's
tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename
dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded

Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo.

Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an
`UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a
live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because
the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so
the operation is retryable once the row is restored.

Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are
left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy
would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it
stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table
this workspace never had.

`InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now
hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line.

Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the
governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that
predates this and sends no job id.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code

The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that
matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line
form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence.

`list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop
it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin
check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not
and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the
check runs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract

The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all
read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the
cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password
nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation
now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the
write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL
helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them.

Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely
multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the
transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway.

The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns
plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and
`converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's
raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at
the definition, which is where the next caller looks.

Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip
that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and
`resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing
resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker.

Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a
`StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an
operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and
never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated
secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now
said at the field.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery

Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways.
The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the
operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML
editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either.
Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of
that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every
login it described.

`custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret,
written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot
read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape:
`datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist.
No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to
take it out.

Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables
outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save
committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And
`set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its
transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the
default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings
row across validation and write.

Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish:
`read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole
job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and
`converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's.

Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but
`extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so
code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced

The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all
three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now
drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names.
Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it
fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot".

The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than
none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it.
`read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any
workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while
`set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the
rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record
or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same
treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every
resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions`
— it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing

The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own
`global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles`
and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The
neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it
predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a
consequence of this change.

Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing:

A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across
as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save
succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step,
and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose.

Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table
disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to
suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction.

Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what
it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which
workspace is gone.

Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions
handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed);
the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog`
was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its
roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings

Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.

The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.

One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.

Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks

Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved.

A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any
lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a
PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in
which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed
nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state.

Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which
still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows
onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual
old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a
target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one
target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so
a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The
pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade
one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once
from what it named before the save.

The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named,
with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal.
Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint.

Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of
a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole
document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical
value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from
the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically

The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call
`/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which
deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining
therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the
username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually
calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant".

The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's
admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role
check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check
when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any
connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role
a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that.

Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in
separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect
as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now
runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles

pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied
data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role.
The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass
Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by
Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing.

Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork
path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is
what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the
copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data

A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only
the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one
created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed —
and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops
entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one.

Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* nit worker error msg

* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it

`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.

A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.

Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it

`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.

The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry

The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".

Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands

Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.

The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test

Two review findings, both real.

`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.

`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy

Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.

Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.

Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist

The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.

Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created

A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.

That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.

Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database

A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.

`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"

This reverts commit 7dd3275a10.

The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the
database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork
request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open
connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it
dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at
the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization
with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it
did before this PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation

A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a
failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_*` behind, as it did
before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes
away once the clone is a single server-side operation.

The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover
on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully
copied database between its import and its final fork request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted

Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected
the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture
already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection
it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the
governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection
happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry
did the same.

Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own
transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a
listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is
split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal

Three fixes from review.

`edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so
the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and
an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is
still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable,
but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request.

The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional
`deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing
a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived
from the stored configuration against the saved one.

`delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork
committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside
the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share
locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on
the missing parent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart

A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's
roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than
chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a
data table now carries one or the other:

- a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data
  table under roles;
- roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads
  the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names
  each one to disable.

This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace
deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline
fix from the same review round is kept.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved

Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was
accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30
seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a
data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its
listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it

Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered
database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it
goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and
able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it.
The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete
leaves a disabled role to retry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting

Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once,
without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in
that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a
healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one
advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and
trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared
while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener
connects after roles are committed and refuses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing `?`

Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture
once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication
connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose
listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a
listener for, now still counts as streaming.

Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such
entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them:
`a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at
a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole
reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH
and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep
the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers

A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only
for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends.
The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the
CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns.

Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check
makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is
refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename

A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles

The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition

Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.

Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition

The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition

The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it

Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license

Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition

The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4

New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry

Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* feat(datatables): Ducklake catalogs on the external instance cluster

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): never grant CREATEROLE to custom_instance_user on the external cluster

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): state the authorization contract of external database usage lookups

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): drop a DuckDB data table secret once its ATTACH has used it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf(datatables): resolve a workspace's data tables per pointer hop, not per entry

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): hold the parent's settings while a fork points at its data tables

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse repointing the external cluster while it is in use, and keep verify-ca working for pg_dump

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): protect external databases pending fork cleanup, and describe Ducklake usage in the API

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): per-cluster data table role catalogs, with roles on the external instance cluster

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): write the external cluster setting under the lifecycle lock, and check fork targets are registered

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): register external fork catalogs under the lifecycle lock, and keep certificate verification in DuckDB attaches

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep certificate verification when DuckDB attaches an external data table

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep certificate verification when DuckDB attaches an external data table

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse fork cleanup of an external database another workspace uses

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse rolling back while external data tables are under roles, and type external_instance in the CLI

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): stop counting storage-only fork cleanup rows as uses of an external database

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): bind fork database copies to their workspace, and count every use before dropping one

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): authenticate instance database setup before writing its status, and keep a fork reservation across it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): create external databases only on a cluster setup succeeded on, and document the registry reader

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep only the most recently used DuckDB root certificate files

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): migrate fork reservations on workspace rename, and lock the parent's data tables for the whole fork

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): take the fork data table lock once, before the external cluster's

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): describe the external instance cluster and how to run one locally

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep fork reservations private, drop a cleaned-up entry with its database, and serialize cleanup with settings saves

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): hold the fork lock across a fork import, and carry the reservation inside the setup write

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): check the external cluster setting on its own transaction, and gate the registry probe

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry

Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #787 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 0edd40979cf36bfba59323f3f6a0811ae1369cf5

New ee-repo-ref: 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): keep DuckDB root certificate files in the job directory

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: drop the unused json import from the settings crate

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): drop the serde_json::json import left unused by the fork setup write

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): accept external_instance data tables in the settings form type

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize fork database reservations, cleanup, setup and Ducklake saves on the database

- A fork copy is created and registered under its workspace's fork lock, and refused once the
  workspace is archived; a rename re-migrates reservations under that lock after archiving.
- Ducklake saves lock every instance database they newly name, as data table saves do.
- Instance database setup holds the database's lock until its entry is written.
- Fork import also holds the database's lock across the restore.
- Cleanup re-reads the entry under its locks before dropping anything.
- Non-superadmins no longer see fork copies reserved for workspaces they are not in.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): state the authorization contract of the external cluster status and write check

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): lock the fork copy at finalization, and order cleanup's registry write after its settings row

- Fork finalization holds the copy's database lock from its availability check to the commit.
- Cleanup removes the registry entry in its own transaction, in a task of its own, instead of on a
  second connection; a rename migrates reservations after its settings rewrites, so both take the
  settings rows before the registry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): hold the fork lock across a rename's settings copy

Fork cleanup of the old id could otherwise drop a copy the renamed workspace goes on using. Also
states the authorization contract of the instance database drop helpers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse moving the external cluster to another host or port while it holds databases

Every settings writer goes through the same check as removal: the login, TLS and maintenance
database may still change, the cluster may not.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): clone a data table under roles with its owners and grants (#11120)

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UbrtwiYNfayrmqouBJHwGV

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: open the raw app data table drawer when the workspace has none

Selecting the first data table of an empty list passed undefined to the name
check, which threw instead of opening the drawer on no data table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): offer cloning a data table under roles where its grants can be replayed

The server clones such a data table and replays the source's owners and grants,
which only the Enterprise Edition does, so the fork wizard hid both clone
options everywhere instead of on a build that cannot replay them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: name the placeholder the empty raw app data drawer renders

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): replace a job directory file at the DuckDB root certificate path instead of trusting it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin the enterprise refusal the role pickers read as 'not under roles'

The server's sentence and the frontend's copy of it were coupled by nothing,
so rewording either one turned every role picker on a community build into a
failed lookup.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): type Ducklake catalogs on the external instance cluster in the settings form

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): read a roles answer only for the workspace it was asked in

A fork and its parent each have their own roles on a data table of the same
name, so an answer stamped with the name alone settled the role from the
workspace the editor was acting on before.

Also derive the AI table creation flag from the data replaced into the editor:
data naming no data table left the flag on from before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep an instance database a settings save is waiting to name

Cleanup for a database whose setup failed took the lock first, read no user,
and dropped it while a save blocked on that same lock was about to commit a
reference to it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): check the workspace stamp in the default database selector too

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): read what a save racing instance-database cleanup committed

A transaction blocked on the lock may still roll back, so keeping the database
for it stranded one whose name then blocks every retry: it is let through and
its outcome read instead. The waiter query also matches this database's locks
only, since pg_locks spans the cluster.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): tell a waiting request apart from the workspaces using a database

Both callers render what cleanup returns as the workspaces that keep the
database, so a waiting request's pid read as one of them. Each now words that
case itself, and the give-up comment names where the kept name actually goes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): take the cleanup lock on a connection the pool cannot reclaim

A session lock outlives the future holding it, so a cancellation between
taking it and releasing it handed a locked session back to the pool, where
every later settings save waits on it. Detached, the connection closes when it
is dropped and the server releases the lock with the session.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): close the cleanup connection on drop instead of detaching it

Detaching released the pool permit while the session stayed alive, so
concurrent cleanups waiting on their locks could open as many connections as
they liked. Closing on drop covers the same cancellation and keeps them
counted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 179d2454a063ee818a9387a1eafdd354a217a16c

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #802 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: c2e43f5b5ff753d339b70e232fd17b6ffecb054d

New ee-repo-ref: 179d2454a063ee818a9387a1eafdd354a217a16c

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to fd5b8af748f2c985b13e18d9ea30894f3bd7e9a3

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #798 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 3145e422d61d580f0a82804f075285c112879da0

New ee-repo-ref: fd5b8af748f2c985b13e18d9ea30894f3bd7e9a3

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): classify a fork import's target from the resolution that built its connection

A second read could see the entry flipped to a resource and skip the reservation check while the
connection already built still reached the instance cluster.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): run external database lifecycle on the caller's transaction, one lock order for fork cleanup

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): check a fork copy's reservation on the locked transaction's connection

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): make and drop fork copies of external data tables on the external cluster

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse a fork whose external copy something already names

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): check an external fork copy's uses before removing its entry, so child fork pointers still count

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): migrate external cluster fork reservations on workspace rename

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): configure the external instance cluster and pick its databases from the UI

Instance settings gets an External Postgres tab: the cluster's connection, the setup run
with its report, and the databases Windmill created there. Data table and Ducklake settings
offer the external_instance kind, with a picker over those databases.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep the external cluster form out of the instance settings the page bulk-saves

The form seeded its key into the settings store after the page snapshotted them, so merely
opening the tab made the page send a setting the validator refuses, failing an admin's
unrelated save. The form is local state now, and only the setup writes the key.

The database picker also treats a superadmin-only listing as authoritative: a workspace
admin, who cannot list, no longer sees a saved database as missing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(tests): app paths are validated, so a guest app cannot be renamed to one with a space

Path validation on apps landed after this test, which still expected a space to be accepted
and created its fixture on a ':' path. The scopable-path guard it exists for is kept by
planting that path on the row, which is now the only way an app can hold one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): one Managed Postgres tab, and a switch for Windmill's own database

The instance settings tab covers both substrates Windmill administers: the external cluster,
which can now be disabled once nothing sits on it, and Windmill's own database, which an
operator can turn off so the cluster is the only one a workspace may newly name. A save that
names it then refuses, as the create endpoint does.

Workspace settings name them the way an admin meets them: Postgres Resource, and Managed
instance, qualified as Internal or External only while both are on offer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): offer the external cluster in the add-data-table wizard, and give Ducklake its room back

The wizard gets the external cluster as a fourth substrate: pick a database it already holds
or name a new one, which the run creates before writing the entry, so Try again does not trip
on a database the last attempt made.

Ducklake's maintenance column moves into the settings popover next to the extra args, which
the wider catalog select had squeezed the name box out of.

A setting a component saves itself now also moves the page's baseline, or Discard would
restore what it replaced and a later save would send that stale value back.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): only a database this wizard run made makes its retry idempotent

A retry skipped the create whenever the name was registered, which let a run adopt a database
another superadmin had made and share their data without the warning the existing-database
branch shows. The run tracks what it created instead, and reports it so Discard can say the
database is still there. Creating one now refreshes the registry the next run's default name
and its validation read, and that default counts the external cluster's databases rather than
the instance's.

Row ownership carries the substrate: "instance" and "external_instance" can hold the same name,
and a row repointed between them while a run probes must not read as that run's own.

Also fixes the merge leftovers in the DuckDB executor's tests, which cargo check never compiles:
the new PgDatabase field and the attach helper's job directory.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): shorten the picked managed kind, and say what an empty database list means

The closed select has room for the qualifier, not the whole name, so a picked managed kind
reads "Managed (Internal)". An external entry gets the tooltip its internal counterpart has,
and a database picker with nothing in it says to type a name rather than "No items found".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep the wizard's external-database bookkeeping optional and parked

The run deps gained a required field, which every existing caller of runSetup -- the sibling
test suite included -- does not pass. It defaults to empty instead, the parked payload carries
it across a Supabase redirect as it claims to, and a resumed run counts it as something left
behind. Two regressions pin the create: made on a first attempt, skipped only for a database
this run made.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): review an external-cluster database as one, not as a Postgres resource

The review step fell through to the resource branch for the new provider, so it announced a
connection already in the workspace for a database that does not exist yet.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): show the server's refusal instead of an object in the toast

Saving data table settings passed the whole error to the toast, which rendered the request
and response as JSON, and the instance-database wizard replaced it with "check console".
Both surface the message the API sent, through the helper that exists for it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: point at the EE commit dropping the unused import

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): define a role on the cluster its data table sits on

The permissions drawer created and listed roles without naming a cluster, so a role defined
from an external data table became a login on Windmill's own, and the refresh then replaced
the correct catalog with the internal one. The drawer passes the data table's cluster to both.

The wizard also read a database it had just created as a name collision, which blocked
returning to the failed attempt and finishing under the same name.

And the merge had left the CONNECT-grant pass and its log in both the caller and the callee.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(datatables): manage the external cluster's role catalog, and name the cluster in the copy

The roles drawer offered one catalog, so the external cluster's roles could only be reached
through a data table sitting on it — and became unreachable once the last one was gone, while
the cluster could not be unset until they were dropped. Opened from the page it now offers the
clusters the instance has; a data table's own drawer still pins its cluster, and its copy names
that cluster rather than "the instance".

A DuckDB attach also decides whether to verify certificates the way every other Postgres
connection does, so a resource carrying a root certificate is no longer downgraded to require
here alone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): bind the roles list to the cluster it was read for

Switching catalogs left the previous cluster's rows on screen and applied whichever response
landed last, so a slower read could seat one cluster's logins under the other's heading while
every control acted on the wrong id — invisible where a name exists on both. The switch clears
the rows, a token discards a response the selection has moved past, and the controls stay inert
while a catalog is being read.

The drop confirmation also names the cluster whose databases it reaches.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to dfe7b8b9204d21e0264fbea1c6f6eedf9e738d56

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #810 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 30db1b33bda0446f5fc5dfe353fbb226d57a26d4

New ee-repo-ref: dfe7b8b9204d21e0264fbea1c6f6eedf9e738d56

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>
2026-09-29 14:45:47 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5.5 797147ea7a fix: report a worker's last job when it ran under one poll interval (#11399)
* fix: report a worker's last job when it ran under one poll interval

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: share the unreported job slot with the interactive worker shell

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin that a main-loop ping without a job keeps the last one

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 14:27:23 +02:00
GuilhemandClaude Opus 5 f367eaf6d0 feat: run turns in several flow chat conversations at once (#11202)
* feat: run turns in several flow chat conversations at once

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep finished turns finished and cached chats current in the flow chat pool

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: attribute a turn's rows by job id as well as sequence

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: count only real stream updates and retry the job-id read

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep a chat that holds an unsent draft, and take one back when its first turn is withdrawn

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: ignore a stale running-turn snapshot, keep a withdrawn chat's draft, poll after clean stream ends

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: follow the turn running now when the listing named one already over

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep replacement turns and SSE fallback moving

* fix: keep replacement turn handoffs active

* fix: preserve unread badge line height

* fix: settle local fallback handoffs

* fix: settle refused turn handoffs

* fix: scope turn handoffs to conversation

* fix: drop stale turn handoffs

* refactor: move the queued message and 409 handling into per-conversation turns

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address cubic's review of the parallel flow chat turns

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: clear a stale failure on refresh, and tighten the docs and test waits

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: recover running rows past the first page, and drop the failure a re-read disproves

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: check the running-turn query at compile time, and narrow what a refresh clears

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: settle a failed turn only from an answer that turn wrote

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: settle a failed turn from its own answer, and only while it is still the failure shown

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: drop a failure whose answer arrived even when a newer turn owns the error

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: free an answered failure whatever the turn that started meanwhile is doing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: drop a rows read that a turn outran, rather than merging it under newer messages

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: drop a rows read whose conversation was left and opened again

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: hand over a file still being read when its composer goes

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: count a drop's routing as work in flight, so its file is handed over too

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: hold the send until every file a conversation is owed has landed

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: keep a panel mounted per conversation instead of handing its draft over

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep the withdrawn chat whose composer was written in, not the empty one

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep the chat in front of the reader when both withdrawn composers were written in

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep a retry's own run arguments when a turn elsewhere refuses it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: name panels apart across pools, and read a flow's inputs when its chat is built

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-29 11:36:30 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 163a4ffa4e fix: scope flow resume to its workspace and minting to the job's run (#11392)
* fix: scope flow resume to its workspace and minting to the job's run

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: name the lineage columns resume minting checks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 18:31:44 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 14a2619ad2 fix: gate batch rerun on job read access, scope started_at to workspace (#11387)
* fix: gate batch rerun on job read access and scope started_at lookup to the workspace

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: assert batch rerun denial comes from the read gate

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 18:29:58 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 f4dcaf3e45 fix: list only the paths the caller can read in path autocomplete (#11388)
* fix: list only the paths the caller can read in path autocomplete

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: bound the path autocomplete cache by total path count

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28 17:55:16 +02:00
990a726409 feat: add provenance claims to job OIDC tokens (#11369)
* feat: add provenance claims to job OIDC tokens and mark preview sub

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: require a flow or script job's version to belong to its path for deployed

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: derive app script paths server-side and test job provenance in CE

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: count an app script as deployed only when a deployed app run stamped it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: state the deployed condition for the preview sub prefix

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: keep the plain OIDC sub for previews by users who can write the path

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: refuse OIDC tokens to previews by users who cannot write the path

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: keep OIDC token issuance unchanged, leaving provenance to the claims

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: name the root job's trigger claim root_trigger_kind

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 421cf2a8b4f98b421e93c0fc7c1c378314a66e50

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #831 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 7acd384875deba4b01a502e628a153b11c82eecb

New ee-repo-ref: 421cf2a8b4f98b421e93c0fc7c1c378314a66e50

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-28 11:42:58 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 893e64f630 fix: only restart a flow on a version of its own path and workspace (#11376)
* fix: only restart a flow on a version of its own path and workspace

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin cross-workspace restart version rejection

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 14:10:21 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 90f9e59321 fix: only let a job's own token claim run lineage (#11367)
* fix: only let a job's own token claim its lineage on the run endpoints

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: drop an unclaimable run lineage instead of refusing the run

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: only let a job's own token run its workflow-as-code tasks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-27 14:09:59 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 c2d8997549 fix: complete a canceled flow whose worker died between two steps (#11366)
* fix: complete a canceled flow whose worker died between two steps

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzGsxKey5g3kycKwGmpKNF

* fix: complete only the stranded canceled flow and let its parent process it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzGsxKey5g3kycKwGmpKNF

* fix: requeue a stranded canceled flow for a worker to complete its cancel

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzGsxKey5g3kycKwGmpKNF

* fix: keep a requeued canceled flow's start time

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UzGsxKey5g3kycKwGmpKNF

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-26 14:40:01 +02:00
bebd762194 perf: complete a job in one statement on the common path (#11355)
* perf: complete a job in one statement on the common path

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take completion locks in one order on every path

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep a losing zombie completion from touching its wac parent

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: leave a flow's ping alone when a step completes during its cancel

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: probe only this test's completion for the lock wait

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: stamp a wac child's kept duration when its completed row exists

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TJMJSJ2bDhYh7Shoh78Yyb

* perf: leave the parent ping out of completions with no flow to ping

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TJMJSJ2bDhYh7Shoh78Yyb

* docs: note that the two completion statements must stay in step

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TJMJSJ2bDhYh7Shoh78Yyb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 7a256cf353db7cf64a60a09fa0de7f3a8b27f626

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #830 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 497137acb65e521568d46f3cbe1d66359f7f87ec

New ee-repo-ref: 7a256cf353db7cf64a60a09fa0de7f3a8b27f626

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-26 00:18:38 +02:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 a1abb36d9f fix: relock importers on their own tag, not the bare dependency tag (#11359)
* fix: relock importers on their own tag, not the bare dependency tag

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin the tag of relocks triggered by a changed import

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 17:32:25 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 4b09558e13 feat: start a deferred queued job now without changing its id (#11347)
* feat: start a deferred queued job now without changing its id

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: refuse starting a schedule's upcoming tick early

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: hide run now on upcoming schedule ticks and register its audit op

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 10:43:46 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 bc4f872f10 perf: skip the flow_env ancestor walk for sub-flows with nothing to inherit (#11349)
* perf: skip the flow_env ancestor walk for sub-flows with nothing to inherit

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep the flow_env mark out of sub-flow definitions replayed by restarts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: align the guest scopable-path test with app path validation

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 10:30:43 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 d18d7043df feat: infer a script's schema when a deploy (e.g. MCP) sends none (#11339)
* feat: infer a script's schema from its code when a deploy sends none

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: merge an inferred schema into the previous one the way the editor does

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: parse non-JSON TS defaults natively and keep the schema on a failed inference

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: type untyped TS params from their literal shape when the default can't be evaluated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: read literal TS defaults off the AST so the server types them like the editor

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: word the script schema description for both create and update

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: note that dbt scripts derive their schema from the descriptor

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 10:00:49 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5.5 1fd729ac1a feat: add an instance-wide accent color setting with sidebar tint (#11335)
* feat: add an instance-wide accent color setting with sidebar tint

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: paint the cached accent before the license resolves

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: serve the banner and accent color from one cached endpoint

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: invalidate the instance ui cache and bound it with a ttl

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep the instance ui ttl under the client poll period

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: load the banner and accent color once per page load

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: read the banner and accent color without a server cache

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: show a cleared accent color as off

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-25 11:23:30 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5 02006f364a fix: keep a cancel that lands after a worker last read its queue row (#11246)
* fix: keep a cancel that lands after a worker last read its queue row

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take the cancellation from the queue row the completion deletes

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: wait for the completion to block on the row instead of a timer

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: settle a missed cancel from the deleted queue row alone

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 11:03:30 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5 efa7a0a70a feat: allow workspace-scoped dynamic custom tags (#11283)
* feat: check dynamic worker tags on the tag they resolve to

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin the tag check after a flow preprocessor resolves the tag

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep tied tag placeholders exact and drop an unresolvable flow tag

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: describe tied tag placeholders in the custom tags editor

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: check workflow-as-code task tags on the tag they resolve to

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: judge a preprocessed flow's tag as written when it is run

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: check a preprocessed flow's own tag, as written only where it reads args

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: explain dynamic tags in the worker tag picker

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: look up worker availability for typed static tags

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: poll worker availability with the tag list as it is at each run

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: allow workspace-scoped dynamic custom tags

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin the $workspace lookup for scoped custom tag patterns

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: keep a tag listed with its own scope inside it past matching patterns

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: warn when a scoped custom tag is also listed for every workspace

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 08:48:55 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5 9ad2c91ddb fix: enforce token path scopes on GET /raw_apps/list (#11284)
* fix: enforce token path scopes on GET /raw_apps/list

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: apply the raw app scope filter before the page limit

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: cover the bare prefix path in the raw app scope test

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 08:13:58 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5 69fafb9262 feat: check dynamic worker tags on the tag they resolve to (#11271)
* feat: check dynamic worker tags on the tag they resolve to

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin the tag check after a flow preprocessor resolves the tag

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep tied tag placeholders exact and drop an unresolvable flow tag

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: describe tied tag placeholders in the custom tags editor

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: check workflow-as-code task tags on the tag they resolve to

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: judge a preprocessed flow's tag as written when it is run

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: check a preprocessed flow's own tag, as written only where it reads args

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: explain dynamic tags in the worker tag picker

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: look up worker availability for typed static tags

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: poll worker availability with the tag list as it is at each run

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: warn on custom tags with nothing fixed at their start or end

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: open the broad custom tag warning from the keyboard

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 07:30:48 +00:00
Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5 2699d5065e fix: check workflow-as-code task tags against CUSTOM_TAGS (#11273)
* fix: check workflow-as-code task tags against CUSTOM_TAGS

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: resolve and check every WAC child before the parent parks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: build parent-code WAC children at push time, not in the pre-pass

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-22 00:54:34 +02:00
b7425443e1 fix: guard data table migration routes against operators and unauthorized authors (#11243)
* fix: refuse operators and unauthorized authors on data table migration routes

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: check the replaced definition on migration upsert and skip unchanged writes

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: let data table admins edit migrations whose annotation no longer parses

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep migration delete idempotent when a concurrent delete wins

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Diego Imbert <70353967+diegoimbert@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-21 14:47:47 +00:00
f00b2fcb1e feat: drafts follow their item through a move; behind means base ≠ head (#10577)
* refactor: give home multi-select a reserved gutter and a menu entry

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep checkbox theming and reserve the gutter on non-selectable rows

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: carry every draft with an item when it moves

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: move draft-only items and warn editors when an item moves

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: put the home selection checkbox back in the kind icon slot

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FaEacdxR6M6VDej6C9r39

* feat: animate the home bulk bar and exit selection at zero

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FaEacdxR6M6VDej6C9r39

* fix: keep dialog icon badges round and the panel inside narrow viewports

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FaEacdxR6M6VDej6C9r39

* fix: address review findings on the draft-carry path

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014FaEacdxR6M6VDej6C9r39

* fix: keep a staged rename when a move carries the draft

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: restamp only the deployer's own carried draft

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: scope the moved-save restamp to the mover as well

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: read the app move's author from the head version, not the draft's base

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: carry a flow draft's baseline path so deploying it cannot un-move the flow

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: reject unsupported kinds in move_draft, survive NUL-poisoned draft rows

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: skip NUL-poisoned rows in every draft-value rewrite, not just the first

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: report a NUL-poisoned draft on move instead of 500ing

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: name the attempted operation in the NUL rejection message

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: drop dead selection code and comments that outlived their state

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: describe script staleness as head-pinned, which is what the loader does

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: correct the third staleness comment left claiming a stable fork base

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address CI review — auth order, save race, carry failure, path validation

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: gate operators earlier, skip the write tx without lineage, unblock a chained move

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: run the post-write moved re-assert under RLS, not the raw pool

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin the moved answer to what the saver can see

The post-write re-assert names a path and a username, and nothing at any
layer stopped it reading them off a raw pool connection. Swapping the
transaction back to `db.begin()` compiles and passes everything else, so
the guard has to be a test: a non-admin saving at a path whose item moved
into a folder they cannot see gets `saved`, while the admin gets `moved`.

Also drops two doc comments still arguing that clearing the write gate at
the old path removes the need for an RLS envelope. It does not — the gate
resolves the old path and the re-assert asks about the new one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: name the real deploy path and stop restating the RLS constraint

`update_path` is not a symbol in this repo; a script move goes through
`create_script`. The re-assert's comment re-derived the disclosure argument
that already sits on `resolve_moved_to_in`, where a caller would break it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: state the RLS and restamp constraints once each

The RLS envelope was argued at three sites in drafts.rs; it now sits only on
`resolve_moved_to_in`, whose signature is what a caller would break. The
restamp scoping was copy-pasted at all three deploy call sites while already
documented in full on `move_drafts_for_path`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: carry both path keys on a move, and grant the draft sequence

The upsert now runs as `windmill_user`, so it calls nextval on `draft_id_seq`
as that role. The only thing granting that is the ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES in
20250205131523, whose DO block swallows failures — so an instance where it
errored would fail every autosave with `permission denied for sequence`.

A draft value carries two path keys: the typed one and a mirror the editors
keep in step with it while it differs from the row's path. Rewriting only the
typed one left the mirror naming the old location, and the loaders prefer the
mirror — reopening a moved session script restored the old path and the next
save un-did the move. Both keys now follow, in the move endpoint and in the
passive carry, under the same tri-state rule.

`typed_path_field` answered `draft_path` for every non-script kind, including
resources, variables and triggers, which have no such key. It returns `None`
for them now, and `move_draft` reads its guard off that mapping so the movable
set and the field mapping cannot drift apart.

Also documents that `move_drafts_for_path` mutates every owner's row and
enforces nothing itself, and parses the draft payload once per save instead of
three times.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin the two-key move, and stop the down migration breaking instances

Revoking the sequence grant would strip a privilege a healthy instance had
before this migration ran — the grant it adds is indistinguishable in the
catalog from the one ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES gives at creation time — so the
down is a comment, matching the other grant-only migrations.

The mirror rewrite is spread over three sites that have to agree and fails
silently when they don't, so it gets a test: a draft carrying both path keys
has both moved, and one carrying neither mirror does not gain one. It reads
the value back over HTTP rather than with `sqlx::query!`, which would need an
offline cache entry of its own.

Also drops twelve `.sqlx` entries this branch added and then superseded, and
corrects the doc and openapi text that still described only the typed path
being rewritten.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: point the empty down at the grant it is declining to revoke

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: drop the restamp and tri-state; a move relocates the draft row only

A deploy that renames an item is a deploy like any other: every draft on the item
goes stale, and the stale prompt with its diff is the single mechanism to catch up.
move_drafts_for_path now touches only the row's path column, so the value keeps the
base version the draft actually forked from, and the "moved" patch carries no
version restamp. DraftBaseVersion shrinks to the three per-kind lineage fields.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: stale prompt links to a diff that names and lets you pick the deployed version

The stale-draft prompt gains "See what changed", which opens the diff drawer. The
drawer resolves the deployed side by the draft row's own path (not the typed path,
which after a rename still names the archived row), labels which version the left
pane is, and offers a picker over the item's deployed history for scripts, flows
and raw apps. The history endpoints return created_by (and created_at for apps)
so each entry can name its deployer. "Restore to deployed" moves to the header
actions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: move_to asserts the response status

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep a script draft's base at the version it forked from

The script editor seeded the draft's parent_hash from the deployed head on every
load, and the next autosave persisted it, so a draft behind the deploy read as up
to date after being opened once. The base now comes from the draft when one
exists; the head is only used for a fresh checkout or an explicit topHash. Deploy
already fetches the live head and confirms on mismatch, so the base is what makes
that check meaningful. The webhook "run this version" URL uses the deployed hash
rather than the draft's base.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: store the version a draft forked from in one draft.base column

Every kind kept its fork base under a different name and type inside the
value: parent_hash (hex) for scripts, version_id for flows, parent_version for
apps. draft.base holds it as one text id, derived on save from the value so
every writer fills it the same way, backfilled by the migration (rows holding a
NUL are skipped, since ->> raises on them). The get-by-path overlay exposes it
as draft_base and the drafts list as base; the editors and the compare page
read that one field and compare it to the head as text.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: raw-app drafts carry a fork base, so behind means base != head for them too

The raw-app bundle never carried the version it forked from, which left raw apps
on the timestamp check that self-heals as you type, and the header's deploy guard
read a version prop nothing set, so deploying over a newer version never asked.
The route now stamps parent_version into the bundle (the draft's own base when it
has one, else the head), the server derives draft.base from it, the stale prompt
compares it to the head and links to the diff, and the editor threads it to the
header so the deploy guard confirms. A deploy re-pins the base to the version it
wrote.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: refuse a rename onto a path that already holds a draft

A draft occupies its path the way a deployed item does: a never-deployed item,
or a draft left on an archived script. Renaming onto it would either merge two
items or leave the losing row stranded at a path its item has left. The move now
refuses with a BadRequest inside the deploy's transaction, so the rename itself
fails and the source stays deployed. Every draft on the item then moves; there is
no longer a left-behind count to report.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: save drafts by row id, so an open editor follows its draft through a move

A rename carries every draft on the item to the new path. An editor left open
across it was still saving by the path it opened on, which the server had to
refuse and answer with where the item went (the "moved" handshake and its
modal). The draft row has an id: the get-by-path overlay now returns it as
draft_id, every later save sends it, and the server writes the row wherever it
is and answers with that path. The editor then follows: it flushes what it holds,
tells the user, and navigates to the item's new path, where the stale prompt
says what changed. The lineage-based move resolvers, the moved status and the
moved modal are gone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: the out-of-date prompt names both versions and can take the latest as the new base

The prompt now says which version the draft forked from and which is deployed
(and by whom), instead of two timestamps, and gains "Take latest, keep my
edits": the draft's base moves to the head and its content stays, so the user
can acknowledge a newer version without discarding their work. Each route sets
its kind's base field on the draft value and persists it; the raw-app bundle
carries it already, so setting the state is enough there.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: two-action out-of-date prompt; taking the latest moves into the diff drawer

Four buttons made the prompt hard to read. It keeps "See what changed" and a
red "Use latest" (it replaces the draft); closing it is keeping the draft.
"Take latest, keep my edits" moves to the diff drawer's header, offered only
while the draft is behind, so the user takes the latest with the diff in front
of them. Scripts, flows and raw apps pass the action through their diff drawer;
the classic app editor has no drawer wired to the prompt and loses it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: drop the draft_id_seq grant; the draft upsert runs on the raw pool

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a moved draft's path keys follow it, and a refused rename names the draft's owner

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: follow a moved draft on tab close, and deploy a followed flow at its new path

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: write a followed draft by id against the row's own path keys; keep base on assign and clone

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: look up a script's head at its row path, and show flow and app version ids bare

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: session editors save by draft id; raw apps keep a legacy draft's base unknown

Also advance the raw-app base on deploy, relocate once per move, drop the
hoisted operator check and the unread base on drafts/list.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: guard a base-unknown raw-app deploy against the head at load; keep the base in session hydration

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: the server follows a moved draft through a move record, not client-sent row ids

A move writes old path -> new path (per workspace and kind, per owner for a
draft-only move) in its transaction; a draft save or discard addressed to a
path the caller has no draft at resolves through it and keeps the moved
draft's path keys. Creating an item at a path drops the records leaving it.
Every writer (edit routes, sessions, chat, CLI, the tab-close flush) follows
without passing an id, so the id plumbing is gone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: session loaders keep a draft's base, and a failed relocation flush stays put

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a draft-only app move refuses the other app kind; a session keeps an unknown base unknown

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin a teammate's carried draft; name the kind that refuses a draft move

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: an unknown base stays unknown in every loader, and an owner move extends an item move

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a clone keeps only a base it can resolve; a base-unknown script deploys without a false guard

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a workspace clone sanitizes a NUL-bearing draft instead of copying it unstripped

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: move records follow an account rename and deletion; a legacy draft says why it cannot move

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: an owner move extends only the item's own route, not another user's

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a redeploy ends a route off its path, take-latest persists on raw apps, stale picker loads are dropped

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a poisoned draft's path keys follow a move, legacy only bypasses routing on a delete, picker loads are generation-guarded

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: count picker load generations, and report a skipped legacy upsert as a conflict

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a legacy discard follows the item's move record too

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a failed version load keeps the picker on what the diff shows; one spelling for a legacy delete

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the picker marks the version on display as head, restore compares the head, relocation follows the last move

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: say so when a version fails to load in the diff picker

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: take latest re-reads the head at click time; type the kept head as prepared diff data

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: taking the latest moves the head each editor knows, not just the base

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: take latest adopts the head the diff shows, and is offered while the drawer sees the draft behind

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a head nobody could name is not behind, so take latest is not offered without one

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the flow drawer's head is the version its payload came from, and its callback type says so

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a NUL in a move's summary is dropped, and take latest simply adopts the head it was handed

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a loaded raw-app draft keeps its own fork base, and an unknown head is refused

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a routed discard names where it landed, a superseded drawer opening is dropped, and a loaded draft keeps its base in every editor

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a legacy draft occupies its destination, a superseded opening writes nothing, and a loaded flow draft keeps no base it lacks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the drawer owns its opening, a loaded script draft keeps no base it lacks, and a legacy occupant says who can clear it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: taking the diff drawer without a token claims it, and the classic app editor takes one

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a retried routed discard still names the destination, and filling the drawer takes the opening too

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a no-op routed discard names the destination only to someone who could write there

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the no-op routed discard gates its answer on reading the destination, and a session draft keeps its unknown base

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: abandoning an opening clears the drawer it still owns

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: an app deploy pins only a version it wrote as the next draft's base

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the deploy-override diff takes an opening its editor can hand back

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: pin the version this deploy wrote even when one landed on top, and tighten three comment blocks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a deploy claims only the version it appended to the head it read, and names the head separately

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a deploy always names the head it left behind, and pins a base only when it can claim one

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the derived base is read after the sanitizer, and a deploy that claims nothing leaves no base to compare

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the route's lineage follows an in-place deploy, and the raw-app editor's event type carries the head

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: the raw-app deploy comment says what that editor actually does with version

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a group member can be told where their item went, and a deploy names the head's author

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: an emptied selection is no shift anchor, and a deploy leaves no draft for the prompt to compare

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: session tabs compare the same base pair, and a consumed draft is not out of date

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a failed anchor read is not a raced deploy, and take latest closes only its own drawer

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: an unclaimed deploy always confirms, and the prompt keeps warning a loaded teammate draft

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: the base-unknown confirmation says what it knows, and two comments match the guard

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the other app kind collides whoever owns it, and session tabs get a head to compare

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the cross-kind refusal reads properly, and a session flow keeps its own response's head

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a fresh session checkout takes the head its payload came from, and a deploy keeps the base it pinned

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the move endpoint validates its source path, and two comments say what their branch does

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: an unanswered head read confirms rather than assuming the app editor is current

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a deploy is not blocked by the draft a move carried to its destination

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: an unread head confirms with the copy for caution, not for an observed deploy

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the move record alone excuses a carried draft at the destination, whoever owns it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: an app deploy answers with the version it wrote, so the editor stops inferring it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: the rename assertion reads the deploy's json answer

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the unread-head warning reads as caution in the deploy drawer too, and the cross-kind refusal names a remedy

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a reused destination retires the routes pointing at it, and draft_base stays out of diffs

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the app head is the tail of app.versions, not the newest timestamp

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: app history lists in deployed order, so the picker numbers it right

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: the ordering test's setup sql compiles offline, and the head join names its app

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: kinds that cannot move skip the move lookup, and the move wording needs read

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf: a deploy history comes a page at a time, so the diff drawer opens at once

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a history stays whole unless asked to page, and pages inside the version array

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: an asked-for history page is bounded, and a failed one is not the end of the list

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: an unasked history is whole again, and an absurd page is empty not an error

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: naming only a page still asks for one, and a stray version stays reachable

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a fork's nul-poisoned draft arrives clean, so its dangling identity repoints too

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: a raw app names its deployed version even when the history will not load

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>
2026-09-18 20:54:23 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5 53afecd458 fix: register the job token with the sensitive log masking system (#10943)
* fix(worker): register the job token with the log masking system

The masking system covered secrets fetched through `get_value_internal` and
`$encrypted:` args, but not the job's own token, so a script that echoed
`$WM_TOKEN` wrote it verbatim into logs that are persisted to the database
and, when configured, to object storage.

`run_worker` now registers the token for the job it just pulled, alongside
the existing `register_running_job` call, so it is redacted like any other
registered secret.

That makes every job carry at least one registered value, where before the
per-batch mask snapshot was skipped entirely for the majority of jobs that
touched no secret. Cache the compiled Aho-Corasick automaton per job and
invalidate it when a new secret is registered, so a chatty job no longer
rebuilds it once per log batch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P316wKe2QCYNcdsx1PwAJ3

* fix(nativets): mask secrets in the in-process log path

NativeTS hands `console.log` output to a task that drains a channel into
`append_logs`, so it never reaches the masking in `handle_child::write_lines`
and a script logging `$WM_TOKEN` persisted the raw JWT.

That drain can still be flushing after the job is unregistered, so a plain
per-line `snapshot` would leave the tail unmasked. `JobMasker` keeps the last
masks it saw for exactly that window, and refreshes while the job is alive so
secrets fetched mid-run are covered too.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P316wKe2QCYNcdsx1PwAJ3

* fix(nativets): seed the job masker at construction

A `JobMasker` that only looked up its masks on the first `mask` call had the
same hole at the head of the log that its retention closes at the tail: if the
drain task's first productive poll landed after the job was unregistered, the
registry was already gone and every line was written raw.

`new` now takes the snapshot, and its callers construct it from the job's own
execution while the job is still registered.

Also cover the nativets sink with an integration test, gated on `deno_core` the
way the CI test build is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P316wKe2QCYNcdsx1PwAJ3

* fix(nativets): mask on the producing side of the log channel

Masking as the drain task wrote to `append_logs` left two holes, because that
task is detached and outlives the job: a secret registered mid-run could still
be queued when the job was unregistered and would then be written raw, and the
`windmill:job_log` tracing emission that EE forwards job logs on never went
through the mask at all.

Mask where the line is produced instead. That loop is joined before the job
completes, so the job's secrets are always still registered, and one call now
covers both the tracing mirror and the channel. The result stream keeps reading
the raw text, the way `handle_child` keeps its raw `line` for results.

`JobMasker` is no longer load-bearing for the post-unregistration window, so it
is documented for what it now does: keep the security notice to once per set of
secrets for a sink that masks line by line.

Also drop the nativets test's tag override — `DEFAULT_TAGS` does advertise
`nativets`, so the comment justifying it was wrong — and pin the automaton
cache invalidation, whose failure mode is an unmasked secret.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P316wKe2QCYNcdsx1PwAJ3

* fix(worker): hold the log-masking lifecycle at the job boundary

Registering the job around the poller's call left every other way of running a
job uncovered: the interactive worker shell and inline AI agent tools both call
`handle_queued_job` directly, and a script logging `$WM_TOKEN` from either
persisted the live credential. Register from inside `handle_queued_job` instead,
under a drop guard, so each path is covered by construction rather than by
remembering to add a call. Nothing is lost by unregistering earlier: the writes
that follow go through `append_logs`, which never consulted the registry.

In nativets, decide the stream/log routing before masking. `MaskSnapshot`'s
notice is one-shot, so a secret-bearing `WM_STREAM:` chunk used to spend it on
text that is then discarded, leaving later redactions in `job_logs` unexplained.

Restore the masker's post-unregistration test: the memory-limit path never joins
the producing loop, so that fallback is still load-bearing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P316wKe2QCYNcdsx1PwAJ3

* docs: correct the nativets masking comments

The producer loop is not joined on the memory-limit path, so it does not
"always" run while the job is registered — say normally, which is what
`JobMasker`'s fallback is there for. Name the reason a stream chunk stays raw
everywhere it goes, including the tracing mirror: it is result data that no log
sink persists, so masking it would be masking a result. State the masker test's
invariant without asserting a mechanism behind it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P316wKe2QCYNcdsx1PwAJ3

* fix(masking): keep the security notice on a line of its own

`mask` appended the notice as a newline plus the notice text, which
assumes the caller hands it a bare log line. nativets hands it a chunk
that already ends in a newline, and its sink concatenates chunks
verbatim, so the notice arrived after a blank line and the next log line
was welded onto the end of it.

Emit the notice as its own line for either shape. `handle_child` is
unaffected: its input never ends in a newline, so it keeps the original
path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P316wKe2QCYNcdsx1PwAJ3

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 15:15:02 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5 48f00259c5 feat: support $flow_expr[...] dynamic tags on flow steps (#11170)
* feat: resolve $flow_expr[...] dynamic tags on flow steps

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: run an unresolvable $flow_expr tag on the default tag and give it the step input scope

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: resolve $flow_expr tags by path lookup instead of expression evaluation

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: say a $flow_expr tag fails to resolve, not to evaluate

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(frontend): word the $flow_expr help like the other dynamic tag lines

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: reject a malformed $flow_expr placeholder instead of queueing its literal tag

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: render $flow_expr tag values through the $args path lookup

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin interpolate_args through the shared tag path rendering

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 14:37:50 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5 9320312eac feat: cap user token expiration with an instance setting (#11159)
* feat: cap user token expiration with an instance setting

Adds `max_token_expiration_days`, an instance-wide ceiling on how far ahead a
token created through `POST /users/tokens/create` may expire. With it set, that
route refuses a token with no expiration and one that expires past the window;
absent or non-positive, nothing changes.

Only the user-facing handler enforces it. Server-side mints (native trigger
webhook tokens, app embed tokens, sessions) pick a lifetime the caller never
chooses and go straight to `create_token_internal`, so they stay uncapped, as
does the superadmin `impersonate` route.

Service accounts are exempt, in the workspace the token targets or in any
workspace for a global token, so unattended automation can keep longer-lived
credentials.

The token form now surfaces the API error instead of only logging it, and offers
"Expires In" in MCP mode as well: that mode always sent no expiration, which the
cap refuses, leaving MCP URLs impossible to generate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: shorten over-long token expirations instead of refusing them

Refusing a non-compliant request breaks the callers that cannot comply. The CLI
authorization page, `wmill user create-token` and the editor's language-server
token each pick a lifetime — usually none at all — with no way to read the
setting, so a cap made browser login hang and the editor lose its LSP root
rather than stopping the long-lived tokens the setting is aimed at.

`cap_token_expiration` now returns the expiration to store, shortening a request
that asks for too long or for none. The policy still holds absolutely, no caller
can break, and there is no clock-skew boundary where an expiration exactly at the
ceiling flips to an error. The token form needed no changes at all, so its MCP
and error-toast edits are gone with it.

Also drops the Enterprise badge on the setting, which nothing enforced, notes the
mint paths in docs/auth-surface.md, and pins that `tokens/impersonate` and the
second-workspace case stay outside the exemption.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: drop the unintended token-form change and correct the exemption docs

The token form needed no change once the ceiling shortens rather than refuses,
but the earlier revert restored from the index, which already held the staged
edit, so the MCP expiration field and the error toast stayed on the branch with
a comment justifying them by a refusal that no longer happens.

docs/auth-surface.md claimed a service-account row in any workspace exempts
outright; that only holds for a workspace-less token, which has no workspace to
match. A ceiling written as a string, which the YAML instance config and config
sync can both produce, now has a test.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: offer only expirations within the ceiling in the token form

The server shortens a token that asks for longer than `max_token_expiration_days`
or for no expiration, which the token form could not tell anyone: a user picking
"No expiration" got the ceiling silently. The form now reads the setting and,
with one set, drops "No expiration" and every choice above it, adds the ceiling
itself as "N days (maximum)" and selects it, and says the instance limits tokens
to N days.

MCP mode hides the expiration field and always sent none, so with a ceiling the
field now shows there too and keeps its value across the toggle. Without a
ceiling the form is unchanged.

Reading it needs no superadmin: the setting joins the keys any logged-in user
can read through `GET /settings/global/{key}`. It holds a policy, not a secret.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: make the token form and the server agree on what counts as a ceiling

The form parsed `max_token_expiration_days` more loosely than
`cap_token_expiration`, so the two could disagree on whether a ceiling exists
at all. A `7.0` from the YAML instance config, or a string such as "7.0" or
"1e1", made the form hide "No expiration" and announce a 7-day limit while the
server capped nothing; a value between chrono's and JavaScript's date limits
preselected an expiration the server could not parse.

Both now read the same thing as a ceiling: a whole number of days from 1 to
1,000,000, stored as an integer, an integral float or a string of digits.
`parseMaxTokenExpirationDays` holds the frontend's copy, and the instance
settings validation uses it too, so the settings page no longer accepts a value
the server would ignore. The bound replaces the date-range guard on both sides.

Also corrects the rationale for shortening rather than refusing: the setting is
now readable by any logged-in user, so those callers do not read it rather than
cannot, and CLIs already installed never will.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: cap service-account tokens like everyone else's

The ticket exempted service accounts from `max_token_expiration_days`, but
their tokens are the long-lived ones a rotation policy is meant to bound, and
the exemption let any workspace admin get an uncapped token by impersonating
one. It also left the token form unable to agree with the server: an admin
impersonating a service account was offered only capped choices while the
server would have kept any.

`cap_token_expiration` now takes just the requested expiration, with no
per-caller lookup, and the service-account query and its cache entry are gone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: cap superadmin impersonation tokens and pin the frontend parser

`POST /users/tokens/impersonate` wrote its own token row with whatever
expiration the superadmin sent, so it was the one route left that could mint a
token that never expires with `max_token_expiration_days` set. The ceiling only
decides the stored expiration (the auth lookup never reads the setting), so
leaving it uncapped meant exactly that. It now goes through
`cap_token_expiration` like `create_token`; nothing in Windmill calls it, so no
caller changes.

Also adds `tokenExpiration.test.ts`, pinning which stored values
`parseMaxTokenExpirationDays` reads as a ceiling against the server's reading,
and documents that tokens existing when the setting is turned on or lowered
keep their expiration.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: reject a max_token_expiration_days the token routes cannot read

The settings API and config sync stored any value for the key, and the token
routes can only read an unparseable one as no ceiling. A typo such as `7.5` or
"7.0" was accepted and silently turned the policy off.

`parse_max_token_expiration_days` in windmill-common is now the single server
reading of the setting: null or empty clears it, a whole number of days within
the bound is the ceiling, anything else is an error. The settings write hook and
`sync_global_settings_declarative` reject that error, and `cap_token_expiration`
reads through the same function, logging a value written around both.

Tests: the parser's accept/clear/reject table (the same table as the frontend
parser's), the settings API refusing 7.5, and config sync refusing "7.0".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: reserve the CLI login token label so its expiry does not email the user

With a token expiration ceiling, the token the CLI authorization page mints now
expires, so every `wmill` login earned an "expiring soon" and an "expired and
deleted" email and critical alert. The CLI already signs in again on its own
when that token stops working, so those notifications ask the user to do
nothing.

The page now labels it `cli-login:<username>` (previously `cli-<username>`),
reserved in `is_user_token` and its SQL and Svelte mirrors: no expiry
notifications, and the label cannot be edited. A colon-terminated namespace
like `embed_app:` and `impersonation:` keeps hand-made labels clear of it. Not
in `is_server_minted_label`, since the page mints through `/users/tokens/create`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: skip the expiring-soon warning for tokens that were short-lived from the start

A token whose whole lifetime fits in the 7-day warning window got its
"expiring soon" email (and critical alert, when enabled) minutes after it was
created, about a lifetime its creator had just picked. With an expiration
ceiling of 7 days or less that is every token created from the form or
`wmill token create`.

`register_token_expiry_notification` no longer queues a warning for such a
token. The window is now `TOKEN_EXPIRY_WARNING_DAYS`, shared with
`check_expiring_tokens`, so shortening the warning window can never leave
tokens of an intermediate lifetime with no warning at all. The "expired and
deleted" notice still goes out for every user token.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: exempt service-account tokens from the expiration ceiling again

Service accounts are the identity automation that needs a long-lived credential
runs as, so their tokens are exempt from `max_token_expiration_days` once more:
a service account in the workspace the token names, or in any workspace for a
workspace-less token. `tokens/impersonate` checks the impersonated account, so
a superadmin minting a token for a service account gets the same exemption.

The token form applies the same rule for the account it is running as, when
that account is a service account in the current workspace, which is what an
admin impersonating one sees; otherwise it would offer only capped choices
while the server keeps any.

Any workspace admin can create and impersonate a service account to hold an
uncapped token, so the ceiling bounds personal tokens; the doc comment and
docs/auth-surface.md say so.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: decide the token form's service-account exemption from the token's workspace

The form treated the account as a service account only when it was one in the
workspace the app was on, while the server checks the workspace the token is
for, or any workspace for a workspace-less token. With an email that is a
service account in one workspace and an ordinary member of another, picking the
other workspace in MCP mode offered "No expiration" and the server silently
stored the ceiling; the reverse hid the exemption.

`GET /workspaces/users` now returns each membership's `is_service_account`
(its query already joins the `usr` row), and the form applies the server's rule
to the token's own workspace. The selection becomes a derived value held within
the ceiling, so switching to a capped workspace never leaves an unoffered choice
selected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 14:37:39 +02:00