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be5e651f202773879d439401fec6c0bcbc72ee2c
15019
Commits
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be5e651f20 |
feat: edit an asset's producing script from its pane and multi-script chip
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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a3d46f7364 |
feat: remember which pipelines are in the assets-only view
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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00555e4557 |
style: borderless pipeline cards on the main surface, like flow steps
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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001fb8b5a3 |
feat: pipeline node context menus, add-at-cursor, and assets-only delete
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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9f4e508369 |
fix: discard the open pane's autosaved edits with Discard all
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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aca183f214 |
fix: keep the pipeline folder while the page tears down on leaving
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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e71b2b0a07 |
fix: show schedule handlers once their defaults load, draft suffix on static chips
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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4ad59a2822 |
fix: autosave edits to a deployed pipeline script from the first keystroke
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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12a1926f7d |
feat: pipeline draft sync status beside the folder name in edit mode
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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a8b8efe395 |
feat: size assets-only cards to their content
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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d07415085e |
fix: await schedule defaults before confirming, refuse colliding trigger renames
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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e78d1d6fb5 |
feat: assets-only trigger chip under the title, editable and selectable
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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dcd2fc4912 |
fix: setup banner without icon, button actions, plainer activity rows
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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146f770626 |
fix: default schedule handlers, unique trigger draft paths, zoned cadence, valid script names
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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77c5df6289 |
feat: assets-only view of a pipeline, with producer and trigger chips
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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4cdbd11977 |
feat: title pipeline schedule nodes with the schedule's summary
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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0050f462b3 |
fix: refuse renaming a pipeline draft out of the pipeline's folder
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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505a89e03e |
fix: room between pipeline node chips and the node's edge
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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1488749972 |
fix: keep the downstream-step pill open while its menu is, without flicker
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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d3e5100bf4 |
feat: name a schedule node's cadence, like "Every day at 12:00"
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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69cea7f3d9 |
feat: label the pipeline + buttons: add data source, add downstream step on hover
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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21690a2ed8 |
fix: judge dbt relations by provenance, keep dynamic_skip on reopen, refresh saved scripts' titles
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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43bf7d2d81 |
fix: taller pipeline nodes, with the asset + back on the node's edge
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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fb6bd7469a |
fix: give pipeline asset nodes the trigger nodes' background again
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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bc75c896ac | Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/enable-operator-ai-chat-nav' into improve-data-pipelines | ||
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ae932e6b79 |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into enable-operator-ai-chat-nav
# Conflicts: # frontend/src/lib/components/sessions/SessionsBetaBanner.svelte # frontend/src/routes/(root)/(logged)/+layout.svelte # frontend/src/routes/(root)/(logged)/run/[...run]/+page.svelte |
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3ac98f2620 |
feat: the home composer flies to the menu that restores it
Removing the composer puts it away rather than throws it out, and the way back is one item in the band's menu — easy to miss on a page the composer has just vacated. A mark flies from the control that removed it to that menu, and the menu answers with one ring as the mark dissolves, so where it went is witnessed rather than explained. The cross and the menu item now read "Remove session chat", one name for one thing whichever a reader reaches for. Reduced motion skips both. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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93e96dde8e |
feat: one sidebar column, shown as a rail or as a panel
The rail and the drawer held two copies of the same column — the same sections, in the same order, in two pieces of markup, so a change to one silently skipped the other. Both now render `sidebarColumn`, and the shells keep only what differs: the rail its width, resize handle and collapse button, the panel its outside-click catcher and its transform. A phone gets that panel rather than a modal. There was a width test deciding between two presentations; the card under the band's handle works at any width, so it goes. What is left of the width test is the choice between a rail and a panel, plus a `(hover: hover)` test — the old `innerWidth >= 768` was standing in for "has a pointer", which is what decides whether the panel closes when the pointer leaves it. With the card everywhere, the backdrop, the `aria-modal` (nothing dims and nothing traps focus) and the drawer's close cross all go: the band's handle opens the panel and a tap outside closes it. The burger row goes with them. Entering panel width now collapses the rail transiently, so coming back to a wide window does not land on a rail the page was resized away from. The band also stops easing its right edge. That transition belongs to the rail, which moves the band's left; its right follows a splitter the page owns, and easing it left the band lying over a session's side panel — a blank strip across that panel's own header for 200ms after every drag. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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8fbff019c0 |
feat: the script, app, runs and audit pages fill the band
Each of these kept a header of its own above the page. They register with the band instead: the breadcrumb names what the page is on, and the page's buttons sit at the far end of the one row. They answer the band's width rather than the window's, since the buttons share that row with the breadcrumb. The script editor folds Diff and Settings into the menu it already shows when compact, the app editor drops the panel buttons, Awareness and Export and goes icon-only on Deploy and the mode switch, the flow editor menus its diff, and runs hides its counters. Runs also declares `actionsFlexible`: its search is the one control here that can give width back, and a box that refused to shrink would make it take its maximum instead. The run detail page loses its ActionRow, and the audit log its big title — the breadcrumb says where you are, and the page keeps its tooltip. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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7e28a10eb2 |
feat: the band narrows, wraps, and draws its own edge
The band publishes its width, so the pages filling it can answer it. Two tiers: under 1000px the breadcrumb keeps the workspace disc and its env badge and drops the name, and under PHONE_BAR (800) the trail stops yielding at 10rem — that floor is what makes the bar wrap, so a page's buttons take the line below rather than squeezing the name to an ellipsis. The band also draws the line between itself and the page, and only while something is scrolled under it. One capture listener on the window sees every scroller, since most pages scroll inside their own box and never move the layout's. An inset shadow, not a border: a border would move every page down a pixel the moment the line appeared. DetailPageLayout and InWorkspaceAppViewer drew that first line themselves; two lines would stack, so theirs go. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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fae8b39776 |
fix: a page is as tall as it is given, not as tall as the screen
The band takes 44px off the top of every route, so a page sized to the viewport overflows by exactly that much: h-screen inside a column that already lost the band's height. These pages measure the box they are in instead. CenteredModal gains `inPage` for the five pages that render it inside the layout rather than over it — the same modal, centred in what is left of the page rather than in the window. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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b52ab0f50b |
fix: route long pipeline edges around nodes in the target column, and flag scripts waiting on unproduced assets
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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798265b624 |
feat: show pipeline assets red when unused or awaited but never produced
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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0f96a1119e |
fix: drop a removed node's trigger drafts, and confirm triggers when leaving
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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489b6603af |
feat: one card for pipeline nodes, and the pipeline pages in the page header
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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2b2cdfede5 |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/enable-operator-ai-chat-nav' into improve-data-pipelines
# Conflicts: # frontend/src/lib/components/SummaryPathDisplay.svelte # frontend/src/lib/components/sessions/SessionsBetaBanner.svelte # frontend/src/routes/(root)/(logged)/+layout.svelte |
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f138e53b80 |
feat: configure pipeline triggers and outputs as drafts in the editor
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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7664001b36 |
fix: bump git sync hub scripts to cli 1.820.1 (#11438)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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1d8d4a16b4 |
fix(cli): resolve fork specific items from the parent workspace entry (#11436)
* test(cli): stop CLI tests resolving a just-published windmill-client Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: quote the Windows cert path in the pg attach assertion Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(cli): note when the windmill-client pin must move Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(cli): resolve fork specific items from the parent workspace entry Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(cli): keep fork resolution to the id-guarded inference Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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ab2a973357 |
fix: collapse run card in ai chat when the run is declined (#11435)
* fix: collapse run card in ai chat when the run is declined Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: simplify run card collapse condition and comment Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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9028432e8a |
fix: embed a VERSIONINFO resource in the Windows binary (#11433)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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c728346a15 |
fix(apps): hide custom component host while it is not rendered (#11434)
Semi-lazy mode mounts unvisited subgrids' components with render=false so they initialize outputs. The custom component always kept its host div visible and the user's renderer draws into it regardless of render, so its content landed in the parent's layout flow and pushed the visible tab's components down until the owning tab was first opened. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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cec8eaeadb |
test: fix CLI and Windows cargo test failures on 1.820.0 (#11429)
* test(cli): stop CLI tests resolving a just-published windmill-client Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: quote the Windows cert path in the pg attach assertion Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(cli): note when the windmill-client pin must move Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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039f49ef12 |
feat: dispatch ai agent tools through the worker queue (#11227)
* feat: dispatch ai agent tools through the worker queue * fix: respect worker tags when executing ai agent tools locally * fix: cancel only direct-child tool jobs on agent failure * fix: cancel queued descendant tool jobs on agent failure * fix: route ai agent tools by the flow's tag rule |
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f890355211 |
chore(main): release 1.820.0 (#11404)
* chore(main): release 1.820.0 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com>v1.820.0 |
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0fdf17d339 |
feat: data table cards and a managed-first add wizard (#11419)
* fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename
A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles
The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition
Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.
Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition
The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition
The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it
Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license
Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition
The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4
New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
* fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(datatables): data table roles in the DB manager and raw apps
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: never add a role to the reference of a data table whose name contains '?'
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: read the roles of a data table whose name contains '?'
The generated client leaves a '?' in a path param unencoded, so the lookup
404'd and the raw-app picker blocked Start on such a data table.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix(datatables): refuse a reference naming both a legacy data table and a role
When a workspace stores both `sales` and a legacy `sales?role=analytics`, the
reference resolved to the legacy entry without a role, so browsing `sales` as
`analytics` reached another data table.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: declare the default role in migrations written for a data table whose name contains '?'
Such a data table connects as its default role without naming it, so the
migrations the manager wrote for it declared no role and ran as admin.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* feat(datatables): set up an external instance cluster for data tables
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): send external cluster passwords as SCRAM verifiers
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): scope external cluster credential readers to the crate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* [ee] feat(datatables): external_instance data tables on the external cluster
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix(datatables): compare the external cluster settings under a row lock before storing setup
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(datatables): only drop external databases Windmill marked, and check use under the lock
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry
Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
* feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles
A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection,
`custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say
this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table.
A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the
instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares
`-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch —
grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from
the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`.
A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before.
Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint,
`get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when
there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could
`RESET ROLE` its way out of.
A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a
copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the
parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a
pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the
governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and
ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not
where an access decision should be made.
Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing
workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a
replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin
Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a
caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema
export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the
connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table
under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing
workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant.
All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a
restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the
only right answer for the copy paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping
A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin
putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the
host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and
`CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the
permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials
on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read.
Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration
generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration
rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or
removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after
which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the
entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it
calls a data table changes nothing about the data table.
Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an
entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than
living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's
tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename
dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded
Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo.
Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an
`UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a
live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because
the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so
the operation is retryable once the row is restored.
Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are
left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy
would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it
stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table
this workspace never had.
`InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now
hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line.
Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the
governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that
predates this and sends no job id.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code
The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that
matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line
form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence.
`list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop
it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin
check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not
and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the
check runs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract
The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all
read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the
cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password
nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation
now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the
write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL
helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them.
Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely
multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the
transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway.
The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns
plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and
`converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's
raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at
the definition, which is where the next caller looks.
Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip
that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and
`resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing
resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker.
Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a
`StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an
operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and
never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated
secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now
said at the field.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery
Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways.
The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the
operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML
editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either.
Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of
that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every
login it described.
`custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret,
written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot
read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape:
`datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist.
No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to
take it out.
Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables
outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save
committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And
`set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its
transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the
default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings
row across validation and write.
Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish:
`read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole
job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and
`converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's.
Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but
`extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so
code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced
The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all
three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now
drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names.
Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it
fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot".
The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than
none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it.
`read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any
workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while
`set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the
rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record
or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same
treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every
resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions`
— it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing
The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own
`global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles`
and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The
neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it
predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a
consequence of this change.
Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing:
A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across
as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save
succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step,
and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose.
Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table
disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to
suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction.
Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what
it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which
workspace is gone.
Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions
handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed);
the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog`
was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its
roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings
Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.
The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.
One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.
Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks
Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved.
A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any
lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a
PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in
which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed
nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state.
Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which
still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows
onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual
old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a
target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one
target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so
a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The
pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade
one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once
from what it named before the save.
The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named,
with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal.
Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint.
Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of
a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole
document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical
value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from
the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically
The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call
`/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which
deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining
therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the
username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually
calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant".
The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's
admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role
check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check
when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any
connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role
a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that.
Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in
separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect
as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now
runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles
pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied
data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role.
The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass
Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by
Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing.
Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork
path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is
what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the
copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data
A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only
the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one
created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed —
and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops
entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one.
Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* nit worker error msg
* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix
* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it
`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.
A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.
Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it
`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.
The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry
The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".
Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands
Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.
The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test
Two review findings, both real.
`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.
`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy
Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.
Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.
Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist
The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.
Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created
A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.
That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.
Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database
A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.
`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"
This reverts commit
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235410c1e4 |
feat: show native web search in the assistant settings modal (#11394)
* feat: show native web search in the assistant settings modal Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UeyhSVDKENUzX8gKj5UXYE * refactor: clarify provider tools subscriptions and give their test its own group Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01UeyhSVDKENUzX8gKj5UXYE --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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c5f59d6ccc |
fix: drop caller-supplied _MODULES at push for every job (#11418)
* fix: drop caller-supplied _MODULES at push for every job Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: never interpolate _MODULES into a tag and drop unused mut Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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bb12bc766c |
serve the parser wasm in the vitest bridge (#11420)
* fix(ai_evals): serve the parser wasm in the vitest bridge The parsers behind inferArgs load their wasm from a vite ?url path that only a dev server answers, so every script draft in the global evals got an empty schema. test_run_script then told the model its arguments were undeclared, and gemini rewrote a correct script until it hit max turns. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ai_evals): match wasm urls past a base path and decode them Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ai_evals): decode wasm urls after the suffix check; fail the run when inference breaks Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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83b8954ae2 |
fix: turn the default raw app into a feature tour (#11417)
* feat: turn the default raw app into a feature tour Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: don't present ctx fields as unforgeable in the starter app Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: format raw app templates Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |