CI cargo_test failed to compile the EE src/ee.rs unit tests (a stale
seats_consumed arity in seat_count_membership, pre-existing on the EE base).
Pin the EE companion head that fixes it so the test target builds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
The length guard ran after the cache key was built from the token (a copy and a
hash of the whole bearer), so cap it before that work. Also correct the
strip_prefix comment: it prevents a repeated-prefix bearer from reducing to a
valid token cached under a non-canonical key, not the oversized case the length
guard handles.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
trim_start_matches stripped every jwt_guest_ prefix, so a repeated-prefix bearer
shrank to a valid short token that verified and was then cached under the full
oversized bearer key. Strip exactly one prefix, and bound the raw bearer length
(the auth cache keys on it) before verifying or caching. The refusal test now
mints a valid signed token over the cap (which would otherwise verify, the extra
claim ignored) and a repeated-prefix bearer, so it fails if either guard regresses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
The auth cache keys on the bearer token, and verify_for_workspace decoded a
token of any length (its header for the JWKS kid, then the body) before
rejecting it, so an oversized token could be decoded unauthenticated and, if it
verified, cached at full size. Refuse a token longer than MAX_GUEST_JWT_LEN
(8 KiB) at the top of verify_for_workspace, before the key lookup or any
signature work. Also correct the MAX_JWKS_URL_LEN doc: the bound holds because
the save path validates the URL through fetch_jwks, not because cached_jwks
checks it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
The cap read pem.trim(), but edit_guest_jwt_key stores the untrimmed string, so
a key with 8 KiB of leading or trailing whitespace passed the check and was
stored (and reparsed per request) at full size. Measure the untrimmed input.
Test covers a whitespace-padded key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
decoding_key_from_pem decoded an unbounded PEM: a well-formed key with an
oversized modulus passes the structural check, is stored in the unbounded TEXT
column, and is reparsed on every guest-JWT request. Refuse one longer than
MAX_GUEST_PEM_LEN (8 KiB) at the same choke point the save path validates
through, the way the JWKS URL is bounded. Also tighten two cap tests to assert
their specific error rather than a substring another cap shares.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
Parent moved (OSS 6081e286c9, EE 32841072aa). The EE change dropped
clear_guest_target_for_state (the OAuth guest cookie is state-bound and never
cleared by a callback); the OSS change was docs/tests on the guest_activity
delete. Keep this branch's ee-repo-ref at the EE companion head.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
The retained-bytes cap left two dimensions unbounded that reviewers named: the
cache keys on the admin-supplied URL (unbounded TEXT column), and the per-key
fixed cost (many tiny keys serialize small but each Jwk and its map slot cost
memory). Add a URL-length cap in fetch_jwks (the choke point save validates
through, so an overlong URL is never stored or cached) and a usable-key count
cap alongside the retained-bytes cap, both measured after filtering so a mixed-
use set is judged by its signing keys. Every dimension is now bounded.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
The key-count cap did not bound retained memory (from_jwk decodes n/e/x/y with
no length limit, so 50 keys could still carry ~1 MiB), and it counted raw
entries, refusing a valid mixed-use set with many encryption keys wholesale.
Replace it with a cap on the serialized size of the usable, retained keys
(JWKS_MAX_RETAINED_BYTES = 64 KiB), measured after filtering. Cache ceiling is
now bounded (200 entries x 64 KiB); a real set retains a few KB.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
JWKS_MAX_BYTES caps one response and the cache caps entry count (200), but a
densely packed 1 MiB body parses into thousands of keys, so one entry could
retain a few MB and a workspace admin rotating URLs could grow the shared
process by hundreds of MB. Refuse a set larger than JWKS_MAX_KEYS (50) in
parse_jwks_keys, which bounds retention at the source; real issuers publish a
handful of keys.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
Parent merged main again (OSS 4434d3d94b, EE 00bf1dde9c). The OSS change was an
ee-repo-ref bump; the EE change was in duckdb_isolation_ee.rs, unrelated to this
feature. Keep this branch's ee-repo-ref at the EE companion head merged over the
new EE parent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
The CE parent's only change was bumping ee-repo-ref to pick up the EE-only
OAuth guest-cookie change; keep this branch's ee-repo-ref at the EE companion
head (my guest_jwt EE changes on top of that same EE parent). Also address a
review nit: the app_path refusal messages now name the empty-path case that
is_scope_literal_path also rejects.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
EE parent moved (OAuth guest cookie is now <state>|<ws>/<path>, bound to the
flow's state via guest_target_for_state / clear_guest_target_for_state in
oauth2_ee.rs). Merged it into the EE companion; the change is self-contained in
oauth2_ee.rs and CE compiles against it unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
change_workspace_id copies workspace_settings by an explicit column list that
omitted guest_jwt_public_key and guest_jwt_jwks_url, so a rename silently cleared
the guest JWT key, the same failure the parent fixed for guest_access_enabled.
Add both columns to the copy, and extend the rename test to assert the key
travels. Sync verify()'s refusal message with the other two sites (leading `/`).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
* fix: tell duckdb scripts which extension to name when autoload hits the fence
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to b9aeffa83f0e601f123c7eab536b235719786da1
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #778 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: fd196f99e22205c69946870997dadd921847cc97
New ee-repo-ref: b9aeffa83f0e601f123c7eab536b235719786da1
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Parent adds guest_activity handling on workspace rename (UPDATE ... SET
workspace_id) and delete (DELETE FROM guest_activity), and reads the deployed
mode under the app-row lock on a rename. The rename/delete queries touch only
workspace_id, leaving the jwt_entry column this PR adds intact. Keep
guest_session_scopes relocated to windmill_api_auth::scopes rather than the
parent's re-added local copy, and sync its refusal message with the parent's.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
parse_jwks_keys filtered on metadata only (kty/alg/use/key_ops), but jsonwebtoken
carries n/e/x/y as strings and defers decoding to auth time, so a JWKS whose only
key had malformed material passed save-time validation and every token failed
later. Keep a key only if DecodingKey::from_jwk decodes it. This is the single
source for both edit_guest_jwt_key and per-request verify.
Update two test comments that credited the SPKI parse alone now that the guard
also accepts a PKCS#1 RSA public key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
The SPKI guard decoded the body with the strict RFC 7468 decoder, which enforces
64-column wrapping, so a legitimate public key wrapped otherwise (or a PKCS#1
`RSA PUBLIC KEY`) was refused where jsonwebtoken would have parsed it. Decode the
body leniently like jsonwebtoken, then require the DER to be a public-key
structure: an SPKI (RSA or EC) or a PKCS#1 RSA public key. Private material
satisfies neither, so the round-13 bypass stays closed. Test adds a one-line
(non-64-column) public key as a positive control.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
jsonwebtoken 8.3 decides public vs private from the PEM label alone and never
inspects the DER, so private material relabelled `PUBLIC KEY` (or a PKCS#1 key
relabelled `RSA PUBLIC KEY`) passed the earlier label check and would be stored,
then served back through the settings response. decoding_key_from_pem now parses
the DER as a SubjectPublicKeyInfo, which only public keys satisfy, before it is
persisted or used. The regression test relabels complete, valid private keys
(EC PKCS#8, RSA PKCS#1) so the guard is what refuses them, not malformed DER.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
jsonwebtoken 8.3's from_rsa_pem accepts private encodings (PKCS#1, PKCS#8), so
a pasted private key would be stored and then served back through the settings
response. Refuse any private PEM in decoding_key_from_pem, the single choke
point for both the save endpoint and per-request verification.
Also drop the last "canonical" references the is_scope_literal_path switch left
in the JWT arm: the refusal log no longer misdiagnoses a reserved character as a
malformed path, and the relocated guest_session_scopes doc carries the
sentinel/label distinction for both its callers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
Adopt the parent's app-path guard for scopes: windmill_common::auth::
is_scope_literal_path (refuses only `:`, `,`, `*` and a leading `/`) rather than
check_proper_path, since app paths may carry spaces and `@`. The relocated
guest_session_scopes and the JWT arm's verify() both use it. The parent's
re-added local guest_session_scopes in users.rs stays relocated to
windmill_api_auth::scopes, its guard preserved there.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
Save the guest JWT key before the Enterprise-only default-app and rate-limit
writes, so a refused write cannot swallow a valid key change on CE. Name the
JWT entry in the Guests card summary. Complete verify()'s doc with the email
and app_path rules. Anchor the refusal suite with a positive control and make
enable_guests assert its status, so a broken fixture cannot pass it vacuously.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
* chore: stop denying reads of secret files in claude settings
Any Read() deny rule makes Claude Code resolve the file operands of every
Bash command that reads files. A path it cannot resolve, such as one that
follows a cd into a directory the analyzer does not track, escalates to a
permission prompt even under bypassPermissions. A plain recursive grep in
the repo root escalates too, because it could reach .env.
Drop the read rules and widen the write rules to cover the same files, so
secrets still cannot be written through Edit, Write, or a shell redirect.
Reads of those files are no longer blocked.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RNCupPk2yewQT1JMNjkV8M
* fix: keep the sso group reconciler alive in oauth2-less builds
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01W24T1FjQXQ87AoeC3UxWWC
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to d6297e6844dc2aab4745fce328e32ccab508969f
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #777 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: eec88486fb2df0ba15998ef285f52fc67af90b1e
New ee-repo-ref: d6297e6844dc2aab4745fce328e32ccab508969f
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Any Read() deny rule makes Claude Code resolve the file operands of every
Bash command that reads files. A path it cannot resolve, such as one that
follows a cd into a directory the analyzer does not track, escalates to a
permission prompt even under bypassPermissions. A plain recursive grep in
the repo root escalates too, because it could reach .env.
Drop the read rules and widen the write rules to cover the same files, so
secrets still cannot be written through Edit, Write, or a shell redirect.
Reads of those files are no longer blocked.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RNCupPk2yewQT1JMNjkV8M
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
jsonwebtoken 8.3 models a JWK's `alg` as its signing `Algorithm` enum, so a set
carrying an encryption key (`alg: "RSA-OAEP"`, absent from that enum) alongside a
signing key failed whole-set deserialization and the whole JWKS was rejected,
which real issuers publish. Parse each key on its own and skip one that does not
model as a JWT key, keeping the usable signing keys. Unit-tested with a mixed set.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
- Gate the audit with a conditional upsert (`DO UPDATE ... WHERE NOT
guest_activity.jwt_entry RETURNING 1`) read with fetch_optional. The row comes
back exactly once per email per day, decided by the conflicting tuple, so it
keeps the atomicity `xmax = 0` had (no double audit when two first requests race
on a metered instance, which takes no advisory lock) and still fires on the
first JWT after an IdP sign-in created today's row. The prior CTE decided this
from the statement snapshot and could double-audit.
- Negative-cache only a real allowance refusal (`PermissionDenied`); a transient
DB error inside guest_admission denies this request but no longer locks the
email out for 30 seconds.
- Refuse a JWKS key whose `key_ops` is present and omits `verify`: it is published
for something other than signature verification. Unit-tested.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
- Gate the JWT `users.login_guest` audit on the transition to `jwt_entry = true`,
not physical insertion: a guest who signed in through the IdP earlier the same
day already has a `guest_activity` row with `jwt_entry = false`, and the old
`xmax = 0` test suppressed the first JWT audit. A CTE reads the prior flag and
the RETURNING decides it atomically in the upsert.
- Fold the signed-in mint's inline account check into `has_any_account`, so the
helper has both callers and the two no longer diverge on lowercasing.
- Negative-cache a refused guest JWT for 30s so a replayed bearer past the cap
does not take the instance-wide allowance advisory lock on every request.
- Update the two stale share-link header comments to the `guest.<jwt>` form,
drop the "plan gate" rationale on the entry test's cfg, collapse the blank
lines the SHARE_LINK_SEGMENT removal left, and prettier-format the settings
card after the isEnterprisePlan wrapper was removed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
- admit_and_record_guest_jwt commits the guest_activity row before the
best-effort audit, on a separate connection. The EE audit writer swallows an
audit_partitioned failure but the failing statement still aborts its
transaction, so auditing before the commit would roll the activity row back
while the arm returned success, admitting a guest uncounted and past the
allowance.
- The share-link guest marker is now the prefix `guest.` glued to the token
(`/a/<path>/guest.<jwt>`, `/public/<ws>/<secret>/guest.<jwt>`). The `.` cannot
appear in a custom-path or secret segment, so an external-JWT link whose custom
path ends in a `guest` segment (`/a/foo/guest/<jwt>`) is read as before rather
than hijacked. Removed the unused SHARE_LINK_SEGMENT constant.
- Moved the JWT allowance test to its own binary (app_guest_jwt_allowance.rs):
set_plan flips a process-global license key, so a test sharing the binary with
the existing allowance test would race under --test-threads.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
* feat: add sso_groups_claim setting for login-time instance group sync
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YESxWqzt959S6TY6vbc4eG
* chore: bump ee-repo-ref for the SSO groups claim reconcile
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01YESxWqzt959S6TY6vbc4eG
* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 3b89bfc11314a326a191101cfe3ef65f6f7f82a8
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #774 was merged in windmill-ee-private.
Previous ee-repo-ref: e388527f9adbbe466fe050ca8d1d236ce3342bc3
New ee-repo-ref: 3b89bfc11314a326a191101cfe3ef65f6f7f82a8
Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
The guest policy moved (parent merge): guests are free up to the instance
allowance, then metered on Enterprise and hard-capped elsewhere. The JWT arm now
calls guest_admission inside the transaction that records guest_activity (the
advisory lock spans the count check and the row), and the door re-reads
guest_session_stands (switch, instance switch, no account) for every guest
request, so the JWT arm needs nothing extra for those. The plan gate on the key
config is gone (guests are free on any plan).
Adds an allowance test: with the window full on a capped instance, a stranger's
JWT is refused (401) and a returning guest's is admitted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01VF3v6LA9399gNphmZaHYG3
