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Author SHA1 Message Date
hugocasa 245bbd5d27 feat: dispatch ai agent tools through the worker queue 2026-09-18 17:36:21 +02:00
Ruben Fiszelandrubenfiszel 01b38320ea chore(main): release 1.815.0 (#11212)
* chore(main): release 1.815.0

* Apply automatic changes

---------

Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-18 15:28:25 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5 37e493ae66 feat: add an instance setting to refuse a token in MCP URLs (#11162)
* feat: add an instance setting to refuse a token in MCP URLs

MCP clients are commonly configured with the token in the URL
(`/api/mcp/w/{workspace}/mcp?token=...`). A URL-borne credential ends up in
browser history, proxy logs and referrers, so an instance can now turn that
channel off with the `mcp_disable_token_query_param` global setting and leave
the Authorization header as the only way in, which sends MCP clients through
the OAuth flow the endpoints already advertise.

The rejection is a middleware on both the workspaced and the gateway MCP
mounts, layered outside everything that reads a token and inside the
WWW-Authenticate layer, so the 401 carries the resource pointer a client needs
to start OAuth discovery.

Off by default. With it on, the token drawer and the home connect drawer stop
offering to mint a token for an MCP URL and hand over the bare URL instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: read the MCP URL policy when a URL is asked for, and drop the all-workspaces option

Two review findings on the token drawer:

The policy was read once per page load and cached for the browser session, so a
superadmin turning the setting on left every open tab handing out `?token=` URLs
the server now refuses. Both entry points now read it when the user actually asks
for an MCP URL: when MCP mode is entered, and when the connect drawer opens.

The workspace picker offered "All workspaces / Multi-workspace", but the gateway's
consent screen binds the token it issues to the one workspace picked there, so
OAuth has no multi-workspace grant to hand out. That entry is now token-only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: don't guess the MCP URL policy, and say where the switch lands on restart

Review findings:

The comment on the settings load claimed `MODE=mcp` as the target deployment, but
that mode joins no monitor loop, so the startup pass is its only read and a change
lands on restart. That is true of every global setting there, `base_url` included;
the comment now says so, and the setting description tells an operator running
dedicated MCP servers what to expect.

A failed settings probe resolved to "tokens allowed", so with the switch on the
drawer would mint a non-expiring token and hand over a URL the server refuses for
as long as it exists. The probe now propagates its error and the panel reports it
with a retry, creating nothing until the answer is known.

The test passed a valid token, so it could not tell a rejection before
authentication from one after it. It now also sends a token that was never valid
and asserts the middleware's own message, which fails if the layer moves inward.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: withhold the MCP URL until a workspace is picked

With no persisted workspace the store starts undefined, so opening the drawer from
/user/workspaces before choosing one rendered a copyable
`/api/mcp/w/undefined/mcp`. It reads like a real URL and a client pointed at it
would never connect. The panel now asks for a workspace instead, matching the guard
the token branch already has on its generate button.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: drop the coverage-status note from the MCP switch test

It documented what the test does not reach rather than a constraint the next
reader could break; that belongs in the PR, not the module doc. The layer-order
rationale, which is what a future edit would break, stays.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: fall back to the bare MCP URL instead of alerting on a failed read

When the setting read fails, show the bare URL rather than an error with a retry.
It works whichever way the setting is, so no alert is needed, and it still never
mints a token for a URL the server may refuse. The connect drawer's wording falls
back the same way so the blurb matches the panel.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: move the MCP URL token setting to Core

It sat in the Auth/OAuth/SAML list, which the settings sidebar shows under SSO,
suggesting a dependency on SSO that does not exist: MCP OAuth has Windmill act as
the authorization server, and any login method, password included, completes it.
It is an instance-wide credential policy, so it now lives with the other ones in
Core, kept out of quick setup like its neighbours.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 15:24:00 +02:00
f0d66a42eb fix: re-encrypt git sync secrets on workspace key rotation (#11218)
* fix: re-encrypt git sync credentials and webhook secrets on workspace key rotation

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: point ee-repo-ref at the git sync key rotation companion

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to bc3ef08c8e4233508c023e6ee847a3cd0b8be43b

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #814 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 8121eac421c5d026f36e2edec140f3c79b23d2cd

New ee-repo-ref: bc3ef08c8e4233508c023e6ee847a3cd0b8be43b

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-18 15:21:07 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5 9d335de87a feat: add a workspace toggle that adds its admins and developers to new forks (#11215)
* feat: add a workspace toggle that adds its admins and developers to new forks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: add members copied into a fork as manual members, not instance-group ones

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* style: keep the fork members copy comment at the query and drop the raw spacer

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 15:15:35 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5 53afecd458 fix: register the job token with the sensitive log masking system (#10943)
* fix(worker): register the job token with the log masking system

The masking system covered secrets fetched through `get_value_internal` and
`$encrypted:` args, but not the job's own token, so a script that echoed
`$WM_TOKEN` wrote it verbatim into logs that are persisted to the database
and, when configured, to object storage.

`run_worker` now registers the token for the job it just pulled, alongside
the existing `register_running_job` call, so it is redacted like any other
registered secret.

That makes every job carry at least one registered value, where before the
per-batch mask snapshot was skipped entirely for the majority of jobs that
touched no secret. Cache the compiled Aho-Corasick automaton per job and
invalidate it when a new secret is registered, so a chatty job no longer
rebuilds it once per log batch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P316wKe2QCYNcdsx1PwAJ3

* fix(nativets): mask secrets in the in-process log path

NativeTS hands `console.log` output to a task that drains a channel into
`append_logs`, so it never reaches the masking in `handle_child::write_lines`
and a script logging `$WM_TOKEN` persisted the raw JWT.

That drain can still be flushing after the job is unregistered, so a plain
per-line `snapshot` would leave the tail unmasked. `JobMasker` keeps the last
masks it saw for exactly that window, and refreshes while the job is alive so
secrets fetched mid-run are covered too.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P316wKe2QCYNcdsx1PwAJ3

* fix(nativets): seed the job masker at construction

A `JobMasker` that only looked up its masks on the first `mask` call had the
same hole at the head of the log that its retention closes at the tail: if the
drain task's first productive poll landed after the job was unregistered, the
registry was already gone and every line was written raw.

`new` now takes the snapshot, and its callers construct it from the job's own
execution while the job is still registered.

Also cover the nativets sink with an integration test, gated on `deno_core` the
way the CI test build is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P316wKe2QCYNcdsx1PwAJ3

* fix(nativets): mask on the producing side of the log channel

Masking as the drain task wrote to `append_logs` left two holes, because that
task is detached and outlives the job: a secret registered mid-run could still
be queued when the job was unregistered and would then be written raw, and the
`windmill:job_log` tracing emission that EE forwards job logs on never went
through the mask at all.

Mask where the line is produced instead. That loop is joined before the job
completes, so the job's secrets are always still registered, and one call now
covers both the tracing mirror and the channel. The result stream keeps reading
the raw text, the way `handle_child` keeps its raw `line` for results.

`JobMasker` is no longer load-bearing for the post-unregistration window, so it
is documented for what it now does: keep the security notice to once per set of
secrets for a sink that masks line by line.

Also drop the nativets test's tag override — `DEFAULT_TAGS` does advertise
`nativets`, so the comment justifying it was wrong — and pin the automaton
cache invalidation, whose failure mode is an unmasked secret.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P316wKe2QCYNcdsx1PwAJ3

* fix(worker): hold the log-masking lifecycle at the job boundary

Registering the job around the poller's call left every other way of running a
job uncovered: the interactive worker shell and inline AI agent tools both call
`handle_queued_job` directly, and a script logging `$WM_TOKEN` from either
persisted the live credential. Register from inside `handle_queued_job` instead,
under a drop guard, so each path is covered by construction rather than by
remembering to add a call. Nothing is lost by unregistering earlier: the writes
that follow go through `append_logs`, which never consulted the registry.

In nativets, decide the stream/log routing before masking. `MaskSnapshot`'s
notice is one-shot, so a secret-bearing `WM_STREAM:` chunk used to spend it on
text that is then discarded, leaving later redactions in `job_logs` unexplained.

Restore the masker's post-unregistration test: the memory-limit path never joins
the producing loop, so that fallback is still load-bearing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P316wKe2QCYNcdsx1PwAJ3

* docs: correct the nativets masking comments

The producer loop is not joined on the memory-limit path, so it does not
"always" run while the job is registered — say normally, which is what
`JobMasker`'s fallback is there for. Name the reason a stream chunk stays raw
everywhere it goes, including the tracing mirror: it is result data that no log
sink persists, so masking it would be masking a result. State the masker test's
invariant without asserting a mechanism behind it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P316wKe2QCYNcdsx1PwAJ3

* fix(masking): keep the security notice on a line of its own

`mask` appended the notice as a newline plus the notice text, which
assumes the caller hands it a bare log line. nativets hands it a chunk
that already ends in a newline, and its sink concatenates chunks
verbatim, so the notice arrived after a blank line and the next log line
was welded onto the end of it.

Emit the notice as its own line for either shape. `handle_child` is
unaffected: its input never ends in a newline, so it keeps the original
path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P316wKe2QCYNcdsx1PwAJ3

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 15:15:02 +02:00
GuilhemandClaude Opus 5 3b4e13d1c5 fix: key the large root font size on screen width, not window width (#11216)
* fix: key the large root font size on screen width, not window width

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: move the flow preview button offset to the screen-width query

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 14:51:32 +02:00
Alexander PetricandClaude Fable 5.1 0cb92a7dcf chore(security): resolve Dependabot alerts in python-client/wmill/uv.lock (#11180)
Targeted lock bumps only (idna, pytest, pygments); requires-python kept at >=3.14.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 14:47:15 +02:00
Alexander PetricandClaude Fable 5.1 2a390c173d chore: remove two lockfiles that nothing consumes (#11183)
benchmarks/pulumi/package-lock.json: the directory is used with bun (bun.lockb); no workflow,
Dockerfile or script installs from this lockfile.

rust-client/Cargo.lock: library crate whose Cargo.toml is generated by dev.nu; the lockfile is
not consumed by downstream crates.io users and was stale (pinned 1.518.2). Ignored from now on.

Both only generated Dependabot alerts about dependency trees that never ship.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 14:45:37 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5 a08992834d feat: render an AI agent result as its answer, not as raw JSON (#11051)
* feat: render an AI agent result as its answer, not as raw JSON

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: sanitize agent markdown through the shared plugin chain

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: fold agent stream events incrementally per poll

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: separate the agent meta line from the result toggle group

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: add a transcript view of an agent run's conversation

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: retire AIAgentLogViewer in favour of the transcript

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: show the partial transcript a max-iterations failure carries

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: move the agent meta line and system prompt below the conversation

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: show an agent run as what it did, not as a conversation

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: name the agent run breakdown a trace

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ai-agent): label the save-as-agent form fields per the guidelines

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ai-agent): reuse the resource form's path and description fields

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ai-agent): keep the action tags on a max-iterations failure

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ai-agent): keep offline replay inert and the streamed answer to one turn

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ai-agent): reset the streamed answer on providers that skip tool_call

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: carry the event type narrowing through the stream parser

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: survive a malformed message rather than take the viewer down

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: coerce agent messages once at the parse boundary

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: show an agent run as one scroll ending in its output

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep every streamed turn instead of dropping the narration

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: share the chat divider and drop the unsafe run auto-scroll

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: give the labelled divider a border colour and the standard pretty icon

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: pad the agent run below its badges as well as above

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: follow a streaming run's pane without moving the page

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: share the chat's stick-to-bottom mechanics with the agent run

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: keep the answer's citations and end a turn's reasoning with the turn

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: read the agent stream through the windmill-chat sdk parser

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: show an agent run's thinking instead of falling back to raw json

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: stop a stream the fold cannot use from claiming the run pane

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: identify an agent run by more than the job id the replay withholds

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: drop the tests and comment lines that were not earning their place

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: stop a streamed turn's text shifting when a tool call closes it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 14:38:46 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5 48f00259c5 feat: support $flow_expr[...] dynamic tags on flow steps (#11170)
* feat: resolve $flow_expr[...] dynamic tags on flow steps

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: run an unresolvable $flow_expr tag on the default tag and give it the step input scope

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: resolve $flow_expr tags by path lookup instead of expression evaluation

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: say a $flow_expr tag fails to resolve, not to evaluate

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(frontend): word the $flow_expr help like the other dynamic tag lines

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: reject a malformed $flow_expr placeholder instead of queueing its literal tag

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: render $flow_expr tag values through the $args path lookup

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: pin interpolate_args through the shared tag path rendering

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 14:37:50 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5 9320312eac feat: cap user token expiration with an instance setting (#11159)
* feat: cap user token expiration with an instance setting

Adds `max_token_expiration_days`, an instance-wide ceiling on how far ahead a
token created through `POST /users/tokens/create` may expire. With it set, that
route refuses a token with no expiration and one that expires past the window;
absent or non-positive, nothing changes.

Only the user-facing handler enforces it. Server-side mints (native trigger
webhook tokens, app embed tokens, sessions) pick a lifetime the caller never
chooses and go straight to `create_token_internal`, so they stay uncapped, as
does the superadmin `impersonate` route.

Service accounts are exempt, in the workspace the token targets or in any
workspace for a global token, so unattended automation can keep longer-lived
credentials.

The token form now surfaces the API error instead of only logging it, and offers
"Expires In" in MCP mode as well: that mode always sent no expiration, which the
cap refuses, leaving MCP URLs impossible to generate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: shorten over-long token expirations instead of refusing them

Refusing a non-compliant request breaks the callers that cannot comply. The CLI
authorization page, `wmill user create-token` and the editor's language-server
token each pick a lifetime — usually none at all — with no way to read the
setting, so a cap made browser login hang and the editor lose its LSP root
rather than stopping the long-lived tokens the setting is aimed at.

`cap_token_expiration` now returns the expiration to store, shortening a request
that asks for too long or for none. The policy still holds absolutely, no caller
can break, and there is no clock-skew boundary where an expiration exactly at the
ceiling flips to an error. The token form needed no changes at all, so its MCP
and error-toast edits are gone with it.

Also drops the Enterprise badge on the setting, which nothing enforced, notes the
mint paths in docs/auth-surface.md, and pins that `tokens/impersonate` and the
second-workspace case stay outside the exemption.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: drop the unintended token-form change and correct the exemption docs

The token form needed no change once the ceiling shortens rather than refuses,
but the earlier revert restored from the index, which already held the staged
edit, so the MCP expiration field and the error toast stayed on the branch with
a comment justifying them by a refusal that no longer happens.

docs/auth-surface.md claimed a service-account row in any workspace exempts
outright; that only holds for a workspace-less token, which has no workspace to
match. A ceiling written as a string, which the YAML instance config and config
sync can both produce, now has a test.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat: offer only expirations within the ceiling in the token form

The server shortens a token that asks for longer than `max_token_expiration_days`
or for no expiration, which the token form could not tell anyone: a user picking
"No expiration" got the ceiling silently. The form now reads the setting and,
with one set, drops "No expiration" and every choice above it, adds the ceiling
itself as "N days (maximum)" and selects it, and says the instance limits tokens
to N days.

MCP mode hides the expiration field and always sent none, so with a ceiling the
field now shows there too and keeps its value across the toggle. Without a
ceiling the form is unchanged.

Reading it needs no superadmin: the setting joins the keys any logged-in user
can read through `GET /settings/global/{key}`. It holds a policy, not a secret.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: make the token form and the server agree on what counts as a ceiling

The form parsed `max_token_expiration_days` more loosely than
`cap_token_expiration`, so the two could disagree on whether a ceiling exists
at all. A `7.0` from the YAML instance config, or a string such as "7.0" or
"1e1", made the form hide "No expiration" and announce a 7-day limit while the
server capped nothing; a value between chrono's and JavaScript's date limits
preselected an expiration the server could not parse.

Both now read the same thing as a ceiling: a whole number of days from 1 to
1,000,000, stored as an integer, an integral float or a string of digits.
`parseMaxTokenExpirationDays` holds the frontend's copy, and the instance
settings validation uses it too, so the settings page no longer accepts a value
the server would ignore. The bound replaces the date-range guard on both sides.

Also corrects the rationale for shortening rather than refusing: the setting is
now readable by any logged-in user, so those callers do not read it rather than
cannot, and CLIs already installed never will.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: cap service-account tokens like everyone else's

The ticket exempted service accounts from `max_token_expiration_days`, but
their tokens are the long-lived ones a rotation policy is meant to bound, and
the exemption let any workspace admin get an uncapped token by impersonating
one. It also left the token form unable to agree with the server: an admin
impersonating a service account was offered only capped choices while the
server would have kept any.

`cap_token_expiration` now takes just the requested expiration, with no
per-caller lookup, and the service-account query and its cache entry are gone.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: cap superadmin impersonation tokens and pin the frontend parser

`POST /users/tokens/impersonate` wrote its own token row with whatever
expiration the superadmin sent, so it was the one route left that could mint a
token that never expires with `max_token_expiration_days` set. The ceiling only
decides the stored expiration (the auth lookup never reads the setting), so
leaving it uncapped meant exactly that. It now goes through
`cap_token_expiration` like `create_token`; nothing in Windmill calls it, so no
caller changes.

Also adds `tokenExpiration.test.ts`, pinning which stored values
`parseMaxTokenExpirationDays` reads as a ceiling against the server's reading,
and documents that tokens existing when the setting is turned on or lowered
keep their expiration.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: reject a max_token_expiration_days the token routes cannot read

The settings API and config sync stored any value for the key, and the token
routes can only read an unparseable one as no ceiling. A typo such as `7.5` or
"7.0" was accepted and silently turned the policy off.

`parse_max_token_expiration_days` in windmill-common is now the single server
reading of the setting: null or empty clears it, a whole number of days within
the bound is the ceiling, anything else is an error. The settings write hook and
`sync_global_settings_declarative` reject that error, and `cap_token_expiration`
reads through the same function, logging a value written around both.

Tests: the parser's accept/clear/reject table (the same table as the frontend
parser's), the settings API refusing 7.5, and config sync refusing "7.0".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: reserve the CLI login token label so its expiry does not email the user

With a token expiration ceiling, the token the CLI authorization page mints now
expires, so every `wmill` login earned an "expiring soon" and an "expired and
deleted" email and critical alert. The CLI already signs in again on its own
when that token stops working, so those notifications ask the user to do
nothing.

The page now labels it `cli-login:<username>` (previously `cli-<username>`),
reserved in `is_user_token` and its SQL and Svelte mirrors: no expiry
notifications, and the label cannot be edited. A colon-terminated namespace
like `embed_app:` and `impersonation:` keeps hand-made labels clear of it. Not
in `is_server_minted_label`, since the page mints through `/users/tokens/create`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: skip the expiring-soon warning for tokens that were short-lived from the start

A token whose whole lifetime fits in the 7-day warning window got its
"expiring soon" email (and critical alert, when enabled) minutes after it was
created, about a lifetime its creator had just picked. With an expiration
ceiling of 7 days or less that is every token created from the form or
`wmill token create`.

`register_token_expiry_notification` no longer queues a warning for such a
token. The window is now `TOKEN_EXPIRY_WARNING_DAYS`, shared with
`check_expiring_tokens`, so shortening the warning window can never leave
tokens of an intermediate lifetime with no warning at all. The "expired and
deleted" notice still goes out for every user token.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: exempt service-account tokens from the expiration ceiling again

Service accounts are the identity automation that needs a long-lived credential
runs as, so their tokens are exempt from `max_token_expiration_days` once more:
a service account in the workspace the token names, or in any workspace for a
workspace-less token. `tokens/impersonate` checks the impersonated account, so
a superadmin minting a token for a service account gets the same exemption.

The token form applies the same rule for the account it is running as, when
that account is a service account in the current workspace, which is what an
admin impersonating one sees; otherwise it would offer only capped choices
while the server keeps any.

Any workspace admin can create and impersonate a service account to hold an
uncapped token, so the ceiling bounds personal tokens; the doc comment and
docs/auth-surface.md say so.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: decide the token form's service-account exemption from the token's workspace

The form treated the account as a service account only when it was one in the
workspace the app was on, while the server checks the workspace the token is
for, or any workspace for a workspace-less token. With an email that is a
service account in one workspace and an ordinary member of another, picking the
other workspace in MCP mode offered "No expiration" and the server silently
stored the ceiling; the reverse hid the exemption.

`GET /workspaces/users` now returns each membership's `is_service_account`
(its query already joins the `usr` row), and the form applies the server's rule
to the token's own workspace. The selection becomes a derived value held within
the ceiling, so switching to a capped workspace never leaves an unoffered choice
selected.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 14:37:39 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5 9690c4462c fix: re-point cloned fork identities that name nobody in the fork (#11161)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 14:37:25 +02:00
Alexander PetricandClaude Fable 5.1 de4818d905 chore(security): resolve Dependabot alerts in frontend, windmill-yaml-validator, typescript-client and cli lockfiles (#11181)
Targeted dependency bumps only; no behavior change intended.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 14:36:33 +02:00
Alexander PetricandClaude Fable 5.1 1015874f7c install the multiplayer server from its lockfile (#11190)
DockerfileExtra copied multiplayer/package.json alone and ran `npm install`,
so the image shipped whatever npm resolved at build time and the committed
multiplayer/package-lock.json described nothing that ran in production:
Dependabot alerts on it were meaningless either way. Copy the lockfile and
install with `npm ci --omit=dev` so the image is reproducible and the lock is
the source of truth for what ships.

The lock is refreshed with `npm update <dep>` per direct dependency, which
moves each to the newest version inside its existing caret range without
touching package.json. That is exactly what a lockfile-less `npm install`
resolves today (verified: a fresh `npm install --package-lock-only` from the
same package.json produces identical versions), so the image does not regress:

  ws           8.19.0  -> 8.21.3  (covers the open alerts on ws < 8.21.0)
  y-websocket  3.0.0   -> 3.1.0
  yjs          13.6.29 -> 13.6.32
  lib0 0.2.117, y-protocols 1.0.7, isomorphic.js 0.2.5 unchanged

package.json has no devDependencies and the lock has no `dev: true` entries,
so `--omit=dev` changes nothing today and only guards against future ones.

Validation:
- `npm ci` on the pre-update lock and `npm ci --omit=dev` on the updated lock
  both succeed; `node --check server.mjs gateway.mjs` passes.
- Smoke start: server.mjs listens on PORT=3999 and logs "Multiplayer server
  running"; gateway.mjs listens on PORT=3998 and logs its route table.
- The same COPY/RUN lines built on node:22-slim with the repo root as build
  context (the context build-extra-image.yml uses) install the six locked
  packages and pass `node --check`. A full DockerfileExtra build was skipped:
  it is a single stage on an uncached multi-GB base image.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 14:35:23 +02:00
Alexander PetricandClaude Fable 5.1 813e486e16 fix(frontend): inline only the package version, not the whole package.json (#11191)
`vite.config.js` had `define: { __pkg__: version }` where `version` was
the entire parsed `package.json`. Vite's `define` substitutes the full
object literal at every site that reads `__pkg__.version`, so each of
those sites became `{name:..., version:..., scripts:{...},
devDependencies:{...}, ...}.version` in the client bundle and the
minifier kept the object. On origin/main that is 11 copies of a
22,093-byte object (npm scripts, dependency/devDependency lists,
overrides) across three chunks — 243,023 bytes of package.json shipped
to every browser, for a single version string.

The only property ever read is `__pkg__.version` (script_helpers.ts,
apps/editor/component/default-codes.ts, flows/content/s3Scripts/deno.ts),
and the declarations in src/app.d.ts, src/global.d.ts and
sharedUtils/sharedUtils.d.ts already type it as `{ version: string }`,
so define the dotted expression `__pkg__.version` to the JSON-encoded
version string instead. Any new property read would now fail
`npm run check` rather than silently compile to `undefined`.

Verification (npm ci, generate-backend-client, check, build):
- `npm run check`: 0 errors, 82 warnings.
- `grep -l '"generate-backend-client"' build/_app/immutable/**/*.js`:
  3 chunks before, none after.
- `grep -c 'windmill-labs/components' -r build/_app/immutable`: 11 → 0.
- `npm:windmill-client@1.813.0` still appears in the chunks that build
  the default Deno/pgsql/S3 snippets (3 chunks, 11 sites).
- build/_app/immutable apparent size: 81,815 KB → 81,578 KB
  (JS bytes 54,202,793 → 53,959,705, -243,088 bytes).

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 14:34:11 +02:00
Diego Imbert ecd0a6c77b fix: show the New menu's description panel only on hover (#11199)
* fix: show the New menu's description panel only on hover

* fix: keep the New menu's submenus reachable with the mouse
2026-09-18 14:33:24 +02:00
df61dea5fa fix: keep instance groups when editing auto-invite (#11217)
* fix: keep instance groups when editing auto-invite and push them from sync

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: compare settings.yaml without undeclared instance groups on push

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: read a missing auto_invite as empty when diffing settings.yaml on push

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to f2fced19fcae81de7f6dac545010ce404c052e1b

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #813 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: cf4258c1232720ca3b82db2b22ea1fb4bca9533e

New ee-repo-ref: f2fced19fcae81de7f6dac545010ce404c052e1b

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>
2026-09-18 14:32:55 +02:00
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5 5639187fec feat(auth): 2 h login links and a click-to-sign-in page for emailed ones (#11203)
* feat(auth): 2 h login links and a click-to-sign-in page for emailed ones

Raise the login link cap from 15 min to 2 h, so a link sent by email still
works when it is read.

A link minted with `confirm: true` is a /user/login_link page instead of
the API path. Loading the page does nothing; its button POSTs to
/api/auth/login_link/{token}, which spends the link and answers where to go.
Mail scanners that open links on delivery no longer burn them. Links minted
without `confirm` still sign in on open.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auth): keep the login link page to design-system components

A tokenless visit bounced off a raw <p>; send it to the page a spent link
already bounces to, and show the modal's own spinner while it goes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 14:31:16 +02:00
AlexRV12andClaude Opus 5 c8c06d8f79 feat(ai-chat): tell the chat which kind of app it is looking at (#11208)
* feat(ai-chat): tell the chat which kind of app it is looking at

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018r5ppn8YmHsM1MaAwY7xgB

* refactor(ai-chat): drop a stale comment and hoist the prefix local

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018r5ppn8YmHsM1MaAwY7xgB

* test(ai-chat): add a global eval for refusing to edit a drag-and-drop app

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018r5ppn8YmHsM1MaAwY7xgB

* test(ai-chat): make the app-kind eval require editing the code app too

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018r5ppn8YmHsM1MaAwY7xgB

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 14:19:06 +02:00
AlexRV12andClaude Opus 5 6f9c4dc294 feat(ai-chat): render get_run through the run tools' card (#11204)
* feat(ai-chat): render get_run through the run tools' card

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ai-chat): retry unreadable logs on reopen and drop the loading tint

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(ai-chat): inline two single-use deriveds in the run card

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(ai-chat): record why an inspected run's logs need the dedicated endpoint

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(ai-chat): key an inspected run's fetch to the tool call, not the job

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(ai-chat): say an inspected run's logs are a tail, not the whole log

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 14:16:52 +02:00
Henri CourdentandRuben Fiszel 041ac95dc4 Auth providers capital (#11209)
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>
2026-09-18 13:59:58 +02:00
Guilhem 72507d52a0 fix: stop picker listing a draft twice when drafts share a friendly path (#11214) 2026-09-18 13:58:37 +02:00
0e807fb1dd feat: put a data table's connection under Postgres roles (#11020)
* feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles

A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection,
`custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say
this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table.

A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the
instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares
`-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch —
grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from
the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`.
A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before.

Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint,
`get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when
there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could
`RESET ROLE` its way out of.

A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a
copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the
parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a
pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the
governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and
ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not
where an access decision should be made.

Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing
workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a
replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin

Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a
caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema
export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the
connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table
under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing
workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant.

All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a
restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the
only right answer for the copy paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping

A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin
putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the
host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and
`CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the
permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials
on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read.

Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration
generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration
rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or
removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after
which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the
entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it
calls a data table changes nothing about the data table.

Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an
entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than
living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's
tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename
dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded

Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo.

Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an
`UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a
live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because
the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so
the operation is retryable once the row is restored.

Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are
left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy
would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it
stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table
this workspace never had.

`InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now
hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line.

Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the
governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that
predates this and sends no job id.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code

The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that
matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line
form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence.

`list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop
it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin
check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not
and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the
check runs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract

The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all
read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the
cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password
nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation
now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the
write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL
helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them.

Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely
multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the
transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway.

The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns
plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and
`converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's
raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at
the definition, which is where the next caller looks.

Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip
that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and
`resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing
resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker.

Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a
`StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an
operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and
never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated
secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now
said at the field.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery

Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways.
The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the
operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML
editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either.
Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of
that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every
login it described.

`custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret,
written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot
read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape:
`datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist.
No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to
take it out.

Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables
outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save
committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And
`set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its
transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the
default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings
row across validation and write.

Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish:
`read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole
job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and
`converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's.

Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but
`extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so
code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced

The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all
three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now
drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names.
Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it
fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot".

The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than
none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it.
`read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any
workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while
`set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the
rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record
or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same
treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every
resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions`
— it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing

The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own
`global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles`
and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The
neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it
predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a
consequence of this change.

Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing:

A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across
as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save
succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step,
and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose.

Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table
disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to
suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction.

Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what
it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which
workspace is gone.

Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions
handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed);
the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog`
was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its
roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings

Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.

The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.

One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.

Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks

Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved.

A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any
lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a
PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in
which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed
nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state.

Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which
still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows
onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual
old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a
target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one
target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so
a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The
pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade
one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once
from what it named before the save.

The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named,
with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal.
Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint.

Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of
a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole
document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical
value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from
the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically

The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call
`/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which
deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining
therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the
username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually
calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant".

The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's
admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role
check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check
when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any
connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role
a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that.

Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in
separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect
as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now
runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles

pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied
data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role.
The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass
Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by
Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing.

Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork
path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is
what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the
copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data

A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only
the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one
created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed —
and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops
entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one.

Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* nit worker error msg

* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it

`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.

A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.

Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it

`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.

The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR

* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry

The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".

Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands

Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.

The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test

Two review findings, both real.

`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.

`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy

Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.

Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.

Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist

The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.

Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created

A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.

That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.

Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database

A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.

`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"

This reverts commit 7dd3275a10.

The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the
database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork
request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open
connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it
dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at
the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization
with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it
did before this PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation

A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a
failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_*` behind, as it did
before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes
away once the clone is a single server-side operation.

The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover
on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully
copied database between its import and its final fork request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted

Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected
the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture
already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection
it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the
governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection
happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry
did the same.

Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own
transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a
listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is
split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal

Three fixes from review.

`edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so
the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and
an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is
still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable,
but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request.

The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional
`deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing
a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived
from the stored configuration against the saved one.

`delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork
committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside
the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share
locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on
the missing parent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart

A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's
roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than
chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a
data table now carries one or the other:

- a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data
  table under roles;
- roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads
  the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names
  each one to disable.

This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace
deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline
fix from the same review round is kept.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved

Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was
accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30
seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a
data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its
listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it

Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered
database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it
goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and
able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it.
The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete
leaves a disabled role to retry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting

Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once,
without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in
that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a
healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one
advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and
trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared
while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener
connects after roles are committed and refuses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing `?`

Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture
once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication
connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose
listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a
listener for, now still counts as streaming.

Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such
entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them:
`a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at
a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole
reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH
and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep
the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers

A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only
for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends.
The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the
CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns.

Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check
makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is
refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename

A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles

The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition

Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.

Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition

The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition

The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it

Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license

Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition

The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4

New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): drop a DuckDB data table secret once its ATTACH has used it

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* perf(datatables): resolve a workspace's data tables per pointer hop, not per entry

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(datatables): hold the parent's settings while a fork points at its data tables

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #787 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 38d6fcf2aeb39cfdac21814bbdbbcc02911e566a

New ee-repo-ref: 7e338e4dabf91689bfd7fb0333c6534040b17b59

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-18 13:56:41 +02:00
Guilhem e2a91ca2b1 feat: flow chat job-backed detail, smooth streaming and answer chrome (#11186)
* feat: flow chat job-backed detail, smooth streaming and answer chrome

* chore: document setFlowPath, drop unused chatIdentity, tighten comments

* fix: read a nested agent tool's call from its own job

* fix: show only the model's arguments on a tool card read from its job

* feat: add attachments to the chat sdk message type

* refactor: read a flow chat message's files from the message, not its run

* fix: keep every job-backed answer when reads finish out of order

* refactor: build flow chat tool cards from the conversation row alone

* feat: keep the model picker's current choice when a flow chat retry replays its run

* fix: export ChatAttachment from the chat sdk entry point

* fix: drop a conversation list for the flow path before setFlowPath

* fix: return the current listing, not old-path rows, after setFlowPath

* fix: treat a listing stale on kind or path as one stale listing

* revert: drop setFlowPath and rebuild the chat when the flow path changes

* fix: refuse a flow chat retry once any turn ran while it read the run

* docs: say where a display message's createdAt comes from

* style: drop the rule between New chat and the conversation list
2026-09-18 11:31:00 +02:00
252 changed files with 13579 additions and 6965 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
{
".": "1.814.0"
".": "1.815.0"
}
+34
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,39 @@
# Changelog
## [1.815.0](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/compare/v1.814.0...v1.815.0) (2026-09-18)
### Features
* add a workspace toggle that adds its admins and developers to new forks ([#11215](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11215)) ([9d335de](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/9d335de87a4dbaa51038d55afe8d980761dcdfaf))
* add an instance setting to refuse a token in MCP URLs ([#11162](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11162)) ([37e493a](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/37e493ae66ed5c000ecac492d60fc0fdf4bda71f))
* **ai-chat:** render get_run through the run tools' card ([#11204](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11204)) ([6f9c4dc](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/6f9c4dc29455d13b0e64af05c2d6aa8bd5ff4fd6))
* **ai-chat:** tell the chat which kind of app it is looking at ([#11208](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11208)) ([c8c06d8](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/c8c06d8f79774abf109192e71a8b6fc37c7937ba))
* attach files to a flow chat message ([#11185](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11185)) ([c4c9677](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/c4c9677982b75c63d98ebf85b1904e0c341ba957))
* **auth:** 2 h login links and a click-to-sign-in page for emailed ones ([#11203](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11203)) ([5639187](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/5639187fec6d517a72e82df49d63d7438301127c))
* cap user token expiration with an instance setting ([#11159](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11159)) ([9320312](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/9320312eac56f944c4d31504601293ab4e816ccc))
* flow chat job-backed detail, smooth streaming and answer chrome ([#11186](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11186)) ([e2a91ca](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/e2a91ca2b141a0bee64ddfafe3cbf3ff86b6fb35))
* put a data table's connection under Postgres roles ([#11020](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11020)) ([0e807fb](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/0e807fb1dd80d7536ec144cd49445abc7961e504))
* render an AI agent result as its answer, not as raw JSON ([#11051](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11051)) ([a089928](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/a08992834d45d0211336f4fc32c3421646ca47c5))
* support $flow_expr[...] dynamic tags on flow steps ([#11170](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11170)) ([48f0025](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/48f00259c5e7361d3553dbcb809461e1cde96f8f))
### Bug Fixes
* **frontend:** inline only the package version, not the whole package.json ([#11191](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11191)) ([813e486](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/813e486e166ac6215364817a7732b66f8dc1d463))
* keep instance groups when editing auto-invite ([#11217](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11217)) ([df61dea](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/df61dea5fa8b18d1e0044dc0db6702b053d5119f))
* key the large root font size on screen width, not window width ([#11216](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11216)) ([3b4e13d](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/3b4e13d1c564c6195e30b55b0671f7533e3ce408))
* re-encrypt git sync secrets on workspace key rotation ([#11218](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11218)) ([f0d66a4](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/f0d66a42eba27502767423af0c08b2ca1f16e8df))
* re-point cloned fork identities that name nobody in the fork ([#11161](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11161)) ([9690c44](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/9690c4462cf264a5577b87d07d465b5442b4e09d))
* register the job token with the sensitive log masking system ([#10943](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/10943)) ([53afecd](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/53afecd4588247bc1812d3e68a30db1f3c3b2724))
* show the New menu's description panel only on hover ([#11199](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11199)) ([ecd0a6c](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/ecd0a6c77bc3a057b8072dbb0aca731e8bd3d882))
* stop picker listing a draft twice when drafts share a friendly path ([#11214](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11214)) ([72507d5](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/72507d52a021de8101794ee8f4a3392be1ba20c7))
### Performance Improvements
* count completed jobs on the v2_job_completed index with a timeout ([#11211](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11211)) ([d1a2536](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/d1a25360b070994a31fb033707dbfde1fb553939))
## [1.814.0](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/compare/v1.813.0...v1.814.0) (2026-09-17)
+8 -4
View File
@@ -49,12 +49,16 @@ export interface BenchmarkWorkspaceFlow {
export interface BenchmarkWorkspaceApp {
path: string
summary: string
/** Defaults to true. Set false for a drag-and-drop app, which the chat can list
* and read but has no tool to edit — its value is a grid, not files. */
rawApp?: boolean
value: {
files: Record<string, string>
runnables: Record<string, unknown>
files?: Record<string, string>
runnables?: Record<string, unknown>
data?: unknown
policy?: unknown
custom_path?: unknown
[key: string]: unknown
}
}
@@ -994,7 +998,7 @@ function buildBenchmarkListableApp(app: BenchmarkWorkspaceApp): ListableApp {
extra_perms: {},
edited_at: BENCHMARK_TIMESTAMP,
execution_mode: 'viewer',
raw_app: true
raw_app: app.rawApp ?? true
}
}
@@ -1012,7 +1016,7 @@ function buildBenchmarkApp(app: BenchmarkWorkspaceApp): AppWithLastVersion {
execution_mode: 'viewer',
extra_perms: {},
custom_path: app.value.custom_path as string | undefined,
raw_app: true
raw_app: app.rawApp ?? true
}
}
+37
View File
@@ -2611,3 +2611,40 @@
judgeChecklist:
- runs the existing script rather than rewriting it
- passes the GitHub resource as the bare string $res:f/evals/global/github_main
- id: global-drag-and-drop-app-not-editable
prompt: |-
Add a refresh button to the ops console app, and the same to the sales board app.
initial: ai_evals/fixtures/frontend/global/initial/apps_code_and_drag_and_drop.json
runtime:
maxTurns: 12
validate:
# One request, two apps, only one of them editable: the code app must come back with a
# draft and the drag-and-drop one must not. Refusing both, or editing both, fails here —
# which is what makes this a test of the distinction rather than of caution.
draftCountExactly: 1
requiredDrafts:
- type: app
path: f/evals/global/ops_console
forbiddenDrafts:
- type: app
path: f/evals/global/sales_board
toolExpect:
# Deliberately not constraining write_app_file/patch_app_file by argument: an entry there
# fails when its tool was never called, so naming both would fail on whichever the model
# did not pick. The draft assertions above cover the same ground, tool-agnostically.
forbiddenToolsUsed:
- init_app
- deploy_workspace_item
- delete_app_file
- delete_app_runnable
assistantExpect:
# A refusal leaves no draft for the judge to read, so the explanation is checked here.
# Only the app kind: substring tests cannot see paraphrase, and every wording of "I can't
# edit it" defeats a fixed list.
requiredMentionsAnyOf:
- - drag-and-drop
- drag and drop
- low-code
- no-code
skipJudge: true
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
{
"user": {
"username": "admin",
"is_admin": true,
"folders": ["evals"],
"folders_read": ["evals"]
},
"workspace": {
"apps": [
{
"path": "f/evals/global/sales_board",
"summary": "Sales board",
"rawApp": false,
"value": {
"grid": []
}
},
{
"path": "f/evals/global/ops_console",
"summary": "Ops console",
"value": {
"files": {
"/App.tsx": "export default function App() {\n\treturn <div>Ops console</div>\n}\n"
},
"runnables": {}
}
}
]
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT 1 AS one FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = $1 FOR UPDATE",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "one",
"type_info": "Int4"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": [
null
]
},
"hash": "06abbf945bee93349ff88f64906b96ea1e853ef202510281427cfa9beeff81b3"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "UPDATE workspace_settings ws\n SET datatable = (\n SELECT jsonb_set(ws.datatable, '{datatables}', jsonb_object_agg(\n dt.key,\n CASE WHEN dt.value->'reference'->>'workspace_id' = $1\n AND dt.value->'reference'->>'datatable' = $2\n THEN jsonb_set(dt.value, '{reference,datatable}', to_jsonb($3::text))\n ELSE dt.value END\n ))\n FROM jsonb_each(ws.datatable->'datatables') dt\n )\n WHERE EXISTS (\n SELECT 1 FROM jsonb_each(COALESCE(ws.datatable->'datatables', '{}'::jsonb)) d\n WHERE d.value->'reference'->>'workspace_id' = $1\n AND d.value->'reference'->>'datatable' = $2\n )",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text",
"Text",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "06ce02cd7ce2f5a57355153edb573c242f9ba758db66e9a5e16f30e3e1494201"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "WITH RECURSIVE descendants AS (\n SELECT id FROM v2_job WHERE parent_job = $1 AND workspace_id = $2\n UNION ALL\n SELECT j.id FROM v2_job j JOIN descendants d ON j.parent_job = d.id\n WHERE j.workspace_id = $2\n ) SELECT d.id AS \"id!\" FROM descendants d JOIN v2_job_queue q ON q.id = d.id",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "id!",
"type_info": "Uuid"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Uuid",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": [
null
]
},
"hash": "0c2bf6925de6dd4d9f8d47d7fdd9e7801129570106b5acd49c0f708398606771"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT permissioned_as, permissioned_as_email FROM v2_job\n WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "permissioned_as",
"type_info": "Varchar"
},
{
"ordinal": 1,
"name": "permissioned_as_email",
"type_info": "Varchar"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Uuid",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": [
false,
false
]
},
"hash": "0d10e0fa5cf4033c7d93c9ed56be8209046007917f44da954eccf2188e5bff1f"
}
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "INSERT INTO workspace_settings (workspace_id, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, git_credentials, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled, guest_jwt_public_key, guest_jwt_jwks_url) SELECT $1, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, git_credentials, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled, guest_jwt_public_key, guest_jwt_jwks_url FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = $2",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Varchar",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "1d8ccd32266637d7f7915f92a8483dce0c9986f3847227c2f66daa84d4109d7d"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "UPDATE workspace_settings ws\n SET datatable = (\n SELECT jsonb_set(ws.datatable, '{datatables}', jsonb_object_agg(\n dt.key,\n CASE WHEN dt.value->'reference'->>'workspace_id' = $2\n THEN jsonb_set(dt.value, '{reference,workspace_id}', to_jsonb($1::text))\n ELSE dt.value END\n ))\n FROM jsonb_each(ws.datatable->'datatables') dt\n )\n WHERE jsonb_typeof(ws.datatable->'datatables') = 'object'\n AND ws.datatable::text LIKE '%\"reference\"%'",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "297c7a40dfce729d44aa37bc7c65560517bd25e40c0752a00467829191e2eb98"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "UPDATE capture_config SET server_id = NULL, last_server_ping = NULL\n WHERE workspace_id = $1 AND trigger_kind = 'postgres'\n AND (trigger_config->>'postgres_resource_path' = $2\n OR trigger_config->>'postgres_resource_path' LIKE $3)",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text",
"Text",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "2a391cc1bfcd2f75b46144a394c01237e09c3060da88170f1f6e06468309d213"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "INSERT INTO usr (workspace_id, username, email, is_admin, created_at, operator, disabled, role, is_service_account, added_via)\n SELECT $1, username, email, is_admin, created_at, operator, disabled, role, is_service_account,\n CASE WHEN $3 THEN NULL ELSE added_via END\n FROM usr WHERE workspace_id = $2\n AND (NOT $3 OR (NOT operator AND NOT disabled AND NOT is_service_account))\n ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Varchar",
"Text",
"Bool"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "2d6b117324eaf076a0ed06d2cb0ce73279957d6a39fdc6b1ecb6e0a1e02f921f"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT add_admins_and_developers_to_forks FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = $1",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "add_admins_and_developers_to_forks",
"type_info": "Bool"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": [
false
]
},
"hash": "2f39fce0ee700117f3e4c066e0b56ee979e4c392970278304e80368b770bb7b4"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = $1)",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "exists",
"type_info": "Bool"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Name"
]
},
"nullable": [
null
]
},
"hash": "334dbcd48fb59c96c62c2705ab2d1ce716cd52417f487cc1a8dd376017b2db7d"
}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "UPDATE token SET label = $1\n WHERE email = $2 AND token_prefix = $3\n AND (label IS NULL OR (\n label <> 'session'\n AND label <> 'guest_session'\n AND lower(label) NOT LIKE 'ephemeral%'\n AND label <> 'debugger-token'\n AND label NOT LIKE 'mcp-oauth-%'\n AND NOT starts_with(label, 'embed_app:')\n AND NOT starts_with(label, 'sdk_app:')\n AND NOT starts_with(label, 'impersonation:')\n ))\n RETURNING token_prefix",
"query": "UPDATE token SET label = $1\n WHERE email = $2 AND token_prefix = $3\n AND (label IS NULL OR (\n label <> 'session'\n AND label <> 'guest_session'\n AND lower(label) NOT LIKE 'ephemeral%'\n AND label <> 'debugger-token'\n AND label NOT LIKE 'mcp-oauth-%'\n AND NOT starts_with(label, 'embed_app:')\n AND NOT starts_with(label, 'sdk_app:')\n AND NOT starts_with(label, 'impersonation:')\n AND NOT starts_with(label, 'cli-login:')\n ))\n RETURNING token_prefix",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
@@ -20,5 +20,5 @@
false
]
},
"hash": "d631a26e5531589ff37e677f91a4f1d9f850e3e46c17130dd580426cda7a9f65"
"hash": "383c80239525d9c4ee90e2f5cb6e46c8a0983c52ad15db083f84a9e344dc4c99"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "UPDATE v2_job_queue SET started_at = now() WHERE id = $1 RETURNING started_at",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "started_at",
"type_info": "Timestamptz"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Uuid"
]
},
"nullable": [
true
]
},
"hash": "451f303f4a24d848ba4ccdc2441ca7cb85bdfc66110b6534260f8642f91f006a"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "UPDATE postgres_trigger SET server_id = NULL, last_server_ping = NULL\n WHERE workspace_id = $1\n AND (postgres_resource_path = $2 OR postgres_resource_path LIKE $3)",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text",
"Text",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "4692810d2be817bbb5de9b476d68d695941bd4fb5ccef393e4da522ed479d601"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT ws.workspace_id AS \"workspace_id!\", dt.key AS \"datatable!\"\n FROM workspace_settings ws\n CROSS JOIN LATERAL jsonb_each(COALESCE(ws.datatable->'datatables', '{}'::jsonb)) dt\n WHERE dt.value->'reference'->>'workspace_id' = $1\n AND dt.value->'reference'->>'datatable' = $2",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "workspace_id!",
"type_info": "Varchar"
},
{
"ordinal": 1,
"name": "datatable!",
"type_info": "Text"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": [
false,
null
]
},
"hash": "5048e21546f9710697100100e1255ab103979433bc386d7c89d0e30db12bfd57"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT ws.workspace_id AS \"workspace_id!\", dt.key AS \"datatable!\"\n FROM workspace_settings ws\n CROSS JOIN LATERAL jsonb_each(COALESCE(ws.datatable->'datatables', '{}'::jsonb)) dt\n WHERE dt.value->'reference'->>'workspace_id' = $1\n AND dt.value->'reference'->>'datatable' = $2",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "workspace_id!",
"type_info": "Varchar"
},
{
"ordinal": 1,
"name": "datatable!",
"type_info": "Text"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": [
false,
null
]
},
"hash": "538dd1779874e4003932d7f17750239c625f85e25b3364bf2edf566f518c8ee2"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT username FROM usr WHERE workspace_id = $1 AND email = $2 AND disabled = false",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "username",
"type_info": "Varchar"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": [
false
]
},
"hash": "58e5cfe9eb87bda9f7de87c403861b6e7b9d35a41594681e2a92a87359e6a018"
}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "\n UPDATE workspace_settings\n SET\n ai_config = source_ws.ai_config,\n large_file_storage = source_ws.large_file_storage,\n ducklake = source_ws.ducklake,\n dbt_warehouses = source_ws.dbt_warehouses,\n datatable = source_ws.datatable,\n git_app_installations = source_ws.git_app_installations\n FROM workspace_settings source_ws\n WHERE source_ws.workspace_id = $1\n AND workspace_settings.workspace_id = $2\n ",
"query": "\n UPDATE workspace_settings\n SET\n ai_config = source_ws.ai_config,\n large_file_storage = source_ws.large_file_storage,\n ducklake = source_ws.ducklake,\n dbt_warehouses = source_ws.dbt_warehouses,\n datatable = source_ws.datatable,\n git_app_installations = source_ws.git_app_installations,\n add_admins_and_developers_to_forks = source_ws.add_admins_and_developers_to_forks\n FROM workspace_settings source_ws\n WHERE source_ws.workspace_id = $1\n AND workspace_settings.workspace_id = $2\n ",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
@@ -11,5 +11,5 @@
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "a6decdebcd9750691f20f874b66a9c6f2ede08c33605c6a3c3dfc213a3eda76a"
"hash": "5ccfbd0f345b9b86ca356008def6cc1011a49fc8d8ad046ac572e81cf8938995"
}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "DELETE FROM token_expiry_notification n\n USING token t\n WHERE n.token_hash = t.token_hash\n AND n.expiration > now()\n AND n.expiration <= now() + interval '7 days'\n RETURNING t.token_prefix, t.label, t.email, t.workspace_id",
"query": "DELETE FROM token_expiry_notification n\n USING token t\n WHERE n.token_hash = t.token_hash\n AND n.expiration > now()\n AND n.expiration <= now() + make_interval(days => $1)\n RETURNING t.token_prefix, t.label, t.email, t.workspace_id",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
@@ -25,7 +25,9 @@
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": []
"Left": [
"Int4"
]
},
"nullable": [
false,
@@ -34,5 +36,5 @@
true
]
},
"hash": "94fd0a57cfc9341b2e9deae60506c6c06aa6934b87200da14231f12f65149cd3"
"hash": "6c57c46c5a0462f379ed6a22ae97e363009177fdc45d795447a920f455f193cc"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "INSERT INTO global_settings (name, value) VALUES ($1, $2)\n ON CONFLICT (name) DO UPDATE SET value = $2",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Varchar",
"Jsonb"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "6f9fb5d72f486358fa25d6887bd69b93910e028f140c07048f2c1c8d63ee6909"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT id, name, enabled, pwd FROM datatable_role",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "id",
"type_info": "Varchar"
},
{
"ordinal": 1,
"name": "name",
"type_info": "Varchar"
},
{
"ordinal": 2,
"name": "enabled",
"type_info": "Bool"
},
{
"ordinal": 3,
"name": "pwd",
"type_info": "Text"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": []
},
"nullable": [
false,
false,
false,
true
]
},
"hash": "71ee2cb6661cca1fa4d8874a7f6d368347c59f36fd87df6dc7996152ccb84af0"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM usr WHERE email = $1 AND is_service_account IS true\n AND ($2::varchar IS NULL OR workspace_id = $2))",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "exists",
"type_info": "Bool"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text",
"Varchar"
]
},
"nullable": [
null
]
},
"hash": "75e6b5cd52d63ac094c90abd1524bc7a919692a96b076b8aaf24d812723531c8"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT id, status = 'success' AS \"success!\", result AS \"result: Json<Box<RawValue>>\"\n FROM v2_job_completed WHERE workspace_id = $1 AND id = ANY($2)",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "id",
"type_info": "Uuid"
},
{
"ordinal": 1,
"name": "success!",
"type_info": "Bool"
},
{
"ordinal": 2,
"name": "result: Json<Box<RawValue>>",
"type_info": "Jsonb"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text",
"UuidArray"
]
},
"nullable": [
false,
null,
true
]
},
"hash": "789c3f6d29f46fcb17a22fe97405a1754ccb8ddeb08c23795dfe14e9f332e9dc"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "\n SELECT ws.workspace_id AS \"workspace_id!\", dt.key AS \"datatable!\"\n FROM workspace_settings ws\n JOIN workspace w ON w.id = ws.workspace_id AND w.deleted = false\n CROSS JOIN LATERAL jsonb_each(COALESCE(ws.datatable->'datatables', '{}'::jsonb)) dt\n WHERE ws.workspace_id <> $1\n AND dt.value->'database'->>'resource_type' = 'instance'\n AND dt.value->'database'->>'resource_path' = $2\n ORDER BY ws.workspace_id, dt.key\n ",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "workspace_id!",
"type_info": "Varchar"
},
{
"ordinal": 1,
"name": "datatable!",
"type_info": "Text"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": [
false,
null
]
},
"hash": "79799b5a2e499df6c28e286c42b9ad2db940c2455ab19cc95e5198baf96d5629"
}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT workspace.id, workspace.name, usr.username, workspace_settings.color, workspace.parent_workspace_id,\n workspace.is_dev_workspace, workspace.dev_workspace_label,\n workspace.owner AS \"created_by?\",\n CASE WHEN usr.operator THEN workspace_settings.operator_settings ELSE NULL END as operator_settings,\n usr.disabled\n FROM workspace\n JOIN usr ON usr.workspace_id = workspace.id\n JOIN workspace_settings ON workspace_settings.workspace_id = workspace.id\n WHERE usr.email = $1 AND workspace.deleted = false",
"query": "SELECT workspace.id, workspace.name, usr.username, workspace_settings.color, workspace.parent_workspace_id,\n workspace.is_dev_workspace, workspace.dev_workspace_label,\n workspace.owner AS \"created_by?\",\n CASE WHEN usr.operator THEN workspace_settings.operator_settings ELSE NULL END as operator_settings,\n usr.disabled, usr.is_service_account\n FROM workspace\n JOIN usr ON usr.workspace_id = workspace.id\n JOIN workspace_settings ON workspace_settings.workspace_id = workspace.id\n WHERE usr.email = $1 AND workspace.deleted = false",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
@@ -52,6 +52,11 @@
"ordinal": 9,
"name": "disabled",
"type_info": "Bool"
},
{
"ordinal": 10,
"name": "is_service_account",
"type_info": "Bool"
}
],
"parameters": {
@@ -69,8 +74,9 @@
true,
false,
null,
false,
false
]
},
"hash": "88a134e4ca82d5ce0334977c7713021ae3e99a5a61ea1c944c1df1368746dfa5"
"hash": "7b33adb5cf051bc123340982b97a80a96ee43e1c91d9907d50cc2ee14111623e"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "INSERT INTO datatable_role (id, name, enabled, pwd) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4)",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Varchar",
"Varchar",
"Bool",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "86af9d51a158ea5cb6161461ecddf2a63695f8cbf8af648da5a0a77a5b9d02ba"
}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "\n SELECT\n workspace_id,\n slack_team_id,\n teams_team_id,\n teams_team_name,\n teams_team_guid,\n slack_name,\n slack_command_script,\n teams_command_script,\n slack_email,\n slack_oauth_client_id,\n slack_oauth_client_secret,\n customer_id,\n plan,\n webhook,\n ai_config,\n dbt_warehouses,\n large_file_storage,\n datatable,\n ducklake,\n git_sync,\n deploy_ui,\n default_app,\n default_scripts,\n mute_critical_alerts,\n color,\n operator_settings,\n git_app_installations,\n auto_invite,\n error_handler,\n success_handler,\n public_app_execution_limit_per_minute,\n error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts,\n guest_access_enabled,\n guest_jwt_public_key,\n guest_jwt_jwks_url\n FROM\n workspace_settings\n WHERE\n workspace_id = $1\n ",
"query": "\n SELECT\n workspace_id,\n slack_team_id,\n teams_team_id,\n teams_team_name,\n teams_team_guid,\n slack_name,\n slack_command_script,\n teams_command_script,\n slack_email,\n slack_oauth_client_id,\n slack_oauth_client_secret,\n customer_id,\n plan,\n webhook,\n ai_config,\n dbt_warehouses,\n large_file_storage,\n datatable,\n ducklake,\n git_sync,\n deploy_ui,\n default_app,\n default_scripts,\n mute_critical_alerts,\n color,\n operator_settings,\n git_app_installations,\n auto_invite,\n error_handler,\n success_handler,\n public_app_execution_limit_per_minute,\n error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts,\n guest_access_enabled,\n guest_jwt_public_key,\n guest_jwt_jwks_url,\n add_admins_and_developers_to_forks\n FROM\n workspace_settings\n WHERE\n workspace_id = $1\n ",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
@@ -177,6 +177,11 @@
"ordinal": 34,
"name": "guest_jwt_jwks_url",
"type_info": "Text"
},
{
"ordinal": 35,
"name": "add_admins_and_developers_to_forks",
"type_info": "Bool"
}
],
"parameters": {
@@ -219,8 +224,9 @@
false,
false,
true,
true
true,
false
]
},
"hash": "dc4a57df3becc610f631ef22c116450390addbfae85fecc61c991d94167e6e99"
"hash": "8ebe054b41793f1a7b85f1f8d29cd21d12fa1207b58bfc46249c250cdcdb5363"
}
@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "UPDATE workspace_settings SET auto_invite = $1 WHERE workspace_id = $2",
"query": "INSERT INTO global_settings (name, value) VALUES ($1, $2)\n ON CONFLICT (name) DO UPDATE SET value = $2, updated_at = now()",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Jsonb",
"Text"
"Varchar",
"Jsonb"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "255ba68caa78d0e814ea817693a319f769907025f9c7d1150d45e8ecb1bff4ab"
"hash": "975e404ac3a6258bb8220e122e3de094c7ab23330fdbc74d6e4ad472ddd3c820"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "UPDATE workspace_settings SET add_admins_and_developers_to_forks = $1 WHERE workspace_id = $2",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Bool",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "9bd1995747f0073b3a866d1238e78f7e6dfa9185056f7731547ff05b8176b271"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtext('datatable_role_catalog'))",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "pg_advisory_xact_lock",
"type_info": "Void"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": []
},
"nullable": [
null
]
},
"hash": "9f663180166f53d117e794f3f3a5723a0a43db163ecca7d5a63d4e74ab1d3be1"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "UPDATE workspace_settings SET auto_invite = (COALESCE(auto_invite, '{}'::jsonb) - 'domain') || $1::jsonb WHERE workspace_id = $2",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Jsonb",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "a1bcf143135ecb9f32709a56a353d3246dc238920c3e155caa9cf767246fa6fb"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "UPDATE capture_config SET server_id = NULL, last_server_ping = NULL\n WHERE workspace_id = $1 AND trigger_kind = 'postgres'\n AND (trigger_config->>'postgres_resource_path' = $2\n OR trigger_config->>'postgres_resource_path' LIKE $3)",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text",
"Text",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "a57de2bb0442a5ee8a607cd63cfcf675de175796184f620cb4b09670c8b0b19f"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT ws.datatable->'datatables' FROM workspace_settings ws\n WHERE ws.workspace_id = $1 FOR UPDATE",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "?column?",
"type_info": "Jsonb"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": [
null
]
},
"hash": "b42af37fb474bea4c5419b0a46d9eadfe384013ab970ccf9c5effd1c78321b7c"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT jsonb_object_keys(value->'databases') FROM global_settings\n WHERE name = 'custom_instance_pg_databases'",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "jsonb_object_keys",
"type_info": "Text"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": []
},
"nullable": [
null
]
},
"hash": "b9842d2d8abf382bd82d8fa1de012373638be391f884f81dc387ffc465badac6"
}
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "INSERT INTO usr (workspace_id, username, email, is_admin, created_at, operator, disabled, role, is_service_account, added_via)\n SELECT $1, username, email, is_admin, created_at, operator, disabled, role, is_service_account, added_via\n FROM usr WHERE workspace_id = $2\n ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Varchar",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "b98844926ff127c528ed3e7bc63bf1ebed0192be267983e8fbd18f79997e6142"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "DELETE FROM usr WHERE email = $1 RETURNING username, workspace_id",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "username",
"type_info": "Varchar"
},
{
"ordinal": 1,
"name": "workspace_id",
"type_info": "Varchar"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": [
false,
false
]
},
"hash": "c1d026c886799dabc39ce73e1fe09ccb175c7271df75d67aa9c72ad6f825a992"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT ws.workspace_id AS \"workspace_id!\", dt.key AS \"datatable!\"\n FROM workspace_settings ws\n CROSS JOIN LATERAL jsonb_each(COALESCE(ws.datatable->'datatables', '{}'::jsonb)) dt\n WHERE dt.value->'reference'->>'workspace_id' = $1\n ORDER BY ws.workspace_id, dt.key",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "workspace_id!",
"type_info": "Varchar"
},
{
"ordinal": 1,
"name": "datatable!",
"type_info": "Text"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": [
false,
null
]
},
"hash": "c5451ea9d9fa5146af242d1ee8c19ebd65b80e7ed9f29b9fb2e03767c2aa94ba"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "DELETE FROM datatable_role WHERE id = $1",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "c85d362fe2e652d4ac01a35bf470e80b993020a2ff5dcb5849dc570d52798587"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT dt.key AS \"datatable!\"\n FROM workspace_settings ws\n CROSS JOIN LATERAL jsonb_each(COALESCE(ws.datatable->'datatables', '{}'::jsonb)) dt\n WHERE ws.workspace_id = $1\n AND dt.key <> $2\n AND NOT dt.value ? 'permissions'\n AND dt.value->'database'->>'resource_type' = 'instance'\n AND dt.value->'database'->>'resource_path' = $3\n ORDER BY dt.key",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "datatable!",
"type_info": "Text"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text",
"Text",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": [
null
]
},
"hash": "d48ca62c86b1af7a9dd2450c1c28dc45020a2a553d8874c49f9eafedea5a9d40"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT datatable FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = $1",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "datatable",
"type_info": "Jsonb"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": [
true
]
},
"hash": "d5fb5dde6300862f978739a3d9249fc2b3e7697c0da7d3195398933d3d81aadf"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "UPDATE workspace_settings ws\n SET datatable = (\n SELECT jsonb_set(ws.datatable, '{datatables}', jsonb_object_agg(\n dt.key,\n CASE WHEN dt.value->'reference'->>'workspace_id' = $1\n AND dt.value->'reference'->>'datatable' = $2\n THEN jsonb_set(dt.value, '{reference,datatable}', to_jsonb($3::text))\n ELSE dt.value END\n ))\n FROM jsonb_each(ws.datatable->'datatables') dt\n )\n WHERE jsonb_typeof(ws.datatable->'datatables') = 'object'\n AND ws.datatable::text LIKE '%\"reference\"%'",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text",
"Text",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "da5057c86607327bafc2942c218025ca9181a0c396405984d87e422e129521c1"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT value->'roles' FROM global_settings WHERE name = 'custom_instance_pg_databases'",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "?column?",
"type_info": "Jsonb"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": []
},
"nullable": [
null
]
},
"hash": "dc8dfc37559e9b6713bde48155f48b5a2c7b8199eace1508e102b60d1ff40c04"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "UPDATE postgres_trigger SET server_id = NULL, last_server_ping = NULL\n WHERE workspace_id = $1\n AND (postgres_resource_path = $2 OR postgres_resource_path LIKE $3)",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text",
"Text",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "e159b2ff15633f85e839ee4fe1ec2ecd11caf228ea8d0f52ad66def595644250"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT datatable FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = $1 FOR UPDATE",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "datatable",
"type_info": "Jsonb"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": [
true
]
},
"hash": "e2061df65ffd4a72146c4ca316829265289c8d6f625ac272655c88e1ad0b1745"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "UPDATE v2_job_queue SET worker = $1 WHERE id = $2",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Varchar",
"Uuid"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "e459c277c0bc27293d71972d12d26d32b476a43ed391c09d7678215195c4283a"
}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "\n SELECT\n workspace_id,\n slack_team_id,\n slack_name,\n teams_team_id,\n teams_team_name,\n teams_team_guid,\n mute_critical_alerts,\n guest_access_enabled,\n deploy_ui,\n large_file_storage,\n datatable\n FROM\n workspace_settings\n WHERE\n workspace_id = $1\n ",
"query": "\n SELECT\n workspace_id,\n slack_team_id,\n slack_name,\n teams_team_id,\n teams_team_name,\n teams_team_guid,\n mute_critical_alerts,\n guest_access_enabled,\n add_admins_and_developers_to_forks,\n deploy_ui,\n large_file_storage,\n datatable\n FROM\n workspace_settings\n WHERE\n workspace_id = $1\n ",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
@@ -45,16 +45,21 @@
},
{
"ordinal": 8,
"name": "add_admins_and_developers_to_forks",
"type_info": "Bool"
},
{
"ordinal": 9,
"name": "deploy_ui",
"type_info": "Jsonb"
},
{
"ordinal": 9,
"ordinal": 10,
"name": "large_file_storage",
"type_info": "Jsonb"
},
{
"ordinal": 10,
"ordinal": 11,
"name": "datatable",
"type_info": "Jsonb"
}
@@ -73,10 +78,11 @@
true,
true,
false,
false,
true,
true,
true
]
},
"hash": "ede15bff96152f209aff756830cbc76b5afa1af6ed324376989117b1054c3447"
"hash": "e6e31fdf705896c81f9a0f45d47c1b93db0406aaf278bccba07be00e9f937e2a"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "UPDATE workspace_settings\n SET datatable = jsonb_set(\n jsonb_set(\n datatable #- ARRAY['datatables', $2, 'reference'],\n ARRAY['datatables', $2, 'database'], $3::jsonb),\n ARRAY['datatables', $2, 'forked_from'], $4::jsonb\n )\n WHERE workspace_id = $1",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text",
"Text",
"Jsonb",
"Jsonb"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "ebaf3ed3097621da59dd201b5a4b9d1f440692f183c7c378f59e4b73f1c6e241"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "INSERT INTO workspace_settings (workspace_id, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, git_credentials, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled, guest_jwt_public_key, guest_jwt_jwks_url, add_admins_and_developers_to_forks) SELECT $1, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, git_credentials, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled, guest_jwt_public_key, guest_jwt_jwks_url, add_admins_and_developers_to_forks FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = $2",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Varchar",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "eefa0588a6a927fd9b3f65e1df652fb2b4cf7983049d2c490940df360c7e2b30"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT workspace_id FROM workspace_settings WHERE datatable::text LIKE $1",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "workspace_id",
"type_info": "Varchar"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": [
false
]
},
"hash": "f3ee09fb17955ca8d886f446d397063c4094546a7807343b570b823796372cef"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "UPDATE workspace_settings\n SET datatable = CASE WHEN $3::jsonb = 'null'::jsonb\n THEN datatable #- ARRAY['datatables', $2, 'permissions']\n ELSE jsonb_set(datatable, ARRAY['datatables', $2, 'permissions'], $3::jsonb)\n END\n WHERE workspace_id = $1",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text",
"Text",
"Jsonb"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "f4adc9e26ebfebce18a29fb2c21bf06394cacb8a9699a608327b097e0ac1363e"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "UPDATE datatable_role SET name = $2, enabled = $3, pwd = $4 WHERE id = $1",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text",
"Varchar",
"Bool",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "fcb34e643b888122766e115a01394ab31ac856252aaa76c75ea27a447009c363"
}
+86 -85
View File
@@ -2311,9 +2311,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "cc"
version = "1.4.6"
version = "1.4.7"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "a3eb0f42d6c360dc3f8a821f6bf2fdea7f72bfd36b3076eb0e6d1e9e0752fff4"
checksum = "54413ede23c2daf518f35156dfde027feb2374004d63bd497f983c8db9c0e313"
dependencies = [
"find-msvc-tools",
"jobserver",
@@ -5055,9 +5055,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "find-msvc-tools"
version = "0.1.12"
version = "0.1.13"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "3e0f1c7c3a72c66fd80abe965175f7523475c0489a87d3ff9d6e8c87d87a9d2d"
checksum = "ef25905e51abafe4dcea6c15fec58c57b601cdbd0ee53d22ea1d3016c587d39b"
[[package]]
name = "fixedbitset"
@@ -5497,9 +5497,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "generator"
version = "0.8.9"
version = "0.8.10"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "b3b854b0e584ead1a33f18b2fcad7cf7be18b3875c78816b753639aa501513ae"
checksum = "54ade96dc9003043bce7c035c85a9df5a858bfb2039c5a2e6fdf00f324f6c551"
dependencies = [
"cc",
"cfg-if",
@@ -14793,7 +14793,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"async-nats",
@@ -14881,7 +14881,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-ai"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"async-stream",
"async-trait",
@@ -14915,7 +14915,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-alerting"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"axum 0.8.9",
"chrono",
@@ -14928,7 +14928,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-api"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"argon2",
@@ -15068,7 +15068,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-api-agent-workers"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"axum 0.8.9",
"chrono",
@@ -15091,7 +15091,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-api-assets"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"axum 0.8.9",
"chrono",
@@ -15108,7 +15108,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-api-auth"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"axum 0.8.9",
@@ -15134,7 +15134,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-api-client"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"reqwest 0.12.28",
"serde",
@@ -15144,7 +15144,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-api-configs"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"axum 0.8.9",
"chrono",
@@ -15161,7 +15161,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-api-debug"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"axum 0.8.9",
"base64 0.22.1",
@@ -15183,7 +15183,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-api-embeddings"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"axum 0.8.9",
@@ -15206,7 +15206,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-api-flow-conversations"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"axum 0.8.9",
"chrono",
@@ -15222,7 +15222,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-api-flows"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"axum 0.8.9",
"chrono",
@@ -15244,7 +15244,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-api-groups"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"axum 0.8.9",
"chrono",
@@ -15266,7 +15266,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-api-inputs"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"axum 0.8.9",
"chrono",
@@ -15280,7 +15280,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-api-integration-tests"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"async-nats",
@@ -15315,7 +15315,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-api-jobs"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"axum 0.8.9",
@@ -15340,7 +15340,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-api-npm-proxy"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"axum 0.8.9",
"chrono",
@@ -15368,7 +15368,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-api-openapi"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"axum 0.8.9",
@@ -15390,7 +15390,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-api-schedule"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"axum 0.8.9",
"chrono",
@@ -15410,7 +15410,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-api-scripts"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"axum 0.8.9",
"chrono",
@@ -15448,7 +15448,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-api-settings"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"axum 0.8.9",
@@ -15470,13 +15470,14 @@ dependencies = [
"windmill-ai",
"windmill-alerting",
"windmill-api-auth",
"windmill-audit",
"windmill-common",
"windmill-object-store",
]
[[package]]
name = "windmill-api-sse"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"lazy_static",
"serde",
@@ -15488,7 +15489,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-api-users"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"argon2",
"axum 0.8.9",
@@ -15512,7 +15513,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-api-workers"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"axum 0.8.9",
"chrono",
@@ -15526,7 +15527,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-api-workspaces"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"axum 0.8.9",
"chrono",
@@ -15561,7 +15562,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-audit"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"chrono",
"lazy_static",
@@ -15575,7 +15576,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-autoscaling"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"axum 0.8.9",
@@ -15594,7 +15595,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-common"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"aes-gcm",
"aho-corasick",
@@ -15701,7 +15702,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-dep-map"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"chrono",
"futures",
@@ -15721,7 +15722,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-git-sync"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"regex",
"serde",
@@ -15738,7 +15739,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-indexer"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"astral-tokio-tar",
@@ -15765,7 +15766,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-jseval"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"futures",
@@ -15782,7 +15783,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-macros"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"itertools 0.14.0",
"lazy_static",
@@ -15798,7 +15799,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-mcp"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"async-trait",
@@ -15819,7 +15820,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-native-triggers"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"async-trait",
@@ -15850,7 +15851,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-oauth"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"arc-swap",
@@ -15875,7 +15876,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-object-store"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"async-stream",
@@ -15910,7 +15911,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-operator"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"futures",
@@ -15928,7 +15929,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"convert_case 0.6.0",
"serde",
@@ -15937,7 +15938,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-bash"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"lazy_static",
@@ -15949,7 +15950,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-csharp"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"serde_json",
@@ -15961,7 +15962,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-go"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"gosyn",
@@ -15973,7 +15974,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-graphql"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"lazy_static",
@@ -15985,7 +15986,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-java"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"serde_json",
@@ -15997,7 +15998,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-nu"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"nu-parser",
@@ -16008,7 +16009,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-php"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"itertools 0.14.0",
@@ -16019,7 +16020,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-py"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"itertools 0.14.0",
@@ -16031,7 +16032,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-py-asset"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"rustpython-ast",
@@ -16042,7 +16043,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-py-imports"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"async-recursion",
@@ -16064,7 +16065,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-r"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"serde_json",
@@ -16076,7 +16077,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-ruby"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"lazy_static",
@@ -16090,7 +16091,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-rust"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"convert_case 0.6.0",
@@ -16107,7 +16108,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-sql"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"lazy_static",
@@ -16120,7 +16121,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-sql-asset"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"serde",
@@ -16132,7 +16133,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-ts"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"lazy_static",
@@ -16150,7 +16151,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-ts-asset"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"serde-wasm-bindgen",
@@ -16166,7 +16167,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-wac"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"rustpython-ast",
@@ -16182,7 +16183,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-yaml"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"lazy_static",
@@ -16196,7 +16197,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-queue"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"async-recursion",
@@ -16235,7 +16236,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-runtime-nativets"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"const_format",
@@ -16275,7 +16276,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-sql-datatype-parser-wasm"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"getrandom 0.3.4",
"wasm-bindgen",
@@ -16286,7 +16287,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-store"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"async-recursion",
@@ -16321,7 +16322,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-test-utils"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"async-trait",
@@ -16345,7 +16346,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-trigger"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"async-trait",
@@ -16378,7 +16379,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-trigger-amqp"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"async-trait",
@@ -16405,7 +16406,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-trigger-azure"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"async-trait",
@@ -16438,7 +16439,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-trigger-email"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"async-trait",
@@ -16458,7 +16459,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-trigger-gcp"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"async-trait",
@@ -16492,7 +16493,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-trigger-http"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"async-trait",
@@ -16528,7 +16529,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-trigger-kafka"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"async-trait",
@@ -16551,7 +16552,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-trigger-mqtt"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"async-trait",
@@ -16575,7 +16576,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-trigger-nats"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"async-nats",
@@ -16599,7 +16600,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-trigger-postgres"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"async-trait",
@@ -16634,7 +16635,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-trigger-sqs"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"async-trait",
@@ -16662,7 +16663,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-trigger-websocket"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"async-trait",
@@ -16687,7 +16688,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-types"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"bitflags 2.13.2",
@@ -16706,7 +16707,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-worker"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"async-once-cell",
@@ -16824,7 +16825,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-worker-volumes"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"bytes",
"futures",
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
[package]
name = "windmill"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
authors.workspace = true
edition.workspace = true
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ members = [
exclude = ["./windmill-duckdb-ffi-internal", "./parsers/windmill-parser-wasm"]
[workspace.package]
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
authors = ["Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>"]
edition = "2021"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1 +1 @@
d252afcc80e77fcc4f9a2a346b80908c8605a6c0
bc3ef08c8e4233508c023e6ee847a3cd0b8be43b
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
-- Refuse while the catalog holds anything. Each row is a live Postgres login with a password
-- only this table carries, so dropping it would leave credentials on the cluster that Windmill can
-- no longer disable, delete or even name — and re-applying could not recreate them, because the
-- role names would already be taken. Cleaning them up here is not an option either: dropping a
-- role means reassigning what it owns in *every* instance database, and a migration runs in one.
--
-- Delete the roles through instance settings first; that path does the cluster work.
LOCK TABLE datatable_role IN ACCESS EXCLUSIVE MODE;
DO $$
BEGIN
IF EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM datatable_role) THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'Cannot roll back: % data table role(s) still exist as Postgres logins. Delete them in instance settings first, which drops them from the cluster.',
(SELECT count(*) FROM datatable_role);
END IF;
END $$;
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS datatable_role;
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
-- The instance's data table role catalog: one row per Postgres login Windmill created for data
-- table access.
--
-- A table rather than a `global_settings` key, because the value is a set of live cluster
-- credentials and that table has generic read, list, write and CLI round-trip paths that know
-- nothing about what they are carrying. Every one of them is a way to leak the passwords or to
-- overwrite the catalog with a copy that has none, and a row nothing generic touches has none of
-- those. One row per role also makes two concurrent creates two inserts rather than a
-- read-modify-write over one document.
CREATE TABLE datatable_role (
id VARCHAR(50) PRIMARY KEY,
-- The Postgres role name, verbatim. Unique because it is the cluster's own key.
name VARCHAR(63) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
enabled BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT true,
-- Generated by Windmill, never entered by anyone, and never leaves the server.
pwd TEXT,
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
);
GRANT ALL ON datatable_role TO windmill_user;
GRANT ALL ON datatable_role TO windmill_admin;
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
ALTER TABLE workspace_settings DROP COLUMN add_admins_and_developers_to_forks;
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
ALTER TABLE workspace_settings ADD COLUMN add_admins_and_developers_to_forks BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false;
+24 -24
View File
@@ -6191,7 +6191,7 @@ checksum = "712e227841d057c1ee1cd2fb22fa7e5a5461ae8e48fa2ca79ec42cfc1931183f"
[[package]]
name = "windmill-common"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"aho-corasick",
"anyhow",
@@ -6274,7 +6274,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-macros"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
@@ -6286,7 +6286,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"convert_case",
"serde",
@@ -6295,7 +6295,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-bash"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"lazy_static",
@@ -6307,7 +6307,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-csharp"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"serde_json",
@@ -6319,7 +6319,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-go"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"gosyn",
@@ -6331,7 +6331,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-graphql"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"lazy_static",
@@ -6343,7 +6343,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-java"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"serde_json",
@@ -6355,7 +6355,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-nu"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"nu-parser",
@@ -6366,7 +6366,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-php"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"itertools 0.14.0",
@@ -6377,7 +6377,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-py"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"itertools 0.14.0",
@@ -6389,7 +6389,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-py-asset"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"rustpython-ast",
@@ -6400,7 +6400,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-py-imports"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"async-recursion",
@@ -6422,7 +6422,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-r"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"serde_json",
@@ -6434,7 +6434,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-ruby"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"lazy_static",
@@ -6448,7 +6448,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-rust"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"convert_case",
@@ -6465,7 +6465,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-sql"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"lazy_static",
@@ -6478,7 +6478,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-sql-asset"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"serde",
@@ -6490,7 +6490,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-ts"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"lazy_static",
@@ -6508,7 +6508,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-ts-asset"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"serde-wasm-bindgen",
@@ -6524,7 +6524,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-wac"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"rustpython-ast",
@@ -6540,7 +6540,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-wasm"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"getrandom 0.2.17",
@@ -6572,7 +6572,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-yaml"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"lazy_static",
@@ -6586,7 +6586,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-types"
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"bitflags",
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ resolver = "2"
members = ["."]
[workspace.package]
version = "1.814.0"
version = "1.815.0"
edition = "2021"
authors = ["Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>"]
@@ -730,7 +730,12 @@ pub fn parse_asset_syntax(
s: &str,
enable_default_syntax: bool,
) -> Option<(AssetKind, Cow<'_, str>)> {
if enable_default_syntax && s == "datatable" {
// `datatable` and `datatable?role=analyst` both name the default data table: the role picks
// which Postgres login the connection is made as, not which data table is read.
if enable_default_syntax
&& s.strip_prefix("datatable")
.is_some_and(|rest| rest.is_empty() || rest.starts_with('?'))
{
return Some((AssetKind::DataTable, Cow::Borrowed("main")));
} else if enable_default_syntax && s == "ducklake" {
return Some((AssetKind::Ducklake, Cow::Borrowed("main")));
@@ -741,6 +746,14 @@ pub fn parse_asset_syntax(
if *kind == AssetKind::Dbt {
return Some((*kind, Cow::Owned(canonicalize_table_asset_path(suffix))));
}
// Same reasoning as above, for the explicit form. Specific to data tables: a
// `Resource`'s `?table=` is part of what it names, and stripping it would merge two
// different assets.
if *kind == AssetKind::DataTable {
if let Some((path, _role)) = suffix.split_once('?') {
return Some((*kind, Cow::Borrowed(path)));
}
}
// The suffix is kept verbatim. For S3 the path encodes the storage:
// `s3://<storage>/<key>`, with an EMPTY storage segment for the
// workspace default — so `s3:///key` yields `/key` (leading slash
@@ -1692,6 +1705,25 @@ fn parse_trigger_spec(s: &str) -> Option<TriggerSpec> {
mod pipeline_annotation_tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn a_datatable_role_is_not_part_of_the_asset_it_names() {
// The role picks which Postgres login the connection is made as, so two references that
// differ only by role are the same asset and must land on one graph node.
assert_eq!(
parse_asset_syntax("datatable://sales?role=analytics", false),
Some((AssetKind::DataTable, Cow::Borrowed("sales")))
);
assert_eq!(
parse_asset_syntax("datatable?role=analytics", true),
Some((AssetKind::DataTable, Cow::Borrowed("main")))
);
// A resource's `?table=` is part of what it names, so it is kept.
assert_eq!(
parse_asset_syntax("$res:f/db/pg?table=users", false),
Some((AssetKind::Resource, Cow::Borrowed("f/db/pg?table=users")))
);
}
#[test]
fn s3_path_keeps_storage_distinction() {
// An S3 asset path is `<storage>/<key>` with an empty storage segment
+7 -2
View File
@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ use windmill_common::{
INSTANCE_EVENTS_WEBHOOK_SETTING, INSTANCE_PYTHON_VERSION_SETTING,
JOB_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECS_SETTING, JOB_ISOLATION_SETTING, JWT_SECRET_SETTING,
KEEP_JOB_DIR_SETTING, LICENSE_KEY_SETTING, MAVEN_REPOS_SETTING, MAVEN_SETTINGS_XML_SETTING,
MONITOR_LOGS_ON_OBJECT_STORE_SETTING, NO_DEFAULT_MAVEN_SETTING,
MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM_SETTING, MONITOR_LOGS_ON_OBJECT_STORE_SETTING,
NO_DEFAULT_MAVEN_SETTING,
NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY_SETTING, NSJAIL_TMPFS_SIZE_MB_SETTING, NSJAIL_TMP_BACKING_SETTING,
NUGET_CONFIG_SETTING, OAUTH_SETTING, OTEL_SETTING, OTEL_TRACES_RETENTION_SECS_SETTING,
OTEL_TRACING_PROXY_SETTING, PIP_INDEX_URL_SETTING, POWERSHELL_REPO_PAT_SETTING,
@@ -126,7 +127,8 @@ use windmill_worker::{
use crate::monitor::{
initial_load, load_concurrency_key_max_queued, load_disable_password_login,
load_fork_workspace_tag_append_fork_suffix, load_keep_job_dir, load_metrics_debug_enabled,
load_fork_workspace_tag_append_fork_suffix, load_keep_job_dir,
load_mcp_disable_token_query_param, load_metrics_debug_enabled,
load_preview_tags_override, load_require_preexisting_user, load_retention_period_overrides,
load_tag_per_workspace_enabled, load_tag_per_workspace_workspaces,
load_workspace_fairness_duration_secs, load_workspace_fairness_enabled,
@@ -2164,6 +2166,9 @@ async fn process_notify_event(
DISABLE_PASSWORD_LOGIN_SETTING => {
load_disable_password_login(db).await;
}
MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM_SETTING => {
load_mcp_disable_token_query_param(db).await;
}
EXPOSE_METRICS_SETTING => {
tracing::info!("Metrics setting changed, restarting");
spawn_graceful_killpill(tx, db, 30, "metrics setting change", server_mode)
+34 -3
View File
@@ -45,7 +45,10 @@ use windmill_common::otel_oss::{
use windmill_common::{
agent_workers::DECODED_AGENT_TOKEN,
apps::APP_WORKSPACED_ROUTE,
auth::{create_token_for_owner, ephemeral_script_token_label, job_token_expiry_secs},
auth::{
create_token_for_owner, ephemeral_script_token_label, job_token_expiry_secs,
TOKEN_EXPIRY_WARNING_DAYS,
},
ee_oss::CriticalErrorChannel,
email_oss::send_email_if_possible,
error,
@@ -62,6 +65,7 @@ use windmill_common::{
FORK_WORKSPACE_TAG_APPEND_FORK_SUFFIX_SETTING, HUB_API_SECRET_SETTING,
HUB_BASE_URL_SETTING, INSTANCE_PYTHON_VERSION_SETTING, JOB_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECS_SETTING,
JOB_ISOLATION_SETTING, JWT_SECRET_SETTING, KEEP_JOB_DIR_SETTING, LICENSE_KEY_SETTING,
MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM, MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM_SETTING,
MONITOR_LOGS_ON_OBJECT_STORE_SETTING, NPMRC_SETTING, NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY_SETTING,
NSJAIL_TMPFS_SIZE_MB_SETTING, NSJAIL_TMP_BACKING_SETTING, NUGET_CONFIG_SETTING,
OTEL_SETTING, OTEL_TRACES_RETENTION_SECS_SETTING, OTEL_TRACING_PROXY_SETTING,
@@ -285,6 +289,15 @@ pub async fn initial_load(
);
if let Some(db) = conn.as_sql() {
// Outside the `server_mode` block below: a `MODE=mcp` process serves the MCP routes
// with `server_mode` false and would otherwise never read this at all. That mode
// joins no monitor loop, so there — as for every global setting, `base_url`
// included — this pass is the only read, and a change lands on restart.
pass.setting(
MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM_SETTING,
false,
|v| async move { apply_mcp_disable_token_query_param(v) },
);
pass.setting(DEFAULT_TAGS_PER_WORKSPACE_SETTING, false, |v| async move {
apply_tag_per_workspace_enabled(v)
});
@@ -1614,6 +1627,23 @@ pub fn apply_disable_password_login(value: Option<serde_json::Value>) {
};
}
pub async fn load_mcp_disable_token_query_param(db: &DB) {
match load_value_from_global_settings(db, MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM_SETTING).await {
Ok(v) => apply_mcp_disable_token_query_param(v),
Err(e) => tracing::error!("Error loading mcp_disable_token_query_param setting: {e:#}"),
};
}
pub fn apply_mcp_disable_token_query_param(value: Option<serde_json::Value>) {
match value {
Some(serde_json::Value::Bool(t)) => {
MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM.store(t, Ordering::Relaxed)
}
None => MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM.store(false, Ordering::Relaxed),
_ => (),
};
}
struct LogFile {
file_path: String,
hostname: String,
@@ -2198,7 +2228,7 @@ async fn cleanup_scheduled_job_deletions(db: &Pool<Postgres>) {
}
pub async fn check_expiring_tokens(db: &DB) {
// Find tokens expiring within 7 days that still have a pending notification row.
// Find tokens expiring within the warning window that still have a pending notification row.
// The notification table stores token_hash (not plaintext) so the join works
// even after the hash migration makes token.token nullable.
let expiring_tokens_r = sqlx::query_as!(
@@ -2207,8 +2237,9 @@ pub async fn check_expiring_tokens(db: &DB) {
USING token t
WHERE n.token_hash = t.token_hash
AND n.expiration > now()
AND n.expiration <= now() + interval '7 days'
AND n.expiration <= now() + make_interval(days => $1)
RETURNING t.token_prefix, t.label, t.email, t.workspace_id",
TOKEN_EXPIRY_WARNING_DAYS,
)
.fetch_all(db)
.await;
+1 -1
View File
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ workspace_protection_rule: workspace_id(char), name(char), rules(int), bypass_gr
FK: (workspace_id) -> workspace(id)
workspace_runnable_dependencies: flow_path(char), runnable_path(char), script_hash(bigint), runnable_is_flow(bool), workspace_id(char), app_path(char), id(bigint), runnable_is_agent(bool)
FK: (app_path, workspace_id) -> app(path, workspace_id) | (flow_path, workspace_id) -> flow(path, workspace_id)
workspace_settings: workspace_id(char), slack_team_id(char), slack_name(char), slack_command_script(char), slack_email(char), customer_id(char), plan(char), webhook(text), ai_config(jsonb), large_file_storage(jsonb), git_sync(jsonb), default_app(char), default_scripts(jsonb), deploy_ui(jsonb), mute_critical_alerts(bool), color(char), operator_settings(jsonb), teams_command_script(text), teams_team_id(text), teams_team_name(text), git_app_installations(jsonb), ducklake(jsonb), slack_oauth_client_id(char), slack_oauth_client_secret(char), datatable(jsonb), teams_team_guid(text), auto_invite(jsonb), error_handler(jsonb), success_handler(jsonb), public_app_execution_limit_per_minute(int), dbt_warehouses(jsonb), guest_access_enabled(bool), guest_jwt_public_key(text), guest_jwt_jwks_url(text), ai_sessions_backup_generation(int)
workspace_settings: workspace_id(char), slack_team_id(char), slack_name(char), slack_command_script(char), slack_email(char), customer_id(char), plan(char), webhook(text), ai_config(jsonb), large_file_storage(jsonb), git_sync(jsonb), default_app(char), default_scripts(jsonb), deploy_ui(jsonb), mute_critical_alerts(bool), color(char), operator_settings(jsonb), teams_command_script(text), teams_team_id(text), teams_team_name(text), git_app_installations(jsonb), ducklake(jsonb), slack_oauth_client_id(char), slack_oauth_client_secret(char), datatable(jsonb), teams_team_guid(text), auto_invite(jsonb), error_handler(jsonb), success_handler(jsonb), public_app_execution_limit_per_minute(int), dbt_warehouses(jsonb), guest_access_enabled(bool), guest_jwt_public_key(text), guest_jwt_jwks_url(text), ai_sessions_backup_generation(int), add_admins_and_developers_to_forks(bool)
FK: (workspace_id) -> workspace(id)
zombie_job_counter: job_id(uuid), counter(int)
FK: (job_id) -> v2_job(id)
+181
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
use axum::{
extract::State,
routing::{get, post},
Json, Router,
};
use serde_json::{json, Value};
use sqlx::{Pool, Postgres};
use std::{sync::Arc, time::Duration};
use tokio::sync::Notify;
use windmill_common::{flows::FlowValue, jobs::JobPayload};
use windmill_test_utils::{
completed_job, in_test_worker, listen_for_completed_jobs, ApiServer, RunJob, StreamFind,
};
async fn model(Json(body): Json<Value>) -> ([(&'static str, &'static str); 1], String) {
let finished = body["messages"]
.as_array()
.unwrap()
.iter()
.any(|m| m["role"] == "tool");
let delta = if finished {
json!({"role":"assistant", "content":"done"})
} else {
json!({"role":"assistant", "tool_calls": (0..3).map(|i| json!({
"index":i, "id":format!("call_{i}"), "type":"function",
"function":{"name":format!("tool_{i}"), "arguments":"{}"}
})).collect::<Vec<_>>()})
};
let event = json!({"choices":[{"index":0, "delta":delta, "finish_reason":null}]});
let end = json!({"choices":[{"index":0, "delta":{}, "finish_reason":if finished {"stop"} else {"tool_calls"}}]});
(
[("content-type", "text/event-stream")],
format!("data: {event}\n\ndata: {end}\n\ndata: [DONE]\n\n"),
)
}
async fn run_batch(db: Pool<Postgres>, parallel: bool, limited: bool) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
std::env::set_var("ALLOW_PRIVATE_AI_BASE_URLS", "true");
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await?;
let base = format!("http://{}", listener.local_addr()?);
let gate = Arc::new(Notify::new());
let router = Router::new()
.route("/v1/chat/completions", post(model))
.route(
"/first",
get(|State(gate): State<Arc<Notify>>| async move {
gate.notified().await;
"ok"
}),
)
.route(
"/second",
get(|State(gate): State<Arc<Notify>>| async move {
gate.notify_one();
"ok"
}),
)
.with_state(gate);
let stub = tokio::spawn(async move {
axum::serve(listener, router).await.unwrap();
});
let tools: Vec<Value> = (0..3).map(|i| {
let wait = if parallel && !limited && i < 2 {
format!("await fetch('{base}/{}');", if i == 0 {"first"} else {"second"})
} else { String::new() };
let finish = if i == 2 { "throw new Error('expected tool failure');".to_string() }
else { format!("return {i};") };
json!({"id":format!("t{i}"),"summary":format!("tool_{i}"),"value":{
"type":"rawscript", "language":"bun", "input_transforms":{},
"tag": if parallel { "bun" } else { "unserved-tool-tag" },
"concurrent_limit": if limited { Some(1) } else { None },
"custom_concurrency_key": if limited { Some("agent-tool-test") } else { None },
"content":format!("export async function main() {{ {wait} await Bun.sleep({}); {finish} }}", if i == 0 {200} else {0})
}})
}).collect();
let flow: FlowValue = serde_json::from_value(json!({"modules":[{"id":"agent","value":{
"type":"aiagent", "tools":tools, "input_transforms":{
"provider":{"type":"static","value":{"kind":"customai","model":"queue-test","resource":{"base_url":format!("{base}/v1")}}},
"user_message":{"type":"static","value":"run the tools"},
"max_iterations":{"type":"static","value":3}
}
}}]}))?;
let id = RunJob::from(JobPayload::RawFlow {
value: flow,
path: Some("u/test/agent_queue".into()),
restarted_from: None,
})
.push(&db)
.await;
let notifications = listen_for_completed_jobs(&db).await;
let wait = async {
if parallel {
in_test_worker(&db, notifications.find(&id), server.addr.port()).await;
} else {
notifications.find(&id).await;
}
};
tokio::time::timeout(
Duration::from_secs(45),
in_test_worker(&db, wait, server.addr.port()),
)
.await?;
let result = completed_job(id, &db).await;
assert!(result.success, "{:?}", result.result);
let result = result.json_result().expect("agent result");
let messages: Vec<_> = result["messages"]
.as_array()
.unwrap()
.iter()
.filter(|m| m["role"] == "tool")
.collect();
assert_eq!(messages.len(), 3);
for (index, message) in messages.iter().enumerate() {
assert_eq!(message["tool_call_id"], format!("call_{index}"));
}
assert_eq!(messages[0]["content"], "0");
assert_eq!(messages[1]["content"], "1");
assert!(messages[2]["content"]
.as_str()
.unwrap()
.contains("expected tool failure"));
let (parent_id, parent_worker): (uuid::Uuid, String) = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT j.id, c.worker FROM v2_job j JOIN v2_job_completed c USING(id) WHERE j.parent_job = $1"
).bind(id).fetch_one(&db).await?;
let children: Vec<(String, String, bool)> = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT j.runnable_path, c.worker, c.status = 'success' FROM v2_job j JOIN v2_job_completed c USING(id) WHERE j.parent_job = $1 ORDER BY j.runnable_path"
).bind(parent_id).fetch_all(&db).await?;
assert_eq!(children.len(), 3);
assert_eq!(
children[0].1, parent_worker,
"first tool must stay on the parent worker"
);
assert_eq!(
children.iter().map(|c| c.2).collect::<Vec<_>>(),
vec![true, true, false]
);
if limited {
let overlapping: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar(
"SELECT count(*) FROM v2_job j1 JOIN v2_job_completed c1 ON c1.id = j1.id
JOIN v2_job j2 ON j2.parent_job = j1.parent_job AND j2.id > j1.id
JOIN v2_job_completed c2 ON c2.id = j2.id
WHERE j1.parent_job = $1 AND c1.started_at < c2.completed_at AND c2.started_at < c1.completed_at"
).bind(parent_id).fetch_one(&db).await?;
assert_eq!(
overlapping, 0,
"the reserved first job must count toward the shared limit"
);
} else if parallel {
assert_ne!(
children[1].1, parent_worker,
"second tool must unblock the first from another worker"
);
} else {
assert!(children.iter().all(|child| child.1 == parent_worker));
}
stub.abort();
server.close().await?;
Ok(())
}
#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))]
#[serial_test::serial]
async fn parent_drains_tools_without_another_worker(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
run_batch(db, false, false).await
}
#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))]
#[serial_test::serial]
async fn parent_keeps_first_tool_while_another_worker_runs_siblings(
db: Pool<Postgres>,
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
run_batch(db, true, false).await
}
#[cfg(all(feature = "enterprise", feature = "private"))]
#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))]
#[serial_test::serial]
async fn reserved_tool_obeys_shared_concurrency_limit(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
run_batch(db, true, true).await
}
+57
View File
@@ -3312,3 +3312,60 @@ export function main(i: number) {
Ok(())
}
// A `$flow_expr[...]` step tag is resolved from the flow's state before the step is pushed, and
// one that cannot be resolved fails the step instead of queueing it on a tag no worker serves.
#[cfg(feature = "deno_core")]
#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))]
async fn test_flow_expr_step_tag(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let step = |id: &str, tag: Option<&str>| {
flow_module(
id,
FlowModuleValue::RawScript {
input_transforms: Default::default(),
language: ScriptLang::Deno,
content: "export function main() { return { lang: 'bun' } }".to_string(),
path: None,
lock: None,
tag: tag.map(str::to_string),
concurrency_settings: Default::default(),
is_trigger: None,
assets: None,
},
)
};
let flow = FlowValue {
modules: vec![
step("a", None),
step("b", Some("$flow_expr[results.a.lang]")),
step("c", Some("nobody-serves-$flow_expr[a.lang]")),
],
same_worker: false,
..Default::default()
};
let job = RunJob::from(JobPayload::RawFlow { value: flow, path: None, restarted_from: None })
.run_until_complete(&db, false, server.addr.port())
.await;
let b_tag = sqlx::query_scalar::<_, String>(
"SELECT tag FROM v2_job WHERE parent_job = $1 AND flow_step_id = 'b'",
)
.bind(job.id)
.fetch_one(&db)
.await?;
assert_eq!(b_tag, "bun");
assert!(!job.success);
let result = job.json_result().unwrap();
let message = result["error"]["message"].as_str().unwrap_or_default();
assert!(
message.contains("Could not resolve the step tag `nobody-serves-$flow_expr[a.lang]`"),
"got {result:?}"
);
Ok(())
}
+25
View File
@@ -1530,6 +1530,31 @@ async fn declarative_sync_rejects_an_unusable_instance_banner(db: Pool<Postgres>
);
}
#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))]
async fn declarative_sync_rejects_a_malformed_max_token_expiration(db: Pool<Postgres>) {
clear_settings_and_configs(&db).await;
let before = count_global_settings(&db).await;
let mut desired = BTreeMap::new();
desired.insert(
"max_token_expiration_days".to_string(),
serde_json::json!("7.0"),
);
let err = windmill_common::instance_config::sync_global_settings_declarative(
&db,
&BTreeMap::new(),
&desired,
)
.await
.expect_err("a ceiling the token routes cannot read must fail the sync");
assert!(
err.to_string().contains("max_token_expiration_days"),
"the error should name the offending setting, got: {err}"
);
assert_eq!(count_global_settings(&db).await, before);
}
#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))]
async fn declarative_sync_rejects_an_unusable_default_allowed_origins(db: Pool<Postgres>) {
// The declarative writers (the sync-config CLI, the operator's ConfigMap
+108
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
/*
* The job's own token (`$WM_TOKEN`) stays valid well past the job it was minted
* for, and job logs are persisted to `job_logs` and optionally to object storage,
* so a script that echoes the token would otherwise park a live credential in
* durable storage. `run_worker` registers the token with `sensitive_log_masks`
* for the job it pulled; this pins that the persisted log carries the masked form.
*/
use sqlx::{Pool, Postgres};
use windmill_common::{
jobs::{JobPayload, RawCode},
scripts::ScriptLang,
};
use windmill_test_utils::*;
/// Prefix of a serialized job token: `jwt_` plus the base64 of a JWT header.
/// The masked form keeps only `jwt` + the last three characters, so it never matches.
const RAW_TOKEN_PREFIX: &str = "jwt_ey";
#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))]
async fn test_job_token_masked_in_persisted_logs(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let port = server.addr.port();
let job = RunJob::from(JobPayload::Code(RawCode {
hash: None,
content: "echo \"running with --token $WM_TOKEN\"".to_string(),
path: None,
lock: None,
language: ScriptLang::Bash,
cache_ttl: None,
cache_ignore_s3_path: None,
dedicated_worker: None,
concurrency_settings: windmill_common::runnable_settings::ConcurrencySettings::default()
.into(),
debouncing_settings: windmill_common::runnable_settings::DebouncingSettings::default(),
modules: None,
tag: None,
}))
.run_until_complete(&db, false, port)
.await;
assert!(job.success, "job should have succeeded");
let logs =
sqlx::query_scalar::<_, Option<String>>("SELECT logs FROM job_logs WHERE job_id = $1")
.bind(job.id)
.fetch_one(&db)
.await?
.unwrap_or_default();
assert!(
!logs.contains(RAW_TOKEN_PREFIX),
"an unmasked job token reached the persisted logs: {logs}"
);
assert!(
logs.contains("secret value was masked"),
"expected the masking notice in logs: {logs}"
);
Ok(())
}
/// nativets runs V8 in-process and persists `console.log` output through its own
/// channel, so it is masked by a different mechanism than the bash case above and
/// needs its own guard.
#[cfg(feature = "deno_core")]
#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))]
async fn test_job_token_masked_in_nativets_logs(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let port = server.addr.port();
let job = RunJob::from(JobPayload::Code(RawCode {
hash: None,
content: "export async function main() {\n console.log('running with --token ' + process.env.WM_TOKEN);\n return 'ok';\n}".to_string(),
path: None,
lock: None,
language: ScriptLang::Nativets,
cache_ttl: None,
cache_ignore_s3_path: None,
dedicated_worker: None,
concurrency_settings: windmill_common::runnable_settings::ConcurrencySettings::default()
.into(),
debouncing_settings: windmill_common::runnable_settings::DebouncingSettings::default(),
modules: None,
tag: None,
}))
.run_until_complete(&db, false, port)
.await;
assert!(job.success, "job should have succeeded");
let logs =
sqlx::query_scalar::<_, Option<String>>("SELECT logs FROM job_logs WHERE job_id = $1")
.bind(job.id)
.fetch_one(&db)
.await?
.unwrap_or_default();
assert!(
!logs.contains(RAW_TOKEN_PREFIX),
"an unmasked job token reached the persisted logs: {logs}"
);
assert!(
logs.contains("secret value was masked"),
"expected the masking notice in logs: {logs}"
);
Ok(())
}
+4
View File
@@ -1249,6 +1249,10 @@ pub async fn register_token_expiry_notification(
if !windmill_common::auth::is_user_token(label) {
return;
}
let warning_days = windmill_common::auth::TOKEN_EXPIRY_WARNING_DAYS;
if expiration <= chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::days(warning_days.into()) {
return;
}
if let Err(e) = sqlx::query!(
"INSERT INTO token_expiry_notification (token_hash, expiration) VALUES ($1, $2) ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING",
token_hash,
@@ -800,6 +800,14 @@ async fn delete_folder(
not_found_if_none(get_folderopt(&mut tx, &w_id, &name).await?, "Folder", &name)?;
// See the same call in `delete_group`: a freed name must not stay in a tenant list.
windmill_common::workspaces::remove_datatable_tenant_in_workspace(
&mut tx,
&w_id,
&format!("f/{name}"),
)
.await?;
let del = sqlx::query_scalar!(
"DELETE FROM folder WHERE name = $1 AND workspace_id = $2 RETURNING 1",
name,
@@ -797,6 +797,15 @@ async fn delete_group(
}
not_found_if_none(get_group_opt(&mut tx, &w_id, &name).await?, "Group", &name)?;
// A tenant list names a principal, so a freed name must not linger in one: a later group
// reusing it would silently inherit the data table access this one had.
windmill_common::workspaces::remove_datatable_tenant_in_workspace(
&mut tx,
&w_id,
&format!("g/{name}"),
)
.await?;
sqlx::query!(
"DELETE FROM usr_to_group WHERE group_ = $1 AND workspace_id = $2",
name,
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
-- A data table under roles in `test-workspace`, and a fork whose entry points at it rather than
-- carrying a copy. `test-user-2` is a non-admin of the parent and an admin of the fork: the shape
-- the pointer exists for.
-- Empty registry: role provisioning grants CONNECT on every database named here, and the data
-- table's `dt_main` is a name in workspace settings, not a database that exists.
INSERT INTO global_settings (name, value) VALUES
('custom_instance_pg_databases', '{"user_pwd": "pw", "databases": {}}'::jsonb)
ON CONFLICT (name) DO UPDATE SET value = EXCLUDED.value;
INSERT INTO datatable_role (id, name, enabled, pwd) VALUES ('role1', 'analytics', true, 'pw');
UPDATE workspace_settings SET datatable = '{
"datatables": {
"main": {
"database": {"resource_type": "instance", "resource_path": "dt_main"},
"permissions": {
"default_role": "role1",
"roles": {
"admin": {"tenants": []},
"role1": {"tenants": ["u/test-user-2", "g/analysts", "f/finance"]}
}
}
}
}
}'::jsonb WHERE workspace_id = 'test-workspace';
INSERT INTO group_ (workspace_id, name, summary, extra_perms) VALUES
('test-workspace', 'analysts', 'Analysts', '{}');
INSERT INTO folder (workspace_id, name, display_name, owners, extra_perms) VALUES
('test-workspace', 'finance', 'finance', '{}', '{}');
INSERT INTO workspace (id, name, owner, parent_workspace_id) VALUES
('wm-fork-dt', 'fork of test-workspace', 'test2@windmill.dev', 'test-workspace');
INSERT INTO workspace_key (workspace_id, kind, key) VALUES ('wm-fork-dt', 'cloud', 'test-key');
INSERT INTO group_ (workspace_id, name, summary, extra_perms) VALUES
('wm-fork-dt', 'all', 'All users', '{}');
INSERT INTO usr (workspace_id, email, username, is_admin, role) VALUES
('wm-fork-dt', 'test2@windmill.dev', 'test-user-2', true, 'Admin');
INSERT INTO workspace_settings (workspace_id, datatable) VALUES ('wm-fork-dt', '{
"datatables": {
"main": {"reference": {"workspace_id": "test-workspace", "datatable": "main"}}
}
}'::jsonb);
@@ -311,3 +311,121 @@ async fn test_fork_keeps_only_resolvable_on_behalf_of(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> any
Ok(())
}
/// Apps, schedules, triggers and their drafts cannot drop an identity the way scripts and flows
/// do, so one naming nobody in the fork goes to its creator while one that still resolves stays.
/// Forked as an admin, whose app policies the clone otherwise keeps.
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../migrations", fixtures("base"))]
async fn test_fork_repoints_unresolvable_identities(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let base_url = format!("http://localhost:{}/api", server.addr.port());
let stranger = json!({
"on_behalf_of": "u/test-user-2",
"on_behalf_of_email": "test2@windmill.dev",
"execution_mode": "publisher",
});
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO app (workspace_id, path, summary, policy, versions)
VALUES ('test-workspace', 'u/test-user/stranger', '', $1, '{}'),
('test-workspace', 'u/test-user/group', '', $2, '{}')",
)
.bind(&stranger)
.bind(json!({
"on_behalf_of": "g/all",
"on_behalf_of_email": "group-all@windmill.dev",
"execution_mode": "publisher",
}))
.execute(&db)
.await?;
// The clone re-aggregates `versions` from `app_version`, and the column is NOT NULL.
sqlx::query(
"WITH v AS (
INSERT INTO app_version (app_id, value, created_by)
SELECT id, '{}'::json, 'test-user' FROM app WHERE workspace_id = 'test-workspace'
RETURNING id, app_id
)
UPDATE app SET versions = ARRAY[v.id] FROM v WHERE app.id = v.app_id",
)
.execute(&db)
.await?;
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO draft (workspace_id, path, typ, value, created_at, email)
VALUES ('test-workspace', 'u/test-user/stranger', 'raw_app', $1::json, NOW(), 'test@windmill.dev'),
('test-workspace', 'u/test-user/stranger', 'trigger_websocket', $2::json, NOW(), 'test@windmill.dev'),
('test-workspace', 'u/test-user/nul', 'raw_app', $3::json, NOW(), 'test@windmill.dev')",
)
.bind(json!({ "policy": stranger }))
.bind(json!({ "permissioned_as": "u/test-user-2" }))
// Saved before drafts were stripped of NULs: any jsonb parse of it raises, so it must be
// skipped rather than abort the fork. Built from parts because a NUL escape can't sit in source.
.bind(format!(
r#"{{"policy":{{"on_behalf_of":"u/test-user-2"}},"files":{{"f":"a{}u0000"}}}}"#,
"\\"
))
.execute(&db)
.await?;
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO schedule (workspace_id, path, edited_by, schedule, script_path, email, permissioned_as, enabled)
VALUES ('test-workspace', 'u/test-user/stranger', 'test-user', '0 0 * * * *', 'u/test-user/s', 'test2@windmill.dev', 'u/test-user-2', false)",
)
.execute(&db)
.await?;
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO websocket_trigger (workspace_id, path, url, script_path, is_flow, edited_by, permissioned_as, mode)
VALUES ('test-workspace', 'u/test-user/stranger', 'ws://localhost', 'u/test-user/s', false, 'test-user', 'u/test-user-2', 'disabled')",
)
.execute(&db)
.await?;
let resp = reqwest::Client::new()
.post(format!(
"{base_url}/w/test-workspace/workspaces/create_fork"
))
.header("Authorization", "Bearer SECRET_TOKEN")
.json(&json!({ "id": "wm-fork-repoint", "name": "Fork", "color": "#0000ff" }))
.send()
.await?;
assert!(
resp.status().is_success(),
"creating the fork: {}",
resp.text().await?
);
let text = |sql: &'static str| sqlx::query_scalar::<_, String>(sql).fetch_one(&db);
assert_eq!(
text("SELECT (policy->>'on_behalf_of') || ' ' || (policy->>'on_behalf_of_email') FROM app WHERE workspace_id = 'wm-fork-repoint' AND path = 'u/test-user/stranger'").await?,
"u/test-user test@windmill.dev"
);
assert_eq!(
text("SELECT policy->>'on_behalf_of' FROM app WHERE workspace_id = 'wm-fork-repoint' AND path = 'u/test-user/group'").await?,
"g/all"
);
assert_eq!(
text("SELECT value->'policy'->>'on_behalf_of' FROM draft WHERE workspace_id = 'wm-fork-repoint' AND path = 'u/test-user/stranger' AND typ = 'raw_app'").await?,
"u/test-user"
);
assert_eq!(
text("SELECT CASE WHEN strpos(value::text, 'u/test-user-2') > 0 THEN 'kept' ELSE 'rewritten' END FROM draft WHERE workspace_id = 'wm-fork-repoint' AND path = 'u/test-user/nul'").await?,
"kept"
);
assert_eq!(
text("SELECT value->>'permissioned_as' FROM draft WHERE workspace_id = 'wm-fork-repoint' AND typ = 'trigger_websocket'").await?,
"u/test-user"
);
assert_eq!(
text("SELECT permissioned_as || ' ' || email FROM schedule WHERE workspace_id = 'wm-fork-repoint'").await?,
"u/test-user test@windmill.dev"
);
assert_eq!(
text(
"SELECT permissioned_as FROM websocket_trigger WHERE workspace_id = 'wm-fork-repoint'"
)
.await?,
"u/test-user"
);
Ok(())
}
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
use serde_json::json;
use sqlx::{Pool, Postgres};
use windmill_test_utils::*;
/// With `add_admins_and_developers_to_forks` on, a fork starts with the parent's admins and
/// developers at their parent role, even when a developer forks it; operators are left out. The
/// copies are manual members: a parent membership that came from an instance group must not carry
/// that provenance into a fork that does not configure the group.
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../migrations", fixtures("base"))]
async fn test_fork_adds_parent_admins_and_developers(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let base_url = format!(
"http://localhost:{}/api/w/test-workspace/workspaces",
server.addr.port()
);
let client = reqwest::Client::new();
sqlx::query(
"UPDATE usr SET operator = true WHERE workspace_id = 'test-workspace' AND username = 'test-user-3'",
)
.execute(&db)
.await?;
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO usr (workspace_id, email, username, is_admin, added_via)
VALUES ('test-workspace', 'test4@windmill.dev', 'test-user-4', false,
'{\"source\": \"instance_group\", \"group\": \"devs\"}')",
)
.execute(&db)
.await?;
let resp = client
.post(format!(
"{base_url}/edit_add_admins_and_developers_to_forks"
))
.header("Authorization", "Bearer SECRET_TOKEN")
.json(&json!({ "add_admins_and_developers_to_forks": true }))
.send()
.await?;
assert!(
resp.status().is_success(),
"enabling the setting: {}",
resp.text().await?
);
let resp = client
.post(format!("{base_url}/create_fork"))
.header("Authorization", "Bearer SECRET_TOKEN_2")
.json(&json!({ "id": "wm-fork-team", "name": "Team fork" }))
.send()
.await?;
assert!(
resp.status().is_success(),
"creating the fork: {}",
resp.text().await?
);
let members: Vec<(String, bool, bool)> = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT username, is_admin, added_via IS NULL FROM usr
WHERE workspace_id = 'wm-fork-team' ORDER BY username",
)
.fetch_all(&db)
.await?;
assert_eq!(
members,
vec![
("test-user".to_string(), true, true),
("test-user-2".to_string(), false, true),
("test-user-4".to_string(), false, true),
]
);
Ok(())
}
@@ -115,6 +115,60 @@ async fn login_link_is_single_use_and_same_origin(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow:
Ok(())
}
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../migrations", fixtures("base"))]
async fn confirmed_login_link_is_spent_by_the_click_not_the_page(
db: Pool<Postgres>,
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let port = server.addr.port();
let base = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api");
let resp = client()
.post(format!("{base}/users/login_links"))
.header("Authorization", "Bearer SECRET_TOKEN")
.json(&json!({"email": "test2@windmill.dev", "confirm": true}))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201);
let link = resp.json::<serde_json::Value>().await?;
// The URL handed out is the frontend page, not the API path that signs in on a GET.
let token = link["url"]
.as_str()
.unwrap()
.split_once("/user/login_link?token=")
.expect("confirmation page url")
.1
.to_string();
let confirm = || {
client()
.post(format!("{base}/auth/login_link/{token}"))
.send()
};
let resp = confirm().await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200);
assert!(resp
.headers()
.get_all("set-cookie")
.iter()
.any(|c| c.to_str().unwrap().starts_with("token=")));
assert_eq!(
resp.json::<serde_json::Value>().await?["location"],
"/user/workspaces"
);
let resp = confirm().await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200);
assert!(resp.headers().get("set-cookie").is_none());
assert_eq!(
resp.json::<serde_json::Value>().await?["location"],
"/user/login_link_expired?reason=used"
);
Ok(())
}
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../migrations", fixtures("base"))]
async fn login_link_mint_can_require_a_login_type(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
//! `max_token_expiration_days`: the instance-wide ceiling on how far ahead a token a caller
//! picks the lifetime of may expire, and the service-account exemption.
use serde_json::json;
use sqlx::types::chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use sqlx::{Pool, Postgres};
use windmill_test_utils::*;
const DAY: u64 = 24 * 60 * 60;
fn client() -> reqwest::Client {
reqwest::Client::new()
}
fn from_now(secs: u64) -> DateTime<Utc> {
Utc::now() + std::time::Duration::from_secs(secs)
}
async fn set_max(db: &Pool<Postgres>, value: serde_json::Value) {
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO global_settings (name, value) VALUES ('max_token_expiration_days', $1)
ON CONFLICT (name) DO UPDATE SET value = EXCLUDED.value",
)
.bind(value)
.execute(db)
.await
.unwrap();
}
/// Mints as `test2@windmill.dev`, a plain member of `test-workspace`.
async fn create_token(port: u16, body: serde_json::Value) -> reqwest::Response {
client()
.post(format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/users/tokens/create"))
.header("Authorization", "Bearer SECRET_TOKEN_2")
.json(&body)
.send()
.await
.unwrap()
}
async fn stored_expiration(db: &Pool<Postgres>, label: &str) -> Option<DateTime<Utc>> {
sqlx::query_scalar::<_, Option<DateTime<Utc>>>("SELECT expiration FROM token WHERE label = $1")
.bind(label)
.fetch_one(db)
.await
.unwrap()
}
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../migrations", fixtures("base"))]
async fn test_max_token_expiration_days_shortens_user_tokens(
db: Pool<Postgres>,
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let port = server.addr.port();
let resp = create_token(port, json!({ "label": "unset" })).await;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201);
assert_eq!(
stored_expiration(&db, "unset").await,
None,
"with no setting a token may still have no expiration"
);
// Refused at write time: the token routes can only read a value they cannot parse as no
// ceiling at all.
let resp = client()
.post(format!(
"http://localhost:{port}/api/settings/global/max_token_expiration_days"
))
.header("Authorization", "Bearer SECRET_TOKEN")
.json(&json!({ "value": 7.5 }))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 400);
set_max(&db, json!(7)).await;
// The token form reads the ceiling as whoever is creating the token, usually not a
// superadmin, so it can offer only expirations the server would keep.
let resp = client()
.get(format!(
"http://localhost:{port}/api/settings/global/max_token_expiration_days"
))
.header("Authorization", "Bearer SECRET_TOKEN_2")
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200);
assert_eq!(resp.text().await?, "7");
let resp = create_token(port, json!({ "label": "none asked" })).await;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201);
let expiration = stored_expiration(&db, "none asked")
.await
.expect("a token asking for no expiration gets the ceiling");
assert!(
expiration > from_now(6 * DAY) && expiration <= from_now(7 * DAY),
"expected the 7 day ceiling, got {expiration}"
);
let resp = create_token(
port,
json!({ "label": "past the ceiling", "expiration": from_now(30 * DAY) }),
)
.await;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201);
let expiration = stored_expiration(&db, "past the ceiling").await.unwrap();
assert!(
expiration > from_now(6 * DAY) && expiration <= from_now(7 * DAY),
"expected an expiration past the ceiling to be shortened to it, got {expiration}"
);
let resp = create_token(
port,
json!({ "label": "within", "expiration": from_now(3 * DAY) }),
)
.await;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201);
let expiration = stored_expiration(&db, "within").await.unwrap();
assert!(
expiration <= from_now(3 * DAY),
"an expiration within the ceiling must be kept, got {expiration}"
);
// The settings UI stores an integer, but the YAML instance config and config sync can write
// the same whole number as a string or as `5.0`. Reading either as "unset" would silently
// drop the ceiling, while the token form (`parseMaxTokenExpirationDays`) still showed it.
for (stored, label) in [
(json!("5"), "string setting"),
(json!(5.0), "float setting"),
] {
set_max(&db, stored).await;
let resp = create_token(port, json!({ "label": label })).await;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201);
let expiration = stored_expiration(&db, label).await;
assert!(
expiration.is_some_and(|e| e > from_now(4 * DAY) && e <= from_now(5 * DAY)),
"{label}: expected the 5 day ceiling, got {expiration:?}"
);
}
// A superadmin impersonating a user picks the lifetime too, so the ceiling applies there;
// left out, it would be the one way to mint a token that never expires.
let resp = client()
.post(format!(
"http://localhost:{port}/api/users/tokens/impersonate"
))
.header("Authorization", "Bearer SECRET_TOKEN")
.json(&json!({ "label": "impersonated", "impersonate_email": "test3@windmill.dev" }))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201);
assert!(
stored_expiration(&db, "impersonated").await.is_some(),
"an impersonation token asking for no expiration gets the ceiling"
);
Ok(())
}
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../migrations", fixtures("base"))]
async fn test_service_accounts_are_exempt(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let port = server.addr.port();
set_max(&db, json!(7)).await;
// The same email is a service account in one workspace and an ordinary user in another.
sqlx::query(
"UPDATE usr SET is_service_account = true
WHERE email = 'test2@windmill.dev' AND workspace_id = 'test-workspace'",
)
.execute(&db)
.await?;
sqlx::query("INSERT INTO workspace (id, name, owner) VALUES ('other', 'other', 'test-user')")
.execute(&db)
.await?;
sqlx::query("INSERT INTO workspace_settings (workspace_id) VALUES ('other')")
.execute(&db)
.await?;
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO usr (workspace_id, email, username, is_admin, role)
VALUES ('other', 'test2@windmill.dev', 'test-user-2', false, 'User')",
)
.execute(&db)
.await?;
// The token form decides the exemption from this list, so it must carry each membership's flag.
let memberships: serde_json::Value = client()
.get(format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/workspaces/users"))
.header("Authorization", "Bearer SECRET_TOKEN_2")
.send()
.await?
.json()
.await?;
for (workspace, is_service_account) in [("test-workspace", true), ("other", false)] {
let membership = memberships["workspaces"]
.as_array()
.and_then(|ws| ws.iter().find(|w| w["id"] == workspace))
.unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("{workspace} missing from {memberships}"));
assert_eq!(membership["is_service_account"], json!(is_service_account));
}
for (label, workspace_id, exempt) in [
("own workspace", Some("test-workspace"), true),
("other workspace", Some("other"), false),
// A workspace-less token has no workspace to match, so a service account anywhere counts.
("global", None, true),
] {
let resp = create_token(
port,
json!({ "label": label, "workspace_id": workspace_id }),
)
.await;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201);
assert_eq!(
stored_expiration(&db, label).await.is_none(),
exempt,
"{label}: expected exempt = {exempt}"
);
}
// Impersonation checks the impersonated account, not the superadmin minting the token.
let resp = client()
.post(format!(
"http://localhost:{port}/api/users/tokens/impersonate"
))
.header("Authorization", "Bearer SECRET_TOKEN")
.json(&json!({ "label": "impersonated service account", "impersonate_email": "test2@windmill.dev" }))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201);
assert_eq!(
stored_expiration(&db, "impersonated service account").await,
None
);
Ok(())
}
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
//! The `mcp_disable_token_query_param` switch closes the URL-borne credential path.
//!
//! The rejection is a middleware layered between the `WWW-Authenticate` decorator and
//! everything that reads a token, on both the workspaced and the gateway mount. Each half of
//! that sandwich is pinned: the `WWW-Authenticate` header on the refusal catches the layer
//! being moved outward (a client would lose the pointer that starts OAuth discovery), and
//! refusing a token that was never valid catches it being moved inward past authentication
//! (the URL-borne token would be hashed and looked up before anything refused it).
#![cfg(feature = "mcp")]
use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
use serde_json::json;
use sqlx::{Pool, Postgres};
use windmill_common::global_settings::MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM;
use windmill_test_utils::*;
/// Workspace-less with an `mcp:` scope, which is what the gateway mount requires; the
/// workspaced mount takes its workspace from the path, so one token reaches both.
async fn insert_mcp_token(db: &Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO token (token_hash, token_prefix, token, email, label, super_admin, scopes)
VALUES (encode(sha256('MCP_TOKEN'::bytea), 'hex'), 'MCP_TOK', 'MCP_TOKEN', 'test@windmill.dev', 'mcp token', true, ARRAY['mcp:all'])",
)
.execute(db)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
/// A token that is not in `token` at all. Authentication would refuse it on its own, so a
/// refusal carrying the middleware's own wording is evidence nothing looked it up first.
const BOGUS_TOKEN: &str = "NOT_A_REAL_TOKEN";
async fn tools_list(url: &str) -> anyhow::Result<reqwest::Response> {
Ok(reqwest::Client::new()
.post(url)
.header("Accept", "application/json, text/event-stream")
.json(&json!({ "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "tools/list", "params": {} }))
.send()
.await?)
}
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../migrations", fixtures("base"))]
async fn test_mcp_token_query_param_switch(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
set_jwt_secret().await;
insert_mcp_token(&db).await?;
let server = ApiServer::start_mcp(db.clone()).await?;
let port = server.addr.port();
let workspaced =
format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/mcp/w/test-workspace/mcp?token=MCP_TOKEN");
let gateway = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/mcp/gateway?token=MCP_TOKEN");
assert_eq!(
tools_list(&workspaced).await?.status(),
200,
"a URL-borne token is the documented default and must keep working while the switch is off"
);
assert_eq!(tools_list(&gateway).await?.status(), 200);
MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed);
for url in [&workspaced, &gateway] {
let resp = tools_list(url).await?;
assert_eq!(
resp.status(),
401,
"{url} still admitted a token in the URL"
);
// What sends the client into the OAuth flow rather than leaving it stuck on a 401.
assert!(
resp.headers().contains_key("www-authenticate"),
"{url} rejected without pointing at the authorization server"
);
}
// Refused before authentication, not after: an invalid token gets the middleware's own
// message rather than the generic 401 that looking it up would produce.
let resp = tools_list(&format!(
"http://localhost:{port}/api/mcp/w/test-workspace/mcp?token={BOGUS_TOKEN}"
))
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 401);
assert!(
resp.text().await?.contains("does not accept a token in the MCP URL"),
"an invalid URL token was answered by authentication, so the token was read before \
the switch refused it"
);
// The header stays open: it is the channel the OAuth flow itself hands tokens over on.
let resp = reqwest::Client::new()
.post(format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/mcp/gateway"))
.header("Accept", "application/json, text/event-stream")
.header("Authorization", "Bearer MCP_TOKEN")
.json(&json!({ "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "tools/list", "params": {} }))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200);
Ok(())
}
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
//! Which user tokens get an "expiring soon" warning queued when they are created.
use serde_json::json;
use sqlx::types::chrono::Utc;
use sqlx::{Pool, Postgres};
use windmill_test_utils::*;
const DAY: u64 = 24 * 60 * 60;
async fn warning_queued(db: &Pool<Postgres>, label: &str) -> bool {
sqlx::query_scalar::<_, bool>(
"SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM token_expiry_notification n
JOIN token t ON t.token_hash = n.token_hash WHERE t.label = $1)",
)
.bind(label)
.fetch_one(db)
.await
.unwrap()
}
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../migrations", fixtures("base"))]
async fn test_short_lived_tokens_get_no_expiry_warning(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let port = server.addr.port();
for (label, lifetime) in [("short", DAY), ("long", 30 * DAY)] {
let resp = reqwest::Client::new()
.post(format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/users/tokens/create"))
.header("Authorization", "Bearer SECRET_TOKEN_2")
.json(&json!({
"label": label,
"expiration": Utc::now() + std::time::Duration::from_secs(lifetime),
}))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201);
}
assert!(
!warning_queued(&db, "short").await,
"a token whose whole lifetime fits in the warning window must not be warned about"
);
assert!(
warning_queued(&db, "long").await,
"a longer-lived token still gets its warning"
);
Ok(())
}
@@ -275,6 +275,67 @@ async fn test_encryption_key_rotation_dispatches_batched_git_sync(
Ok(())
}
/// Stored repository tokens and webhook secrets are encrypted under the
/// workspace key but never synced, so a rotation has to carry them over even
/// when the caller skips re-encrypting variables.
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../migrations", fixtures("base"))]
async fn test_encryption_key_rotation_reencrypts_git_sync_secrets(
db: Pool<Postgres>,
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
use windmill_common::variables::{build_crypt, crypt_from_key_with_suffix, decrypt, encrypt};
initialize_tracing().await;
create_folder(&db, "28103").await?;
create_git_repo_resource(&db).await?;
let sync_script_path = "f/28103/test_sync_script_git_secrets";
create_sync_script(&db, sync_script_path).await?;
setup_git_sync_config(&db, sync_script_path).await?;
let mc = build_crypt(&db, "test-workspace").await?;
sqlx::query(
r#"
UPDATE workspace_settings SET
git_credentials = jsonb_build_array(jsonb_build_object(
'token', $1::text, 'repo_identity', 'https://gitlab.example.com/grp/proj')),
git_sync = jsonb_set(git_sync, '{repositories,0,auto_pull}', jsonb_build_object(
'enabled', true, 'mode', 'webhook', 'webhook_id', 1, 'webhook_secret', $2::text))
WHERE workspace_id = 'test-workspace'
"#,
)
.bind(encrypt(&mc, "stored-token"))
.bind(encrypt(&mc, "hook-secret"))
.execute(&db)
.await?;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let port = server.addr.port();
let base = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/w/test-workspace/workspaces");
let new_key = "c".repeat(64);
let resp = authed(client().post(format!("{base}/encryption_key")))
.json(&json!({"new_key": new_key, "skip_reencrypt": true}))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(
resp.status(),
200,
"set_encryption_key failed: {}",
resp.text().await?
);
let (token, secret): (String, String) = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT git_credentials->0->>'token', git_sync#>>'{repositories,0,auto_pull,webhook_secret}'
FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = 'test-workspace'",
)
.fetch_one(&db)
.await?;
let new_mc = crypt_from_key_with_suffix(&new_key, "");
assert_eq!(decrypt(&new_mc, token)?, "stored-token");
assert_eq!(decrypt(&new_mc, secret)?, "hook-secret");
Ok(())
}
/// Regression test for the non-debouncing fallback: a workspace whose sync
/// script predates hub version 28103 must still receive git-sync jobs for the
/// encryption_key entry and every re-encrypted secret. Before the fallback was
@@ -1166,3 +1166,47 @@ async fn test_create_service_account_drops_orphaned_group_memberships(
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(feature = "private")]
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../migrations", fixtures("base"))]
async fn test_edit_auto_invite_preserves_instance_groups(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
sqlx::query(
r#"UPDATE workspace_settings
SET auto_invite = '{"instance_groups": ["eng"], "instance_groups_roles": {"eng": "developer"}}'
WHERE workspace_id = 'test-workspace'"#,
)
.execute(&db)
.await?;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let port = server.addr.port();
let base = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/w/test-workspace/workspaces");
// enable, then disable
for body in [
json!({"operator": false, "invite_all": true, "auto_add": false}),
json!({}),
] {
let resp = authed(client().post(format!("{base}/edit_auto_invite")))
.json(&body)
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200, "{body}: {}", resp.text().await?);
let auto_invite: serde_json::Value = sqlx::query_scalar(
"SELECT auto_invite FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = 'test-workspace'",
)
.fetch_one(&db)
.await?;
assert_eq!(auto_invite["instance_groups"], json!(["eng"]), "{body}");
assert_eq!(
auto_invite["instance_groups_roles"],
json!({"eng": "developer"}),
"{body}"
);
}
Ok(())
}
+2 -1
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ path = "src/lib.rs"
[features]
default = []
enterprise = ["license"]
private = ["windmill-common/private"]
private = ["windmill-common/private", "windmill-audit/private"]
parquet = ["windmill-common/parquet", "windmill-object-store/parquet"]
license = ["dep:rsa"]
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ license = ["dep:rsa"]
windmill-ai = { workspace = true, default-features = false }
windmill-alerting.workspace = true
windmill-api-auth.workspace = true
windmill-audit.workspace = true
windmill-common = { workspace = true, default-features = false }
axum.workspace = true
anyhow.workspace = true
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
/*
* Author: Ruben Fiszel
* Copyright: Windmill Labs, Inc 2022
* This file and its contents are licensed under the AGPLv3 License.
* Please see the included NOTICE for copyright information and
* LICENSE-AGPL for a copy of the license.
*/
//! Where the data table role catalog endpoints come from: the enterprise implementation, or a
//! refusal. Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature; see `windmill_common::datatable_roles_oss`.
#[cfg(all(feature = "private", feature = "enterprise"))]
pub(crate) use crate::datatable_roles_ee::{
create_datatable_role, delete_datatable_role, list_datatable_roles, update_datatable_role,
};
#[cfg(not(all(feature = "private", feature = "enterprise")))]
pub(crate) use ce::*;
// The routes stay registered so the API has one shape; each answers after authentication, before
// anything is read.
#[cfg(not(all(feature = "private", feature = "enterprise")))]
mod ce {
use windmill_api_auth::ApiAuthed;
use windmill_common::{
datatable_roles_oss::datatable_roles_unavailable as unavailable, error::Result,
};
pub(crate) async fn list_datatable_roles(_authed: ApiAuthed) -> Result<String> {
Err(unavailable())
}
pub(crate) async fn create_datatable_role(_authed: ApiAuthed) -> Result<String> {
Err(unavailable())
}
pub(crate) async fn update_datatable_role(_authed: ApiAuthed) -> Result<String> {
Err(unavailable())
}
pub(crate) async fn delete_datatable_role(_authed: ApiAuthed) -> Result<String> {
Err(unavailable())
}
}
+26
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ mod audit_logs_s3;
mod audit_logs_s3_backfill;
#[cfg(feature = "parquet")]
mod background_task;
#[cfg(all(feature = "private", feature = "enterprise"))]
mod datatable_roles_ee;
mod datatable_roles_oss;
#[cfg(feature = "private")]
mod ee;
pub mod ee_oss;
@@ -61,6 +64,7 @@ use windmill_common::{
GITHUB_APP_WEBHOOK_BASE_URL_SETTING, HTTP_ROUTE_DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ORIGINS_SETTING,
HTTP_ROUTE_WORKSPACED_ROUTE_SETTING, HUB_ACCESSIBLE_URL_SETTING, HUB_BASE_URL_SETTING,
INSTANCE_BANNER_SETTING, MAX_RETENTION_OVERRIDE_WORKSPACES,
MAX_TOKEN_EXPIRATION_DAYS_SETTING, MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM_SETTING,
RETENTION_PERIOD_SECS_OVERRIDES_SETTING, RUFF_CONFIG_SETTING, UNIQUE_ID_SETTING,
WORKSPACE_FAIRNESS_DURATION_SECS_SETTING, WORKSPACE_FAIRNESS_ENABLED_SETTING,
WORKSPACE_FAIRNESS_MAX_PERCENT_SETTING, WORKSPACE_FAIRNESS_MIN_TOTAL_SETTING,
@@ -151,6 +155,16 @@ pub fn global_service() -> Router {
"/list_custom_instance_pg_databases",
post(list_custom_instance_pg_databases),
)
.route(
"/datatable_roles",
get(datatable_roles_oss::list_datatable_roles)
.post(datatable_roles_oss::create_datatable_role),
)
.route(
"/datatable_roles/{id}",
post(datatable_roles_oss::update_datatable_role)
.delete(datatable_roles_oss::delete_datatable_role),
)
.route(
"/refresh_custom_instance_user_pwd",
post(refresh_custom_instance_user_pwd),
@@ -1182,6 +1196,12 @@ async fn run_setting_pre_write_hook(
}
}
}
MAX_TOKEN_EXPIRATION_DAYS_SETTING => {
windmill_common::global_settings::parse_max_token_expiration_days(Some(value))
.map_err(|e| {
error::Error::BadRequest(format!("{MAX_TOKEN_EXPIRATION_DAYS_SETTING}: {e}"))
})?;
}
INSTANCE_BANNER_SETTING => {
match value {
// Clearing (delete row) is handled by the caller; allow it through.
@@ -1343,6 +1363,12 @@ pub async fn get_global_setting(
&& key != HTTP_ROUTE_DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ORIGINS_SETTING
&& key != WS_BASE_URL_SETTING
&& key != INSTANCE_BANNER_SETTING
// The token form reads it to stop offering expirations the server would shorten.
&& key != MAX_TOKEN_EXPIRATION_DAYS_SETTING
// Whoever is wiring up an MCP client reads it to know whether a URL-borne token
// would be refused, and they are usually not a superadmin. Not a secret: pointing
// any MCP client at the instance discovers the same answer.
&& key != MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM_SETTING
{
require_super_admin(&db, &authed).await?;
}
+156 -25
View File
@@ -47,7 +47,10 @@ use windmill_audit::audit_oss::audit_log;
use windmill_audit::ActionKind;
use windmill_common::audit::AuditAuthor;
use windmill_common::auth::{hash_token, safe_token_prefix, TOKEN_PREFIX_LEN};
use windmill_common::global_settings::AUTOMATE_USERNAME_CREATION_SETTING;
use windmill_common::global_settings::{
load_value_from_global_settings, parse_max_token_expiration_days,
AUTOMATE_USERNAME_CREATION_SETTING, MAX_TOKEN_EXPIRATION_DAYS_SETTING,
};
use windmill_common::oauth2::InstanceEvent;
use windmill_common::per_minute_counter::PerMinuteCounter;
use windmill_common::users::truncate_token;
@@ -168,7 +171,10 @@ pub fn make_unauthed_service() -> Router {
.route("/logout", post(logout).get(logout))
.route("/is_first_time_setup", get(is_first_time_setup))
.route("/request_password_reset", post(request_password_reset))
.route("/login_link/{token}", get(consume_login_link))
.route(
"/login_link/{token}",
get(consume_login_link).post(confirm_login_link),
)
.route("/is_smtp_configured", get(is_smtp_configured))
.route(
"/is_password_login_disabled",
@@ -1703,14 +1709,25 @@ async fn delete_user(
.await?;
windmill_common::user_drafts::delete_drafts_of_email(&mut *tx, &email_to_delete).await?;
let usernames = sqlx::query_scalar!(
"DELETE FROM usr WHERE email = $1 RETURNING username",
let memberships = sqlx::query!(
"DELETE FROM usr WHERE email = $1 RETURNING username, workspace_id",
&email_to_delete
)
.fetch_all(&mut *tx)
.await?;
for username in usernames {
for row in memberships {
let username = row.username;
// A tenant list names a principal of its workspace, so the name has to be freed in every
// workspace this account belonged to: a later account taking the username would otherwise
// inherit the data table access it had.
windmill_common::workspaces::remove_datatable_tenant_in_workspace(
&mut tx,
&row.workspace_id,
&format!("u/{username}"),
)
.await?;
sqlx::query!("DELETE FROM password WHERE email = $1", &email_to_delete)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
@@ -2456,6 +2473,15 @@ pub async fn delete_workspace_user_internal(
tx: &mut Transaction<'_, Postgres>,
authed: Option<&ApiAuthed>, // None for system operations
) -> Result<()> {
// Same reasoning as the `extra_perms` sweep below: a freed username must not stay named
// anywhere that grants access, tenant lists included.
windmill_common::workspaces::remove_datatable_tenant_in_workspace(
tx,
w_id,
&format!("u/{username_to_delete}"),
)
.await?;
// ---- Clean up extra_perms referencing this user ----
let extra_perms_tables = [
"script",
@@ -3072,11 +3098,68 @@ pub async fn create_guest_session_token<'c>(
// create_token_internal is re-exported from windmill-api-auth above
/// Applies the instance-wide ceiling on how long a token a caller picks the lifetime of may
/// live (`create_token`, and `impersonate` for superadmins), returning the expiration to store:
/// the requested one while it fits, the ceiling otherwise, and the ceiling as well when none was
/// requested. Only the stored expiration is capped: tokens already stored when the setting is
/// turned on or lowered keep theirs, since the auth lookup never reads the setting.
///
/// It shortens rather than refuses because most callers do not comply on their own. The CLI
/// authorization page, `wmill user create-token` and the editor's language-server token each
/// pick a lifetime, often none at all, without reading the setting (and CLIs already installed
/// never will), so refusing would break logging in and the editor instead of the long-lived
/// tokens the setting is aimed at.
///
/// Read from `global_settings` on each call rather than cached: token creation is rare
/// enough that the round trip costs nothing, and the ceiling is then never served stale.
///
/// A token owned by a service account is exempt: in the workspace the token names, or in any
/// workspace for a workspace-less token, which has none to match. Service accounts are the
/// identity automation that needs a long-lived credential runs as. The cost is that any
/// workspace admin can create and impersonate one to hold an uncapped token, so the ceiling
/// bounds personal tokens rather than what an admin can obtain.
async fn cap_token_expiration(
db: &DB,
owner_email: &str,
workspace_id: Option<&str>,
requested: Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>,
) -> Result<Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>> {
let value = load_value_from_global_settings(db, MAX_TOKEN_EXPIRATION_DAYS_SETTING).await?;
let max_days = match parse_max_token_expiration_days(value.as_ref()) {
Ok(Some(max_days)) => max_days,
Ok(None) => return Ok(requested),
// Both write paths reject this, so only a row written around them gets here.
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!("ignoring {MAX_TOKEN_EXPIRATION_DAYS_SETTING}: {e}");
return Ok(requested);
}
};
let max = chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::days(max_days);
let is_service_account = sqlx::query_scalar!(
"SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM usr WHERE email = $1 AND is_service_account IS true
AND ($2::varchar IS NULL OR workspace_id = $2))",
owner_email,
workspace_id,
)
.fetch_one(db)
.await?
.unwrap_or(false);
if is_service_account {
return Ok(requested);
}
Ok(Some(match requested {
Some(expiration) if expiration < max => expiration,
_ => max,
}))
}
async fn create_token(
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
authed: ApiAuthed,
OptJobAuthed { job_id, .. }: OptJobAuthed,
Json(token_config): Json<NewToken>,
Json(mut token_config): Json<NewToken>,
) -> Result<(StatusCode, String)> {
forbid_elevated_job_token(&db, &authed.email, job_id).await?;
check_token_create_rate_limit(&authed.username)?;
@@ -3098,6 +3181,14 @@ async fn create_token(
windmill_api_auth::ensure_scopes_within_caller(&authed, token_config.scopes.as_deref())?;
token_config.expiration = cap_token_expiration(
&db,
&authed.email,
token_config.workspace_id.as_deref(),
token_config.expiration,
)
.await?;
let mut tx = db.begin().await?;
let token = create_token_internal(&mut *tx, &db, &authed, token_config).await?;
@@ -3154,6 +3245,7 @@ async fn impersonate(
.fetch_optional(&db)
.await?
.unwrap_or(false);
let expiration = cap_token_expiration(&db, &impersonated, None, new_token.expiration).await?;
let mut tx = db.begin().await?;
sqlx::query!(
@@ -3165,7 +3257,7 @@ async fn impersonate(
plaintext as Option<&str>,
impersonated,
new_token.label,
new_token.expiration,
expiration,
is_super_admin
)
.execute(&mut *tx)
@@ -3175,7 +3267,7 @@ async fn impersonate(
&mut *tx,
&t_hash,
new_token.label.as_deref(),
new_token.expiration,
expiration,
)
.await;
@@ -3195,9 +3287,12 @@ async fn impersonate(
}
const LOGIN_LINK_DEFAULT_TTL_S: u32 = 600;
const LOGIN_LINK_MAX_TTL_S: u32 = 900;
// Long enough for a link sent by email to still work when it is read. `require_login_type` is
// only checked at mint, so a much longer cap would need re-checking it when the link is opened.
const LOGIN_LINK_MAX_TTL_S: u32 = 7200;
const LOGIN_LINK_DEFAULT_RD: &str = "/user/workspaces";
const LOGIN_LINK_EXPIRED_PAGE: &str = "/user/login_link_expired";
const LOGIN_LINK_CONFIRM_PAGE: &str = "/user/login_link";
#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub struct NewLoginLink {
@@ -3208,6 +3303,9 @@ pub struct NewLoginLink {
/// account it created can require `pending_oauth`, so the link stops working once the
/// owner has set a password or signed in with a provider.
pub require_login_type: Option<String>,
/// Hand out a page that signs in only when its button is clicked. Mail scanners open links
/// on delivery, and opening the plain link spends it, so a link sent by email sets this.
pub confirm: Option<bool>,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
@@ -3358,11 +3456,12 @@ async fn create_login_link(
.await?;
tx.commit().await?;
let url = format!(
"{}/api/auth/login_link/{}",
(**BASE_URL.load()).clone(),
token
);
let base_url = (**BASE_URL.load()).clone();
let url = if nl.confirm.unwrap_or(false) {
format!("{base_url}{LOGIN_LINK_CONFIRM_PAGE}?token={token}")
} else {
format!("{base_url}/api/auth/login_link/{token}")
};
Ok((StatusCode::CREATED, Json(LoginLink { url, expires_at })))
}
@@ -3608,19 +3707,45 @@ async fn consume_login_link(
Path(token): Path<String>,
Query(query): Query<LoginLinkQuery>,
) -> Result<Response> {
let bounce = |reason: &str| {
Ok(login_link_redirect(format!(
"{LOGIN_LINK_EXPIRED_PAGE}?reason={reason}"
)))
};
let location = redeem_login_link(&headers, cookies, &db, &token, query.rd).await?;
Ok(login_link_redirect(location))
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
struct LoginLinkLocation {
location: String,
}
/// The confirmation page's click. It answers with where to go rather than redirecting, and the
/// page navigates there itself.
async fn confirm_login_link(
headers: axum::http::HeaderMap,
cookies: Cookies,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
Path(token): Path<String>,
) -> JsonResult<LoginLinkLocation> {
let location = redeem_login_link(&headers, cookies, &db, &token, None).await?;
Ok(Json(LoginLinkLocation { location }))
}
/// Spends the link and sets the session cookie, returning the post-login destination; or
/// returns the explanation page, with no session, when the link cannot be used.
async fn redeem_login_link(
headers: &axum::http::HeaderMap,
cookies: Cookies,
db: &DB,
token: &str,
requested_rd: Option<String>,
) -> Result<String> {
let bounce = |reason: &str| Ok(format!("{LOGIN_LINK_EXPIRED_PAGE}?reason={reason}"));
if token.len() != 32 {
return bounce("invalid");
}
let t_hash = hash_token(&token);
let t_hash = hash_token(token);
// The account is unknown until the row is read, so only the global and per-IP tiers
// apply here; a 32-char random token leaves nothing for the per-account tier to guard.
windmill_common::login_rate_limit::check_and_increment_login_attempt(
&headers,
headers,
&t_hash[..TOKEN_PREFIX_LEN],
)?;
@@ -3687,11 +3812,10 @@ async fn consume_login_link(
.await?;
tx.commit().await?;
let rd = link
Ok(link
.rd
.or_else(|| same_origin_rd(query.rd))
.unwrap_or_else(|| LOGIN_LINK_DEFAULT_RD.to_string());
Ok(login_link_redirect(rd))
.or_else(|| same_origin_rd(requested_rd))
.unwrap_or_else(|| LOGIN_LINK_DEFAULT_RD.to_string()))
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -3925,6 +4049,7 @@ async fn update_token_label(
AND NOT starts_with(label, 'embed_app:')
AND NOT starts_with(label, 'sdk_app:')
AND NOT starts_with(label, 'impersonation:')
AND NOT starts_with(label, 'cli-login:')
))
RETURNING token_prefix",
req.label.as_deref(),
@@ -3965,6 +4090,12 @@ async fn leave_workspace(
) -> Result<String> {
forbid_job_token_account_destruction(&authed)?;
let mut tx = db.begin().await?;
windmill_common::workspaces::remove_datatable_tenant_in_workspace(
&mut tx,
&w_id,
&format!("u/{}", authed.username),
)
.await?;
sqlx::query!(
"DELETE FROM usr WHERE workspace_id = $1 AND username = $2",
&w_id,
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ use windmill_api_auth::{require_super_admin, ApiAuthed};
use windmill_api_jobs::run_wait_result_internal;
use windmill_audit::audit_oss::audit_log;
use windmill_audit::ActionKind;
use windmill_common::datatable_roles::ADMIN_DATATABLE_ROLE;
use windmill_common::db::UserDB;
use windmill_common::error::{pg_error_message, Error, JsonResult, Result};
use windmill_common::jobs::{JobPayload, RawCode};
@@ -38,7 +39,11 @@ use windmill_common::runnable_settings::{ConcurrencySettingsWithCustom, Debounci
use windmill_common::scripts::ScriptLang;
use windmill_common::users::username_to_permissioned_as;
use windmill_common::worker::to_raw_value;
use windmill_common::workspaces::get_datatable_resource_from_db_unchecked;
use windmill_common::worker::SqlAnnotations;
use windmill_common::workspaces::{
ensure_can_use_datatable_role, ensure_datatable_admin_access,
get_datatable_resource_from_db_unchecked, resolve_governing_datatable, DatatableAccess,
};
use windmill_common::{PgDatabase, DB};
use windmill_git_sync::{
handle_deployment_metadata, handle_deployment_metadata_batch, DeployedObject,
@@ -86,6 +91,42 @@ pub(crate) fn routes() -> Router {
)
}
/// Refuse a migration whose role this caller may not use, before a job is pushed or a version
/// recorded.
///
/// A migration that declares `-- role <name>` runs as that role, so the caller has to be one of its
/// tenants. One that declares none runs as `admin` and reaches every object in the database
/// whatever the roles grant, so it is for the admins of the workspace that governs the data table
/// — a fork can run a migration under a role it holds, never a migration under `admin`.
///
/// The executor re-checks the role when it resolves the connection, so this is not the boundary. It
/// is what makes the refusal legible: which migration, and which role.
async fn ensure_migration_role_allowed(
db: &DB,
w_id: &str,
datatable_name: &str,
authed: &ApiAuthed,
sql: &str,
timestamp: i64,
name: &str,
) -> Result<()> {
let context = format!("Migration {timestamp} ({name})");
let access = DatatableAccess::Authed(authed.to_authed_ref());
match SqlAnnotations::datatable_role(sql)? {
Some(role) => {
ensure_can_use_datatable_role(db, w_id, datatable_name, Some(&role), &access, &context)
.await
}
None => ensure_datatable_admin_access(db, w_id, datatable_name, &access)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
Error::NotAuthorized(format!(
"{context} declares no role, so it would run as admin. {e}"
))
}),
}
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
struct AppliedMigration {
version: i64,
@@ -128,7 +169,18 @@ async fn datatable_database_arg(
.await?
.ok_or_else(|| Error::internal_err(format!("datatable {datatable_name} not found")))?;
Ok(to_raw_value(&format!("datatable://{datatable_name}")))
// `?role=admin` rather than a bare reference, so a migration that declares no `-- role` runs
// as the connection that owns the schema instead of falling through to the data table's
// default role — which is what `ensure_migration_role_allowed` gated it as, and which is the
// only role a DDL statement can be expected to succeed under. A migration that does declare a
// role overrides this: the annotation wins over the reference.
//
// A legacy name containing `?` cannot be migrated through this reference: the appended query
// makes it neither an exact name nor a parseable one. Accepted on purpose, since such names can
// no longer be created and none are expected to carry migrations.
Ok(to_raw_value(&format!(
"datatable://{datatable_name}?role={ADMIN_DATATABLE_ROLE}"
)))
}
/// Run a migration's SQL as a normal Windmill `postgresql` job, permissioned as
@@ -384,6 +436,11 @@ async fn run_datatable_migrations(
Path((w_id, datatable_name)): Path<(String, String)>,
Query(query): Query<RunDatatableMigrationsQuery>,
) -> JsonResult<RunDatatableMigrationsResult> {
// Before the admin connection is opened at all: the bookkeeping below is created and read
// through it, so a caller no role covers must be refused here rather than after the fact.
crate::datatable_permissions::ensure_reaches_datatable(&db, &w_id, &datatable_name, &authed)
.await?;
audit_log(
&db,
&authed,
@@ -440,6 +497,16 @@ async fn run_datatable_migrations(
if applied_versions.contains(&m.timestamp) {
continue;
}
ensure_migration_role_allowed(
&db,
&w_id,
&datatable_name,
&authed,
&m.code_up,
m.timestamp,
&m.name,
)
.await?;
run_datatable_migration_job(&db, &user_db, &authed, &w_id, &database_arg, &m.code_up)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
@@ -506,6 +573,11 @@ async fn rollback_datatable_migrations(
Path((w_id, datatable_name)): Path<(String, String)>,
Query(query): Query<RollbackDatatableMigrationsQuery>,
) -> JsonResult<RollbackDatatableMigrationsResult> {
// Before the admin connection is opened at all: the bookkeeping below is created and read
// through it, so a caller no role covers must be refused here rather than after the fact.
crate::datatable_permissions::ensure_reaches_datatable(&db, &w_id, &datatable_name, &authed)
.await?;
audit_log(
&db,
&authed,
@@ -588,6 +660,17 @@ async fn rollback_datatable_migrations(
))
})?;
ensure_migration_role_allowed(
&db,
&w_id,
&datatable_name,
&authed,
&code_down,
version,
&definition.name,
)
.await?;
let database_arg = datatable_database_arg(&db, &w_id, &datatable_name).await?;
run_datatable_migration_job(&db, &user_db, &authed, &w_id, &database_arg, &code_down)
.await
@@ -748,10 +831,15 @@ async fn read_applied_datatable_versions(
/// List a data table's migrations annotated with whether each has been applied.
async fn datatable_migrations_status(
_authed: ApiAuthed,
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
Path((w_id, datatable_name)): Path<(String, String)>,
) -> JsonResult<DatatableMigrationsStatusResult> {
// Reads `_wm_migrations` through the data table's admin connection, so it answers to the same
// question as running one: may you reach this data table at all.
crate::datatable_permissions::ensure_reaches_datatable(&db, &w_id, &datatable_name, &authed)
.await?;
let enabled = datatable_migrations_enabled(&db, &w_id, &datatable_name).await?;
if !enabled {
return Ok(Json(DatatableMigrationsStatusResult {
@@ -1431,6 +1519,15 @@ async fn generate_initial_datatable_migration(
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
Path((w_id, datatable_name)): Path<(String, String)>,
) -> JsonResult<DatatableMigration> {
// Returns a `pg_dump` of the whole schema and writes into the data table's own bookkeeping, so
// it answers to the workspace that governs it rather than to whoever is asking.
ensure_datatable_admin_access(
&db,
&w_id,
&datatable_name,
&DatatableAccess::Authed(authed.to_authed_ref()),
)
.await?;
validate_datatable_path_segment(&datatable_name)?;
ensure_datatable_migrations_enabled(&db, &w_id, &datatable_name).await?;
@@ -1601,9 +1698,21 @@ pub(crate) struct DatatableRename {
pub(crate) to: String,
}
async fn resolve_datatable_pg(db: &DB, w_id: &str, datatable: &str) -> Result<PgDatabase> {
/// The database whose `_wm_migrations` a rename or delete of `datatable` in `w_id` should touch —
/// `None` when that is somebody else's.
///
/// A fork's entry points at the workspace that governs the data table, so renaming or removing it
/// changes what the fork calls the data table and nothing more. Following the pointer here would
/// let a fork admin relabel or wipe the *governing* workspace's migration bookkeeping through
/// their own settings form, and the parent would then re-run every migration from zero.
async fn resolve_datatable_pg(db: &DB, w_id: &str, datatable: &str) -> Result<Option<PgDatabase>> {
let governing = resolve_governing_datatable(db, w_id, datatable).await?;
if governing.workspace_id != w_id {
return Ok(None);
}
let db_resource = get_datatable_resource_from_db_unchecked(db, w_id, datatable).await?;
serde_json::from_value(db_resource)
.map(Some)
.map_err(|e| Error::internal_err(format!("Failed to parse database credentials: {}", e)))
}
@@ -1621,7 +1730,9 @@ fn ignore_missing_wm_migrations(e: tokio_postgres::Error) -> Result<()> {
/// Drop a data table's rows from its own database's `_wm_migrations`.
async fn remote_forget_datatable_migrations(db: &DB, w_id: &str, datatable: &str) -> Result<()> {
let pg_db = resolve_datatable_pg(db, w_id, datatable).await?;
let Some(pg_db) = resolve_datatable_pg(db, w_id, datatable).await? else {
return Ok(());
};
let (client, connection) = pg_db.connect(Some(db)).await?;
tokio::spawn(async move {
let _ = connection.await;
@@ -1646,7 +1757,9 @@ async fn remote_rename_datatable_migrations(
from: &str,
to: &str,
) -> Result<()> {
let pg_db = resolve_datatable_pg(db, w_id, resolve_by).await?;
let Some(pg_db) = resolve_datatable_pg(db, w_id, resolve_by).await? else {
return Ok(());
};
let (client, connection) = pg_db.connect(Some(db)).await?;
tokio::spawn(async move {
let _ = connection.await;
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
/*
* Author: Ruben Fiszel
* Copyright: Windmill Labs, Inc 2022
* This file and its contents are licensed under the AGPLv3 License.
* Please see the included NOTICE for copyright information and
* LICENSE-AGPL for a copy of the license.
*/
//! Who may connect to a data table as which role.
//!
//! The decision lives on the data table entry of the workspace that governs it, which is not
//! necessarily the workspace asking: a fork's entry points at its parent's, and everything here
//! resolves through that pointer first. Nothing in this module runs SQL against the data table —
//! a save is tenant lists and a default, and the Postgres roles themselves are the instance
//! catalog's business.
use axum::{routing::get, Router};
use windmill_api_auth::ApiAuthed;
use windmill_common::error::Result;
use windmill_common::workspaces::GoverningDatatable;
use windmill_common::DB;
use crate::datatable_permissions_oss as roles;
pub(crate) fn routes() -> Router {
Router::new()
.route(
"/datatable_permissions/{datatable_name}",
get(roles::get_datatable_permissions).post(roles::set_datatable_permissions),
)
.route(
"/datatable_usable_roles/{datatable_name}",
get(roles::list_usable_datatable_roles),
)
}
/// Administering a data table — its permissions, its migrations that declare no role, its exports
/// — is for the admins of the workspace that governs it. A fork can use the data table; it never
/// administers it.
// The gate for whatever administers a data table under roles, which the routes of this module alone
// do not always reach.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub(crate) async fn ensure_governs_datatable(
db: &DB,
authed: &ApiAuthed,
w_id: &str,
governing: &GoverningDatatable,
) -> Result<()> {
roles::ensure_governs_datatable(db, authed, w_id, governing).await
}
/// Refuse a caller that no tenant of this data table covers.
///
/// The bookkeeping endpoints below open the data table's `admin` connection to read or create
/// `_wm_migrations` before they know which migration will run — so without this, someone covered
/// by no role at all can still force admin-backed reads and writes on a database they may not
/// touch. It asks only "may you reach this data table as anything"; which role a given migration
/// runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that.
pub(crate) async fn ensure_reaches_datatable(
db: &DB,
w_id: &str,
datatable_name: &str,
authed: &ApiAuthed,
) -> Result<()> {
roles::ensure_reaches_datatable(db, w_id, datatable_name, authed).await
}
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
/*
* Author: Ruben Fiszel
* Copyright: Windmill Labs, Inc 2022
* This file and its contents are licensed under the AGPLv3 License.
* Please see the included NOTICE for copyright information and
* LICENSE-AGPL for a copy of the license.
*/
//! Where the data table permissions endpoints and their gates come from: the enterprise
//! implementation, or a refusal. Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature; see
//! `windmill_common::datatable_roles_oss`.
#[cfg(all(feature = "private", feature = "enterprise"))]
pub(crate) use crate::datatable_permissions_ee::{
ensure_governs_datatable, ensure_reaches_datatable, get_datatable_permissions,
list_usable_datatable_roles, set_datatable_permissions,
};
#[cfg(not(all(feature = "private", feature = "enterprise")))]
pub(crate) use ce::*;
#[cfg(not(all(feature = "private", feature = "enterprise")))]
mod ce {
use windmill_api_auth::ApiAuthed;
use windmill_common::{
datatable_roles_oss::datatable_roles_unavailable as unavailable,
error::Result,
workspaces::{resolve_governing_datatable, GoverningDatatable},
DB,
};
/// Nobody administers a data table's roles without them.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub(crate) async fn ensure_governs_datatable(
_db: &DB,
_authed: &ApiAuthed,
_w_id: &str,
_governing: &GoverningDatatable,
) -> Result<()> {
Err(unavailable())
}
/// A data table not under roles is reached as it was before roles existed. One under roles is
/// refused: no role of it can be connected as.
pub(crate) async fn ensure_reaches_datatable(
db: &DB,
w_id: &str,
datatable_name: &str,
_authed: &ApiAuthed,
) -> Result<()> {
let governing = resolve_governing_datatable(db, w_id, datatable_name).await?;
if governing.datatable.permissions.is_none() {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(unavailable())
}
}
// The routes stay registered so the API has one shape; each answers after authentication,
// before anything is read.
pub(crate) async fn get_datatable_permissions(_authed: ApiAuthed) -> Result<String> {
Err(unavailable())
}
pub(crate) async fn set_datatable_permissions(_authed: ApiAuthed) -> Result<String> {
Err(unavailable())
}
pub(crate) async fn list_usable_datatable_roles(_authed: ApiAuthed) -> Result<String> {
Err(unavailable())
}
}
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
pub mod ai_session_backups;
pub mod data_metrics;
pub mod datatable_migrations;
pub mod datatable_permissions;
pub mod datatable_permissions_oss;
pub mod deployment_requests;
pub mod workspaces;
pub mod workspaces_extra;
@@ -9,3 +11,6 @@ pub mod workspaces_oss;
#[cfg(feature = "private")]
pub mod workspaces_ee;
#[cfg(all(feature = "private", feature = "enterprise"))]
pub mod datatable_permissions_ee;
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn change_workspace_id(
// Duplicate workspace settings (keep copy in old workspace for reference)
info!("Duplicating workspace_settings table");
sqlx::query!(
"INSERT INTO workspace_settings (workspace_id, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, git_credentials, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled, guest_jwt_public_key, guest_jwt_jwks_url) SELECT $1, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, git_credentials, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled, guest_jwt_public_key, guest_jwt_jwks_url FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = $2",
"INSERT INTO workspace_settings (workspace_id, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, git_credentials, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled, guest_jwt_public_key, guest_jwt_jwks_url, add_admins_and_developers_to_forks) SELECT $1, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, git_credentials, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled, guest_jwt_public_key, guest_jwt_jwks_url, add_admins_and_developers_to_forks FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = $2",
&rw.new_id,
&old_id
)
@@ -492,6 +492,30 @@ pub(crate) async fn change_workspace_id(
.fetch_all(&mut *tx)
.await?;
// A fork's data table entry names the workspace that governs it by id, so the rename has to
// follow there too — anywhere, not just in the reparented children: a detached workspace can
// point at this one without being its fork. Left behind, the pointer resolves to the archived
// shell and every job through it stops.
info!("Re-pointing data table references to the new workspace id");
sqlx::query!(
r#"UPDATE workspace_settings ws
SET datatable = (
SELECT jsonb_set(ws.datatable, '{datatables}', jsonb_object_agg(
dt.key,
CASE WHEN dt.value->'reference'->>'workspace_id' = $2
THEN jsonb_set(dt.value, '{reference,workspace_id}', to_jsonb($1::text))
ELSE dt.value END
))
FROM jsonb_each(ws.datatable->'datatables') dt
)
WHERE jsonb_typeof(ws.datatable->'datatables') = 'object'
AND ws.datatable::text LIKE '%"reference"%'"#,
&rw.new_id,
&old_id,
)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
info!("Updating workspace_protection_rule table");
sqlx::query!(
"UPDATE workspace_protection_rule SET workspace_id = $1 WHERE workspace_id = $2",
@@ -971,6 +995,22 @@ pub(crate) async fn delete_workspace(
// but the destructive cleanup itself runs only after the commit below: a delete that
// fails mid-way must never leave a live workspace with its fork data destroyed and no
// registry row to retry from. Read-only: nothing is dropped here.
// Read before the delete: another workspace's data table entry can point at one of this
// workspace's, and deleting the workspace it names leaves that pointer resolving to nothing.
// Nothing sweeps them — turning them back into copies would hand each fork the database
// outright — so the deleter is told which data tables they just stranded.
let stranded_pointers = sqlx::query!(
r#"SELECT ws.workspace_id AS "workspace_id!", dt.key AS "datatable!"
FROM workspace_settings ws
CROSS JOIN LATERAL jsonb_each(COALESCE(ws.datatable->'datatables', '{}'::jsonb)) dt
WHERE dt.value->'reference'->>'workspace_id' = $1
ORDER BY ws.workspace_id, dt.key"#,
&w_id,
)
.fetch_all(&db)
.await
.unwrap_or_default();
let fork_ducklake_cleanups = prepare_fork_ducklake_cleanups(&db, &w_id, None)
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|e| {
@@ -1289,7 +1329,23 @@ pub(crate) async fn delete_workspace(
tracing::warn!("failed to broadcast fork lineage change: {e:#}");
}
Ok(format!("Deleted workspace {}", &w_id))
if stranded_pointers.is_empty() {
Ok(format!("Deleted workspace {}", &w_id))
} else {
let stranded = stranded_pointers
.iter()
.map(|r| format!("{}/{}", r.workspace_id, r.datatable))
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(", ");
Ok(format!(
concat!(
"Deleted workspace {}. These data tables were governed by it and no longer ",
"resolve: {}. Their databases still exist; a superadmin can point them at ",
"another workspace's data table."
),
&w_id, stranded
))
}
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -1343,15 +1399,20 @@ pub async fn drop_forked_datatable_databases(
let mut errors: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
for dt_name in &req.datatable_names {
let dt = match datatables.get(dt_name) {
Some(dt) if dt.forked_from.is_some() => dt,
// Only a clone is droppable, and a clone is terminal by construction: a kept data table is
// a pointer at the parent's database, which this fork does not own.
let database = match datatables.get(dt_name) {
Some(dt) if dt.forked_from.is_some() => match dt.database.as_ref() {
Some(database) => database,
None => continue,
},
_ => continue,
};
if dt.database.resource_type
if database.resource_type
== windmill_common::workspaces::DataTableCatalogResourceType::Instance
{
let db_to_drop = &dt.database.resource_path;
let db_to_drop = &database.resource_path;
if !db_to_drop.starts_with("wm_fork_") {
errors.push(format!(
"Refusing to drop instance database '{}' for datatable://{}: name does not start with 'wm_fork_'",
+340 -5
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
openapi: "3.0.3"
info:
version: 1.814.0
version: 1.815.0
title: Windmill API
contact:
@@ -529,6 +529,30 @@ paths:
responses:
"302":
description: redirected to the post-login destination, or to /user/login_link_expired when the link is used, expired or unknown
post:
security: []
summary: consume a single-use login link from its confirmation page, set the session cookie and answer where to go
operationId: confirmLoginLink
tags:
- user
parameters:
- name: token
in: path
required: true
schema:
type: string
responses:
"200":
description: the post-login destination, or /user/login_link_expired when the link is used, expired or unknown
content:
application/json:
schema:
type: object
required:
- location
properties:
location:
type: string
/auth/reset_password:
post:
@@ -1588,6 +1612,89 @@ paths:
additionalProperties:
$ref: "#/components/schemas/CustomInstanceDb"
/settings/datatable_roles:
get:
summary: list the instance's data table roles
operationId: listInstanceDatatableRoles
tags:
- setting
responses:
"200":
description: the instance role catalog
content:
application/json:
schema:
type: array
items:
$ref: "#/components/schemas/InstanceDatatableRole"
post:
summary: create a data table role on the instance's Postgres cluster
operationId: createInstanceDatatableRole
tags:
- setting
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/json:
schema:
type: object
required: [name]
properties:
name:
type: string
responses:
"200":
description: the created role
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: "#/components/schemas/InstanceDatatableRole"
/settings/datatable_roles/{id}:
post:
summary: rename a data table role or turn its login on and off
operationId: updateInstanceDatatableRole
tags:
- setting
parameters:
- in: path
name: id
required: true
schema:
type: string
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/json:
schema:
type: object
properties:
name:
type: string
enabled:
type: boolean
responses:
"200":
description: the updated role
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: "#/components/schemas/InstanceDatatableRole"
delete:
summary: drop a data table role from the cluster and from every workspace that named it
operationId: deleteInstanceDatatableRole
tags:
- setting
parameters:
- in: path
name: id
required: true
schema:
type: string
responses:
"200":
description: deleted
/settings/setup_custom_instance_pg_database/{name}:
post:
summary: Runs CREATE DATABASE on the Windmill Postgres and grants access to the custom_instance_user
@@ -3983,9 +4090,13 @@ paths:
guest_access_enabled:
type: boolean
description: Whether this workspace admits guest sessions. An app's own `guest` execution mode is inert while this is false.
add_admins_and_developers_to_forks:
type: boolean
description: Whether every new fork of this workspace starts with its admins and developers as members, keeping their role.
required:
- workspace_id
- guest_access_enabled
- add_admins_and_developers_to_forks
/w/{workspace}/workspaces/get_settings:
get:
@@ -4076,6 +4187,9 @@ paths:
guest_jwt_jwks_url:
type: string
description: JWKS URL a guest JWT (`jwt_guest_`) is verified against for this workspace. Mutually exclusive with `guest_jwt_public_key`.
add_admins_and_developers_to_forks:
type: boolean
description: Whether every new fork of this workspace starts with its admins and developers as members, keeping their role.
/w/{workspace}/workspaces/get_deploy_to:
get:
@@ -5141,7 +5255,7 @@ paths:
type: array
items:
type: object
required: [name, resource_type, resource_path]
required: [name, resource_type, resource_path, permissioned]
properties:
name:
type: string
@@ -5150,6 +5264,97 @@ paths:
enum: [postgres, instance]
resource_path:
type: string
governing_workspace_id:
type: string
permissioned:
type: boolean
/w/{workspace}/workspaces/datatable_permissions/{datatable_name}:
get:
summary: get who may connect to a data table as which role
operationId: getDatatablePermissions
tags:
- workspace
parameters:
- $ref: "#/components/parameters/WorkspaceId"
- name: datatable_name
in: path
required: true
schema:
type: string
responses:
"200":
description: the data table's roles and their tenants
content:
application/json:
schema:
$ref: "#/components/schemas/DatatablePermissions"
post:
summary: set who may connect to a data table as which role
operationId: setDatatablePermissions
tags:
- workspace
parameters:
- $ref: "#/components/parameters/WorkspaceId"
- name: datatable_name
in: path
required: true
schema:
type: string
requestBody:
required: true
content:
application/json:
schema:
type: object
required: [permissioned]
properties:
permissioned:
type: boolean
default_role:
type: string
roles:
type: array
items:
$ref: "#/components/schemas/DatatableRoleTenants"
responses:
"200":
description: status
content:
text/plain:
schema:
type: string
/w/{workspace}/workspaces/datatable_usable_roles/{datatable_name}:
get:
summary: list the data table roles the caller may connect as
operationId: listUsableDatatableRoles
tags:
- workspace
parameters:
- $ref: "#/components/parameters/WorkspaceId"
- name: datatable_name
in: path
required: true
schema:
type: string
responses:
"200":
description: usable roles
content:
application/json:
schema:
type: object
required: [permissioned, roles, default_role]
properties:
permissioned:
type: boolean
roles:
type: array
items:
type: string
default_role:
type: string
/w/{workspace}/workspaces/list_datatable_schemas:
get:
@@ -5331,7 +5536,22 @@ paths:
description: status
content:
application/json:
schema: {}
schema:
type: object
properties:
stranded_references:
description: >-
Data tables in other workspaces that were governed by one this save deleted
and no longer resolve.
type: array
items:
type: object
required: [workspace_id, datatable]
properties:
workspace_id:
type: string
datatable:
type: string
/w/{workspace}/workspaces/run_datatable_migrations/{datatable_name}:
post:
@@ -6100,6 +6320,39 @@ paths:
schema:
type: string
/w/{workspace}/workspaces/edit_add_admins_and_developers_to_forks:
post:
summary: choose whether new forks of this workspace start with its admins and developers
description: >-
When on, every fork created from this workspace gets the workspace's admins and
developers as members, with the role they hold here; operators, disabled users and
service accounts are left out. The setting is copied into each fork, so forks of a
fork follow it too. Off by default. Workspace-admin gated.
operationId: editAddAdminsAndDevelopersToForks
tags:
- workspace
parameters:
- $ref: "#/components/parameters/WorkspaceId"
requestBody:
description: Whether new forks start with this workspace's admins and developers
required: true
content:
application/json:
schema:
type: object
properties:
add_admins_and_developers_to_forks:
type: boolean
required:
- add_admins_and_developers_to_forks
responses:
"200":
description: status
content:
text/plain:
schema:
type: string
/w/{workspace}/workspaces/edit_guest_jwt_key:
post:
summary: set the key guest JWTs are verified against for this workspace
@@ -6564,7 +6817,7 @@ paths:
type: string
expires_in_s:
type: integer
description: link lifetime in seconds, at most 900 (default 600)
description: link lifetime in seconds, at most 7200 (default 600)
rd:
type: string
description: same-origin path the browser lands on after login (default /user/workspaces)
@@ -6574,6 +6827,12 @@ paths:
mint only while the account still has this login type (for example
pending_oauth), so a link stops working once the owner has set a password
or signed in with a provider
confirm:
type: boolean
description: >-
return a /user/login_link page that signs in only when its button is
clicked, instead of a link spent by opening it; set it for links sent by
email, which mail scanners open on delivery (default false)
responses:
"201":
description: login link minted
@@ -33400,6 +33659,66 @@ components:
- ducklake
- datatable
InstanceDatatableRole:
type: object
required: [id, name, enabled]
properties:
id:
type: string
name:
type: string
enabled:
type: boolean
DatatableRoleTenants:
type: object
required: [id, tenants]
properties:
id:
type: string
name:
type: string
tenants:
type: array
items:
type: string
DatatablePermissions:
type: object
required: [supported, permissioned, default_role, roles, editable, available_roles]
properties:
supported:
type: boolean
description: >-
Whether this data table can be put under roles at all. Only one backed by the
instance database can: a role is a login on that cluster.
permissioned:
type: boolean
default_role:
type: string
roles:
type: array
items:
$ref: "#/components/schemas/DatatableRoleTenants"
governing_workspace_id:
type: string
editable:
type: boolean
available_roles:
type: array
items:
$ref: "#/components/schemas/InstanceDatatableRole"
ungoverned_reachers:
type: array
items:
type: object
required: [workspace_id, datatable]
properties:
workspace_id:
type: string
datatable:
type: string
CustomInstanceDb:
type: object
required:
@@ -34482,6 +34801,9 @@ components:
nullable: true
disabled:
type: boolean
is_service_account:
type: boolean
description: Whether this membership is a service account.
required:
- id
- name
@@ -35448,9 +35770,11 @@ components:
type: object
additionalProperties:
type: object
required: [database]
properties:
database:
description: >-
Set on an entry that owns its database. Absent on a fork's entry, which points at
another workspace's data table instead.
type: object
properties:
resource_type:
@@ -35462,6 +35786,17 @@ components:
type: string
required:
- resource_type
reference:
description: >-
The workspace and data table that govern this one. Server-owned: written by fork
creation, and carried across a settings save whatever the request says.
type: object
required: [workspace_id, datatable]
properties:
workspace_id:
type: string
datatable:
type: string
migrations_enabled:
type: boolean
description: Whether the SQL migrations feature is opted in for this data table
+6
View File
@@ -567,6 +567,9 @@ async fn set_config(
};
let mut tx = user_db.begin(&authed).await?;
if matches!(nc.trigger_kind, TriggerKind::Postgres) {
windmill_common::datatable_roles::lock_datatable_streams(&mut *tx, false).await?;
}
sqlx::query!(
r#"
@@ -614,6 +617,9 @@ async fn ping_config(
)>,
) -> Result<()> {
let mut tx = user_db.begin(&authed).await?;
if matches!(trigger_kind, TriggerKind::Postgres) {
windmill_common::datatable_roles::lock_datatable_streams(&mut *tx, false).await?;
}
sqlx::query!(
r#"
+4 -3
View File
@@ -8365,8 +8365,9 @@ pub async fn run_wait_result_flow_by_version(
/// job lives, in particular DuckDB, which runs in-process in the worker.
///
/// What it does permit is any statement against the workspace's data tables, writes and DDL
/// included: the helper's body is an unrestricted SQL template and data tables carry no
/// per-user ACL. Narrowing that is a separate decision from this exemption.
/// included: the helper's body is an unrestricted SQL template. What that reaches is the
/// operator's own data table role — the preview job is permissioned as them, so the executor
/// resolves it under their tenancy like any other job.
///
/// The database argument is only half the target: the executor honors a `-- database`
/// directive in the SQL over it, and `-- s3` redirects the result set, so both are refused.
@@ -8598,7 +8599,7 @@ async fn run_inline_preview_script(
#[cfg(not(feature = "run_inline"))]
async fn run_inline_preview_script() -> error::Result<Response> {
Err(error::Error::InternalErr(
"inline preview requires the worker feature".to_string(),
"inline preview requires the run_inline feature on the worker".to_string(),
))
}
+5 -3
View File
@@ -560,7 +560,7 @@ pub async fn run_server(
if server_mode || mcp_mode {
use mcp::{
add_www_authenticate_header, add_www_authenticate_header_gateway,
extract_workspace_from_token,
extract_workspace_from_token, reject_token_query_param,
};
let (mcp_router, mcp_cancellation_token) = setup_mcp_server(
db.clone(),
@@ -573,15 +573,17 @@ pub async fn run_server(
let workspaced_mcp_router = mcp_router
.clone()
.route_layer(from_extractor::<ApiAuthed>())
.layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(reject_token_query_param))
.layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(add_www_authenticate_header))
.layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(extract_and_store_workspace_id));
// Gateway MCP router — resolves workspace from token
let gateway_mcp_router = mcp_router
.route_layer(from_extractor::<ApiAuthed>())
.layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(extract_workspace_from_token))
.layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(reject_token_query_param))
.layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(
add_www_authenticate_header_gateway,
))
.layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(extract_workspace_from_token));
));
(
workspaced_mcp_router,
gateway_mcp_router,
+28 -2
View File
@@ -43,11 +43,14 @@ use axum::{
extract::{Extension, Path},
http::Request,
middleware::Next,
response::Response,
response::{IntoResponse, Response},
routing::get,
Json, Router,
};
use windmill_common::{auth::hash_token, db::GatewayWorkspaceId, error::JsonResult};
use windmill_common::{
auth::hash_token, db::GatewayWorkspaceId, error::JsonResult,
global_settings::MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM,
};
// McpAuth impl for ApiAuthed is in windmill-api-auth (same crate as the type)
@@ -446,6 +449,29 @@ pub async fn add_www_authenticate_header(
}
}
/// Middleware refusing a credential carried in the MCP URL once the instance sets
/// `mcp_disable_token_query_param`. Sits outside everything that reads the token, so neither
/// the gateway lookup nor `ApiAuthed` ever sees it, and inside the `WWW-Authenticate` layer,
/// whose header is what sends the client into the OAuth flow instead. Refused rather than
/// ignored: the URL leaked the token whether or not the request used it.
pub async fn reject_token_query_param(request: Request<axum::body::Body>, next: Next) -> Response {
let carries_token = MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed)
&& request
.uri()
.query()
.is_some_and(|q| url::form_urlencoded::parse(q.as_bytes()).any(|(k, _)| k == "token"));
if carries_token {
return (
axum::http::StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
"This instance does not accept a token in the MCP URL. Remove the token query \
parameter and let your client sign in through OAuth, or send the token in an \
Authorization header.",
)
.into_response();
}
next.run(request).await
}
/// Extract the bearer token from either the `Authorization` header or the
/// `?token=` query parameter (MCP clients commonly pass it in the URL).
fn extract_gateway_token(request: &Request<axum::body::Body>) -> Option<String> {

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