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Author SHA1 Message Date
Diego Imbert 7577c55b13 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/datatable-external-instance-4' into datatable-external-instance-ui 2026-09-18 01:03:57 +02:00
Diego Imbert 51224582c1 Merge commit '2661dadba63efcc0c5db88a7942d66caf34f20b9' into HEAD
# Conflicts:
#	backend/ee-repo-ref.txt
2026-09-18 01:00:23 +02:00
Diego Imbert 2661dadba6 Merge commit '8c554ef1337aa6cd99ab869443dfd30becc65a36' into HEAD 2026-09-18 01:00:09 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 8c554ef133 fix(datatables): take the fork data table lock once, before the external cluster's
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 01:00:06 +02:00
Diego Imbert cdd681c029 Merge commit '154bade187169ec5c403d300a160556b768a0ead' into HEAD 2026-09-18 00:58:35 +02:00
Diego Imbert 154bade187 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/fork-database-authorization' into HEAD 2026-09-18 00:58:33 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 e550374f06 fix(datatables): migrate fork reservations on workspace rename, and lock the parent's data tables for the whole fork
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 00:58:19 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 57211d6c95 fix(datatables): keep only the most recently used DuckDB root certificate files
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-18 00:55:35 +02:00
Diego Imbert 0dbf5eef74 Merge commit 'addd77eaf4' into HEAD
# Conflicts:
#	backend/ee-repo-ref.txt
2026-09-18 00:55:35 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 addd77eaf4 fix(datatables): create external databases only on a cluster setup succeeded on, and document the registry reader
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 18:43:49 +02:00
Diego Imbert 7f5628e775 Merge commit 'eab084b36fe14ecee3ecc9a78fb079760de133b9' into HEAD
# Conflicts:
#	backend/windmill-common/src/lib.rs
2026-09-17 18:43:49 +02:00
Diego Imbert eab084b36f Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/fork-database-authorization' into HEAD 2026-09-17 18:41:27 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 4cba79b7f0 fix(datatables): authenticate instance database setup before writing its status, and keep a fork reservation across it
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 18:41:11 +02:00
Diego Imbert 8e780a7923 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/datatable-external-instance-4' into datatable-external-instance-ui 2026-09-17 18:25:57 +02:00
Diego Imbert 3fdb3047a7 Merge commit '5dfb2f30f74cedaae9f113383e42d3a35cde5189' into HEAD
# Conflicts:
#	backend/ee-repo-ref.txt
#	backend/windmill-common/src/datatable_roles.rs
2026-09-17 18:23:38 +02:00
Diego Imbert 5dfb2f30f7 Merge commit '76a10f8ee8' into HEAD
# Conflicts:
#	backend/ee-repo-ref.txt
#	backend/windmill-common/src/lib.rs
2026-09-17 18:22:16 +02:00
Diego Imbert 76a10f8ee8 Merge commit 'c9e2246e1c2480135884c9b3dcace11da0907dba' into HEAD
# Conflicts:
#	backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces.rs
#	backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces_extra.rs
2026-09-17 18:21:18 +02:00
Diego Imbert c9e2246e1c Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/fork-database-authorization' into HEAD 2026-09-17 18:17:06 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 b68768084e fix(datatables): bind fork database copies to their workspace, and count every use before dropping one
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 18:16:48 +02:00
Diego Imbert 4a0d7c0c29 Merge commit 'd62807e9edc553b1eb08c10ce28521a71007a263' into HEAD 2026-09-17 18:04:22 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 d62807e9ed fix(datatables): stop counting storage-only fork cleanup rows as uses of an external database
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 18:04:19 +02:00
Diego Imbert 696b4ab5f8 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/datatable-external-instance-4' into datatable-external-instance-ui 2026-09-17 16:37:27 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 48f026eb0f fix(datatables): refuse rolling back while external data tables are under roles, and type external_instance in the CLI
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 16:35:45 +02:00
Diego Imbert 0e659898f3 Merge commit 'a296ca016a' into HEAD
# Conflicts:
#	backend/ee-repo-ref.txt
2026-09-17 16:35:45 +02:00
Diego Imbert a296ca016a Merge commit '7c16d482fd' into HEAD
# Conflicts:
#	backend/ee-repo-ref.txt
2026-09-17 16:34:50 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 7c16d482fd fix(datatables): refuse fork cleanup of an external database another workspace uses
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 16:34:14 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 947e44fe49 fix(settings): show the server's reason when saving instance settings fails
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 16:26:29 +02:00
Diego Imbert 489493dba2 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/datatable-external-instance-4' into datatable-external-instance-ui 2026-09-17 16:18:12 +02:00
Diego Imbert c55ff3141c Merge commit '5eec203099ba1034039f8b52e81400078cac919d' into HEAD 2026-09-17 16:17:18 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 5eec203099 fix(datatables): keep certificate verification when DuckDB attaches an external data table
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 16:17:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 0b3882f2b2 fix(datatables): keep certificate verification when DuckDB attaches an external data table
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 16:17:02 +02:00
Diego Imbert 58731b1828 Merge commit '53d62dd399' into HEAD
# Conflicts:
#	backend/ee-repo-ref.txt
2026-09-17 16:17:02 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 5624d350d5 feat(datatables): manage the external instance cluster's data table roles from the UI
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 16:09:25 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 53d62dd399 fix(datatables): register external fork catalogs under the lifecycle lock, and keep certificate verification in DuckDB attaches
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 16:07:40 +02:00
Diego Imbert e17b76c255 Merge commit '5ddaee5b78' into HEAD
# Conflicts:
#	backend/ee-repo-ref.txt
2026-09-17 16:07:40 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 5ddaee5b78 fix(datatables): write the external cluster setting under the lifecycle lock, and check fork targets are registered
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 16:04:18 +02:00
Diego Imbert cfada61f41 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/datatable-external-instance-4' into datatable-external-instance-ui 2026-09-17 16:00:06 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 0406f133c5 feat(datatables): per-cluster data table role catalogs, with roles on the external instance cluster
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 15:59:22 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 aebae79397 feat(datatables): configure the external instance cluster and pick its databases from the UI
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 15:45:22 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 b62d8b246a fix(datatables): protect external databases pending fork cleanup, and describe Ducklake usage in the API
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 15:30:25 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 3981b2eb1b fix(datatables): refuse repointing the external cluster while it is in use, and keep verify-ca working for pg_dump
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 15:28:31 +02:00
Diego Imbert 5bc2f13565 Merge commit '3981b2eb1b3bf77cdc1a5cbf43090e6b9706aa1f' into datatable-external-instance-3 2026-09-17 15:28:31 +02:00
Diego Imbert a928253af0 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/datatable-roles-redesign-part-2' into datatable-roles-redesign-part-4
# Conflicts:
#	backend/windmill-common/src/workspaces.rs
2026-09-17 15:22:45 +02:00
Diego Imbert 5d8f031cf6 Merge branch 'datatable-roles-redesign' into datatable-roles-redesign-part-2 2026-09-17 15:22:26 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 8a7f364cfe fix(datatables): hold the parent's settings while a fork points at its data tables
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 13:29:35 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 ee176e24d5 perf(datatables): resolve a workspace's data tables per pointer hop, not per entry
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 13:04:26 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 4bdc5a9e20 fix(datatables): drop a DuckDB data table secret once its ATTACH has used it
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 12:17:30 +02:00
Diego Imbert 0c53990d18 Merge commit '9b0046d8671697e6f6568c89170052367139d157' into datatable-external-instance-3
# Conflicts:
#	backend/ee-repo-ref.txt
#	backend/windmill-common/src/external_instance_pg.rs
2026-09-17 11:50:21 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 9b0046d867 docs(datatables): state the authorization contract of external database usage lookups
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 11:50:10 +02:00
Diego Imbert 1f78ce77f5 Merge commit 'dbe0230f483bbe10aeca055c4d39506fea41459d' into HEAD
# Conflicts:
#	backend/ee-repo-ref.txt
2026-09-17 11:50:00 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 dbe0230f48 fix(datatables): never grant CREATEROLE to custom_instance_user on the external cluster
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 11:49:20 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 67f488c676 feat(datatables): Ducklake catalogs on the external instance cluster
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 11:47:25 +02:00
Diego Imbert ced4913b33 Merge commit 'b3a3f1cf5a0e6f97af2679c8abf640c6b832d7db' into datatable-external-instance-2
# Conflicts:
#	backend/ee-repo-ref.txt
2026-09-17 11:34:32 +02:00
Diego Imbert b3a3f1cf5a Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/datatable-roles-redesign-part-4' into HEAD
# Conflicts:
#	backend/ee-repo-ref.txt
2026-09-17 11:34:28 +02:00
Diego Imbert 92e51f19aa Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/datatable-roles-redesign-part-2' into datatable-roles-redesign-part-4
# Conflicts:
#	backend/ee-repo-ref.txt
#	backend/windmill-api-integration-tests/tests/datatable_roles.rs
#	backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/datatable_permissions_oss.rs
#	backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/workspaces.rs
#	backend/windmill-common/src/datatable_roles_oss.rs
#	backend/windmill-common/src/workspaces.rs
#	frontend/src/lib/components/datatableAcl/PgAclEditor.svelte
#	frontend/src/lib/components/workspaceSettings/DataTablePermissionsButton.svelte
#	frontend/src/lib/components/workspaceSettings/DataTableRolesSection.svelte
#	frontend/src/lib/components/workspaceSettings/DataTableSettings.svelte
#	frontend/src/lib/components/workspaceSettings/InstanceRolesButton.svelte
2026-09-17 10:03:05 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 36532c35d8 fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
2026-09-17 10:01:19 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 79481a2f02 fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry
Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
2026-09-17 10:01:19 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 c884597e56 fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
2026-09-17 10:01:19 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 115448d3d1 fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
2026-09-17 10:01:19 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 1ece278fd2 fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
2026-09-17 10:01:19 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 7819d48df9 fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
2026-09-17 10:01:19 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 ce1f720d85 fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
2026-09-17 10:01:19 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 93d346e54b feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 10:01:19 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 9378828472 docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 79bb761c5d fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 d191cfe4eb fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 31b5b0a062 fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
windmill-internal-app[bot] d1c2f801f4 chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4

New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 d3ee67c9bc test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition
The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 eafc551651 feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license
Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 db05c8b7c9 test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it
Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 11ba3cd477 feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition
The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 7ae3335f03 feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition
The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 c7269e975f feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition
Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.

Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 8a0babd7a6 fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles
The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 6d9ef5f6b7 fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename
A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 1dbc1e7759 fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers
A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only
for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends.
The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the
CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns.

Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check
makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is
refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 df471e37d8 fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing ?
Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture
once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication
connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose
listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a
listener for, now still counts as streaming.

Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such
entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them:
`a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at
a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole
reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH
and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep
the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 122a3bd164 fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting
Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once,
without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in
that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a
healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one
advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and
trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared
while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener
connects after roles are committed and refuses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 2f95c22242 fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it
Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered
database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it
goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and
able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it.
The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete
leaves a disabled role to retry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 7279ee15e2 fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved
Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was
accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30
seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a
data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its
listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 fa1e8bd3aa refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart
A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's
roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than
chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a
data table now carries one or the other:

- a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data
  table under roles;
- roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads
  the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names
  each one to disable.

This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace
deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline
fix from the same review round is kept.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 dc3ebfbe74 fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal
Three fixes from review.

`edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so
the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and
an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is
still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable,
but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request.

The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional
`deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing
a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived
from the stored configuration against the saved one.

`delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork
committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside
the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share
locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on
the missing parent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 8255f2ad2b fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted
Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected
the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture
already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection
it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the
governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection
happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry
did the same.

Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own
transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a
listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is
split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 ebe076cbe6 docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation
A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a
failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_*` behind, as it did
before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes
away once the clone is a single server-side operation.

The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover
on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully
copied database between its import and its final fork request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 643bc1b51a Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"
This reverts commit 7dd3275a10.

The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the
database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork
request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open
connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it
dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at
the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization
with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it
did before this PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 29fccb0978 fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database
A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.

`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 432ccc0fbd refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created
A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.

That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.

Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 e6794984d2 fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist
The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.

Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 2abcd122a8 fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy
Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.

Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.

Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 30f039d292 fix(datatables): honour -- role: x, and fix the DuckDB attach test
Two review findings, both real.

`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.

`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 5fd9ab24b8 chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands
Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.

The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 f7812187cc fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry
The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".

Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 b5785e8e7a fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it
`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.

The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 ac8587e452 fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it
`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.

A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.

Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego Imbert 3ae1688c44 fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix 2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego Imbert d69da0bbd6 nit worker error msg 2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 eeed332591 fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data
A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only
the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one
created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed —
and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops
entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one.

Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 78a12fdfcc fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles
pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied
data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role.
The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass
Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by
Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing.

Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork
path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is
what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the
copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 189bc3297b fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically
The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call
`/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which
deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining
therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the
username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually
calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant".

The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's
admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role
check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check
when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any
connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role
a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that.

Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in
separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect
as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now
runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 0efddb94cf fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks
Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved.

A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any
lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a
PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in
which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed
nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state.

Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which
still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows
onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual
old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a
target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one
target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so
a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The
pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade
one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once
from what it named before the save.

The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named,
with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal.
Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint.

Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of
a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole
document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical
value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from
the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 1db77dda87 refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings
Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.

The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.

One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.

Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 d0ea1ce598 fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing
The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own
`global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles`
and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The
neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it
predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a
consequence of this change.

Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing:

A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across
as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save
succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step,
and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose.

Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table
disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to
suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction.

Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what
it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which
workspace is gone.

Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions
handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed);
the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog`
was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its
roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 c400469e67 fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced
The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all
three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now
drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names.
Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it
fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot".

The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than
none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it.
`read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any
workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while
`set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the
rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record
or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same
treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every
resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions`
— it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 a74f73ccb1 fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery
Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways.
The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the
operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML
editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either.
Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of
that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every
login it described.

`custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret,
written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot
read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape:
`datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist.
No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to
take it out.

Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables
outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save
committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And
`set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its
transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the
default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings
row across validation and write.

Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish:
`read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole
job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and
`converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's.

Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but
`extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so
code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 a7bff8de97 fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract
The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all
read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the
cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password
nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation
now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the
write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL
helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them.

Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely
multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the
transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway.

The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns
plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and
`converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's
raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at
the definition, which is where the next caller looks.

Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip
that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and
`resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing
resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker.

Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a
`StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an
operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and
never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated
secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now
said at the field.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 0d5106f618 fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code
The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that
matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line
form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence.

`list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop
it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin
check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not
and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the
check runs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 b8d6b3c953 fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded
Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo.

Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an
`UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a
live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because
the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so
the operation is retryable once the row is restored.

Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are
left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy
would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it
stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table
this workspace never had.

`InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now
hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line.

Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the
governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that
predates this and sends no job id.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 c2c24598a2 fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping
A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin
putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the
host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and
`CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the
permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials
on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read.

Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration
generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration
rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or
removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after
which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the
entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it
calls a data table changes nothing about the data table.

Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an
entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than
living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's
tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename
dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 21d97f3a4c fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin
Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a
caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema
export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the
connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table
under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing
workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant.

All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a
restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the
only right answer for the copy paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 34ed0c4230 feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles
A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection,
`custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say
this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table.

A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the
instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares
`-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch —
grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from
the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`.
A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before.

Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint,
`get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when
there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could
`RESET ROLE` its way out of.

A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a
copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the
parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a
pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the
governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and
ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not
where an access decision should be made.

Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing
workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a
replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-17 10:01:15 +02:00
Diego Imbert 13162656bf Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/datatable-roles-redesign-part-2' into datatable-roles-redesign-part-4
# Conflicts:
#	backend/ee-repo-ref.txt
#	backend/windmill-api-workspaces/src/datatable_permissions_oss.rs
2026-09-17 09:50:52 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 e79bc14903 fix: check ACL read reach against the entry it connects from
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
2026-09-17 09:00:04 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 b7623f12eb fix: build the ACL connection from the authorized data table entry
Resolving the settings again could land on a resource with the same
database name on another server, which the later entry checks never see.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
2026-09-17 00:09:29 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 955aadbf10 fix(datatables): only drop external databases Windmill marked, and check use under the lock
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 00:08:15 +02:00
Diego Imbert a41644c795 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/datatable-external-instance' into datatable-external-instance-2
# Conflicts:
#	backend/ee-repo-ref.txt
2026-09-17 00:08:14 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 631c01d20d fix(datatables): compare the external cluster settings under a row lock before storing setup
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-17 00:07:50 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 0a2ebfb3db fix: hold the ACL connection to the database that was authorized
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
2026-09-16 23:55:43 +02:00
Diego Imbert 0489cb1630 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/datatable-roles-redesign-part-2' into datatable-roles-redesign-part-4
# Conflicts:
#	backend/ee-repo-ref.txt
#	backend/windmill-api-integration-tests/tests/datatable_roles.rs
2026-09-16 23:45:48 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 455e1b8d23 [ee] feat(datatables): external_instance data tables on the external cluster
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 23:43:10 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 d7417f5cc2 Merge branch 'datatable-roles-redesign' into datatable-roles-redesign-part-2
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
2026-09-16 23:40:04 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 5ef5f58eeb fix(datatables): scope external cluster credential readers to the crate
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 23:38:06 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 4533ec460e fix(datatables): send external cluster passwords as SCRAM verifiers
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 22:44:11 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 b3cda2f548 feat(datatables): set up an external instance cluster for data tables
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 22:35:00 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 8d0d51e99d fix: run one data table ACL apply at a time per server before it connects
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
2026-09-16 22:25:51 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 110876d0c9 docs(datatables): note that legacy names with ? cannot be migrated
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 22:25:27 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 e5ec5217d4 fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with aliases saved from other workspaces
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 18:09:07 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 6a89ba0179 fix: add only missing grant options before an ACL apply, never default privileges
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
2026-09-16 17:31:06 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 707b0dc8ee fix(datatables): let CE migrations connect as an explicitly named admin
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 17:25:42 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 dcc37bf6f2 fix: declare the default role in migrations written for a data table whose name contains '?'
Such a data table connects as its default role without naming it, so the
migrations the manager wrote for it declared no role and ran as admin.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 17:20:19 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 10861bb529 fix(datatables): refuse a reference naming both a legacy data table and a role
When a workspace stores both `sales` and a legacy `sales?role=analytics`, the
reference resolved to the legacy entry without a role, so browsing `sales` as
`analytics` reached another data table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 17:03:32 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 d459b371d8 fix: refresh grant options only after the ACL apply validates its plan
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
2026-09-16 16:53:13 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 41e1101a2d fix: take every pooled connection before the ACL apply locks
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BRoYE5ZeAVvrDYdfhDAYXb
2026-09-16 16:39:14 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 4416283b17 fix: read the roles of a data table whose name contains '?'
The generated client leaves a '?' in a path param unencoded, so the lookup
404'd and the raw-app picker blocked Start on such a data table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 16:32:36 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 e0360bce5c fix: never add a role to the reference of a data table whose name contains '?'
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 16:07:00 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 f36aa69fc3 feat(datatables): data table roles in the DB manager and raw apps
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 15:23:20 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 a1b91690fd feat(datatables): add an ACL editor for data table roles
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 15:22:05 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 0676f55856 fix(datatables): refuse roles while a same-workspace alias reaches the database
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 15:14:29 +02:00
windmill-internal-app[bot] aa6a52271b chore: update ee-repo-ref to a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607
This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #783 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 5c853e2c20eca6b748415fc0d6862a6ebfb5fec4

New ee-repo-ref: a1873dbb67f2302b85ff5362f8387b48eccdb607

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.
2026-09-16 15:14:29 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 64d5f762dc test(datatables): run the tenant matcher test on the enterprise edition
The matcher it covers is enterprise code now, so without the enterprise
edition the test hit the stub and failed the default windmill-common run. It
runs with private and enterprise, and a counterpart without them asserts that
no tenant list covers anyone, the wildcard and a workspace admin included.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-16 15:14:29 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 4c2f1a7b60 feat(datatables): gate the roles UI mount sites on an enterprise license
Both mount sites are still commented out; the gate travels with them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-16 15:14:29 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 16fdba4d82 test(datatables): run the roles tests on the enterprise edition, refusals without it
Each test that exercises roles runs with private and enterprise. Two tests run
without them: every roles route answers the Enterprise refusal, and a data
table saved under roles, or a named role, is refused a connection while one
not under roles resolves as before.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-16 15:14:29 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 1986ec2535 feat(datatables): move the data table role catalog endpoints to the enterprise edition
The superadmin list, create, update and delete handlers move to
windmill-ee-private. The routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, refuse after authentication.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-16 15:14:29 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 a7bac22c13 feat(datatables): move the data table permissions endpoints to the enterprise edition
The permissions read, save and usable-roles handlers move to
windmill-ee-private; the routes stay registered and, without the enterprise
edition, answer that data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature.
ensure_governs_datatable and ensure_reaches_datatable keep their paths: the
first refuses, the second passes a data table not under roles.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-16 15:14:29 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 1d6da0084e feat(datatables): move data table role catalog and resolution to the enterprise edition
Roles are an Enterprise Edition feature. The catalog, the Postgres logins,
CONNECT convergence, tenant evaluation and the role half of connection
resolution move to windmill-ee-private. Every public function keeps its path
and signature and forwards through datatable_roles_oss, which re-exports the
enterprise implementation or, without it, refuses.

Without the enterprise edition a data table under roles, or a caller naming a
role, is refused a connection rather than resolved as admin, and the reach and
admin-access checks refuse one under roles. A data table not under roles
resolves as before in every edition, and an instance database keeps the
CONNECT grants it was created with. The catalog lock, the stream lock, the
tenant cascades and the permissions stripping stay in OSS: they only restrict.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-16 15:14:29 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 3d4a2133ed fix(datatables): no entry without roles may newly reach a database under roles
The previous guard only caught a new name replacing an entry under roles.
A whole-map save could also repoint an existing entry without roles at
that database, or another workspace could point one there, and every
caller of that entry would connect as admin. The rule is now stated on
the saved entries: one that carries no roles and newly points at an
instance database any entry under roles uses, in this workspace or
another, is refused. A declared rename carries its roles and passes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-16 15:14:29 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 f8a6347052 fix(datatables): refuse a save that drops a data table's roles through an undeclared rename
A data table's roles follow its entry only through a declared rename. A
settings sync sends the whole map and never declares one, so renaming a
data table under roles there read as a delete and a new entry on the same
database: the new entry carried no roles, and every caller connected as
admin. Such a save is now refused, naming both entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-16 15:14:29 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 46dfcc5c49 fix(datatables): warn when a settings sync strands fork pointers
A settings save reported the fork pointers left resolving to nothing only
for the names in `deleted_datatables`, which `wmill sync push` never sends.
The save now works out what it removed from the locked entries, and the
CLI prints the stranded pointers it returns.

Also correct the replication helper's contract: no role or admin check
makes a replication connection safe, so a data table under roles is
refused outright rather than gated as an admin operation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-16 15:14:29 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 e9c27d63db fix(datatables): wait out live listeners, and resolve stored names containing ?
Turning roles on counted a trigger as gone once disabled, and a capture
once its client stopped pinging, but the listener keeps its replication
connection until its next heartbeat notices. A trigger or capture whose
listener pinged in the last 15 seconds, the window a server holds a
listener for, now still counts as streaming.

Data table names could contain `?` before they were restricted, and such
entries are still stored. Splitting `?role=` off a reference misread them:
`a?b` became `a` with an unknown parameter, and the clone checks looked at
a different entry than the one copied. An entry stored under the whole
reference is now looked up first, in the Postgres executor, DuckDB ATTACH
and the clone checks. Agent workers cannot read the workspace and keep
the strict parse, which refuses such a name rather than misreading it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 15:14:29 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 65a6cc3eb5 fix(datatables): serialize roles going on with a stream starting
Turning roles on looked for enabled triggers and live captures once,
without a lock anything starting a stream also took. A trigger enabled in
that window could have its listener connect before roles committed, and a
healthy listener never checks again. Both transitions now serialize on one
advisory lock: roles going on hold it exclusive while they look, and
trigger create, edit and enable, and capture setup and ping hold it shared
while they commit. Either the look sees the stream, or the listener
connects after roles are committed and refuses.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 15:14:29 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 dd2ca5513e fix(datatables): disable a data table role before deleting it
Deleting a role reassigns and drops what it owns in each registered
database on its own connection, and each of those passes commits as it
goes. A database failing part-way left the role enabled in the catalog and
able to log in, but already stripped in the databases reached before it.
The role is now disabled in its own commit first, so a failed delete
leaves a disabled role to retry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 15:14:29 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 6a3a2ed13c fix(datatables): refuse a Postgres trigger on a data table under roles when it is saved
Creating or editing a trigger that points at a data table under roles was
accepted, and its listener then retried the refused connection every 30
seconds forever. The save is now refused, and a trigger that reaches such a
data table anyway (re-enabled, or cloned into a fork) is disabled by its
listener with the reason, as a missing replication slot is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 15:14:29 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 791bb8d843 refactor(datatables): keep Postgres triggers and data table roles apart
A replication stream reads every row of every table whatever the data table's
roles grant, and its listener checks access only when it connects. Rather than
chase every way access can change and bounce the streams each one affects, a
data table now carries one or the other:

- a Postgres trigger or capture cannot be created on, or connect to, a data
  table under roles;
- roles cannot be turned on while an enabled trigger or a live capture reads
  the data table, its own or a fork's through its pointer. The refusal names
  each one to disable.

This removes the stream bounces on roles edits and on data table and workspace
deletion, and the trigger gate that admitted admins. The fork schema baseline
fix from the same review round is kept.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 15:14:29 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 b68b97f5ea fix(datatables): keep the fork schema baseline, and bounce streams on every removal
Three fixes from review.

`edit_datatable_config` took `forked_from` wholesale from the stored entry, so
the fork schema diff's save of an advanced baseline was silently discarded and
an applied change was offered again. Whether an entry carries a clone stamp is
still carried from the store, since that is what marks its database droppable,
but the baseline inside it is now taken from the request.

The stranded-pointer warning and the stream bounce ran over the optional
`deleted_datatables` hint, which the settings-sync CLI never sends, so removing
a governing data table through `wmill` bounced nothing. Removals are now derived
from the stored configuration against the saved one.

`delete_workspace` read the pointers to bounce before its transaction, so a fork
committing a pointer during the deletion was missed. The read now happens inside
the transaction, after the workspace row is deleted: a fork's insert key-share
locks that row through its parent foreign key, so it is either seen or fails on
the missing parent.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 15:14:29 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 92c723f735 fix(datatables): bounce the streams reading a data table when it is deleted
Deleting a governing data table, or the workspace that holds it, only collected
the fork pointers it stranded, for the warning. A Postgres trigger or capture
already streaming through one of those pointers kept the replication connection
it opened while the pointer still resolved, so it went on dispatching the
governing database's rows after the fork lost access — until its connection
happened to restart. The governing workspace's own streams on a deleted entry
did the same.

Both deletion paths now bounce the affected listeners inside their own
transaction, through the helper a permission change already uses, so a
listener that reconnects re-resolves the entry and finds it gone. The helper is
split so a caller can pass the (workspace, local name) pairs it already holds.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 15:14:29 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 c7f28ba8ed docs(datatables): record the stale clone database as a known limitation
A clone is three requests and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so a
failure after the first leaves a registered `wm_fork_*` behind, as it did
before data table roles. Accepted for this PR: it is harmless to data and goes
away once the clone is a single server-side operation.

The comment also records why the obvious fix is wrong: reclaiming the leftover
on retry, without durable clone ownership, can drop another workspace's fully
copied database between its import and its final fork request.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 15:14:29 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 bea9667516 Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"
This reverts commit 7dd3275a10.

The reclaim tied the caller to the source they administer, but not to the
database it dropped. Between another workspace's import and its final fork
request, that workspace's target is full, registered, unnamed and has no open
connection, so an admin of any instance data table could name it and have it
dropped and recreated empty. The victim's fork would then commit pointing at
the empty copy. Safe reclaim needs durable clone ownership and serialization
with the request that names the database; until then the leftover stays, as it
did before this PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 15:14:29 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 bb8c8ed735 fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database
A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.

`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-16 15:14:29 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 4610f8a35c refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created
A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.

That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.

Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-16 15:14:29 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 284d1ecb43 fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist
The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.

Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-16 15:14:29 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 306a35e3b0 fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy
Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.

Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.

Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-16 15:14:28 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 5a98030fb7 fix(datatables): honour -- role: x, and fix the DuckDB attach test
Two review findings, both real.

`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.

`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-16 15:14:28 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 d558b6508a chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands
Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.

The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-16 15:14:28 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 fce20faeae fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry
The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".

Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
2026-09-16 15:14:28 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 da3babccc7 fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it
`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.

The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-16 15:14:28 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 69742c0b48 fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it
`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.

A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.

Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-16 15:14:28 +02:00
Diego Imbert 3dfbf64d9d fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix 2026-09-16 15:14:28 +02:00
Diego Imbert d32ff92eac nit worker error msg 2026-09-16 15:14:28 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 01eba26582 fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data
A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only
the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one
created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed —
and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops
entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one.

Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-16 15:14:28 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 cafcf3afc3 fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles
pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied
data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role.
The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass
Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by
Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing.

Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork
path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is
what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the
copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-16 15:14:28 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 030254af47 fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically
The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call
`/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which
deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining
therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the
username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually
calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant".

The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's
admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role
check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check
when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any
connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role
a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that.

Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in
separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect
as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now
runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-16 15:14:28 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 9872bff69f fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks
Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved.

A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any
lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a
PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in
which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed
nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state.

Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which
still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows
onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual
old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a
target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one
target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so
a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The
pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade
one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once
from what it named before the save.

The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named,
with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal.
Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint.

Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of
a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole
document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical
value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from
the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-16 15:14:28 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 e400daabb8 refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings
Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.

The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.

One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.

Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-16 15:14:28 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 7f3c7a19af fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing
The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own
`global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles`
and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The
neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it
predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a
consequence of this change.

Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing:

A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across
as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save
succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step,
and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose.

Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table
disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to
suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction.

Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what
it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which
workspace is gone.

Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions
handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed);
the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog`
was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its
roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-16 15:14:28 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 1d9ee09b31 fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced
The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all
three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now
drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names.
Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it
fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot".

The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than
none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it.
`read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any
workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while
`set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the
rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record
or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same
treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every
resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions`
— it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-16 15:14:28 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 715d8a0e6d fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery
Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways.
The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the
operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML
editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either.
Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of
that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every
login it described.

`custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret,
written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot
read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape:
`datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist.
No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to
take it out.

Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables
outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save
committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And
`set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its
transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the
default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings
row across validation and write.

Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish:
`read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole
job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and
`converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's.

Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but
`extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so
code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-16 15:14:28 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 ea14c01a3c fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract
The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all
read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the
cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password
nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation
now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the
write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL
helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them.

Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely
multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the
transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway.

The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns
plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and
`converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's
raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at
the definition, which is where the next caller looks.

Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip
that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and
`resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing
resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker.

Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a
`StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an
operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and
never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated
secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now
said at the field.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-16 15:14:28 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 54f4467027 fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code
The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that
matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line
form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence.

`list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop
it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin
check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not
and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the
check runs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-16 15:14:28 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 8276ae09fa fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded
Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo.

Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an
`UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a
live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because
the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so
the operation is retryable once the row is restored.

Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are
left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy
would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it
stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table
this workspace never had.

`InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now
hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line.

Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the
governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that
predates this and sends no job id.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-16 15:14:28 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 6f9457fc8e fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping
A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin
putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the
host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and
`CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the
permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials
on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read.

Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration
generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration
rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or
removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after
which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the
entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it
calls a data table changes nothing about the data table.

Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an
entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than
living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's
tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename
dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-16 15:14:28 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 6ea682d741 fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin
Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a
caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema
export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the
connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table
under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing
workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant.

All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a
restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the
only right answer for the copy paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-16 15:14:28 +02:00
Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5 22b3e69c07 feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles
A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection,
`custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say
this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table.

A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the
instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares
`-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch —
grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from
the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`.
A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before.

Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint,
`get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when
there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could
`RESET ROLE` its way out of.

A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a
copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the
parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a
pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the
governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and
ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not
where an access decision should be made.

Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing
workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a
replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
2026-09-16 15:14:28 +02:00
353 changed files with 16541 additions and 14974 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
{
".": "1.815.0"
".": "1.813.0"
}
-60
View File
@@ -1,65 +1,5 @@
# Changelog
## [1.815.0](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/compare/v1.814.0...v1.815.0) (2026-09-18)
### Features
* add a workspace toggle that adds its admins and developers to new forks ([#11215](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11215)) ([9d335de](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/9d335de87a4dbaa51038d55afe8d980761dcdfaf))
* add an instance setting to refuse a token in MCP URLs ([#11162](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11162)) ([37e493a](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/37e493ae66ed5c000ecac492d60fc0fdf4bda71f))
* **ai-chat:** render get_run through the run tools' card ([#11204](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11204)) ([6f9c4dc](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/6f9c4dc29455d13b0e64af05c2d6aa8bd5ff4fd6))
* **ai-chat:** tell the chat which kind of app it is looking at ([#11208](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11208)) ([c8c06d8](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/c8c06d8f79774abf109192e71a8b6fc37c7937ba))
* attach files to a flow chat message ([#11185](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11185)) ([c4c9677](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/c4c9677982b75c63d98ebf85b1904e0c341ba957))
* **auth:** 2 h login links and a click-to-sign-in page for emailed ones ([#11203](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11203)) ([5639187](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/5639187fec6d517a72e82df49d63d7438301127c))
* cap user token expiration with an instance setting ([#11159](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11159)) ([9320312](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/9320312eac56f944c4d31504601293ab4e816ccc))
* flow chat job-backed detail, smooth streaming and answer chrome ([#11186](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11186)) ([e2a91ca](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/e2a91ca2b141a0bee64ddfafe3cbf3ff86b6fb35))
* put a data table's connection under Postgres roles ([#11020](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11020)) ([0e807fb](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/0e807fb1dd80d7536ec144cd49445abc7961e504))
* render an AI agent result as its answer, not as raw JSON ([#11051](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11051)) ([a089928](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/a08992834d45d0211336f4fc32c3421646ca47c5))
* support $flow_expr[...] dynamic tags on flow steps ([#11170](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11170)) ([48f0025](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/48f00259c5e7361d3553dbcb809461e1cde96f8f))
### Bug Fixes
* **frontend:** inline only the package version, not the whole package.json ([#11191](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11191)) ([813e486](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/813e486e166ac6215364817a7732b66f8dc1d463))
* keep instance groups when editing auto-invite ([#11217](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11217)) ([df61dea](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/df61dea5fa8b18d1e0044dc0db6702b053d5119f))
* key the large root font size on screen width, not window width ([#11216](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11216)) ([3b4e13d](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/3b4e13d1c564c6195e30b55b0671f7533e3ce408))
* re-encrypt git sync secrets on workspace key rotation ([#11218](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11218)) ([f0d66a4](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/f0d66a42eba27502767423af0c08b2ca1f16e8df))
* re-point cloned fork identities that name nobody in the fork ([#11161](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11161)) ([9690c44](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/9690c4462cf264a5577b87d07d465b5442b4e09d))
* register the job token with the sensitive log masking system ([#10943](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/10943)) ([53afecd](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/53afecd4588247bc1812d3e68a30db1f3c3b2724))
* show the New menu's description panel only on hover ([#11199](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11199)) ([ecd0a6c](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/ecd0a6c77bc3a057b8072dbb0aca731e8bd3d882))
* stop picker listing a draft twice when drafts share a friendly path ([#11214](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11214)) ([72507d5](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/72507d52a021de8101794ee8f4a3392be1ba20c7))
### Performance Improvements
* count completed jobs on the v2_job_completed index with a timeout ([#11211](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11211)) ([d1a2536](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/d1a25360b070994a31fb033707dbfde1fb553939))
## [1.814.0](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/compare/v1.813.0...v1.814.0) (2026-09-17)
### Features
* **ai-chat:** add list_workers and list_data_metrics global tools ([#11143](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11143)) ([e954d33](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/e954d33613e4ff5027667eb8f646615d9bbd499d))
* **ai-chat:** merge get_job_logs and get_flow_run_details into get_run ([#11172](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11172)) ([5bb37ca](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/5bb37ca3388666fba72c55534e37f37bb3e9299e))
* allow git sync auto-pull, promotion and PRs on Pro licenses ([#11173](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11173)) ([02e47de](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/02e47de8b4c4f3f54753aabf8c67bc8e71ffb957))
* badge chat-input flows on the home list ([#11164](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11164)) ([3d08197](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/3d0819718221f885b61e73d02b43dcc853c7d02a))
* collect flow conversations and agent memory once their last message goes ([#11178](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11178)) ([23c24a9](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/23c24a9688d4c8c462f53221334d538280f16bca))
* flow chat model picker on a shared model-settings component ([#11187](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11187)) ([189793c](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/189793c2e4db7f1c853695ebcc895c1ec82ed19f))
* keep flow inputs and seed the agent when chat mode is enabled ([#11177](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11177)) ([68f2248](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/68f2248018fc218a090bf939e1eb22ff97d5bc22))
* let plan mode search and read connected mcp servers ([#11205](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11205)) ([5371519](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/5371519f0f5ce7750982dcdb374dca72115902e7))
* let test_run_flow name the conversation of a chat-mode test run ([#11198](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11198)) ([6e1ef93](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/6e1ef93f329cb396ffc3df3304d592e8fa0e0e71))
* managed memory with an inherited or custom memory id per step ([#11118](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11118)) ([c297ed0](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/c297ed0052d998fb8f063faa2a36c6eb03e327be))
* render the flow chat through the shared session chat components ([#11175](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11175)) ([a9ec0ae](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/a9ec0aec3ac0c6b0f7919d0eb2168816923826d7))
* show flow step detail inside the graph tab on narrow detail layouts ([#11168](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11168)) ([64dffe6](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/64dffe6106ad6a55b61a423c855a4b5b0cef533e))
* store mcp tool call, result and reasoning on flow conversation rows ([#11176](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11176)) ([a571117](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/a571117f3fd2cef14c920770645c60ee358fdfdd))
* tell test flow conversations from deployed ones and rename a chat ([#11179](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11179)) ([4eab995](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/4eab995cf7cf091a5e4640da4cb77e0921bb7fdf))
### Bug Fixes
* disable a schedule whose cron has no run left instead of panicking ([#11195](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11195)) ([381d447](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/381d4470ef699ea82283742132e56556b95d2bd2))
* skip expiry notifications for app embed and SDK tokens ([#11169](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/issues/11169)) ([9d348f8](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/commit/9d348f84c7830f36b6153472556fd70e3d84cd24))
## [1.813.0](https://github.com/windmill-labs/windmill/compare/v1.812.0...v1.813.0) (2026-09-16)
-4
View File
@@ -175,10 +175,6 @@ the decrypted value, exactly as against a real backend. The chat's read path pas
Seed a recognizable secret (the existing fixture uses `sk_live_do_not_leak_me`) and
assert it via `valueExcludes` to catch a leak.
`toolExpect.toolCallArgs` entries support `sharedByAtLeast: <n>`: at least `n` recorded
calls to that tool must carry the same non-blank string in the field. Use it for calls that
have to share an identifier, like two test runs of one chat conversation.
`toolExpect.toolCallArgs` entries additionally support `fieldMustBeAbsent: true`: no
recorded call to that tool may pass the field at all (an explicit `null` counts as
passing it). Use it for partial-update tools, where supplying a field the model could
+12 -1
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto'
import type { BackendValidationSettings } from '../../core/backendValidation'
import { buildWorkspaceId } from './workspaceId'
interface CompletedJobResultMaybe {
completed: boolean
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ export interface CompletedPreviewJob {
const tokenCache = new Map<string, Promise<string>>()
const sharedWorkspaceQueue = new Map<string, Promise<void>>()
const managedSharedWorkspacePrefixes = ['f/evals/']
const DEFAULT_WORKSPACE_PREFIX = 'ai-evals'
export class BackendPreviewClient {
constructor(private readonly settings: BackendValidationSettings) {}
@@ -440,6 +441,16 @@ async function withSharedWorkspaceLock<T>(workspaceId: string, body: () => Promi
}
}
function buildWorkspaceId(caseId: string, attempt: number): string {
const caseSlug = caseId
.toLowerCase()
.replace(/[^a-z0-9-]+/g, '-')
.replace(/^-+|-+$/g, '')
.slice(0, 30)
const suffix = randomUUID().slice(0, 8)
return `${DEFAULT_WORKSPACE_PREFIX}-${caseSlug || 'case'}-a${attempt}-${suffix}`
}
function extractFolderName(path: string): string | null {
if (!path.startsWith('f/')) {
return null
+4 -56
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import type {
Script
} from '../../../frontend/src/lib/gen'
import type {
DataMetric,
DataTableTables,
DataTableTableSchema,
EndpointTool,
@@ -49,16 +48,12 @@ export interface BenchmarkWorkspaceFlow {
export interface BenchmarkWorkspaceApp {
path: string
summary: string
/** Defaults to true. Set false for a drag-and-drop app, which the chat can list
* and read but has no tool to edit — its value is a grid, not files. */
rawApp?: boolean
value: {
files?: Record<string, string>
runnables?: Record<string, unknown>
files: Record<string, string>
runnables: Record<string, unknown>
data?: unknown
policy?: unknown
custom_path?: unknown
[key: string]: unknown
}
}
@@ -117,9 +112,6 @@ export interface BenchmarkWorkspaceRunnables {
aiProviders?: BenchmarkWorkspaceAiProvider[]
resources?: BenchmarkWorkspaceResource[]
datatables?: BenchmarkDatatableSeed[]
/** DuckLake catalog names, as `list_ducklakes` reports them. */
ducklakes?: string[]
dataMetrics?: DataMetric[]
jobs?: BenchmarkWorkspaceJob[]
}
@@ -681,27 +673,6 @@ export function listBenchmarkDatatables(workspace: string): DataTableTables[] |
}))
}
// ============= DuckLake catalogs and declared metrics =============
/** Seeded DuckLake names, or `null` for a non-benchmark workspace. */
export function listBenchmarkDucklakes(workspace: string): string[] | null {
const runnables = benchmarkWorkspaceRunnables.get(workspace)
return runnables ? (runnables.ducklakes ?? []) : null
}
/**
* Seeded metric declarations, or `null` for a non-benchmark workspace.
*
* The `table` / `path_prefix` filters are ignored: which rows a filter selects is
* `canonical_table_path`'s business and is pinned by `ducklakeTools.test.ts`.
* Re-deriving it here would give the eval its own copy of that spec to drift from,
* and the case this serves measures whether the model reaches for the tool at all.
*/
export function listBenchmarkDataMetrics(workspace: string): DataMetric[] | null {
const runnables = benchmarkWorkspaceRunnables.get(workspace)
return runnables ? (runnables.dataMetrics ?? []) : null
}
export function getBenchmarkDatatableSchema(input: {
workspace: string
datatableName: string
@@ -869,29 +840,6 @@ export function runBenchmarkFlowByPath(input: {
})
}
/**
* Mirror `JobService.runFlowPreview` for benchmark workspaces, including the server's
* refusal of a chat-enabled flow run that names no conversation (`memory_id`).
*/
export function runBenchmarkFlowPreview(input: {
workspace: string
memoryId?: string
requestBody?: { path?: string; value?: { chat_input_enabled?: boolean }; args?: unknown }
}): string {
if (input.requestBody?.value?.chat_input_enabled && !input.memoryId) {
throw new Error('Bad request: memory_id is required for chat-enabled flows')
}
const args = (input.requestBody?.args ?? {}) as Record<string, unknown>
return createBenchmarkCompletedJob({
workspace: input.workspace,
jobKind: 'flowpreview',
success: true,
args,
result: { path: input.requestBody?.path, args, mocked: true },
logs: 'Mock benchmark flow preview completed successfully.'
})
}
export function previewBenchmarkSchedule(input: {
requestBody?: Record<string, unknown>
}): Record<string, unknown> {
@@ -998,7 +946,7 @@ function buildBenchmarkListableApp(app: BenchmarkWorkspaceApp): ListableApp {
extra_perms: {},
edited_at: BENCHMARK_TIMESTAMP,
execution_mode: 'viewer',
raw_app: app.rawApp ?? true
raw_app: true
}
}
@@ -1016,7 +964,7 @@ function buildBenchmarkApp(app: BenchmarkWorkspaceApp): AppWithLastVersion {
execution_mode: 'viewer',
extra_perms: {},
custom_path: app.value.custom_path as string | undefined,
raw_app: app.rawApp ?? true
raw_app: true
}
}
@@ -76,9 +76,7 @@ vi.mock('$lib/gen', async () => {
listBenchmarkPlainResources,
listBenchmarkApps,
listBenchmarkDatatables,
listBenchmarkDataMetrics,
listBenchmarkDrafts,
listBenchmarkDucklakes,
listBenchmarkFlows,
listBenchmarkJobs,
listBenchmarkScripts,
@@ -89,7 +87,6 @@ vi.mock('$lib/gen', async () => {
previewBenchmarkSchedule,
runBenchmarkDatatableSql,
runBenchmarkFlowByPath,
runBenchmarkFlowPreview,
runBenchmarkScriptByPath,
runBenchmarkScriptPreview,
updateBenchmarkDraft,
@@ -296,14 +293,6 @@ vi.mock('$lib/gen', async () => {
args: data.requestBody
})
: actual.JobService.runScriptByPath(data),
runFlowPreview: async (data: {
workspace: string
memoryId?: string
requestBody?: { path?: string; value?: { chat_input_enabled?: boolean }; args?: unknown }
}) =>
hasBenchmarkWorkspace(data.workspace)
? runBenchmarkFlowPreview(data)
: actual.JobService.runFlowPreview(data as any),
runFlowByPath: async (data: {
workspace: string
path: string
@@ -352,10 +341,6 @@ vi.mock('$lib/gen', async () => {
hasBenchmarkWorkspace(data.workspace)
? (listBenchmarkDatatables(data.workspace) ?? [])
: actual.WorkspaceService.listDataTableTables(data),
listDucklakes: async (data: { workspace: string }) =>
hasBenchmarkWorkspace(data.workspace)
? (listBenchmarkDucklakes(data.workspace) ?? [])
: actual.WorkspaceService.listDucklakes(data),
getDataTableTableSchema: async (data: {
workspace: string
datatableName: string
@@ -371,12 +356,6 @@ vi.mock('$lib/gen', async () => {
})
: actual.WorkspaceService.getDataTableTableSchema(data)
}),
DataMetricService: wrapService(actual.DataMetricService, {
listDataMetrics: async (data: { workspace: string }) =>
hasBenchmarkWorkspace(data.workspace)
? { metrics: listBenchmarkDataMetrics(data.workspace) ?? [] }
: actual.DataMetricService.listDataMetrics(data)
}),
ScheduleService: wrapService(actual.ScheduleService, {
existsSchedule: async (data: { workspace: string; path: string }) =>
hasBenchmarkWorkspace(data.workspace) ? false : actual.ScheduleService.existsSchedule(data),
+12 -1
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
import type { WindmillBackendSettings } from "../../core/windmillBackendSettings";
import { buildWorkspaceId } from "./workspaceId";
const tokenCache = new Map<string, Promise<string>>();
const sharedWorkspaceQueue = new Map<string, Promise<void>>();
const DEFAULT_WORKSPACE_PREFIX = "ai-evals";
export class WindmillBackendClient {
constructor(private readonly settings: WindmillBackendSettings) {}
@@ -178,6 +179,16 @@ async function withSharedWorkspaceLock<T>(
}
}
function buildWorkspaceId(caseId: string, attempt: number): string {
const caseSlug = caseId
.toLowerCase()
.replace(/[^a-z0-9-]+/g, "-")
.replace(/^-+|-+$/g, "")
.slice(0, 30);
const suffix = randomUUID().slice(0, 8);
return `${DEFAULT_WORKSPACE_PREFIX}-${caseSlug || "case"}-a${attempt}-${suffix}`;
}
async function expectOk(response: Response, context: string): Promise<void> {
if (response.ok) {
return;
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
import { describe, expect, it } from "bun:test";
import { buildWorkspaceId } from "./workspaceId";
describe("buildWorkspaceId", () => {
// `workspace.proper_id` rejects `--`, which a case id can carry itself and
// which truncating a slug on a hyphen produces once the suffix adds its own.
// One id per shape: cut landing on a hyphen, cut landing mid-word, no cut, and
// a doubled hyphen no cut ever reaches.
it("stays within the id length cap and the proper_id format", () => {
for (const caseId of [
"global-test6-secret-variable-draft",
"global-test23-datatable-query-select",
"short",
"global--test-foo",
]) {
const id = buildWorkspaceId(caseId, 1);
expect(id.length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(50);
expect(id).toMatch(/^\w+(-\w+)*$/);
}
});
});
-22
View File
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
const DEFAULT_WORKSPACE_PREFIX = "ai-evals";
// A workspace id must be at most 50 characters AND match `^\w+(-\w+)*$`
// (`workspace.proper_id`), so the case slug yields to the random suffix that
// makes the id unique, and no hyphen may end up doubled — neither one already in
// the case id nor one a truncation leaves for the suffix to follow.
const MAX_WORKSPACE_ID_LENGTH = 50;
export function buildWorkspaceId(caseId: string, attempt: number): string {
const caseSlug = caseId
.toLowerCase()
.replace(/[^a-z0-9-]+/g, "-")
.replace(/-{2,}/g, "-")
.replace(/^-+|-+$/g, "");
const suffix = `-a${attempt}-${randomUUID().slice(0, 8)}`;
const head = `${DEFAULT_WORKSPACE_PREFIX}-${caseSlug || "case"}`;
return `${head
.slice(0, MAX_WORKSPACE_ID_LENGTH - suffix.length)
.replace(/-+$/, "")}${suffix}`;
}
+12 -95
View File
@@ -1919,11 +1919,10 @@
- when the lookup fails, tells the user instead of inventing table names
- does not write scripts or resources to answer a read-only question
# --- Dedicated tools preferred over the API catalog ---
# The harness serves worker/queue reads itself (benchmark fetch handlers in
# adapters/frontend), so these cases do not require an mcp-enabled eval backend.
# The stale `api-catalog` in the id below is kept so results stay comparable
# across benchmark runs.
# --- API catalog (search_api_endpoints / call_api_get / call_api_endpoint) ---
# The harness serves the catalog and the executed calls itself (mock
# listMcpTools + benchmark fetch handlers in adapters/frontend), so these cases
# do not require an mcp-enabled eval backend.
- id: global-test30-api-catalog-workers
prompt: |-
@@ -1935,42 +1934,23 @@
draftCountExactly: 0
toolExpect:
requiredToolsUsed:
- list_workers
forbiddenToolsUsed:
- search_api_endpoints
- call_api_get
forbiddenToolsUsed:
- call_api_endpoint
- write_script
- deploy_workspace_item
toolCallArgs:
- tool: call_api_get
field: name
stringIncludesAnyOf:
- listWorkers
# Read-only workspace inspection produces no draft; validate via tool use.
skipJudge: true
judgeChecklist:
- reads worker state through list_workers instead of guessing or fabricating
- discovers the workers endpoint through the API catalog instead of guessing or fabricating
- reports worker status from the returned data
- id: global-test37-ducklake-declared-measure
prompt: |-
We track orders in the main ducklake. Write me a duckdb script that reports total
revenue by month. Keep it as a draft, don't deploy it.
initial: ai_evals/fixtures/frontend/global/initial/ducklake_orders_metrics.json
runtime:
maxTurns: 8
validate:
draftCountExactly: 1
toolExpect:
requiredToolsUsed:
- list_data_metrics
forbiddenToolsUsed:
- deploy_workspace_item
- delete_workspace_item
# The judge runs: the point is not that the tool was called but that the number it
# describes is the declared one. `revenue` excludes test rows, so an aggregate that
# reproduces it without the filter is plausible, runnable and wrong.
judgeChecklist:
- totals revenue with the declared sum over the amount column rather than an invented aggregate over a guessed column
- excludes test orders from the total, as the declared revenue measure does
- groups by month using the declared order_month expression over order_date
- does not introduce column names absent from the declarations
- id: global-test31-draft-test-run-not-deployed
prompt: |-
Update `f/evals/global/format_greeting` so the provided name is uppercased in the greeting, then run it with name "ada" to check it works.
@@ -2160,32 +2140,6 @@
- creates an AI draft of f/evals/global/process_invoice applying 8% tax
- does not deploy or save the draft
- id: global-test38-chat-flow-follow-up-same-conversation
prompt: |-
I want to check that my support chat flow `f/evals/global/support_chat` remembers what was said.
Test it: first send "My name is Ada", then send "What is my name?" as a follow-up in the same chat.
initial: ai_evals/fixtures/frontend/global/initial/support_chat_flow.json
runtime:
maxTurns: 8
validate:
draftCountExactly: 0
toolExpect:
requiredToolsUsed:
- test_run_flow
# A chat flow's memory lives in its conversation, so a follow-up only reaches the first
# turn's history when both test runs name the same conversation.
toolCallArgs:
- tool: test_run_flow
field: memory_id
sharedByAtLeast: 2
forbiddenToolsUsed:
- run_flow
- deploy_workspace_item
# The judge cannot observe runs; what this case guards is the conversation the runs share.
skipJudge: true
judgeChecklist:
- test-runs the chat flow twice, the second message as a follow-up in the first run's conversation
- id: global-undo-created-draft
prompt: |-
Create a draft Postgres resource at `u/admin/scratch_db` for host db.example.com port 5432, database `orders`, user `app`, and tell me what fields it ended up with.
@@ -2611,40 +2565,3 @@
judgeChecklist:
- runs the existing script rather than rewriting it
- passes the GitHub resource as the bare string $res:f/evals/global/github_main
- id: global-drag-and-drop-app-not-editable
prompt: |-
Add a refresh button to the ops console app, and the same to the sales board app.
initial: ai_evals/fixtures/frontend/global/initial/apps_code_and_drag_and_drop.json
runtime:
maxTurns: 12
validate:
# One request, two apps, only one of them editable: the code app must come back with a
# draft and the drag-and-drop one must not. Refusing both, or editing both, fails here —
# which is what makes this a test of the distinction rather than of caution.
draftCountExactly: 1
requiredDrafts:
- type: app
path: f/evals/global/ops_console
forbiddenDrafts:
- type: app
path: f/evals/global/sales_board
toolExpect:
# Deliberately not constraining write_app_file/patch_app_file by argument: an entry there
# fails when its tool was never called, so naming both would fail on whichever the model
# did not pick. The draft assertions above cover the same ground, tool-agnostically.
forbiddenToolsUsed:
- init_app
- deploy_workspace_item
- delete_app_file
- delete_app_runnable
assistantExpect:
# A refusal leaves no draft for the judge to read, so the explanation is checked here.
# Only the app kind: substring tests cannot see paraphrase, and every wording of "I can't
# edit it" defeats a fixed list.
requiredMentionsAnyOf:
- - drag-and-drop
- drag and drop
- low-code
- no-code
skipJudge: true
-7
View File
@@ -182,13 +182,6 @@ export interface ToolCallArgumentRule {
* the point is that the model filled it in at all rather than what it said.
*/
nonEmpty?: boolean;
/**
* Existential over calls: at least this many recorded calls to `tool` carry the
* same non-blank string in `field`. Use when calls have to share an identifier —
* e.g. test runs that continue one conversation — while a retry with a rejected
* value in between is still acceptable.
*/
sharedByAtLeast?: number;
/**
* Universal over calls: no recorded call to `tool` may pass `field` at all.
* For partial-update tools, where supplying a field the model could not have
-26
View File
@@ -396,32 +396,6 @@ describe("validateToolExpectations", () => {
expect(nonEmptyCheck?.details).toContain("blank on 1 of 2");
});
it("requires sharedByAtLeast calls to carry one value, not merely a value each", () => {
const run = (ids: (string | undefined)[]) =>
validateToolExpectations({
run: {
success: true,
actual: {},
assistantMessageCount: 1,
toolCallCount: ids.length,
toolsUsed: ["test_run_flow"],
toolCallDetails: ids.map((memory_id) => ({
name: "test_run_flow",
arguments: { path: "f/chat", memory_id },
})),
skillsInvoked: [],
},
toolExpect: {
toolCallArgs: [{ tool: "test_run_flow", field: "memory_id", sharedByAtLeast: 2 }],
},
}).find((c) => c.name.includes("is shared by at least 2 calls"))?.passed;
expect(run(["a", "b"])).toBe(false);
expect(run(["a"])).toBe(false);
expect(run([undefined, undefined])).toBe(false);
expect(run(["rejected", "a", "a"])).toBe(true);
});
it("passes nonEmpty when every call filled the field", () => {
const checks = validateToolExpectations({
run: {
-17
View File
@@ -320,23 +320,6 @@ export function validateToolExpectations(input: {
);
}
if (rule.sharedByAtLeast !== undefined) {
const counts = new Map<string, number>();
for (const value of values) {
if (typeof value === "string" && value.trim().length > 0) {
counts.set(value, (counts.get(value) ?? 0) + 1);
}
}
const mostShared = Math.max(0, ...counts.values());
checks.push(
check(
`${rule.tool}.${rule.field} is shared by at least ${rule.sharedByAtLeast} calls`,
mostShared >= rule.sharedByAtLeast,
`most calls sharing one value: ${mostShared}; values: ${summarizeToolValues(values)}`
)
);
}
if (rule.fieldMustBeAbsent) {
// Anything other than `undefined` was supplied — an explicit `null` is the
// model passing the field, not omitting it.
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
{
"user": {
"username": "admin",
"is_admin": true,
"folders": ["evals"],
"folders_read": ["evals"]
},
"workspace": {
"apps": [
{
"path": "f/evals/global/sales_board",
"summary": "Sales board",
"rawApp": false,
"value": {
"grid": []
}
},
{
"path": "f/evals/global/ops_console",
"summary": "Ops console",
"value": {
"files": {
"/App.tsx": "export default function App() {\n\treturn <div>Ops console</div>\n}\n"
},
"runnables": {}
}
}
]
}
}
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
{
"workspace": {
"ducklakes": ["main"],
"dataMetrics": [
{
"script_path": "f/analytics/orders_pipeline",
"table_path": "main/main.orders",
"kind": "measure",
"name": "revenue",
"expr": "sum(amount)",
"filter": "not is_test"
},
{
"script_path": "f/analytics/orders_pipeline",
"table_path": "main/main.orders",
"kind": "measure",
"name": "order_count",
"expr": "count(*)"
},
{
"script_path": "f/analytics/orders_pipeline",
"table_path": "main/main.orders",
"kind": "dimension",
"name": "order_month",
"expr": "date_trunc('month', order_date)"
},
{
"script_path": "f/analytics/orders_pipeline",
"table_path": "main/main.orders",
"kind": "dimension",
"name": "region",
"expr": "region"
}
]
}
}
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
{
"workspace": {
"flows": [
{
"path": "f/evals/global/support_chat",
"summary": "Support chat",
"description": "Answers customer questions in a chat, remembering earlier messages.",
"schema": {
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"user_message": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Message from user"
}
},
"required": ["user_message"]
},
"value": {
"chat_input_enabled": true,
"modules": [
{
"id": "assistant",
"summary": "Support assistant",
"value": {
"type": "aiagent",
"tools": [],
"input_transforms": {
"provider": {
"type": "static",
"value": {
"kind": "anthropic",
"model": "claude-haiku-4-5-20251001",
"resource": "$res:f/evals/ai/anthropic"
}
},
"user_message": {
"type": "javascript",
"expr": "flow_input.user_message"
},
"system_prompt": {
"type": "static",
"value": "You are a friendly support assistant. Keep answers short."
},
"memory": {
"type": "static",
"value": { "kind": "auto", "context_length": 10 }
},
"streaming": { "type": "static", "value": true },
"output_type": { "type": "static", "value": "text" }
}
}
}
]
}
}
]
}
}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT id, conversation_id, message_type as \"message_type: MessageType\", content, job_id, created_at, created_seq, step_name, success, tool_arguments, tool_result, reasoning, attachments\n FROM flow_conversation_message\n WHERE conversation_id = $1\n AND created_seq > $2\n ORDER BY created_seq ASC\n LIMIT $3\n ",
"query": "SELECT id, conversation_id, message_type as \"message_type: MessageType\", content, job_id, created_at, created_seq, step_name, success\n FROM (\n SELECT id, conversation_id, message_type, content, job_id, created_at, created_seq, step_name, success\n FROM flow_conversation_message\n WHERE conversation_id = $1\n ORDER BY created_seq DESC\n LIMIT $2 OFFSET $3\n ) AS messages\n ORDER BY created_seq ASC\n ",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
@@ -58,26 +58,6 @@
"ordinal": 8,
"name": "success",
"type_info": "Bool"
},
{
"ordinal": 9,
"name": "tool_arguments",
"type_info": "Text"
},
{
"ordinal": 10,
"name": "tool_result",
"type_info": "Text"
},
{
"ordinal": 11,
"name": "reasoning",
"type_info": "Text"
},
{
"ordinal": 12,
"name": "attachments",
"type_info": "Jsonb"
}
],
"parameters": {
@@ -96,12 +76,8 @@
false,
false,
true,
false,
true,
true,
true,
true
false
]
},
"hash": "d6fa78c43b6c5f8040d7bccb29ad8627be1dac6fbe0097735a52f47c173f51c9"
"hash": "1c3473a0f9f6b6148b2c975f9f05bdefedf8a51c4e6ddf0eca367b9cc778d051"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "INSERT INTO workspace_settings (workspace_id, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, git_credentials, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled, guest_jwt_public_key, guest_jwt_jwks_url) SELECT $1, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, git_credentials, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled, guest_jwt_public_key, guest_jwt_jwks_url FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = $2",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Varchar",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "1d8ccd32266637d7f7915f92a8483dce0c9986f3847227c2f66daa84d4109d7d"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "UPDATE workspace_settings SET auto_invite = $1 WHERE workspace_id = $2",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Jsonb",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "255ba68caa78d0e814ea817693a319f769907025f9c7d1150d45e8ecb1bff4ab"
}
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "INSERT INTO usr (workspace_id, username, email, is_admin, created_at, operator, disabled, role, is_service_account, added_via)\n SELECT $1, username, email, is_admin, created_at, operator, disabled, role, is_service_account,\n CASE WHEN $3 THEN NULL ELSE added_via END\n FROM usr WHERE workspace_id = $2\n AND (NOT $3 OR (NOT operator AND NOT disabled AND NOT is_service_account))\n ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Varchar",
"Text",
"Bool"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "2d6b117324eaf076a0ed06d2cb0ce73279957d6a39fdc6b1ecb6e0a1e02f921f"
}
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT add_admins_and_developers_to_forks FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = $1",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "add_admins_and_developers_to_forks",
"type_info": "Bool"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": [
false
]
},
"hash": "2f39fce0ee700117f3e4c066e0b56ee979e4c392970278304e80368b770bb7b4"
}
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "UPDATE flow_conversation SET title = $1, updated_at = updated_at\n WHERE id = $2 AND workspace_id = $3\n RETURNING id",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "id",
"type_info": "Uuid"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Varchar",
"Uuid",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": [
false
]
},
"hash": "5b9c9eb64051f291fed4be9bc0b0cc0aef2e7bde732899976eddac36a2da7658"
}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT id, workspace_id, flow_path, title, created_at, updated_at, created_by, is_test\n FROM flow_conversation\n WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2",
"query": "SELECT id, workspace_id, flow_path, title, created_at, updated_at, created_by\n FROM flow_conversation\n WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2\n FOR UPDATE",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
@@ -37,11 +37,6 @@
"ordinal": 6,
"name": "created_by",
"type_info": "Varchar"
},
{
"ordinal": 7,
"name": "is_test",
"type_info": "Bool"
}
],
"parameters": {
@@ -57,9 +52,8 @@
true,
false,
false,
false,
false
]
},
"hash": "48c8522a4fed219c5011f4ba63c81cfe028a8b2a32bd790840cef65c452a8c31"
"hash": "6f32c1feed096ff706ae359ad6a3ca33b3f82ca38289dfa4a69aa95041027d57"
}
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT id, name, enabled, pwd FROM datatable_role",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "id",
"type_info": "Varchar"
},
{
"ordinal": 1,
"name": "name",
"type_info": "Varchar"
},
{
"ordinal": 2,
"name": "enabled",
"type_info": "Bool"
},
{
"ordinal": 3,
"name": "pwd",
"type_info": "Text"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": []
},
"nullable": [
false,
false,
false,
true
]
},
"hash": "71ee2cb6661cca1fa4d8874a7f6d368347c59f36fd87df6dc7996152ccb84af0"
}
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM usr WHERE email = $1 AND is_service_account IS true\n AND ($2::varchar IS NULL OR workspace_id = $2))",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "exists",
"type_info": "Bool"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text",
"Varchar"
]
},
"nullable": [
null
]
},
"hash": "75e6b5cd52d63ac094c90abd1524bc7a919692a96b076b8aaf24d812723531c8"
}
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "\n SELECT ws.workspace_id AS \"workspace_id!\", dt.key AS \"datatable!\"\n FROM workspace_settings ws\n JOIN workspace w ON w.id = ws.workspace_id AND w.deleted = false\n CROSS JOIN LATERAL jsonb_each(COALESCE(ws.datatable->'datatables', '{}'::jsonb)) dt\n WHERE ws.workspace_id <> $1\n AND dt.value->'database'->>'resource_type' = 'instance'\n AND dt.value->'database'->>'resource_path' = $2\n ORDER BY ws.workspace_id, dt.key\n ",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "workspace_id!",
"type_info": "Varchar"
},
{
"ordinal": 1,
"name": "datatable!",
"type_info": "Text"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": [
false,
null
]
},
"hash": "79799b5a2e499df6c28e286c42b9ad2db940c2455ab19cc95e5198baf96d5629"
}
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "INSERT INTO datatable_role (id, name, enabled, pwd) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4)",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Varchar",
"Varchar",
"Bool",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "86af9d51a158ea5cb6161461ecddf2a63695f8cbf8af648da5a0a77a5b9d02ba"
}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT workspace.id, workspace.name, usr.username, workspace_settings.color, workspace.parent_workspace_id,\n workspace.is_dev_workspace, workspace.dev_workspace_label,\n workspace.owner AS \"created_by?\",\n CASE WHEN usr.operator THEN workspace_settings.operator_settings ELSE NULL END as operator_settings,\n usr.disabled, usr.is_service_account\n FROM workspace\n JOIN usr ON usr.workspace_id = workspace.id\n JOIN workspace_settings ON workspace_settings.workspace_id = workspace.id\n WHERE usr.email = $1 AND workspace.deleted = false",
"query": "SELECT workspace.id, workspace.name, usr.username, workspace_settings.color, workspace.parent_workspace_id,\n workspace.is_dev_workspace, workspace.dev_workspace_label,\n workspace.owner AS \"created_by?\",\n CASE WHEN usr.operator THEN workspace_settings.operator_settings ELSE NULL END as operator_settings,\n usr.disabled\n FROM workspace\n JOIN usr ON usr.workspace_id = workspace.id\n JOIN workspace_settings ON workspace_settings.workspace_id = workspace.id\n WHERE usr.email = $1 AND workspace.deleted = false",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
@@ -52,11 +52,6 @@
"ordinal": 9,
"name": "disabled",
"type_info": "Bool"
},
{
"ordinal": 10,
"name": "is_service_account",
"type_info": "Bool"
}
],
"parameters": {
@@ -74,9 +69,8 @@
true,
false,
null,
false,
false
]
},
"hash": "7b33adb5cf051bc123340982b97a80a96ee43e1c91d9907d50cc2ee14111623e"
"hash": "88a134e4ca82d5ce0334977c7713021ae3e99a5a61ea1c944c1df1368746dfa5"
}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "DELETE FROM token_expiry_notification n\n USING token t\n WHERE n.token_hash = t.token_hash\n AND n.expiration > now()\n AND n.expiration <= now() + make_interval(days => $1)\n RETURNING t.token_prefix, t.label, t.email, t.workspace_id",
"query": "DELETE FROM token_expiry_notification n\n USING token t\n WHERE n.token_hash = t.token_hash\n AND n.expiration > now()\n AND n.expiration <= now() + interval '7 days'\n RETURNING t.token_prefix, t.label, t.email, t.workspace_id",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
@@ -25,9 +25,7 @@
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Int4"
]
"Left": []
},
"nullable": [
false,
@@ -36,5 +34,5 @@
true
]
},
"hash": "6c57c46c5a0462f379ed6a22ae97e363009177fdc45d795447a920f455f193cc"
"hash": "94fd0a57cfc9341b2e9deae60506c6c06aa6934b87200da14231f12f65149cd3"
}
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "UPDATE workspace_settings SET add_admins_and_developers_to_forks = $1 WHERE workspace_id = $2",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Bool",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "9bd1995747f0073b3a866d1238e78f7e6dfa9185056f7731547ff05b8176b271"
}
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "UPDATE workspace_settings SET auto_invite = (COALESCE(auto_invite, '{}'::jsonb) - 'domain') || $1::jsonb WHERE workspace_id = $2",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Jsonb",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "a1bcf143135ecb9f32709a56a353d3246dc238920c3e155caa9cf767246fa6fb"
}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "\n UPDATE workspace_settings\n SET\n ai_config = source_ws.ai_config,\n large_file_storage = source_ws.large_file_storage,\n ducklake = source_ws.ducklake,\n dbt_warehouses = source_ws.dbt_warehouses,\n datatable = source_ws.datatable,\n git_app_installations = source_ws.git_app_installations,\n add_admins_and_developers_to_forks = source_ws.add_admins_and_developers_to_forks\n FROM workspace_settings source_ws\n WHERE source_ws.workspace_id = $1\n AND workspace_settings.workspace_id = $2\n ",
"query": "\n UPDATE workspace_settings\n SET\n ai_config = source_ws.ai_config,\n large_file_storage = source_ws.large_file_storage,\n ducklake = source_ws.ducklake,\n dbt_warehouses = source_ws.dbt_warehouses,\n datatable = source_ws.datatable,\n git_app_installations = source_ws.git_app_installations\n FROM workspace_settings source_ws\n WHERE source_ws.workspace_id = $1\n AND workspace_settings.workspace_id = $2\n ",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
@@ -11,5 +11,5 @@
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "5ccfbd0f345b9b86ca356008def6cc1011a49fc8d8ad046ac572e81cf8938995"
"hash": "a6decdebcd9750691f20f874b66a9c6f2ede08c33605c6a3c3dfc213a3eda76a"
}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "INSERT INTO flow_conversation_message (conversation_id, message_type, content, job_id, step_name, success, tool_arguments, tool_result, reasoning, attachments)\n VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8, $9, $10)",
"query": "INSERT INTO flow_conversation_message (conversation_id, message_type, content, job_id, step_name, success)\n VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6)",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
@@ -21,14 +21,10 @@
"Text",
"Uuid",
"Varchar",
"Bool",
"Text",
"Text",
"Text",
"Jsonb"
"Bool"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "12329c3359a7944ab5fa3aa27ddca1b26f340ccf574b9fa07641fe88b2d2987c"
"hash": "b1a9a433e577133869c067b2ce383fc6ce4e9df307feb5fd3edc0d1276d61ff1"
}
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT jsonb_object_keys(value->'databases') FROM global_settings\n WHERE name = 'custom_instance_pg_databases'",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "jsonb_object_keys",
"type_info": "Text"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": []
},
"nullable": [
null
]
},
"hash": "b9842d2d8abf382bd82d8fa1de012373638be391f884f81dc387ffc465badac6"
}
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "INSERT INTO usr (workspace_id, username, email, is_admin, created_at, operator, disabled, role, is_service_account, added_via)\n SELECT $1, username, email, is_admin, created_at, operator, disabled, role, is_service_account, added_via\n FROM usr WHERE workspace_id = $2\n ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Varchar",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "b98844926ff127c528ed3e7bc63bf1ebed0192be267983e8fbd18f79997e6142"
}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "INSERT INTO flow_conversation (id, workspace_id, flow_path, created_by, title, is_test)\n VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6)\n ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING\n RETURNING id, workspace_id, flow_path, title, created_at, updated_at, created_by, is_test",
"query": "INSERT INTO flow_conversation (id, workspace_id, flow_path, created_by, title)\n VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5)\n ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING\n RETURNING id, workspace_id, flow_path, title, created_at, updated_at, created_by",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
@@ -37,11 +37,6 @@
"ordinal": 6,
"name": "created_by",
"type_info": "Varchar"
},
{
"ordinal": 7,
"name": "is_test",
"type_info": "Bool"
}
],
"parameters": {
@@ -50,8 +45,7 @@
"Varchar",
"Varchar",
"Varchar",
"Varchar",
"Bool"
"Varchar"
]
},
"nullable": [
@@ -61,9 +55,8 @@
true,
false,
false,
false,
false
]
},
"hash": "6d259b8cce5da5fecefe4ce322789b6b2cc43b51f2056c677d58f39c31fb26cb"
"hash": "c1e3ed3ecc3bcb98f60ba8196d33fee4a74f61b061e5025ecb75882208b3ba8f"
}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT id, workspace_id, flow_path, title, created_at, updated_at, created_by, is_test\n FROM flow_conversation\n WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2\n FOR UPDATE",
"query": "SELECT id, workspace_id, flow_path, title, created_at, updated_at, created_by\n FROM flow_conversation\n WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
@@ -37,11 +37,6 @@
"ordinal": 6,
"name": "created_by",
"type_info": "Varchar"
},
{
"ordinal": 7,
"name": "is_test",
"type_info": "Bool"
}
],
"parameters": {
@@ -57,9 +52,8 @@
true,
false,
false,
false,
false
]
},
"hash": "dd84f9dfb238d18cb74f9e43228345427131bf8008eba6920021d6a449791534"
"hash": "c383cc023714b361d10c10e8fef1fc148ab1da942951ee9ffdddaecee76a6be9"
}
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT dt.key AS \"datatable!\"\n FROM workspace_settings ws\n CROSS JOIN LATERAL jsonb_each(COALESCE(ws.datatable->'datatables', '{}'::jsonb)) dt\n WHERE ws.workspace_id = $1\n AND dt.key <> $2\n AND NOT dt.value ? 'permissions'\n AND dt.value->'database'->>'resource_type' = 'instance'\n AND dt.value->'database'->>'resource_path' = $3\n ORDER BY dt.key",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
"ordinal": 0,
"name": "datatable!",
"type_info": "Text"
}
],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Text",
"Text",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": [
null
]
},
"hash": "d48ca62c86b1af7a9dd2450c1c28dc45020a2a553d8874c49f9eafedea5a9d40"
}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "UPDATE token SET label = $1\n WHERE email = $2 AND token_prefix = $3\n AND (label IS NULL OR (\n label <> 'session'\n AND label <> 'guest_session'\n AND lower(label) NOT LIKE 'ephemeral%'\n AND label <> 'debugger-token'\n AND label NOT LIKE 'mcp-oauth-%'\n AND NOT starts_with(label, 'embed_app:')\n AND NOT starts_with(label, 'sdk_app:')\n AND NOT starts_with(label, 'impersonation:')\n AND NOT starts_with(label, 'cli-login:')\n ))\n RETURNING token_prefix",
"query": "UPDATE token SET label = $1\n WHERE email = $2 AND token_prefix = $3\n AND (label IS NULL OR (\n label <> 'session'\n AND label <> 'guest_session'\n AND lower(label) NOT LIKE 'ephemeral%'\n AND label <> 'debugger-token'\n AND label NOT LIKE 'mcp-oauth-%'\n AND NOT starts_with(label, 'embed_app:')\n AND NOT starts_with(label, 'sdk_app:')\n AND NOT starts_with(label, 'impersonation:')\n ))\n RETURNING token_prefix",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
@@ -20,5 +20,5 @@
false
]
},
"hash": "383c80239525d9c4ee90e2f5cb6e46c8a0983c52ad15db083f84a9e344dc4c99"
"hash": "d631a26e5531589ff37e677f91a4f1d9f850e3e46c17130dd580426cda7a9f65"
}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "\n SELECT\n workspace_id,\n slack_team_id,\n teams_team_id,\n teams_team_name,\n teams_team_guid,\n slack_name,\n slack_command_script,\n teams_command_script,\n slack_email,\n slack_oauth_client_id,\n slack_oauth_client_secret,\n customer_id,\n plan,\n webhook,\n ai_config,\n dbt_warehouses,\n large_file_storage,\n datatable,\n ducklake,\n git_sync,\n deploy_ui,\n default_app,\n default_scripts,\n mute_critical_alerts,\n color,\n operator_settings,\n git_app_installations,\n auto_invite,\n error_handler,\n success_handler,\n public_app_execution_limit_per_minute,\n error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts,\n guest_access_enabled,\n guest_jwt_public_key,\n guest_jwt_jwks_url,\n add_admins_and_developers_to_forks\n FROM\n workspace_settings\n WHERE\n workspace_id = $1\n ",
"query": "\n SELECT\n workspace_id,\n slack_team_id,\n teams_team_id,\n teams_team_name,\n teams_team_guid,\n slack_name,\n slack_command_script,\n teams_command_script,\n slack_email,\n slack_oauth_client_id,\n slack_oauth_client_secret,\n customer_id,\n plan,\n webhook,\n ai_config,\n dbt_warehouses,\n large_file_storage,\n datatable,\n ducklake,\n git_sync,\n deploy_ui,\n default_app,\n default_scripts,\n mute_critical_alerts,\n color,\n operator_settings,\n git_app_installations,\n auto_invite,\n error_handler,\n success_handler,\n public_app_execution_limit_per_minute,\n error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts,\n guest_access_enabled,\n guest_jwt_public_key,\n guest_jwt_jwks_url\n FROM\n workspace_settings\n WHERE\n workspace_id = $1\n ",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
@@ -177,11 +177,6 @@
"ordinal": 34,
"name": "guest_jwt_jwks_url",
"type_info": "Text"
},
{
"ordinal": 35,
"name": "add_admins_and_developers_to_forks",
"type_info": "Bool"
}
],
"parameters": {
@@ -224,9 +219,8 @@
false,
false,
true,
true,
false
true
]
},
"hash": "8ebe054b41793f1a7b85f1f8d29cd21d12fa1207b58bfc46249c250cdcdb5363"
"hash": "dc4a57df3becc610f631ef22c116450390addbfae85fecc61c991d94167e6e99"
}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "\n SELECT\n j.args as \"args: Json<HashMap<String, Box<RawValue>>>\",\n js.flow_status as \"flow_status: Json<windmill_common::flow_status::FlowStatus>\",\n j.runnable_path\n FROM v2_job_status js\n INNER JOIN v2_job j ON j.id = js.id\n WHERE js.id = $1\n ",
"query": "\n SELECT\n j.args as \"args: Json<HashMap<String, Box<RawValue>>>\",\n js.flow_status as \"flow_status: Json<windmill_common::flow_status::FlowStatus>\"\n FROM v2_job_status js\n INNER JOIN v2_job j ON j.id = js.id\n WHERE js.id = $1\n ",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
@@ -12,11 +12,6 @@
"ordinal": 1,
"name": "flow_status: Json<windmill_common::flow_status::FlowStatus>",
"type_info": "Jsonb"
},
{
"ordinal": 2,
"name": "runnable_path",
"type_info": "Varchar"
}
],
"parameters": {
@@ -25,10 +20,9 @@
]
},
"nullable": [
true,
true,
true
]
},
"hash": "9008f9abb70a9a07e38acb20bea6a710d0efd77dac4aedeb88d72240e816530b"
"hash": "dd89d652154748d6d7e625e31778f6885d0ee62d29a4b8894a4b459dd215a103"
}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "SELECT id, conversation_id, message_type as \"message_type: MessageType\", content, job_id, created_at, created_seq, step_name, success, tool_arguments, tool_result, reasoning, attachments\n FROM (\n SELECT id, conversation_id, message_type, content, job_id, created_at, created_seq, step_name, success, tool_arguments, tool_result, reasoning, attachments\n FROM flow_conversation_message\n WHERE conversation_id = $1\n ORDER BY created_seq DESC\n LIMIT $2 OFFSET $3\n ) AS messages\n ORDER BY created_seq ASC\n ",
"query": "SELECT id, conversation_id, message_type as \"message_type: MessageType\", content, job_id, created_at, created_seq, step_name, success\n FROM flow_conversation_message\n WHERE conversation_id = $1\n AND created_seq > $2\n ORDER BY created_seq ASC\n LIMIT $3\n ",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
@@ -58,26 +58,6 @@
"ordinal": 8,
"name": "success",
"type_info": "Bool"
},
{
"ordinal": 9,
"name": "tool_arguments",
"type_info": "Text"
},
{
"ordinal": 10,
"name": "tool_result",
"type_info": "Text"
},
{
"ordinal": 11,
"name": "reasoning",
"type_info": "Text"
},
{
"ordinal": 12,
"name": "attachments",
"type_info": "Jsonb"
}
],
"parameters": {
@@ -96,12 +76,8 @@
false,
false,
true,
false,
true,
true,
true,
true
false
]
},
"hash": "a4a823f70b3dbe6aaf4a61c98345e94c5042fd5e6351fea139a66ecb1fb812ab"
"hash": "e8802be9203c1e88a06e337260ccca029380139f89a01a89033e36a6ed9ac082"
}
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "\n SELECT\n workspace_id,\n slack_team_id,\n slack_name,\n teams_team_id,\n teams_team_name,\n teams_team_guid,\n mute_critical_alerts,\n guest_access_enabled,\n add_admins_and_developers_to_forks,\n deploy_ui,\n large_file_storage,\n datatable\n FROM\n workspace_settings\n WHERE\n workspace_id = $1\n ",
"query": "\n SELECT\n workspace_id,\n slack_team_id,\n slack_name,\n teams_team_id,\n teams_team_name,\n teams_team_guid,\n mute_critical_alerts,\n guest_access_enabled,\n deploy_ui,\n large_file_storage,\n datatable\n FROM\n workspace_settings\n WHERE\n workspace_id = $1\n ",
"describe": {
"columns": [
{
@@ -45,21 +45,16 @@
},
{
"ordinal": 8,
"name": "add_admins_and_developers_to_forks",
"type_info": "Bool"
},
{
"ordinal": 9,
"name": "deploy_ui",
"type_info": "Jsonb"
},
{
"ordinal": 10,
"ordinal": 9,
"name": "large_file_storage",
"type_info": "Jsonb"
},
{
"ordinal": 11,
"ordinal": 10,
"name": "datatable",
"type_info": "Jsonb"
}
@@ -78,11 +73,10 @@
true,
true,
false,
false,
true,
true,
true
]
},
"hash": "e6e31fdf705896c81f9a0f45d47c1b93db0406aaf278bccba07be00e9f937e2a"
"hash": "ede15bff96152f209aff756830cbc76b5afa1af6ed324376989117b1054c3447"
}
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
{
"db_name": "PostgreSQL",
"query": "INSERT INTO workspace_settings (workspace_id, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, git_credentials, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled, guest_jwt_public_key, guest_jwt_jwks_url, add_admins_and_developers_to_forks) SELECT $1, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, git_credentials, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled, guest_jwt_public_key, guest_jwt_jwks_url, add_admins_and_developers_to_forks FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = $2",
"describe": {
"columns": [],
"parameters": {
"Left": [
"Varchar",
"Text"
]
},
"nullable": []
},
"hash": "eefa0588a6a927fd9b3f65e1df652fb2b4cf7983049d2c490940df360c7e2b30"
}
+132 -132
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+3 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
[package]
name = "windmill"
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
authors.workspace = true
edition.workspace = true
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ members = [
exclude = ["./windmill-duckdb-ffi-internal", "./parsers/windmill-parser-wasm"]
[workspace.package]
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
authors = ["Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>"]
edition = "2021"
@@ -624,6 +624,7 @@ wasm-bindgen-test = "^0"
convert_case = "0.6.0"
getrandom = "0.2"
tokio-postgres = {version = "^0.7", features = ["array-impls", "with-serde_json-1", "with-chrono-0_4", "with-uuid-1", "with-bit-vec-0_6"]}
postgres-protocol = "0.6"
rust-postgres = { package = "tokio-postgres", git = "https://github.com/MaterializeInc/rust-postgres", rev = "78c1222577bb091d69bc22b1bc7ad01c14675abe"}
rust-postgres-native-tls = { package = "postgres-native-tls", git = "https://github.com/MaterializeInc/rust-postgres", features = ["runtime"], rev = "78c1222577bb091d69bc22b1bc7ad01c14675abe" }
bit-vec = "=0.6.3"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1 +1 @@
bc3ef08c8e4233508c023e6ee847a3cd0b8be43b
151be033ea2bf2f768f381a8cd3b888bdd366cf9
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
ALTER TABLE flow_conversation_message DROP COLUMN tool_arguments;
ALTER TABLE flow_conversation_message DROP COLUMN tool_result;
ALTER TABLE flow_conversation_message DROP COLUMN reasoning;
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-- A chat is rebuilt from its rows without reading jobs, so every tool row carries its call:
-- the arguments the model wrote and the text the model got back, or what the call failed
-- with. A script or flow tool's job holds the args its input transforms produced, not the
-- model's; an MCP tool runs inside the agent's job, whose result lists every call of the
-- turn with nothing tying one to a row. A provider-native web search carries only its
-- citations, the provider never returning the query.
ALTER TABLE flow_conversation_message ADD COLUMN tool_arguments TEXT;
ALTER TABLE flow_conversation_message ADD COLUMN tool_result TEXT;
-- The thinking behind this row. The agent job keeps the turn's thinking as one string;
-- the rows keep it per iteration, next to the answer or tool call it led to.
ALTER TABLE flow_conversation_message ADD COLUMN reasoning TEXT;
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
ALTER TABLE flow_conversation DROP COLUMN is_test;
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-- A chat run from the flow editor's test panel is stored exactly like one from the
-- deployed flow, so the two were indistinguishable once written. Marking them lets the
-- lists tell a trial apart from a real conversation.
ALTER TABLE flow_conversation ADD COLUMN is_test BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false;
-- Existing rows: a conversation whose messages came from a flowpreview run was a test.
-- Derived once here because the job is purged on retention, after which the origin of an
-- old conversation is unknowable.
--
-- Walked to the root job rather than matched directly: an existing message row never holds
-- the flow job itself. The rows point at the step that produced them — the AI agent's job
-- for an answer, the tool's own job for a tool call — whose kind is never 'flowpreview'.
--
-- `root_job` first, matching `get_root_job_id` (windmill-worker/src/common.rs): only it
-- reaches the top of the run. `flow_innermost_root_job` stops at the closest flow scope by
-- design, so an agent inside a subflow would land on that subflow's 'flow' row and the
-- conversation would read as deployed.
UPDATE flow_conversation c
SET is_test = true
WHERE EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM flow_conversation_message m
JOIN v2_job j ON j.id = m.job_id
JOIN v2_job root
ON root.id = coalesce(j.root_job, j.flow_innermost_root_job, j.parent_job, j.id)
WHERE m.conversation_id = c.id AND root.kind = 'flowpreview'
);
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
ALTER TABLE flow_conversation_message DROP COLUMN attachments;
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-- The files a user message carried, as object-storage references: `[{input, s3, storage?,
-- filename?}]`. Only references, never file bytes and never a presigned URL, so a
-- transcript can show a message's files without reading its run's args.
ALTER TABLE flow_conversation_message ADD COLUMN attachments JSONB;
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
-- Roles on the external cluster are live logins there; dropping the column would forget them.
LOCK TABLE datatable_role;
DO $$
BEGIN
IF EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM datatable_role WHERE cluster <> 'instance') THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'datatable_role holds roles on the external instance cluster. Delete them in instance settings first.';
END IF;
-- Before this, only data tables on Windmill's own cluster could be under roles, and a role
-- block left with just `admin` survives deleting every external role.
IF EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM workspace_settings ws,
jsonb_each(CASE WHEN jsonb_typeof(ws.datatable->'datatables') = 'object'
THEN ws.datatable->'datatables' ELSE '{}'::jsonb END) dt
WHERE dt.value->'database'->>'resource_type' = 'external_instance'
AND dt.value ? 'permissions'
) THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'external instance data tables are still under roles. Turn their roles off first.';
END IF;
END $$;
ALTER TABLE datatable_role DROP CONSTRAINT datatable_role_cluster_name_key;
ALTER TABLE datatable_role ADD CONSTRAINT datatable_role_name_key UNIQUE (name);
ALTER TABLE datatable_role DROP COLUMN cluster;
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
-- A data table role is a Postgres login on one cluster: Windmill's own ('instance'), or the external
-- instance cluster ('external_instance'). Role names are the cluster's own key, so they are unique
-- per cluster rather than across the instance.
ALTER TABLE datatable_role
ADD COLUMN cluster VARCHAR(20) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'instance'
CHECK (cluster IN ('instance', 'external_instance'));
ALTER TABLE datatable_role DROP CONSTRAINT datatable_role_name_key;
ALTER TABLE datatable_role ADD CONSTRAINT datatable_role_cluster_name_key UNIQUE (cluster, name);
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
ALTER TABLE workspace_settings DROP COLUMN add_admins_and_developers_to_forks;
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
ALTER TABLE workspace_settings ADD COLUMN add_admins_and_developers_to_forks BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false;
+24 -24
View File
@@ -6191,7 +6191,7 @@ checksum = "712e227841d057c1ee1cd2fb22fa7e5a5461ae8e48fa2ca79ec42cfc1931183f"
[[package]]
name = "windmill-common"
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
dependencies = [
"aho-corasick",
"anyhow",
@@ -6274,7 +6274,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-macros"
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
"quote",
@@ -6286,7 +6286,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser"
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
dependencies = [
"convert_case",
"serde",
@@ -6295,7 +6295,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-bash"
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"lazy_static",
@@ -6307,7 +6307,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-csharp"
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"serde_json",
@@ -6319,7 +6319,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-go"
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"gosyn",
@@ -6331,7 +6331,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-graphql"
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"lazy_static",
@@ -6343,7 +6343,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-java"
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"serde_json",
@@ -6355,7 +6355,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-nu"
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"nu-parser",
@@ -6366,7 +6366,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-php"
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"itertools 0.14.0",
@@ -6377,7 +6377,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-py"
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"itertools 0.14.0",
@@ -6389,7 +6389,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-py-asset"
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"rustpython-ast",
@@ -6400,7 +6400,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-py-imports"
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"async-recursion",
@@ -6422,7 +6422,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-r"
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"serde_json",
@@ -6434,7 +6434,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-ruby"
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"lazy_static",
@@ -6448,7 +6448,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-rust"
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"convert_case",
@@ -6465,7 +6465,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-sql"
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"lazy_static",
@@ -6478,7 +6478,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-sql-asset"
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"serde",
@@ -6490,7 +6490,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-ts"
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"lazy_static",
@@ -6508,7 +6508,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-ts-asset"
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"serde-wasm-bindgen",
@@ -6524,7 +6524,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-wac"
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"rustpython-ast",
@@ -6540,7 +6540,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-wasm"
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"getrandom 0.2.17",
@@ -6572,7 +6572,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-parser-yaml"
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"lazy_static",
@@ -6586,7 +6586,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "windmill-types"
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"bitflags",
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ resolver = "2"
members = ["."]
[workspace.package]
version = "1.815.0"
version = "1.813.0"
edition = "2021"
authors = ["Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>"]
+2 -7
View File
@@ -52,8 +52,7 @@ use windmill_common::{
INSTANCE_EVENTS_WEBHOOK_SETTING, INSTANCE_PYTHON_VERSION_SETTING,
JOB_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECS_SETTING, JOB_ISOLATION_SETTING, JWT_SECRET_SETTING,
KEEP_JOB_DIR_SETTING, LICENSE_KEY_SETTING, MAVEN_REPOS_SETTING, MAVEN_SETTINGS_XML_SETTING,
MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM_SETTING, MONITOR_LOGS_ON_OBJECT_STORE_SETTING,
NO_DEFAULT_MAVEN_SETTING,
MONITOR_LOGS_ON_OBJECT_STORE_SETTING, NO_DEFAULT_MAVEN_SETTING,
NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY_SETTING, NSJAIL_TMPFS_SIZE_MB_SETTING, NSJAIL_TMP_BACKING_SETTING,
NUGET_CONFIG_SETTING, OAUTH_SETTING, OTEL_SETTING, OTEL_TRACES_RETENTION_SECS_SETTING,
OTEL_TRACING_PROXY_SETTING, PIP_INDEX_URL_SETTING, POWERSHELL_REPO_PAT_SETTING,
@@ -127,8 +126,7 @@ use windmill_worker::{
use crate::monitor::{
initial_load, load_concurrency_key_max_queued, load_disable_password_login,
load_fork_workspace_tag_append_fork_suffix, load_keep_job_dir,
load_mcp_disable_token_query_param, load_metrics_debug_enabled,
load_fork_workspace_tag_append_fork_suffix, load_keep_job_dir, load_metrics_debug_enabled,
load_preview_tags_override, load_require_preexisting_user, load_retention_period_overrides,
load_tag_per_workspace_enabled, load_tag_per_workspace_workspaces,
load_workspace_fairness_duration_secs, load_workspace_fairness_enabled,
@@ -2166,9 +2164,6 @@ async fn process_notify_event(
DISABLE_PASSWORD_LOGIN_SETTING => {
load_disable_password_login(db).await;
}
MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM_SETTING => {
load_mcp_disable_token_query_param(db).await;
}
EXPOSE_METRICS_SETTING => {
tracing::info!("Metrics setting changed, restarting");
spawn_graceful_killpill(tx, db, 30, "metrics setting change", server_mode)
+3 -34
View File
@@ -45,10 +45,7 @@ use windmill_common::otel_oss::{
use windmill_common::{
agent_workers::DECODED_AGENT_TOKEN,
apps::APP_WORKSPACED_ROUTE,
auth::{
create_token_for_owner, ephemeral_script_token_label, job_token_expiry_secs,
TOKEN_EXPIRY_WARNING_DAYS,
},
auth::{create_token_for_owner, ephemeral_script_token_label, job_token_expiry_secs},
ee_oss::CriticalErrorChannel,
email_oss::send_email_if_possible,
error,
@@ -65,7 +62,6 @@ use windmill_common::{
FORK_WORKSPACE_TAG_APPEND_FORK_SUFFIX_SETTING, HUB_API_SECRET_SETTING,
HUB_BASE_URL_SETTING, INSTANCE_PYTHON_VERSION_SETTING, JOB_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECS_SETTING,
JOB_ISOLATION_SETTING, JWT_SECRET_SETTING, KEEP_JOB_DIR_SETTING, LICENSE_KEY_SETTING,
MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM, MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM_SETTING,
MONITOR_LOGS_ON_OBJECT_STORE_SETTING, NPMRC_SETTING, NPM_CONFIG_REGISTRY_SETTING,
NSJAIL_TMPFS_SIZE_MB_SETTING, NSJAIL_TMP_BACKING_SETTING, NUGET_CONFIG_SETTING,
OTEL_SETTING, OTEL_TRACES_RETENTION_SECS_SETTING, OTEL_TRACING_PROXY_SETTING,
@@ -289,15 +285,6 @@ pub async fn initial_load(
);
if let Some(db) = conn.as_sql() {
// Outside the `server_mode` block below: a `MODE=mcp` process serves the MCP routes
// with `server_mode` false and would otherwise never read this at all. That mode
// joins no monitor loop, so there — as for every global setting, `base_url`
// included — this pass is the only read, and a change lands on restart.
pass.setting(
MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM_SETTING,
false,
|v| async move { apply_mcp_disable_token_query_param(v) },
);
pass.setting(DEFAULT_TAGS_PER_WORKSPACE_SETTING, false, |v| async move {
apply_tag_per_workspace_enabled(v)
});
@@ -1627,23 +1614,6 @@ pub fn apply_disable_password_login(value: Option<serde_json::Value>) {
};
}
pub async fn load_mcp_disable_token_query_param(db: &DB) {
match load_value_from_global_settings(db, MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM_SETTING).await {
Ok(v) => apply_mcp_disable_token_query_param(v),
Err(e) => tracing::error!("Error loading mcp_disable_token_query_param setting: {e:#}"),
};
}
pub fn apply_mcp_disable_token_query_param(value: Option<serde_json::Value>) {
match value {
Some(serde_json::Value::Bool(t)) => {
MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM.store(t, Ordering::Relaxed)
}
None => MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM.store(false, Ordering::Relaxed),
_ => (),
};
}
struct LogFile {
file_path: String,
hostname: String,
@@ -2228,7 +2198,7 @@ async fn cleanup_scheduled_job_deletions(db: &Pool<Postgres>) {
}
pub async fn check_expiring_tokens(db: &DB) {
// Find tokens expiring within the warning window that still have a pending notification row.
// Find tokens expiring within 7 days that still have a pending notification row.
// The notification table stores token_hash (not plaintext) so the join works
// even after the hash migration makes token.token nullable.
let expiring_tokens_r = sqlx::query_as!(
@@ -2237,9 +2207,8 @@ pub async fn check_expiring_tokens(db: &DB) {
USING token t
WHERE n.token_hash = t.token_hash
AND n.expiration > now()
AND n.expiration <= now() + make_interval(days => $1)
AND n.expiration <= now() + interval '7 days'
RETURNING t.token_prefix, t.label, t.email, t.workspace_id",
TOKEN_EXPIRY_WARNING_DAYS,
)
.fetch_all(db)
.await;
+3 -3
View File
@@ -99,9 +99,9 @@ email_trigger: path(char), local_part(char), workspaced_local_part(bool), script
favorite: usr(char), workspace_id(char), path(char), favorite_kind(favorite_kind)
flow: workspace_id(char), path(char), summary(text), description(text), value(jsonb), edited_by(char), edited_at(ts), archived(bool), schema(json), extra_perms(jsonb), dependency_job(uuid), draft_only(bool), tag(char), ws_error_handler_muted(bool), dedicated_worker(bool), timeout(int), visible_to_runner_only(bool), concurrency_key(char), versions(bigint[]), on_behalf_of(varchar), on_behalf_of_email(text), lock_error_logs(text), labels(text[])
FK: (workspace_id) -> workspace(id)
flow_conversation: id(uuid), workspace_id(char), flow_path(char), title(char), created_at(ts), updated_at(ts), created_by(char), is_test(bool)
flow_conversation: id(uuid), workspace_id(char), flow_path(char), title(char), created_at(ts), updated_at(ts), created_by(char)
FK: (workspace_id) -> workspace(id)
flow_conversation_message: id(uuid), conversation_id(uuid), message_type(message_type), content(text), job_id(uuid), created_at(ts), created_seq(int8), step_name(char), success(bool), tool_arguments(text), tool_result(text), reasoning(text), attachments(jsonb)
flow_conversation_message: id(uuid), conversation_id(uuid), message_type(message_type), content(text), job_id(uuid), created_at(ts), created_seq(int8), step_name(char), success(bool)
FK: (conversation_id) -> flow_conversation(id) | (job_id) -> v2_job(id)
flow_iterator_data: job_id(uuid), itered(jsonb)
flow_node: id(bigint), workspace_id(char), hash(bigint), path(char), lock(text), code(text), flow(jsonb), hash_v2(char(64))
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ workspace_protection_rule: workspace_id(char), name(char), rules(int), bypass_gr
FK: (workspace_id) -> workspace(id)
workspace_runnable_dependencies: flow_path(char), runnable_path(char), script_hash(bigint), runnable_is_flow(bool), workspace_id(char), app_path(char), id(bigint), runnable_is_agent(bool)
FK: (app_path, workspace_id) -> app(path, workspace_id) | (flow_path, workspace_id) -> flow(path, workspace_id)
workspace_settings: workspace_id(char), slack_team_id(char), slack_name(char), slack_command_script(char), slack_email(char), customer_id(char), plan(char), webhook(text), ai_config(jsonb), large_file_storage(jsonb), git_sync(jsonb), default_app(char), default_scripts(jsonb), deploy_ui(jsonb), mute_critical_alerts(bool), color(char), operator_settings(jsonb), teams_command_script(text), teams_team_id(text), teams_team_name(text), git_app_installations(jsonb), ducklake(jsonb), slack_oauth_client_id(char), slack_oauth_client_secret(char), datatable(jsonb), teams_team_guid(text), auto_invite(jsonb), error_handler(jsonb), success_handler(jsonb), public_app_execution_limit_per_minute(int), dbt_warehouses(jsonb), guest_access_enabled(bool), guest_jwt_public_key(text), guest_jwt_jwks_url(text), ai_sessions_backup_generation(int), add_admins_and_developers_to_forks(bool)
workspace_settings: workspace_id(char), slack_team_id(char), slack_name(char), slack_command_script(char), slack_email(char), customer_id(char), plan(char), webhook(text), ai_config(jsonb), large_file_storage(jsonb), git_sync(jsonb), default_app(char), default_scripts(jsonb), deploy_ui(jsonb), mute_critical_alerts(bool), color(char), operator_settings(jsonb), teams_command_script(text), teams_team_id(text), teams_team_name(text), git_app_installations(jsonb), ducklake(jsonb), slack_oauth_client_id(char), slack_oauth_client_secret(char), datatable(jsonb), teams_team_guid(text), auto_invite(jsonb), error_handler(jsonb), success_handler(jsonb), public_app_execution_limit_per_minute(int), dbt_warehouses(jsonb), guest_access_enabled(bool), guest_jwt_public_key(text), guest_jwt_jwks_url(text), ai_sessions_backup_generation(int)
FK: (workspace_id) -> workspace(id)
zombie_job_counter: job_id(uuid), counter(int)
FK: (job_id) -> v2_job(id)
-57
View File
@@ -3312,60 +3312,3 @@ export function main(i: number) {
Ok(())
}
// A `$flow_expr[...]` step tag is resolved from the flow's state before the step is pushed, and
// one that cannot be resolved fails the step instead of queueing it on a tag no worker serves.
#[cfg(feature = "deno_core")]
#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))]
async fn test_flow_expr_step_tag(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let step = |id: &str, tag: Option<&str>| {
flow_module(
id,
FlowModuleValue::RawScript {
input_transforms: Default::default(),
language: ScriptLang::Deno,
content: "export function main() { return { lang: 'bun' } }".to_string(),
path: None,
lock: None,
tag: tag.map(str::to_string),
concurrency_settings: Default::default(),
is_trigger: None,
assets: None,
},
)
};
let flow = FlowValue {
modules: vec![
step("a", None),
step("b", Some("$flow_expr[results.a.lang]")),
step("c", Some("nobody-serves-$flow_expr[a.lang]")),
],
same_worker: false,
..Default::default()
};
let job = RunJob::from(JobPayload::RawFlow { value: flow, path: None, restarted_from: None })
.run_until_complete(&db, false, server.addr.port())
.await;
let b_tag = sqlx::query_scalar::<_, String>(
"SELECT tag FROM v2_job WHERE parent_job = $1 AND flow_step_id = 'b'",
)
.bind(job.id)
.fetch_one(&db)
.await?;
assert_eq!(b_tag, "bun");
assert!(!job.success);
let result = job.json_result().unwrap();
let message = result["error"]["message"].as_str().unwrap_or_default();
assert!(
message.contains("Could not resolve the step tag `nobody-serves-$flow_expr[a.lang]`"),
"got {result:?}"
);
Ok(())
}
-25
View File
@@ -1530,31 +1530,6 @@ async fn declarative_sync_rejects_an_unusable_instance_banner(db: Pool<Postgres>
);
}
#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))]
async fn declarative_sync_rejects_a_malformed_max_token_expiration(db: Pool<Postgres>) {
clear_settings_and_configs(&db).await;
let before = count_global_settings(&db).await;
let mut desired = BTreeMap::new();
desired.insert(
"max_token_expiration_days".to_string(),
serde_json::json!("7.0"),
);
let err = windmill_common::instance_config::sync_global_settings_declarative(
&db,
&BTreeMap::new(),
&desired,
)
.await
.expect_err("a ceiling the token routes cannot read must fail the sync");
assert!(
err.to_string().contains("max_token_expiration_days"),
"the error should name the offending setting, got: {err}"
);
assert_eq!(count_global_settings(&db).await, before);
}
#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))]
async fn declarative_sync_rejects_an_unusable_default_allowed_origins(db: Pool<Postgres>) {
// The declarative writers (the sync-config CLI, the operator's ConfigMap
-108
View File
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
/*
* The job's own token (`$WM_TOKEN`) stays valid well past the job it was minted
* for, and job logs are persisted to `job_logs` and optionally to object storage,
* so a script that echoes the token would otherwise park a live credential in
* durable storage. `run_worker` registers the token with `sensitive_log_masks`
* for the job it pulled; this pins that the persisted log carries the masked form.
*/
use sqlx::{Pool, Postgres};
use windmill_common::{
jobs::{JobPayload, RawCode},
scripts::ScriptLang,
};
use windmill_test_utils::*;
/// Prefix of a serialized job token: `jwt_` plus the base64 of a JWT header.
/// The masked form keeps only `jwt` + the last three characters, so it never matches.
const RAW_TOKEN_PREFIX: &str = "jwt_ey";
#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))]
async fn test_job_token_masked_in_persisted_logs(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let port = server.addr.port();
let job = RunJob::from(JobPayload::Code(RawCode {
hash: None,
content: "echo \"running with --token $WM_TOKEN\"".to_string(),
path: None,
lock: None,
language: ScriptLang::Bash,
cache_ttl: None,
cache_ignore_s3_path: None,
dedicated_worker: None,
concurrency_settings: windmill_common::runnable_settings::ConcurrencySettings::default()
.into(),
debouncing_settings: windmill_common::runnable_settings::DebouncingSettings::default(),
modules: None,
tag: None,
}))
.run_until_complete(&db, false, port)
.await;
assert!(job.success, "job should have succeeded");
let logs =
sqlx::query_scalar::<_, Option<String>>("SELECT logs FROM job_logs WHERE job_id = $1")
.bind(job.id)
.fetch_one(&db)
.await?
.unwrap_or_default();
assert!(
!logs.contains(RAW_TOKEN_PREFIX),
"an unmasked job token reached the persisted logs: {logs}"
);
assert!(
logs.contains("secret value was masked"),
"expected the masking notice in logs: {logs}"
);
Ok(())
}
/// nativets runs V8 in-process and persists `console.log` output through its own
/// channel, so it is masked by a different mechanism than the bash case above and
/// needs its own guard.
#[cfg(feature = "deno_core")]
#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))]
async fn test_job_token_masked_in_nativets_logs(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let port = server.addr.port();
let job = RunJob::from(JobPayload::Code(RawCode {
hash: None,
content: "export async function main() {\n console.log('running with --token ' + process.env.WM_TOKEN);\n return 'ok';\n}".to_string(),
path: None,
lock: None,
language: ScriptLang::Nativets,
cache_ttl: None,
cache_ignore_s3_path: None,
dedicated_worker: None,
concurrency_settings: windmill_common::runnable_settings::ConcurrencySettings::default()
.into(),
debouncing_settings: windmill_common::runnable_settings::DebouncingSettings::default(),
modules: None,
tag: None,
}))
.run_until_complete(&db, false, port)
.await;
assert!(job.success, "job should have succeeded");
let logs =
sqlx::query_scalar::<_, Option<String>>("SELECT logs FROM job_logs WHERE job_id = $1")
.bind(job.id)
.fetch_one(&db)
.await?
.unwrap_or_default();
assert!(
!logs.contains(RAW_TOKEN_PREFIX),
"an unmasked job token reached the persisted logs: {logs}"
);
assert!(
logs.contains("secret value was masked"),
"expected the masking notice in logs: {logs}"
);
Ok(())
}
-60
View File
@@ -1199,63 +1199,3 @@ async fn test_wm_labels_from_result_merged_with_static_labels(
Ok(())
}
/// `tag` lives only on `v2_job`, which count_jobs joins only when `tags` is set.
#[sqlx::test(fixtures("base"))]
async fn test_count_completed_jobs_tags_filter(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let port = server.addr.port();
let client = windmill_api_client::create_client(
&format!("http://localhost:{port}"),
"SECRET_TOKEN".to_string(),
);
for (ws, tag, status) in [
("test-workspace", "deno", "success"),
("test-workspace", "deno", "failure"),
("test-workspace", "python3", "success"),
("other-workspace", "deno", "success"),
] {
let id = uuid::Uuid::new_v4();
sqlx::query("INSERT INTO v2_job (id, workspace_id, tag) VALUES ($1, $2, $3)")
.bind(id)
.bind(ws)
.bind(tag)
.execute(&db)
.await?;
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO v2_job_completed (id, workspace_id, status, duration_ms) VALUES ($1, $2, $3::job_status, 0)",
)
.bind(id)
.bind(ws)
.bind(status)
.execute(&db)
.await?;
}
for (query, expected) in [
("", 3),
("tags=deno", 2),
("tags=deno&success=true", 1),
("tags=deno,python3&completed_after_s_ago=3600", 3),
] {
let response = client
.client()
.get(format!(
"{}/w/test-workspace/jobs/completed/count_jobs?{query}",
client.baseurl()
))
.send()
.await?;
assert!(
response.status().is_success(),
"{query}: {}",
response.text().await?
);
assert_eq!(response.json::<i64>().await?, expected, "{query}");
}
Ok(())
}
-2
View File
@@ -258,7 +258,6 @@ async fn test_new_turns_wait_for_conversation_cleanup_and_recreate(
"test-user",
"hi again",
conv_id,
false,
)
.await?;
windmill_common::flow_conversations::add_message_to_conversation_tx(
@@ -269,7 +268,6 @@ async fn test_new_turns_wait_for_conversation_cleanup_and_recreate(
windmill_common::flow_conversations::MessageType::User,
None,
true,
None,
)
.await?;
tx.commit().await?;
-1
View File
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ async-trait.workspace = true
async-stream.workspace = true
base64.workspace = true
bytes.workspace = true
indexmap.workspace = true
eventsource-stream.workspace = true
futures.workspace = true
http.workspace = true
+2 -6
View File
@@ -1074,8 +1074,7 @@ impl BedrockQueryBuilder {
let mut accumulated_text = String::new();
let mut events_str = String::new();
let mut accumulated_tool_calls: indexmap::IndexMap<String, StreamingToolCall> =
indexmap::IndexMap::new();
let mut accumulated_tool_calls: HashMap<String, StreamingToolCall> = HashMap::new();
let mut current_tool_use_id: Option<String> = None;
let mut usage: Option<TokenUsage> = None;
// Claude reasoning block for the turn (only populated when thinking is on),
@@ -1264,10 +1263,7 @@ mod tests {
// recovers the uncached share by subtracting the details back out.
assert_eq!(usage["usage"]["prompt_tokens"], 1010);
assert_eq!(usage["usage"]["completion_tokens"], 7);
assert_eq!(
usage["usage"]["prompt_tokens_details"]["cached_tokens"],
900
);
assert_eq!(usage["usage"]["prompt_tokens_details"]["cached_tokens"], 900);
assert_eq!(
usage["usage"]["prompt_tokens_details"]["cache_write_tokens"],
100
+8 -11
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
use std::collections::HashMap;
use eventsource_stream::Eventsource;
use indexmap::IndexMap;
use reqwest::Response;
use serde::Deserialize;
use tokio_stream::StreamExt;
@@ -138,9 +137,7 @@ pub struct OpenAISSEParser {
pub accumulated_content: String,
/// The thinking streamed before the answer, kept so it can be stored with it.
pub accumulated_reasoning: String,
// Insertion-ordered in every parser: tool calls run and are persisted in the order the
// stream showed them, and a chat attaches a round's thinking to its first call.
pub accumulated_tool_calls: IndexMap<i64, OpenAIToolCall>,
pub accumulated_tool_calls: HashMap<i64, OpenAIToolCall>,
pub events_str: String,
pub stream_event_processor: Box<dyn StreamEventSink>,
/// Token usage from final chunk (when stream_options.include_usage is true)
@@ -152,7 +149,7 @@ impl OpenAISSEParser {
Self {
accumulated_content: String::new(),
accumulated_reasoning: String::new(),
accumulated_tool_calls: IndexMap::new(),
accumulated_tool_calls: HashMap::new(),
events_str: String::new(),
stream_event_processor,
usage: None,
@@ -362,7 +359,7 @@ pub struct AnthropicSSEParser {
pub accumulated_content: String,
/// The thinking streamed before the answer, kept so it can be stored with it.
pub accumulated_reasoning: String,
pub accumulated_tool_calls: IndexMap<i64, OpenAIToolCall>,
pub accumulated_tool_calls: HashMap<i64, OpenAIToolCall>,
pub events_str: String,
pub stream_event_processor: Box<dyn StreamEventSink>,
/// Track content block types by index
@@ -385,7 +382,7 @@ impl AnthropicSSEParser {
Self {
accumulated_content: String::new(),
accumulated_reasoning: String::new(),
accumulated_tool_calls: IndexMap::new(),
accumulated_tool_calls: HashMap::new(),
events_str: String::new(),
stream_event_processor,
content_blocks: HashMap::new(),
@@ -604,7 +601,7 @@ pub struct GeminiSSEParser {
pub accumulated_content: String,
/// The thinking streamed before the answer, kept so it can be stored with it.
pub accumulated_reasoning: String,
pub accumulated_tool_calls: IndexMap<i64, OpenAIToolCall>,
pub accumulated_tool_calls: HashMap<i64, OpenAIToolCall>,
pub events_str: String,
pub stream_event_processor: Box<dyn StreamEventSink>,
tool_call_index: i64,
@@ -618,7 +615,7 @@ impl GeminiSSEParser {
Self {
accumulated_content: String::new(),
accumulated_reasoning: String::new(),
accumulated_tool_calls: IndexMap::new(),
accumulated_tool_calls: HashMap::new(),
events_str: String::new(),
stream_event_processor,
tool_call_index: 0,
@@ -836,7 +833,7 @@ pub struct OpenAIResponsesSSEParser {
pub accumulated_content: String,
/// The reasoning summary streamed before the answer, kept so it can be stored with it.
pub accumulated_reasoning: String,
pub accumulated_tool_calls: IndexMap<String, OpenAIToolCall>,
pub accumulated_tool_calls: HashMap<String, OpenAIToolCall>,
/// Maps item_id -> (name, call_id) for function calls
tool_call_metadata: HashMap<String, (String, String)>,
/// Maps item_id -> accumulated arguments
@@ -858,7 +855,7 @@ impl OpenAIResponsesSSEParser {
Self {
accumulated_content: String::new(),
accumulated_reasoning: String::new(),
accumulated_tool_calls: IndexMap::new(),
accumulated_tool_calls: HashMap::new(),
tool_call_metadata: HashMap::new(),
tool_call_arguments: HashMap::new(),
events_str: String::new(),
+6 -56
View File
@@ -78,50 +78,17 @@ impl Default for OutputType {
#[serde(tag = "kind", rename_all = "lowercase")]
pub enum Memory {
Off,
Window {
#[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deserialize_null_as_zero")]
context_length: usize,
},
/// Written before `window`. Its `memory_id` stays a fallback behind the run's memory id.
Auto {
#[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deserialize_null_as_zero")]
#[serde(default)]
context_length: usize,
#[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deserialize_blank_as_none")]
#[serde(default)]
memory_id: Option<Uuid>,
},
/// Written before a step had history inputs of its own, and read on its own where it remains.
Manual {
messages: Vec<OpenAIMessage>,
},
}
// An editor form can leave `""` in a legacy baked id it never filled; it means no id rather than
// failing every run of the step.
fn deserialize_blank_as_none<'de, D: serde::Deserializer<'de>>(
deserializer: D,
) -> Result<Option<Uuid>, D::Error> {
match <Option<String> as serde::Deserialize>::deserialize(deserializer)? {
Some(id) if !id.trim().is_empty() => Uuid::parse_str(id.trim())
.map(Some)
.map_err(serde::de::Error::custom),
_ => Ok(None),
}
}
// A count the editor's number field was cleared of is stored as `null`, which `default` does not
// cover; it reads as 0, memory off, rather than failing every run of the step.
fn deserialize_null_as_zero<'de, D: serde::Deserializer<'de>>(
deserializer: D,
) -> Result<usize, D::Error> {
<Option<usize> as serde::Deserialize>::deserialize(deserializer).map(Option::unwrap_or_default)
}
fn deserialize_present<'de, D: serde::Deserializer<'de>>(
deserializer: D,
) -> Result<Option<serde_json::Value>, D::Error> {
<serde_json::Value as serde::Deserialize>::deserialize(deserializer).map(Some)
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct AIAgentArgsRaw {
provider: ProviderWithResource,
@@ -136,12 +103,6 @@ struct AIAgentArgsRaw {
streaming: Option<bool>,
max_iterations: Option<usize>,
memory: Option<Memory>,
// A null must stay distinguishable from an absent key: a step whose own memory id evaluates to
// nothing runs stateless instead of falling back to the run's memory id.
#[serde(default, deserialize_with = "deserialize_present")]
memory_id: Option<serde_json::Value>,
#[serde(default)]
previous_messages: Option<Vec<OpenAIMessage>>,
enabled_tools: Option<Vec<String>>,
// Legacy field for backward compatibility
messages_context_length: Option<usize>,
@@ -163,10 +124,6 @@ pub struct AIAgentArgs {
pub streaming: Option<bool>,
pub max_iterations: Option<usize>,
pub memory: Option<Memory>,
/// Memory id set on the step, overriding the run's. Empty when its expression produced none.
pub memory_id: Option<String>,
/// History supplied by the flow, replayed without reading or writing memory.
pub previous_messages: Option<Vec<OpenAIMessage>>,
/// Which of the agent's tools this run may call; `narrow_roster` holds what the names are and
/// what `None` means.
pub enabled_tools: Option<Vec<String>>,
@@ -182,17 +139,12 @@ impl From<AIAgentArgsRaw> for AIAgentArgs {
});
// Backward compatibility: if context_length is 0, use off mode
let memory = memory.map(|memory| match memory {
Memory::Auto { context_length: 0, .. } | Memory::Window { context_length: 0 } => {
let memory = memory.map(|memory| {
if let Memory::Auto { context_length: 0, .. } = memory {
Memory::Off
} else {
memory
}
memory => memory,
});
let memory_id = raw.memory_id.map(|value| match value {
serde_json::Value::Null => String::new(),
serde_json::Value::String(s) => s.trim().to_string(),
value => value.to_string(),
});
AIAgentArgs {
@@ -207,8 +159,6 @@ impl From<AIAgentArgsRaw> for AIAgentArgs {
streaming: raw.streaming,
max_iterations: raw.max_iterations,
memory,
memory_id,
previous_messages: raw.previous_messages,
enabled_tools: raw.enabled_tools,
credentials_check: raw.credentials_check.unwrap_or(false),
}
-4
View File
@@ -1249,10 +1249,6 @@ pub async fn register_token_expiry_notification(
if !windmill_common::auth::is_user_token(label) {
return;
}
let warning_days = windmill_common::auth::TOKEN_EXPIRY_WARNING_DAYS;
if expiration <= chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::days(warning_days.into()) {
return;
}
if let Err(e) = sqlx::query!(
"INSERT INTO token_expiry_notification (token_hash, expiration) VALUES ($1, $2) ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING",
token_hash,
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
use axum::{
extract::{Path, Query},
routing::{delete, get, post},
routing::{delete, get},
Extension, Json, Router,
};
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
@@ -15,14 +15,13 @@ use windmill_common::{
db::{UserDB, DB},
error::{JsonResult, Result},
flow_conversations::MessageType,
utils::{not_found_if_none, paginate, truncate_with_ellipsis, Pagination},
utils::{not_found_if_none, paginate, Pagination},
};
pub fn workspaced_service() -> Router {
Router::new()
.route("/list", get(list_conversations))
.route("/delete/{conversation_id}", delete(delete_conversation))
.route("/update/{conversation_id}", post(update_conversation))
.route("/{conversation_id}/messages", get(list_messages))
}
@@ -37,37 +36,11 @@ pub struct FlowConversationMessage {
pub created_seq: i64,
pub step_name: Option<String>,
pub success: bool,
/// On a tool row, the arguments the model wrote. For a Windmill tool these exclude the
/// inputs its step wires in. Null for a web search, whose query the provider does not
/// return.
pub tool_arguments: Option<String>,
/// On a tool row, the text the model got back, or what the call failed with; a web
/// search's citations.
pub tool_result: Option<String>,
/// On an answer, the thinking that produced it; on a tool row, the thinking that led to
/// the call. The agent job keeps the turn's thinking as one string.
pub reasoning: Option<String>,
/// The files a user message carried, as object-storage references
/// (`[{input, s3, storage?, filename?}]`).
pub attachments: Option<sqlx::types::JsonValue>,
}
/// Which conversations a listing holds. A test chat was started from the editor's test
/// panel; a deployed one from the flow itself.
#[derive(Deserialize, Default, Clone, Copy)]
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
pub enum ConversationKind {
Test,
/// The default: a deployed flow's chat should not surface someone's trial runs.
#[default]
Deployed,
All,
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub struct ListConversationsQuery {
pub flow_path: Option<String>,
pub kind: Option<ConversationKind>,
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -94,7 +67,6 @@ async fn list_conversations(
"created_at",
"updated_at",
"created_by",
"is_test",
])
.and_where_eq("workspace_id", "?".bind(&w_id));
@@ -102,16 +74,6 @@ async fn list_conversations(
sqlb.and_where_eq("flow_path", "?".bind(flow_path));
}
match query.kind.unwrap_or_default() {
ConversationKind::Test => {
sqlb.and_where_eq("is_test", "true");
}
ConversationKind::Deployed => {
sqlb.and_where_eq("is_test", "false");
}
ConversationKind::All => {}
}
sqlb.order_by("updated_at", true)
.limit(per_page as i64)
.offset(offset as i64);
@@ -139,7 +101,7 @@ async fn delete_conversation(
// Verify the conversation exists and belongs to the user
let conversation = sqlx::query_as!(
FlowConversation,
"SELECT id, workspace_id, flow_path, title, created_at, updated_at, created_by, is_test
"SELECT id, workspace_id, flow_path, title, created_at, updated_at, created_by
FROM flow_conversation
WHERE id = $1 AND workspace_id = $2",
conversation_id,
@@ -186,50 +148,6 @@ async fn delete_conversation(
Ok(format!("Conversation {} deleted", conversation_id))
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub struct UpdateConversation {
pub title: String,
}
async fn update_conversation(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(user_db): Extension<UserDB>,
Path((w_id, conversation_id)): Path<(String, Uuid)>,
Json(update): Json<UpdateConversation>,
) -> Result<String> {
// Postgres refuses a NUL in a text column, so it must not reach the query as a 500.
if update.title.contains('\0') {
return Err(windmill_common::error::Error::BadRequest(
"title cannot contain a NUL character".to_string(),
));
}
// The column is VARCHAR(255) and the helper appends an ellipsis to what it cuts, so the
// bound it takes is three short of the column's. A longer title would otherwise reach
// Postgres as a 22001 and come back a 500.
let title = truncate_with_ellipsis(update.title.trim(), 252);
let mut tx = user_db.clone().begin(&authed).await?;
// `updated_at` is kept: the list is ordered by it, and a rename must not move the
// chat to the top the way a new turn does.
let updated = sqlx::query_scalar!(
"UPDATE flow_conversation SET title = $1, updated_at = updated_at
WHERE id = $2 AND workspace_id = $3
RETURNING id",
title,
conversation_id,
&w_id
)
.fetch_optional(&mut *tx)
.await?;
not_found_if_none(updated, "Conversation", conversation_id.to_string())?;
tx.commit().await?;
Ok(format!("Conversation {} updated", conversation_id))
}
async fn list_messages(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(user_db): Extension<UserDB>,
@@ -260,7 +178,7 @@ async fn list_messages(
let messages = if let Some(after_seq) = query.after_seq {
sqlx::query_as!(
FlowConversationMessage,
r#"SELECT id, conversation_id, message_type as "message_type: MessageType", content, job_id, created_at, created_seq, step_name, success, tool_arguments, tool_result, reasoning, attachments
r#"SELECT id, conversation_id, message_type as "message_type: MessageType", content, job_id, created_at, created_seq, step_name, success
FROM flow_conversation_message
WHERE conversation_id = $1
AND created_seq > $2
@@ -277,9 +195,9 @@ async fn list_messages(
// Fetch messages for this conversation, oldest first, but reverse the order of the messages for easy rendering on the frontend
sqlx::query_as!(
FlowConversationMessage,
r#"SELECT id, conversation_id, message_type as "message_type: MessageType", content, job_id, created_at, created_seq, step_name, success, tool_arguments, tool_result, reasoning, attachments
r#"SELECT id, conversation_id, message_type as "message_type: MessageType", content, job_id, created_at, created_seq, step_name, success
FROM (
SELECT id, conversation_id, message_type, content, job_id, created_at, created_seq, step_name, success, tool_arguments, tool_result, reasoning, attachments
SELECT id, conversation_id, message_type, content, job_id, created_at, created_seq, step_name, success
FROM flow_conversation_message
WHERE conversation_id = $1
ORDER BY created_seq DESC
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
//! Who may read and change a data table's grants and owners. On the Enterprise Edition: its
//! administrators, from the workspace that governs it. Without it: nobody. Each refusal is decided
//! before anything connects to the data table, so the fixture's database never has to exist.
use serde_json::{json, Value};
use sqlx::{Pool, Postgres};
use windmill_test_utils::*;
fn grant_select_on_public() -> Value {
json!({
"target": {"kind": "schema", "schema": "public"},
"change": {"type": "grant", "role": "analytics", "privileges": ["SELECT"],
"scope": "all_tables"},
"statements": [r#"GRANT SELECT ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA "public" TO "analytics""#]
})
}
async fn post_acl(
port: u16,
w_id: &str,
action: &str,
token: &str,
) -> anyhow::Result<reqwest::Response> {
Ok(reqwest::Client::new()
.post(format!(
"http://localhost:{port}/api/w/{w_id}/workspaces/datatable_acl/main/{action}"
))
.header("Authorization", format!("Bearer {token}"))
.json(&grant_select_on_public())
.send()
.await?)
}
/// A fork reaches the data table through a pointer: it may use it, never change what each role may
/// touch on it — not even as an admin of the fork.
#[cfg(all(feature = "private", feature = "enterprise"))]
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../migrations", fixtures("base", "datatable_roles"))]
async fn a_fork_cannot_change_access_on_the_data_table_it_points_at(
db: Pool<Postgres>,
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let port = server.addr.port();
for action in ["plan", "apply"] {
let resp = post_acl(port, "wm-fork-dt", action, "SECRET_TOKEN_2").await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 401, "{action}: {}", resp.text().await?);
}
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(all(feature = "private", feature = "enterprise"))]
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../migrations", fixtures("base", "datatable_roles"))]
async fn a_member_who_is_not_an_admin_cannot_change_access(
db: Pool<Postgres>,
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let port = server.addr.port();
for action in ["plan", "apply"] {
let resp = post_acl(port, "test-workspace", action, "SECRET_TOKEN_2").await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 401, "{action}: {}", resp.text().await?);
}
Ok(())
}
/// Not even reading, and not even on a data table that is not under roles — which any member
/// reaches, so only the edition stands between them and the instance's credentials.
#[cfg(not(all(feature = "private", feature = "enterprise")))]
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../migrations", fixtures("base", "datatable_roles"))]
async fn only_the_enterprise_edition_has_the_access_editor(
db: Pool<Postgres>,
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
sqlx::query(
"UPDATE workspace_settings
SET datatable = datatable #- '{datatables,main,permissions}'
WHERE workspace_id = 'test-workspace'",
)
.execute(&db)
.await?;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let port = server.addr.port();
let read = reqwest::Client::new()
.get(format!(
"http://localhost:{port}/api/w/test-workspace/workspaces/datatable_acl/main?kind=database"
))
.header("Authorization", "Bearer SECRET_TOKEN")
.send()
.await?;
let mut responses = vec![("read", read)];
for action in ["plan", "apply"] {
responses.push((
action,
post_acl(port, "test-workspace", action, "SECRET_TOKEN").await?,
));
}
for (action, resp) in responses {
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 400, "{action}");
let body = resp.text().await?;
assert!(
body.contains("Data table roles are a Windmill Enterprise Edition feature"),
"{action}: {body}"
);
}
Ok(())
}
@@ -391,7 +391,11 @@ async fn concurrent_role_creations_both_survive(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::R
assert_eq!(a.0, 200, "{}", a.1);
assert_eq!(b.0, 200, "{}", b.1);
let catalog = windmill_common::datatable_roles::read_role_catalog(&db).await?;
let catalog = windmill_common::datatable_roles::read_role_catalog(
&db,
windmill_common::datatable_roles::DatatableRoleCluster::Instance,
)
.await?;
let recorded: Vec<&str> = catalog.values().map(|r| r.name.as_str()).collect();
for name in &names {
assert!(
@@ -460,7 +464,11 @@ async fn a_role_delete_that_fails_part_way_leaves_the_role_disabled(
let body = resp.text().await?;
assert_eq!(status, 400, "{body}");
let catalog = windmill_common::datatable_roles::read_role_catalog(&db).await?;
let catalog = windmill_common::datatable_roles::read_role_catalog(
&db,
windmill_common::datatable_roles::DatatableRoleCluster::Instance,
)
.await?;
let role = catalog
.get(&id)
.expect("a failed delete keeps the entry to retry");
@@ -912,6 +920,18 @@ async fn a_stored_name_containing_a_question_mark_resolves_as_itself(
resolve("main?dt").await.is_err(),
"an unknown parameter was ignored"
);
sqlx::query(
"UPDATE workspace_settings
SET datatable = jsonb_set(datatable, '{datatables,main?role=analytics}', datatable->'datatables'->'main')
WHERE workspace_id = 'test-workspace'",
)
.execute(&db)
.await?;
assert!(
resolve("main?role=analytics").await.is_err(),
"a reference naming both a stored data table and a role on another resolved to one of them"
);
Ok(())
}
@@ -1009,6 +1029,70 @@ async fn an_entry_without_roles_cannot_newly_reach_a_database_under_roles(
Ok(())
}
/// Browsing names the role it connects as, and a role the caller may not use is refused rather
/// than quietly listed as the default. The refusal is decided before connecting, so the fixture's
/// database never has to exist.
#[cfg(all(feature = "private", feature = "enterprise"))]
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../migrations", fixtures("base", "datatable_roles"))]
async fn browsing_as_a_role_the_caller_may_not_use_is_refused(
db: Pool<Postgres>,
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let port = server.addr.port();
let base = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/w/test-workspace/workspaces");
// `test-user-2` is a tenant of `analytics` only.
let resp = authed(
client().get(format!(
"{base}/list_datatable_tables?role_for=main&role=admin"
)),
"SECRET_TOKEN_2",
)
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200);
let body: Value = resp.json().await?;
let entry = body
.as_array()
.and_then(|a| a.iter().find(|e| e["datatable_name"] == "main"))
.expect("main is listed");
assert_eq!(entry["usable_roles"], json!(["analytics"]), "{entry}");
assert_eq!(entry["default_role"], "analytics", "{entry}");
assert_eq!(entry["permissioned"], true, "{entry}");
assert_eq!(entry["instance"], true, "{entry}");
let error = entry["error"].as_str().unwrap_or_default();
assert!(
error.contains("Not allowed to use role 'admin'"),
"listed as another role than the one asked for: {entry}"
);
let resp = authed(
client().get(format!(
"{base}/get_datatable_table_schema?datatable_name=main&schema_name=public&table_name=t&role=admin"
)),
"SECRET_TOKEN_2",
)
.send()
.await?;
let status = resp.status();
let text = resp.text().await?;
assert!(
text.contains("Not allowed to use role 'admin'"),
"{status}: {text}"
);
// A role means nothing without the data table it belongs to.
let resp = authed(
client().get(format!("{base}/list_datatable_tables?role=analytics")),
"SECRET_TOKEN_2",
)
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 400, "{}", resp.text().await?);
Ok(())
}
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../migrations", fixtures("base", "datatable_roles"))]
async fn an_alias_saved_elsewhere_waits_for_roles_going_on_for_its_database(
db: Pool<Postgres>,
@@ -311,121 +311,3 @@ async fn test_fork_keeps_only_resolvable_on_behalf_of(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> any
Ok(())
}
/// Apps, schedules, triggers and their drafts cannot drop an identity the way scripts and flows
/// do, so one naming nobody in the fork goes to its creator while one that still resolves stays.
/// Forked as an admin, whose app policies the clone otherwise keeps.
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../migrations", fixtures("base"))]
async fn test_fork_repoints_unresolvable_identities(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let base_url = format!("http://localhost:{}/api", server.addr.port());
let stranger = json!({
"on_behalf_of": "u/test-user-2",
"on_behalf_of_email": "test2@windmill.dev",
"execution_mode": "publisher",
});
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO app (workspace_id, path, summary, policy, versions)
VALUES ('test-workspace', 'u/test-user/stranger', '', $1, '{}'),
('test-workspace', 'u/test-user/group', '', $2, '{}')",
)
.bind(&stranger)
.bind(json!({
"on_behalf_of": "g/all",
"on_behalf_of_email": "group-all@windmill.dev",
"execution_mode": "publisher",
}))
.execute(&db)
.await?;
// The clone re-aggregates `versions` from `app_version`, and the column is NOT NULL.
sqlx::query(
"WITH v AS (
INSERT INTO app_version (app_id, value, created_by)
SELECT id, '{}'::json, 'test-user' FROM app WHERE workspace_id = 'test-workspace'
RETURNING id, app_id
)
UPDATE app SET versions = ARRAY[v.id] FROM v WHERE app.id = v.app_id",
)
.execute(&db)
.await?;
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO draft (workspace_id, path, typ, value, created_at, email)
VALUES ('test-workspace', 'u/test-user/stranger', 'raw_app', $1::json, NOW(), 'test@windmill.dev'),
('test-workspace', 'u/test-user/stranger', 'trigger_websocket', $2::json, NOW(), 'test@windmill.dev'),
('test-workspace', 'u/test-user/nul', 'raw_app', $3::json, NOW(), 'test@windmill.dev')",
)
.bind(json!({ "policy": stranger }))
.bind(json!({ "permissioned_as": "u/test-user-2" }))
// Saved before drafts were stripped of NULs: any jsonb parse of it raises, so it must be
// skipped rather than abort the fork. Built from parts because a NUL escape can't sit in source.
.bind(format!(
r#"{{"policy":{{"on_behalf_of":"u/test-user-2"}},"files":{{"f":"a{}u0000"}}}}"#,
"\\"
))
.execute(&db)
.await?;
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO schedule (workspace_id, path, edited_by, schedule, script_path, email, permissioned_as, enabled)
VALUES ('test-workspace', 'u/test-user/stranger', 'test-user', '0 0 * * * *', 'u/test-user/s', 'test2@windmill.dev', 'u/test-user-2', false)",
)
.execute(&db)
.await?;
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO websocket_trigger (workspace_id, path, url, script_path, is_flow, edited_by, permissioned_as, mode)
VALUES ('test-workspace', 'u/test-user/stranger', 'ws://localhost', 'u/test-user/s', false, 'test-user', 'u/test-user-2', 'disabled')",
)
.execute(&db)
.await?;
let resp = reqwest::Client::new()
.post(format!(
"{base_url}/w/test-workspace/workspaces/create_fork"
))
.header("Authorization", "Bearer SECRET_TOKEN")
.json(&json!({ "id": "wm-fork-repoint", "name": "Fork", "color": "#0000ff" }))
.send()
.await?;
assert!(
resp.status().is_success(),
"creating the fork: {}",
resp.text().await?
);
let text = |sql: &'static str| sqlx::query_scalar::<_, String>(sql).fetch_one(&db);
assert_eq!(
text("SELECT (policy->>'on_behalf_of') || ' ' || (policy->>'on_behalf_of_email') FROM app WHERE workspace_id = 'wm-fork-repoint' AND path = 'u/test-user/stranger'").await?,
"u/test-user test@windmill.dev"
);
assert_eq!(
text("SELECT policy->>'on_behalf_of' FROM app WHERE workspace_id = 'wm-fork-repoint' AND path = 'u/test-user/group'").await?,
"g/all"
);
assert_eq!(
text("SELECT value->'policy'->>'on_behalf_of' FROM draft WHERE workspace_id = 'wm-fork-repoint' AND path = 'u/test-user/stranger' AND typ = 'raw_app'").await?,
"u/test-user"
);
assert_eq!(
text("SELECT CASE WHEN strpos(value::text, 'u/test-user-2') > 0 THEN 'kept' ELSE 'rewritten' END FROM draft WHERE workspace_id = 'wm-fork-repoint' AND path = 'u/test-user/nul'").await?,
"kept"
);
assert_eq!(
text("SELECT value->>'permissioned_as' FROM draft WHERE workspace_id = 'wm-fork-repoint' AND typ = 'trigger_websocket'").await?,
"u/test-user"
);
assert_eq!(
text("SELECT permissioned_as || ' ' || email FROM schedule WHERE workspace_id = 'wm-fork-repoint'").await?,
"u/test-user test@windmill.dev"
);
assert_eq!(
text(
"SELECT permissioned_as FROM websocket_trigger WHERE workspace_id = 'wm-fork-repoint'"
)
.await?,
"u/test-user"
);
Ok(())
}
@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
use serde_json::json;
use sqlx::{Pool, Postgres};
use windmill_test_utils::*;
/// With `add_admins_and_developers_to_forks` on, a fork starts with the parent's admins and
/// developers at their parent role, even when a developer forks it; operators are left out. The
/// copies are manual members: a parent membership that came from an instance group must not carry
/// that provenance into a fork that does not configure the group.
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../migrations", fixtures("base"))]
async fn test_fork_adds_parent_admins_and_developers(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let base_url = format!(
"http://localhost:{}/api/w/test-workspace/workspaces",
server.addr.port()
);
let client = reqwest::Client::new();
sqlx::query(
"UPDATE usr SET operator = true WHERE workspace_id = 'test-workspace' AND username = 'test-user-3'",
)
.execute(&db)
.await?;
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO usr (workspace_id, email, username, is_admin, added_via)
VALUES ('test-workspace', 'test4@windmill.dev', 'test-user-4', false,
'{\"source\": \"instance_group\", \"group\": \"devs\"}')",
)
.execute(&db)
.await?;
let resp = client
.post(format!(
"{base_url}/edit_add_admins_and_developers_to_forks"
))
.header("Authorization", "Bearer SECRET_TOKEN")
.json(&json!({ "add_admins_and_developers_to_forks": true }))
.send()
.await?;
assert!(
resp.status().is_success(),
"enabling the setting: {}",
resp.text().await?
);
let resp = client
.post(format!("{base_url}/create_fork"))
.header("Authorization", "Bearer SECRET_TOKEN_2")
.json(&json!({ "id": "wm-fork-team", "name": "Team fork" }))
.send()
.await?;
assert!(
resp.status().is_success(),
"creating the fork: {}",
resp.text().await?
);
let members: Vec<(String, bool, bool)> = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT username, is_admin, added_via IS NULL FROM usr
WHERE workspace_id = 'wm-fork-team' ORDER BY username",
)
.fetch_all(&db)
.await?;
assert_eq!(
members,
vec![
("test-user".to_string(), true, true),
("test-user-2".to_string(), false, true),
("test-user-4".to_string(), false, true),
]
);
Ok(())
}
@@ -115,60 +115,6 @@ async fn login_link_is_single_use_and_same_origin(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow:
Ok(())
}
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../migrations", fixtures("base"))]
async fn confirmed_login_link_is_spent_by_the_click_not_the_page(
db: Pool<Postgres>,
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let port = server.addr.port();
let base = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api");
let resp = client()
.post(format!("{base}/users/login_links"))
.header("Authorization", "Bearer SECRET_TOKEN")
.json(&json!({"email": "test2@windmill.dev", "confirm": true}))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201);
let link = resp.json::<serde_json::Value>().await?;
// The URL handed out is the frontend page, not the API path that signs in on a GET.
let token = link["url"]
.as_str()
.unwrap()
.split_once("/user/login_link?token=")
.expect("confirmation page url")
.1
.to_string();
let confirm = || {
client()
.post(format!("{base}/auth/login_link/{token}"))
.send()
};
let resp = confirm().await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200);
assert!(resp
.headers()
.get_all("set-cookie")
.iter()
.any(|c| c.to_str().unwrap().starts_with("token=")));
assert_eq!(
resp.json::<serde_json::Value>().await?["location"],
"/user/workspaces"
);
let resp = confirm().await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200);
assert!(resp.headers().get("set-cookie").is_none());
assert_eq!(
resp.json::<serde_json::Value>().await?["location"],
"/user/login_link_expired?reason=used"
);
Ok(())
}
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../migrations", fixtures("base"))]
async fn login_link_mint_can_require_a_login_type(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
@@ -1,239 +0,0 @@
//! `max_token_expiration_days`: the instance-wide ceiling on how far ahead a token a caller
//! picks the lifetime of may expire, and the service-account exemption.
use serde_json::json;
use sqlx::types::chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use sqlx::{Pool, Postgres};
use windmill_test_utils::*;
const DAY: u64 = 24 * 60 * 60;
fn client() -> reqwest::Client {
reqwest::Client::new()
}
fn from_now(secs: u64) -> DateTime<Utc> {
Utc::now() + std::time::Duration::from_secs(secs)
}
async fn set_max(db: &Pool<Postgres>, value: serde_json::Value) {
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO global_settings (name, value) VALUES ('max_token_expiration_days', $1)
ON CONFLICT (name) DO UPDATE SET value = EXCLUDED.value",
)
.bind(value)
.execute(db)
.await
.unwrap();
}
/// Mints as `test2@windmill.dev`, a plain member of `test-workspace`.
async fn create_token(port: u16, body: serde_json::Value) -> reqwest::Response {
client()
.post(format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/users/tokens/create"))
.header("Authorization", "Bearer SECRET_TOKEN_2")
.json(&body)
.send()
.await
.unwrap()
}
async fn stored_expiration(db: &Pool<Postgres>, label: &str) -> Option<DateTime<Utc>> {
sqlx::query_scalar::<_, Option<DateTime<Utc>>>("SELECT expiration FROM token WHERE label = $1")
.bind(label)
.fetch_one(db)
.await
.unwrap()
}
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../migrations", fixtures("base"))]
async fn test_max_token_expiration_days_shortens_user_tokens(
db: Pool<Postgres>,
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let port = server.addr.port();
let resp = create_token(port, json!({ "label": "unset" })).await;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201);
assert_eq!(
stored_expiration(&db, "unset").await,
None,
"with no setting a token may still have no expiration"
);
// Refused at write time: the token routes can only read a value they cannot parse as no
// ceiling at all.
let resp = client()
.post(format!(
"http://localhost:{port}/api/settings/global/max_token_expiration_days"
))
.header("Authorization", "Bearer SECRET_TOKEN")
.json(&json!({ "value": 7.5 }))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 400);
set_max(&db, json!(7)).await;
// The token form reads the ceiling as whoever is creating the token, usually not a
// superadmin, so it can offer only expirations the server would keep.
let resp = client()
.get(format!(
"http://localhost:{port}/api/settings/global/max_token_expiration_days"
))
.header("Authorization", "Bearer SECRET_TOKEN_2")
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200);
assert_eq!(resp.text().await?, "7");
let resp = create_token(port, json!({ "label": "none asked" })).await;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201);
let expiration = stored_expiration(&db, "none asked")
.await
.expect("a token asking for no expiration gets the ceiling");
assert!(
expiration > from_now(6 * DAY) && expiration <= from_now(7 * DAY),
"expected the 7 day ceiling, got {expiration}"
);
let resp = create_token(
port,
json!({ "label": "past the ceiling", "expiration": from_now(30 * DAY) }),
)
.await;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201);
let expiration = stored_expiration(&db, "past the ceiling").await.unwrap();
assert!(
expiration > from_now(6 * DAY) && expiration <= from_now(7 * DAY),
"expected an expiration past the ceiling to be shortened to it, got {expiration}"
);
let resp = create_token(
port,
json!({ "label": "within", "expiration": from_now(3 * DAY) }),
)
.await;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201);
let expiration = stored_expiration(&db, "within").await.unwrap();
assert!(
expiration <= from_now(3 * DAY),
"an expiration within the ceiling must be kept, got {expiration}"
);
// The settings UI stores an integer, but the YAML instance config and config sync can write
// the same whole number as a string or as `5.0`. Reading either as "unset" would silently
// drop the ceiling, while the token form (`parseMaxTokenExpirationDays`) still showed it.
for (stored, label) in [
(json!("5"), "string setting"),
(json!(5.0), "float setting"),
] {
set_max(&db, stored).await;
let resp = create_token(port, json!({ "label": label })).await;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201);
let expiration = stored_expiration(&db, label).await;
assert!(
expiration.is_some_and(|e| e > from_now(4 * DAY) && e <= from_now(5 * DAY)),
"{label}: expected the 5 day ceiling, got {expiration:?}"
);
}
// A superadmin impersonating a user picks the lifetime too, so the ceiling applies there;
// left out, it would be the one way to mint a token that never expires.
let resp = client()
.post(format!(
"http://localhost:{port}/api/users/tokens/impersonate"
))
.header("Authorization", "Bearer SECRET_TOKEN")
.json(&json!({ "label": "impersonated", "impersonate_email": "test3@windmill.dev" }))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201);
assert!(
stored_expiration(&db, "impersonated").await.is_some(),
"an impersonation token asking for no expiration gets the ceiling"
);
Ok(())
}
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../migrations", fixtures("base"))]
async fn test_service_accounts_are_exempt(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let port = server.addr.port();
set_max(&db, json!(7)).await;
// The same email is a service account in one workspace and an ordinary user in another.
sqlx::query(
"UPDATE usr SET is_service_account = true
WHERE email = 'test2@windmill.dev' AND workspace_id = 'test-workspace'",
)
.execute(&db)
.await?;
sqlx::query("INSERT INTO workspace (id, name, owner) VALUES ('other', 'other', 'test-user')")
.execute(&db)
.await?;
sqlx::query("INSERT INTO workspace_settings (workspace_id) VALUES ('other')")
.execute(&db)
.await?;
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO usr (workspace_id, email, username, is_admin, role)
VALUES ('other', 'test2@windmill.dev', 'test-user-2', false, 'User')",
)
.execute(&db)
.await?;
// The token form decides the exemption from this list, so it must carry each membership's flag.
let memberships: serde_json::Value = client()
.get(format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/workspaces/users"))
.header("Authorization", "Bearer SECRET_TOKEN_2")
.send()
.await?
.json()
.await?;
for (workspace, is_service_account) in [("test-workspace", true), ("other", false)] {
let membership = memberships["workspaces"]
.as_array()
.and_then(|ws| ws.iter().find(|w| w["id"] == workspace))
.unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("{workspace} missing from {memberships}"));
assert_eq!(membership["is_service_account"], json!(is_service_account));
}
for (label, workspace_id, exempt) in [
("own workspace", Some("test-workspace"), true),
("other workspace", Some("other"), false),
// A workspace-less token has no workspace to match, so a service account anywhere counts.
("global", None, true),
] {
let resp = create_token(
port,
json!({ "label": label, "workspace_id": workspace_id }),
)
.await;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201);
assert_eq!(
stored_expiration(&db, label).await.is_none(),
exempt,
"{label}: expected exempt = {exempt}"
);
}
// Impersonation checks the impersonated account, not the superadmin minting the token.
let resp = client()
.post(format!(
"http://localhost:{port}/api/users/tokens/impersonate"
))
.header("Authorization", "Bearer SECRET_TOKEN")
.json(&json!({ "label": "impersonated service account", "impersonate_email": "test2@windmill.dev" }))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201);
assert_eq!(
stored_expiration(&db, "impersonated service account").await,
None
);
Ok(())
}
@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
//! The `mcp_disable_token_query_param` switch closes the URL-borne credential path.
//!
//! The rejection is a middleware layered between the `WWW-Authenticate` decorator and
//! everything that reads a token, on both the workspaced and the gateway mount. Each half of
//! that sandwich is pinned: the `WWW-Authenticate` header on the refusal catches the layer
//! being moved outward (a client would lose the pointer that starts OAuth discovery), and
//! refusing a token that was never valid catches it being moved inward past authentication
//! (the URL-borne token would be hashed and looked up before anything refused it).
#![cfg(feature = "mcp")]
use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
use serde_json::json;
use sqlx::{Pool, Postgres};
use windmill_common::global_settings::MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM;
use windmill_test_utils::*;
/// Workspace-less with an `mcp:` scope, which is what the gateway mount requires; the
/// workspaced mount takes its workspace from the path, so one token reaches both.
async fn insert_mcp_token(db: &Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO token (token_hash, token_prefix, token, email, label, super_admin, scopes)
VALUES (encode(sha256('MCP_TOKEN'::bytea), 'hex'), 'MCP_TOK', 'MCP_TOKEN', 'test@windmill.dev', 'mcp token', true, ARRAY['mcp:all'])",
)
.execute(db)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
/// A token that is not in `token` at all. Authentication would refuse it on its own, so a
/// refusal carrying the middleware's own wording is evidence nothing looked it up first.
const BOGUS_TOKEN: &str = "NOT_A_REAL_TOKEN";
async fn tools_list(url: &str) -> anyhow::Result<reqwest::Response> {
Ok(reqwest::Client::new()
.post(url)
.header("Accept", "application/json, text/event-stream")
.json(&json!({ "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "tools/list", "params": {} }))
.send()
.await?)
}
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../migrations", fixtures("base"))]
async fn test_mcp_token_query_param_switch(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
set_jwt_secret().await;
insert_mcp_token(&db).await?;
let server = ApiServer::start_mcp(db.clone()).await?;
let port = server.addr.port();
let workspaced =
format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/mcp/w/test-workspace/mcp?token=MCP_TOKEN");
let gateway = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/mcp/gateway?token=MCP_TOKEN");
assert_eq!(
tools_list(&workspaced).await?.status(),
200,
"a URL-borne token is the documented default and must keep working while the switch is off"
);
assert_eq!(tools_list(&gateway).await?.status(), 200);
MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed);
for url in [&workspaced, &gateway] {
let resp = tools_list(url).await?;
assert_eq!(
resp.status(),
401,
"{url} still admitted a token in the URL"
);
// What sends the client into the OAuth flow rather than leaving it stuck on a 401.
assert!(
resp.headers().contains_key("www-authenticate"),
"{url} rejected without pointing at the authorization server"
);
}
// Refused before authentication, not after: an invalid token gets the middleware's own
// message rather than the generic 401 that looking it up would produce.
let resp = tools_list(&format!(
"http://localhost:{port}/api/mcp/w/test-workspace/mcp?token={BOGUS_TOKEN}"
))
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 401);
assert!(
resp.text().await?.contains("does not accept a token in the MCP URL"),
"an invalid URL token was answered by authentication, so the token was read before \
the switch refused it"
);
// The header stays open: it is the channel the OAuth flow itself hands tokens over on.
let resp = reqwest::Client::new()
.post(format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/mcp/gateway"))
.header("Accept", "application/json, text/event-stream")
.header("Authorization", "Bearer MCP_TOKEN")
.json(&json!({ "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "tools/list", "params": {} }))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200);
Ok(())
}
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
//! Which user tokens get an "expiring soon" warning queued when they are created.
use serde_json::json;
use sqlx::types::chrono::Utc;
use sqlx::{Pool, Postgres};
use windmill_test_utils::*;
const DAY: u64 = 24 * 60 * 60;
async fn warning_queued(db: &Pool<Postgres>, label: &str) -> bool {
sqlx::query_scalar::<_, bool>(
"SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM token_expiry_notification n
JOIN token t ON t.token_hash = n.token_hash WHERE t.label = $1)",
)
.bind(label)
.fetch_one(db)
.await
.unwrap()
}
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../migrations", fixtures("base"))]
async fn test_short_lived_tokens_get_no_expiry_warning(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let port = server.addr.port();
for (label, lifetime) in [("short", DAY), ("long", 30 * DAY)] {
let resp = reqwest::Client::new()
.post(format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/users/tokens/create"))
.header("Authorization", "Bearer SECRET_TOKEN_2")
.json(&json!({
"label": label,
"expiration": Utc::now() + std::time::Duration::from_secs(lifetime),
}))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 201);
}
assert!(
!warning_queued(&db, "short").await,
"a token whose whole lifetime fits in the warning window must not be warned about"
);
assert!(
warning_queued(&db, "long").await,
"a longer-lived token still gets its warning"
);
Ok(())
}
@@ -275,67 +275,6 @@ async fn test_encryption_key_rotation_dispatches_batched_git_sync(
Ok(())
}
/// Stored repository tokens and webhook secrets are encrypted under the
/// workspace key but never synced, so a rotation has to carry them over even
/// when the caller skips re-encrypting variables.
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../migrations", fixtures("base"))]
async fn test_encryption_key_rotation_reencrypts_git_sync_secrets(
db: Pool<Postgres>,
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
use windmill_common::variables::{build_crypt, crypt_from_key_with_suffix, decrypt, encrypt};
initialize_tracing().await;
create_folder(&db, "28103").await?;
create_git_repo_resource(&db).await?;
let sync_script_path = "f/28103/test_sync_script_git_secrets";
create_sync_script(&db, sync_script_path).await?;
setup_git_sync_config(&db, sync_script_path).await?;
let mc = build_crypt(&db, "test-workspace").await?;
sqlx::query(
r#"
UPDATE workspace_settings SET
git_credentials = jsonb_build_array(jsonb_build_object(
'token', $1::text, 'repo_identity', 'https://gitlab.example.com/grp/proj')),
git_sync = jsonb_set(git_sync, '{repositories,0,auto_pull}', jsonb_build_object(
'enabled', true, 'mode', 'webhook', 'webhook_id', 1, 'webhook_secret', $2::text))
WHERE workspace_id = 'test-workspace'
"#,
)
.bind(encrypt(&mc, "stored-token"))
.bind(encrypt(&mc, "hook-secret"))
.execute(&db)
.await?;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let port = server.addr.port();
let base = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/w/test-workspace/workspaces");
let new_key = "c".repeat(64);
let resp = authed(client().post(format!("{base}/encryption_key")))
.json(&json!({"new_key": new_key, "skip_reencrypt": true}))
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(
resp.status(),
200,
"set_encryption_key failed: {}",
resp.text().await?
);
let (token, secret): (String, String) = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT git_credentials->0->>'token', git_sync#>>'{repositories,0,auto_pull,webhook_secret}'
FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = 'test-workspace'",
)
.fetch_one(&db)
.await?;
let new_mc = crypt_from_key_with_suffix(&new_key, "");
assert_eq!(decrypt(&new_mc, token)?, "stored-token");
assert_eq!(decrypt(&new_mc, secret)?, "hook-secret");
Ok(())
}
/// Regression test for the non-debouncing fallback: a workspace whose sync
/// script predates hub version 28103 must still receive git-sync jobs for the
/// encryption_key entry and every re-encrypted secret. Before the fallback was
@@ -1166,47 +1166,3 @@ async fn test_create_service_account_drops_orphaned_group_memberships(
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(feature = "private")]
#[sqlx::test(migrations = "../migrations", fixtures("base"))]
async fn test_edit_auto_invite_preserves_instance_groups(db: Pool<Postgres>) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
initialize_tracing().await;
sqlx::query(
r#"UPDATE workspace_settings
SET auto_invite = '{"instance_groups": ["eng"], "instance_groups_roles": {"eng": "developer"}}'
WHERE workspace_id = 'test-workspace'"#,
)
.execute(&db)
.await?;
let server = ApiServer::start(db.clone()).await?;
let port = server.addr.port();
let base = format!("http://localhost:{port}/api/w/test-workspace/workspaces");
// enable, then disable
for body in [
json!({"operator": false, "invite_all": true, "auto_add": false}),
json!({}),
] {
let resp = authed(client().post(format!("{base}/edit_auto_invite")))
.json(&body)
.send()
.await?;
assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200, "{body}: {}", resp.text().await?);
let auto_invite: serde_json::Value = sqlx::query_scalar(
"SELECT auto_invite FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = 'test-workspace'",
)
.fetch_one(&db)
.await?;
assert_eq!(auto_invite["instance_groups"], json!(["eng"]), "{body}");
assert_eq!(
auto_invite["instance_groups_roles"],
json!({"eng": "developer"}),
"{body}"
);
}
Ok(())
}
+6 -17
View File
@@ -26,9 +26,7 @@ use windmill_api_auth::{check_scopes, get_scope_tags, ApiAuthed};
use windmill_common::{
db::{UserDB, UserDbWithAuthed},
error::{self, Error},
flow_conversations::{
add_message_to_conversation_tx, message_attachments, MessageExtras, MessageType,
},
flow_conversations::{add_message_to_conversation_tx, MessageType},
get_latest_flow_version_info_for_path,
jobs::{
check_tag_available_for_workspace_internal, format_result, script_path_to_payload,
@@ -655,11 +653,9 @@ pub async fn set_flow_memory_id(
pub async fn process_flow_run_query_params(
tx: &mut sqlx::Transaction<'_, sqlx::Postgres>,
job_id: Uuid,
w_id: &str,
flow_path: &str,
run_query: &RunJobQuery,
) -> error::Result<()> {
if let Some(memory_id) = run_query.memory_key(w_id, flow_path) {
if let Some(memory_id) = run_query.memory_id {
set_flow_memory_id(tx, job_id, memory_id).await?;
}
Ok(())
@@ -673,13 +669,10 @@ pub async fn handle_chat_conversation_messages(
run_query: &RunJobQuery,
user_message_raw: Option<&Box<serde_json::value::RawValue>>,
job_id: Uuid,
is_test: bool,
// The run's args, for the files the message carried.
args: &HashMap<String, Box<serde_json::value::RawValue>>,
) -> error::Result<()> {
// Names the query parameter rather than the field: it is not a flow argument, and
// supplying it as one is the first thing tried on reading `memory_id is required`.
let memory_id = run_query.memory_key(w_id, flow_path).ok_or_else(|| {
let memory_id = run_query.memory_id.ok_or_else(|| {
windmill_common::error::Error::BadRequest(
"memory_id is required for chat-enabled flows. Pass it as the `memory_id` query \
parameter, not as a flow argument: it names the conversation the turn belongs to, \
@@ -708,12 +701,11 @@ pub async fn handle_chat_conversation_messages(
&authed.username,
&user_message,
memory_id,
is_test,
)
.await?;
// The run this message started. The row keeps the files the message carried as
// references; its args are the only record of every other flow input, and nothing
// The run this message started. Its args are the only record of what the message
// carried besides its text — attachments and every other flow input and nothing
// written later points at them: an assistant row holds the AI agent step's job.
add_message_to_conversation_tx(
tx,
@@ -723,7 +715,6 @@ pub async fn handle_chat_conversation_messages(
MessageType::User,
None,
true,
Some(&MessageExtras { attachments: message_attachments(args), ..Default::default() }),
)
.await?;
@@ -831,7 +822,7 @@ pub async fn run_flow<'c>(
.await?;
// Set memory_id if provided (for agent memory)
if let Some(memory_id) = run_query.memory_key(w_id, flow_path) {
if let Some(memory_id) = run_query.memory_id {
set_flow_memory_id(&mut tx, uuid, memory_id).await?;
}
@@ -845,8 +836,6 @@ pub async fn run_flow<'c>(
&run_query,
args.args.get("user_message"),
uuid,
false,
&args.args,
)
.await?;
}
+1 -13
View File
@@ -47,25 +47,13 @@ pub struct RunJobQuery {
pub cache_ignore_s3_path: Option<bool>,
pub skip_preprocessor: Option<bool>,
pub poll_delay_ms: Option<u64>,
/// Any string; see [`RunJobQuery::memory_key`].
pub memory_id: Option<String>,
pub memory_id: Option<Uuid>,
pub trigger_external_id: Option<String>,
pub service_name: Option<String>,
pub suspended_mode: Option<bool>,
}
impl RunJobQuery {
/// The memory id as stored in `flow_status.memory_id`: a uuid is kept, any other string hashed
/// within the workspace and the flow being run.
pub fn memory_key(&self, workspace_id: &str, flow_path: &str) -> Option<Uuid> {
self.memory_id
.as_deref()
.filter(|memory_id| !memory_id.trim().is_empty())
.map(|memory_id| {
windmill_common::flow_conversations::memory_key(workspace_id, flow_path, memory_id)
})
}
pub async fn get_scheduled_for(
&self,
db: &DB,
+186 -18
View File
@@ -60,11 +60,10 @@ use windmill_common::{
global_settings::{
AI_CONFIG_SETTING, APP_WORKSPACED_ROUTE_SETTING, AUTOMATE_USERNAME_CREATION_SETTING,
CRITICAL_ALERT_MUTE_UI_SETTING, CUSTOM_TAGS_SETTING, DEFAULT_TAGS_WORKSPACES_SETTING,
DISABLE_HUB_SETTING, EMAIL_DOMAIN_SETTING, ENV_SETTINGS,
DISABLE_HUB_SETTING, EMAIL_DOMAIN_SETTING, ENV_SETTINGS, EXTERNAL_INSTANCE_PG_SETTING,
GITHUB_APP_WEBHOOK_BASE_URL_SETTING, HTTP_ROUTE_DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ORIGINS_SETTING,
HTTP_ROUTE_WORKSPACED_ROUTE_SETTING, HUB_ACCESSIBLE_URL_SETTING, HUB_BASE_URL_SETTING,
INSTANCE_BANNER_SETTING, MAX_RETENTION_OVERRIDE_WORKSPACES,
MAX_TOKEN_EXPIRATION_DAYS_SETTING, MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM_SETTING,
RETENTION_PERIOD_SECS_OVERRIDES_SETTING, RUFF_CONFIG_SETTING, UNIQUE_ID_SETTING,
WORKSPACE_FAIRNESS_DURATION_SECS_SETTING, WORKSPACE_FAIRNESS_ENABLED_SETTING,
WORKSPACE_FAIRNESS_MAX_PERCENT_SETTING, WORKSPACE_FAIRNESS_MIN_TOTAL_SETTING,
@@ -169,6 +168,22 @@ pub fn global_service() -> Router {
"/refresh_custom_instance_user_pwd",
post(refresh_custom_instance_user_pwd),
)
.route(
"/external_instance_pg/status",
get(get_external_instance_pg_status),
)
.route(
"/external_instance_pg/setup",
post(setup_external_instance_pg),
)
.route(
"/external_instance_pg/databases",
get(list_external_instance_pg_databases),
)
.route(
"/external_instance_pg/databases/{name}",
post(create_external_instance_pg_database).delete(drop_external_instance_pg_database),
)
.route(
"/setup_custom_instance_pg_database/{name}",
post(setup_custom_instance_pg_database),
@@ -878,6 +893,14 @@ pub async fn set_global_setting_internal(
)));
}
if key == EXTERNAL_INSTANCE_PG_SETTING {
return windmill_common::external_instance_pg::write_external_instance_pg_setting(
db,
Some(&value),
)
.await;
}
run_setting_pre_write_hook(db, &key, &value).await?;
match value {
@@ -1196,12 +1219,6 @@ async fn run_setting_pre_write_hook(
}
}
}
MAX_TOKEN_EXPIRATION_DAYS_SETTING => {
windmill_common::global_settings::parse_max_token_expiration_days(Some(value))
.map_err(|e| {
error::Error::BadRequest(format!("{MAX_TOKEN_EXPIRATION_DAYS_SETTING}: {e}"))
})?;
}
INSTANCE_BANNER_SETTING => {
match value {
// Clearing (delete row) is handled by the caller; allow it through.
@@ -1265,7 +1282,7 @@ async fn set_instance_config(
let desired_map = desired.global_settings.to_settings_map();
if !desired_map.is_empty() {
let current_map = current.global_settings.to_settings_map();
let settings_diff =
let mut settings_diff =
instance_config::diff_global_settings(&current_map, &desired_map, ApplyMode::Merge);
let ai_config_changed = settings_diff
.upserts
@@ -1294,8 +1311,15 @@ async fn set_instance_config(
}
for (key, value) in &settings_diff.upserts {
run_setting_pre_write_hook(&db, key, value).await?;
if key != EXTERNAL_INSTANCE_PG_SETTING {
run_setting_pre_write_hook(&db, key, value).await?;
}
}
windmill_common::external_instance_pg::write_external_instance_pg_from_diff(
&db,
&mut settings_diff,
)
.await?;
instance_config::apply_settings_diff(&db, &settings_diff)
.await
@@ -1363,12 +1387,6 @@ pub async fn get_global_setting(
&& key != HTTP_ROUTE_DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ORIGINS_SETTING
&& key != WS_BASE_URL_SETTING
&& key != INSTANCE_BANNER_SETTING
// The token form reads it to stop offering expirations the server would shorten.
&& key != MAX_TOKEN_EXPIRATION_DAYS_SETTING
// Whoever is wiring up an MCP client reads it to know whether a URL-borne token
// would be refused, and they are usually not a superadmin. Not a secret: pointing
// any MCP client at the instance discovers the same answer.
&& key != MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM_SETTING
{
require_super_admin(&db, &authed).await?;
}
@@ -1660,6 +1678,8 @@ struct CustomInstanceDb {
tag: Option<String>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
used_by_workspaces: Vec<String>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
workspace_id: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Deserialize, Debug, Serialize, Default)]
@@ -1756,6 +1776,135 @@ async fn refresh_custom_instance_user_pwd(
Ok(Json(()))
}
async fn get_external_instance_pg_status(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
) -> JsonResult<windmill_common::external_instance_pg::ExternalInstancePgStatus> {
require_super_admin(&db, &authed).await?;
Ok(Json(
windmill_common::external_instance_pg::external_instance_pg_status(&db).await?,
))
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct SetupExternalInstancePgBody {
#[serde(default)]
rotate_passwords: bool,
}
async fn setup_external_instance_pg(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
Json(body): Json<SetupExternalInstancePgBody>,
) -> JsonResult<windmill_common::external_instance_pg::ExternalInstancePgSetupReport> {
require_super_admin(&db, &authed).await?;
let report = windmill_common::external_instance_pg::setup_external_instance_pg_unchecked(
&db,
body.rotate_passwords,
)
.await?;
let rotated = body.rotate_passwords.to_string();
let success = report.success.to_string();
windmill_audit::audit_oss::audit_log(
&db,
&authed,
"settings.setup_external_instance_pg",
windmill_audit::ActionKind::Update,
"global",
Some(&authed.email),
Some(
[
("rotate_passwords", rotated.as_str()),
("success", success.as_str()),
]
.into(),
),
)
.await?;
Ok(Json(report))
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
struct ExternalInstancePgDatabase {
#[serde(flatten)]
status: windmill_common::instance_config::CustomInstanceDb,
used_by_workspaces: Vec<String>,
}
async fn list_external_instance_pg_databases(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
) -> JsonResult<std::collections::BTreeMap<String, ExternalInstancePgDatabase>> {
require_super_admin(&db, &authed).await?;
let databases = windmill_common::external_instance_pg::external_instance_databases(&db).await?;
let mut usages =
windmill_common::external_instance_pg::external_instance_database_usages(&db).await?;
Ok(Json(
databases
.into_iter()
.map(|(name, status)| {
let used_by_workspaces = usages.remove(&name).unwrap_or_default();
(
name,
ExternalInstancePgDatabase {
status,
used_by_workspaces: used_by_workspaces.into_iter().collect(),
},
)
})
.collect(),
))
}
async fn create_external_instance_pg_database(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
Path(dbname): Path<String>,
Json(body): Json<SetupCustomInstanceDbBody>,
) -> JsonResult<()> {
require_super_admin(&db, &authed).await?;
let tag = body.tag.as_deref().unwrap_or("datatable");
windmill_common::external_instance_pg::create_external_instance_database_unchecked(
&db, &dbname, tag, None,
)
.await?;
windmill_audit::audit_oss::audit_log(
&db,
&authed,
"settings.create_external_instance_pg_database",
windmill_audit::ActionKind::Create,
"global",
Some(&authed.email),
Some([("dbname", dbname.as_str()), ("tag", tag)].into()),
)
.await?;
Ok(Json(()))
}
async fn drop_external_instance_pg_database(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
Path(dbname): Path<String>,
) -> JsonResult<()> {
require_super_admin(&db, &authed).await?;
// A data table naming a dropped database fails on every job, far from the drop that caused it.
windmill_common::external_instance_pg::drop_external_instance_database_unchecked(
&db, &dbname, None,
)
.await?;
windmill_audit::audit_oss::audit_log(
&db,
&authed,
"settings.drop_external_instance_pg_database",
windmill_audit::ActionKind::Delete,
"global",
Some(&authed.email),
Some([("dbname", dbname.as_str())].into()),
)
.await?;
Ok(Json(()))
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct SetupCustomInstanceDbBody {
tag: Option<String>,
@@ -1767,12 +1916,31 @@ async fn setup_custom_instance_pg_database(
Path(dbname): Path<String>,
Json(body): Json<SetupCustomInstanceDbBody>,
) -> JsonResult<CustomInstanceDb> {
// Before anything is recorded: the status written below replaces the registry entry, and with it
// the workspace a fork copy is reserved for.
require_super_admin(&db, &authed).await?;
// A re-run keeps the fork reservation: without it, the workspace the copy was made for could no
// longer import into it or finish its fork.
let workspace_id = sqlx::query_scalar::<_, Option<String>>(
"SELECT value->'databases'->$1->>'workspace_id' FROM global_settings
WHERE name = 'custom_instance_pg_databases'",
)
.bind(&dbname)
.fetch_optional(&db)
.await?
.flatten();
let mut logs = CustomInstanceDbLogs::default();
let result = setup_custom_instance_pg_database_inner(authed, &db, &dbname, &mut logs).await;
let success = result.is_ok();
let error = result.err().map(|e| e.to_string());
let status =
CustomInstanceDb { logs, success, error, tag: body.tag, used_by_workspaces: vec![] };
let status = CustomInstanceDb {
logs,
success,
error,
tag: body.tag,
used_by_workspaces: vec![],
workspace_id,
};
let status_json = serde_json::to_value(&status).map_err(to_anyhow)?;
// Save that the database was setup successfully
sqlx::query!(
+22 -127
View File
@@ -47,10 +47,7 @@ use windmill_audit::audit_oss::audit_log;
use windmill_audit::ActionKind;
use windmill_common::audit::AuditAuthor;
use windmill_common::auth::{hash_token, safe_token_prefix, TOKEN_PREFIX_LEN};
use windmill_common::global_settings::{
load_value_from_global_settings, parse_max_token_expiration_days,
AUTOMATE_USERNAME_CREATION_SETTING, MAX_TOKEN_EXPIRATION_DAYS_SETTING,
};
use windmill_common::global_settings::AUTOMATE_USERNAME_CREATION_SETTING;
use windmill_common::oauth2::InstanceEvent;
use windmill_common::per_minute_counter::PerMinuteCounter;
use windmill_common::users::truncate_token;
@@ -171,10 +168,7 @@ pub fn make_unauthed_service() -> Router {
.route("/logout", post(logout).get(logout))
.route("/is_first_time_setup", get(is_first_time_setup))
.route("/request_password_reset", post(request_password_reset))
.route(
"/login_link/{token}",
get(consume_login_link).post(confirm_login_link),
)
.route("/login_link/{token}", get(consume_login_link))
.route("/is_smtp_configured", get(is_smtp_configured))
.route(
"/is_password_login_disabled",
@@ -3098,68 +3092,11 @@ pub async fn create_guest_session_token<'c>(
// create_token_internal is re-exported from windmill-api-auth above
/// Applies the instance-wide ceiling on how long a token a caller picks the lifetime of may
/// live (`create_token`, and `impersonate` for superadmins), returning the expiration to store:
/// the requested one while it fits, the ceiling otherwise, and the ceiling as well when none was
/// requested. Only the stored expiration is capped: tokens already stored when the setting is
/// turned on or lowered keep theirs, since the auth lookup never reads the setting.
///
/// It shortens rather than refuses because most callers do not comply on their own. The CLI
/// authorization page, `wmill user create-token` and the editor's language-server token each
/// pick a lifetime, often none at all, without reading the setting (and CLIs already installed
/// never will), so refusing would break logging in and the editor instead of the long-lived
/// tokens the setting is aimed at.
///
/// Read from `global_settings` on each call rather than cached: token creation is rare
/// enough that the round trip costs nothing, and the ceiling is then never served stale.
///
/// A token owned by a service account is exempt: in the workspace the token names, or in any
/// workspace for a workspace-less token, which has none to match. Service accounts are the
/// identity automation that needs a long-lived credential runs as. The cost is that any
/// workspace admin can create and impersonate one to hold an uncapped token, so the ceiling
/// bounds personal tokens rather than what an admin can obtain.
async fn cap_token_expiration(
db: &DB,
owner_email: &str,
workspace_id: Option<&str>,
requested: Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>,
) -> Result<Option<chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>> {
let value = load_value_from_global_settings(db, MAX_TOKEN_EXPIRATION_DAYS_SETTING).await?;
let max_days = match parse_max_token_expiration_days(value.as_ref()) {
Ok(Some(max_days)) => max_days,
Ok(None) => return Ok(requested),
// Both write paths reject this, so only a row written around them gets here.
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!("ignoring {MAX_TOKEN_EXPIRATION_DAYS_SETTING}: {e}");
return Ok(requested);
}
};
let max = chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::days(max_days);
let is_service_account = sqlx::query_scalar!(
"SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM usr WHERE email = $1 AND is_service_account IS true
AND ($2::varchar IS NULL OR workspace_id = $2))",
owner_email,
workspace_id,
)
.fetch_one(db)
.await?
.unwrap_or(false);
if is_service_account {
return Ok(requested);
}
Ok(Some(match requested {
Some(expiration) if expiration < max => expiration,
_ => max,
}))
}
async fn create_token(
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
authed: ApiAuthed,
OptJobAuthed { job_id, .. }: OptJobAuthed,
Json(mut token_config): Json<NewToken>,
Json(token_config): Json<NewToken>,
) -> Result<(StatusCode, String)> {
forbid_elevated_job_token(&db, &authed.email, job_id).await?;
check_token_create_rate_limit(&authed.username)?;
@@ -3181,14 +3118,6 @@ async fn create_token(
windmill_api_auth::ensure_scopes_within_caller(&authed, token_config.scopes.as_deref())?;
token_config.expiration = cap_token_expiration(
&db,
&authed.email,
token_config.workspace_id.as_deref(),
token_config.expiration,
)
.await?;
let mut tx = db.begin().await?;
let token = create_token_internal(&mut *tx, &db, &authed, token_config).await?;
@@ -3245,7 +3174,6 @@ async fn impersonate(
.fetch_optional(&db)
.await?
.unwrap_or(false);
let expiration = cap_token_expiration(&db, &impersonated, None, new_token.expiration).await?;
let mut tx = db.begin().await?;
sqlx::query!(
@@ -3257,7 +3185,7 @@ async fn impersonate(
plaintext as Option<&str>,
impersonated,
new_token.label,
expiration,
new_token.expiration,
is_super_admin
)
.execute(&mut *tx)
@@ -3267,7 +3195,7 @@ async fn impersonate(
&mut *tx,
&t_hash,
new_token.label.as_deref(),
expiration,
new_token.expiration,
)
.await;
@@ -3287,12 +3215,9 @@ async fn impersonate(
}
const LOGIN_LINK_DEFAULT_TTL_S: u32 = 600;
// Long enough for a link sent by email to still work when it is read. `require_login_type` is
// only checked at mint, so a much longer cap would need re-checking it when the link is opened.
const LOGIN_LINK_MAX_TTL_S: u32 = 7200;
const LOGIN_LINK_MAX_TTL_S: u32 = 900;
const LOGIN_LINK_DEFAULT_RD: &str = "/user/workspaces";
const LOGIN_LINK_EXPIRED_PAGE: &str = "/user/login_link_expired";
const LOGIN_LINK_CONFIRM_PAGE: &str = "/user/login_link";
#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub struct NewLoginLink {
@@ -3303,9 +3228,6 @@ pub struct NewLoginLink {
/// account it created can require `pending_oauth`, so the link stops working once the
/// owner has set a password or signed in with a provider.
pub require_login_type: Option<String>,
/// Hand out a page that signs in only when its button is clicked. Mail scanners open links
/// on delivery, and opening the plain link spends it, so a link sent by email sets this.
pub confirm: Option<bool>,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
@@ -3456,12 +3378,11 @@ async fn create_login_link(
.await?;
tx.commit().await?;
let base_url = (**BASE_URL.load()).clone();
let url = if nl.confirm.unwrap_or(false) {
format!("{base_url}{LOGIN_LINK_CONFIRM_PAGE}?token={token}")
} else {
format!("{base_url}/api/auth/login_link/{token}")
};
let url = format!(
"{}/api/auth/login_link/{}",
(**BASE_URL.load()).clone(),
token
);
Ok((StatusCode::CREATED, Json(LoginLink { url, expires_at })))
}
@@ -3707,45 +3628,19 @@ async fn consume_login_link(
Path(token): Path<String>,
Query(query): Query<LoginLinkQuery>,
) -> Result<Response> {
let location = redeem_login_link(&headers, cookies, &db, &token, query.rd).await?;
Ok(login_link_redirect(location))
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
struct LoginLinkLocation {
location: String,
}
/// The confirmation page's click. It answers with where to go rather than redirecting, and the
/// page navigates there itself.
async fn confirm_login_link(
headers: axum::http::HeaderMap,
cookies: Cookies,
Extension(db): Extension<DB>,
Path(token): Path<String>,
) -> JsonResult<LoginLinkLocation> {
let location = redeem_login_link(&headers, cookies, &db, &token, None).await?;
Ok(Json(LoginLinkLocation { location }))
}
/// Spends the link and sets the session cookie, returning the post-login destination; or
/// returns the explanation page, with no session, when the link cannot be used.
async fn redeem_login_link(
headers: &axum::http::HeaderMap,
cookies: Cookies,
db: &DB,
token: &str,
requested_rd: Option<String>,
) -> Result<String> {
let bounce = |reason: &str| Ok(format!("{LOGIN_LINK_EXPIRED_PAGE}?reason={reason}"));
let bounce = |reason: &str| {
Ok(login_link_redirect(format!(
"{LOGIN_LINK_EXPIRED_PAGE}?reason={reason}"
)))
};
if token.len() != 32 {
return bounce("invalid");
}
let t_hash = hash_token(token);
let t_hash = hash_token(&token);
// The account is unknown until the row is read, so only the global and per-IP tiers
// apply here; a 32-char random token leaves nothing for the per-account tier to guard.
windmill_common::login_rate_limit::check_and_increment_login_attempt(
headers,
&headers,
&t_hash[..TOKEN_PREFIX_LEN],
)?;
@@ -3812,10 +3707,11 @@ async fn redeem_login_link(
.await?;
tx.commit().await?;
Ok(link
let rd = link
.rd
.or_else(|| same_origin_rd(requested_rd))
.unwrap_or_else(|| LOGIN_LINK_DEFAULT_RD.to_string()))
.or_else(|| same_origin_rd(query.rd))
.unwrap_or_else(|| LOGIN_LINK_DEFAULT_RD.to_string());
Ok(login_link_redirect(rd))
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -4049,7 +3945,6 @@ async fn update_token_label(
AND NOT starts_with(label, 'embed_app:')
AND NOT starts_with(label, 'sdk_app:')
AND NOT starts_with(label, 'impersonation:')
AND NOT starts_with(label, 'cli-login:')
))
RETURNING token_prefix",
req.label.as_deref(),
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
/*
* Author: Ruben Fiszel
* Copyright: Windmill Labs, Inc 2022
* This file and its contents are licensed under the AGPLv3 License.
* Please see the included NOTICE for copyright information and
* LICENSE-AGPL for a copy of the license.
*/
//! Where the ACL planner comes from: the enterprise one, or a refusal.
//!
//! Data table roles are an Enterprise Edition feature, and so is everything here — reading who
//! owns what included. `private` alone is not that edition — community builds carry it — so the
//! planner is behind `enterprise` as well.
#[cfg(all(feature = "private", feature = "enterprise"))]
pub(crate) use crate::datatable_acl_ee::plan_statements;
#[cfg(all(feature = "private", feature = "enterprise"))]
pub(crate) fn ensure_datatable_acl_available() -> windmill_common::error::Result<()> {
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(not(all(feature = "private", feature = "enterprise")))]
use {
crate::datatable_acl::{AclChange, AclPlan, AclTarget, CatalogFacts},
windmill_common::{datatable_roles_oss::datatable_roles_unavailable, error::Result},
};
/// Checked first by every ACL route, before anything is read or connected to.
#[cfg(not(all(feature = "private", feature = "enterprise")))]
pub(crate) fn ensure_datatable_acl_available() -> Result<()> {
Err(datatable_roles_unavailable())
}
#[cfg(not(all(feature = "private", feature = "enterprise")))]
pub(crate) fn plan_statements(
_target: &AclTarget,
_change: &AclChange,
_dbname: &str,
_pg_role: &str,
_facts: &CatalogFacts,
) -> Result<AclPlan> {
Err(datatable_roles_unavailable())
}
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
//! to keep that file focused on core workspace configuration.
use crate::workspaces::{
is_instance_datatable, pg_dump_database, strip_unreplayable_dump_lines, ItemComparison,
managed_datatable_kind, pg_dump_database, strip_unreplayable_dump_lines, ItemComparison,
PgDumpOptions,
};
@@ -1556,7 +1556,9 @@ async fn generate_initial_datatable_migration(
// without what a replay elsewhere cannot run: the replaying user owns none of this
// database's objects, and the grants Windmill plants in an instance database (`ALTER
// DEFAULT PRIVILEGES FOR ROLE ...`) fail even replaying onto the same server.
let no_acl = is_instance_datatable(&db, &w_id, &datatable_name).await?;
let no_acl = managed_datatable_kind(&db, &w_id, &datatable_name)
.await?
.is_some();
let dump_file = pg_dump_database(
&pg_db,
PgDumpOptions {
@@ -65,3 +65,15 @@ pub(crate) async fn ensure_reaches_datatable(
) -> Result<()> {
roles::ensure_reaches_datatable(db, w_id, datatable_name, authed).await
}
/// [`ensure_reaches_datatable`] against an entry already resolved, for a caller that goes on to
/// connect from that same entry.
pub(crate) async fn ensure_reaches_governing_datatable(
db: &DB,
w_id: &str,
datatable_name: &str,
governing: &GoverningDatatable,
authed: &ApiAuthed,
) -> Result<()> {
roles::ensure_reaches_governing_datatable(db, w_id, datatable_name, governing, authed).await
}
@@ -12,8 +12,9 @@
#[cfg(all(feature = "private", feature = "enterprise"))]
pub(crate) use crate::datatable_permissions_ee::{
ensure_governs_datatable, ensure_reaches_datatable, get_datatable_permissions,
list_usable_datatable_roles, set_datatable_permissions,
ensure_governs_datatable, ensure_reaches_datatable, ensure_reaches_governing_datatable,
get_datatable_permissions, list_usable_datatable_roles, set_datatable_permissions,
usable_datatable_roles,
};
#[cfg(not(all(feature = "private", feature = "enterprise")))]
@@ -56,6 +57,20 @@ mod ce {
}
}
pub(crate) async fn ensure_reaches_governing_datatable(
_db: &DB,
_w_id: &str,
_datatable_name: &str,
governing: &GoverningDatatable,
_authed: &ApiAuthed,
) -> Result<()> {
if governing.datatable.permissions.is_none() {
Ok(())
} else {
Err(unavailable())
}
}
// The routes stay registered so the API has one shape; each answers after authentication,
// before anything is read.
@@ -70,4 +85,28 @@ mod ce {
pub(crate) async fn list_usable_datatable_roles(_authed: ApiAuthed) -> Result<String> {
Err(unavailable())
}
pub(crate) struct UsableDatatableRoles {
pub(crate) permissioned: bool,
pub(crate) roles: Vec<String>,
pub(crate) default_role: String,
}
/// A data table not under roles is used as `admin`, as before roles existed. One under roles
/// is refused: no role of it can be connected as.
pub(crate) async fn usable_datatable_roles(
_db: &DB,
_authed: &ApiAuthed,
_w_id: &str,
governing: &GoverningDatatable,
) -> Result<UsableDatatableRoles> {
if governing.datatable.permissions.is_some() {
return Err(unavailable());
}
Ok(UsableDatatableRoles {
permissioned: false,
roles: vec![],
default_role: windmill_common::datatable_roles::ADMIN_DATATABLE_ROLE.to_string(),
})
}
}
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
#[cfg(feature = "parquet")]
pub mod ai_session_backups;
pub mod data_metrics;
pub mod datatable_acl;
pub mod datatable_acl_oss;
pub mod datatable_migrations;
pub mod datatable_permissions;
pub mod datatable_permissions_oss;
@@ -12,5 +14,8 @@ pub mod workspaces_oss;
#[cfg(feature = "private")]
pub mod workspaces_ee;
#[cfg(all(feature = "private", feature = "enterprise"))]
pub mod datatable_acl_ee;
#[cfg(all(feature = "private", feature = "enterprise"))]
pub mod datatable_permissions_ee;
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
@@ -110,10 +110,25 @@ pub(crate) async fn change_workspace_id(
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
// A fork copy reserved for the old id would otherwise be unreachable: its creator cannot
// import into it or finish its fork under the new id, and nothing else would ever drop it.
sqlx::query(
r#"UPDATE global_settings SET value = jsonb_set(value, '{databases}', (
SELECT COALESCE(jsonb_object_agg(k, CASE WHEN v->>'workspace_id' = $1
THEN jsonb_set(v, '{workspace_id}', to_jsonb($2::text)) ELSE v END), '{}'::jsonb)
FROM jsonb_each(COALESCE(value->'databases', '{}'::jsonb)) AS e(k, v)
))
WHERE name = 'custom_instance_pg_databases'"#,
)
.bind(&old_id)
.bind(&rw.new_id)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
// Duplicate workspace settings (keep copy in old workspace for reference)
info!("Duplicating workspace_settings table");
sqlx::query!(
"INSERT INTO workspace_settings (workspace_id, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, git_credentials, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled, guest_jwt_public_key, guest_jwt_jwks_url, add_admins_and_developers_to_forks) SELECT $1, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, git_credentials, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled, guest_jwt_public_key, guest_jwt_jwks_url, add_admins_and_developers_to_forks FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = $2",
"INSERT INTO workspace_settings (workspace_id, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, git_credentials, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled, guest_jwt_public_key, guest_jwt_jwks_url) SELECT $1, slack_team_id, slack_name, slack_command_script, slack_email, customer_id, plan, webhook, ai_config, large_file_storage, git_sync, default_app, default_scripts, deploy_ui, mute_critical_alerts, color, operator_settings, teams_command_script, teams_team_id, teams_team_name, git_app_installations, git_credentials, ducklake, dbt_warehouses, slack_oauth_client_id, slack_oauth_client_secret, datatable, teams_team_guid, auto_invite, error_handler, success_handler, public_app_execution_limit_per_minute, error_handler_fallback_to_instance_alerts, guest_access_enabled, guest_jwt_public_key, guest_jwt_jwks_url FROM workspace_settings WHERE workspace_id = $2",
&rw.new_id,
&old_id
)
@@ -1409,9 +1424,7 @@ pub async fn drop_forked_datatable_databases(
_ => continue,
};
if database.resource_type
== windmill_common::workspaces::DataTableCatalogResourceType::Instance
{
if database.resource_type.is_windmill_managed() {
let db_to_drop = &database.resource_path;
if !db_to_drop.starts_with("wm_fork_") {
errors.push(format!(
@@ -1420,7 +1433,42 @@ pub async fn drop_forked_datatable_databases(
));
continue;
}
if let Err(e) = windmill_common::drop_custom_instance_database(&db, db_to_drop).await {
// The fork's own entry is what is going away; anything else still reaching the copy,
// a child fork's pointer at this entry included, keeps it. The lock keeps a child fork
// from gaining such a pointer before the drop.
let dropped = async {
let mut tx = db.begin().await?;
windmill_common::workspaces::lock_fork_datatables(&mut tx, &w_id).await?;
if database.resource_type
== windmill_common::workspaces::DataTableCatalogResourceType::ExternalInstance
{
windmill_common::external_instance_pg::drop_external_instance_database_unchecked(
&db,
db_to_drop,
Some((&w_id, dt_name)),
)
.await?;
} else {
let uses = windmill_common::workspaces::managed_database_uses(
&mut tx,
windmill_common::workspaces::DataTableCatalogResourceType::Instance,
db_to_drop,
Some((&w_id, dt_name)),
)
.await?;
if !uses.is_empty() {
return Err(Error::BadRequest(format!(
"it is still used by {}",
uses.join(", ")
)));
}
windmill_common::drop_custom_instance_database(&db, db_to_drop).await?;
}
tx.commit().await?;
Ok::<_, Error>(())
}
.await;
if let Err(e) = dropped {
errors.push(format!(
"Could not drop instance database '{}' for datatable://{}: {}",
db_to_drop, dt_name, e
@@ -1787,7 +1835,17 @@ async fn resolve_fork_catalog_pg(
"ducklake://{ducklake_name}: malformed registry catalog identity `{catalog}`"
))
})?;
let catalog_resource = if resource_type == "instance" {
let catalog_resource = if resource_type == "external_instance" {
serde_json::to_value(
windmill_common::external_instance_pg::external_instance_connection_unchecked(
db,
resource_path,
false,
)
.await?,
)
.map_err(|e| Error::internal_err(format!("serializing pg creds: {e}")))?
} else if resource_type == "instance" {
let mut pg_creds = windmill_common::PgDatabase::parse_uri(
&windmill_common::get_database_url().await?.as_str().await,
)?;
File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff
+6 -7
View File
@@ -4310,11 +4310,11 @@ async fn execute_component(
}
}
let flow_path = payload
let is_flow = payload
.path
.as_deref()
.and_then(|path| path.strip_prefix("flow/"))
.map(str::to_string);
.as_ref()
.map(|p| p.starts_with("flow/"))
.unwrap_or(false);
// Tag for inline-script jobs is read from the deployed policy in run mode;
// only preview mode (editor) honors the client-supplied tag. This applies to
@@ -4444,9 +4444,8 @@ async fn execute_component(
// Apply runnable query parameters if provided
if let Some(ref run_query) = payload.run_query_params {
if let Some(flow_path) = flow_path.as_deref() {
crate::jobs::process_flow_run_query_params(&mut tx, uuid, &w_id, flow_path, run_query)
.await?;
if is_flow {
crate::jobs::process_flow_run_query_params(&mut tx, uuid, run_query).await?;
}
}
+32 -52
View File
@@ -4369,12 +4369,12 @@ async fn count_completed_jobs_detail(
Query(query): Query<CountCompletedJobsQuery>,
) -> error::JsonResult<i64> {
let mut sqlb = SqlBuilder::select_from("v2_job_completed");
//FOR RLS
sqlb.join("v2_job USING (id)");
sqlb.field("COUNT(*) as count");
// Filtering on v2_job.workspace_id instead would keep the planner off
// ix_job_workspace_id_completed_at_all and scan the whole retention window.
if !(w_id == "admins" && query.all_workspaces.unwrap_or(false)) {
sqlb.and_where_eq("v2_job_completed.workspace_id", "?".bind(&w_id));
sqlb.and_where_eq("v2_job.workspace_id", "?".bind(&w_id));
}
if let Some(after_s_ago) = query.completed_after_s_ago {
@@ -4393,7 +4393,6 @@ async fn count_completed_jobs_detail(
}
if let Some(tags) = query.tags {
sqlb.join("v2_job USING (id)");
sqlb.and_where_in(
"v2_job.tag",
&tags.split(",").map(|t| quote(t)).collect::<Vec<_>>(),
@@ -4401,19 +4400,7 @@ async fn count_completed_jobs_detail(
}
let sql = sqlb.sql()?;
let mut tx = db.begin().await?;
set_list_jobs_statement_timeout(&mut tx).await?;
let stats = sqlx::query_scalar::<_, i64>(&sql)
.fetch_one(&mut *tx)
.await
.map_err(|e| {
list_jobs_timeout_error(
e,
"Counting completed jobs",
"Lower completed_after_s_ago or narrow the filters.",
)
})?;
tx.commit().await?;
let stats = sqlx::query_scalar::<_, i64>(&sql).fetch_one(&db).await?;
Ok(Json(stats))
}
@@ -4442,33 +4429,6 @@ lazy_static::lazy_static! {
.unwrap_or(30);
}
/// A client that gives up does not cancel its query, so without this bound every retry of a
/// slow filter stacks another scan running until the connection-wide 5min timeout.
async fn set_list_jobs_statement_timeout(tx: &mut Transaction<'_, Postgres>) -> error::Result<()> {
let timeout_secs = *LIST_JOBS_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT_SECS;
if timeout_secs > 0 {
sqlx::query(&format!("SET LOCAL statement_timeout = '{timeout_secs}s'"))
.execute(&mut **tx)
.await?;
}
Ok(())
}
fn list_jobs_timeout_error(e: sqlx::Error, action: &str, hint: &str) -> Error {
let timeout_secs = *LIST_JOBS_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT_SECS;
match e {
sqlx::Error::Database(ref db_err)
if timeout_secs > 0 && db_err.code().as_deref() == Some("57014") =>
{
Error::Generic(
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
format!("{action} took more than {timeout_secs}s and was stopped. {hint}"),
)
}
e => e.into(),
}
}
async fn list_jobs(
authed: ApiAuthed,
Extension(user_db): Extension<UserDB>,
@@ -4585,14 +4545,32 @@ async fn list_jobs(
};
// tracing::info!("sql: {}", &sql);
let mut tx: Transaction<'_, Postgres> = user_db.begin(&authed).await?;
set_list_jobs_statement_timeout(&mut tx).await?;
// A client that gives up does not cancel its query, so without this bound every retry of a
// slow filter stacks another scan running until the connection-wide 5min timeout.
let timeout_secs = *LIST_JOBS_STATEMENT_TIMEOUT_SECS;
if timeout_secs > 0 {
sqlx::query(&format!("SET LOCAL statement_timeout = '{timeout_secs}s'"))
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
}
let jobs: Vec<UnifiedJob> = sqlx::query_as(&sql)
.fetch_all(&mut *tx)
.warn_after_seconds_with_sql(5, format!("list_jobs: {}", sql))
.await
.map_err(|e| {
list_jobs_timeout_error(e, "Listing jobs", "Set a start date or narrow the filters.")
.map_err(|e| match e {
sqlx::Error::Database(ref db_err)
if timeout_secs > 0 && db_err.code().as_deref() == Some("57014") =>
{
Error::Generic(
StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
format!(
"Listing jobs took more than {timeout_secs}s and was stopped. Set a start date or narrow the filters."
),
)
}
e => e.into(),
})?;
tx.commit().await?;
@@ -8723,7 +8701,12 @@ fn register_potential_assets_on_inline_execution(
.as_ref()
.and_then(|args| args.get("database"))
.map(|v| v.get().trim_matches('"'))
.and_then(|dt| dt.strip_prefix("datatable://"));
.and_then(|dt| dt.strip_prefix("datatable://"))
// `?role=` picks the connection, not the data table. Anything else after a `?` may be
// part of a name stored before names were restricted, so it stays.
.map(|dt| {
windmill_common::workspaces::parse_datatable_ref(dt).map_or(dt, |(name, _)| name)
});
if let Some(datatable) = datatable {
let re = regex::Regex::new(r#"SET search_path TO "([^"]+)";"#).unwrap();
let (schema, content) = if let Some(captures) = re.captures(&preview.content) {
@@ -9563,7 +9546,7 @@ async fn run_preview_flow_job(
.await?;
// Set memory_id if provided (for agent memory)
if let Some(memory_id) = run_query.memory_key(&w_id, &flow_path) {
if let Some(memory_id) = run_query.memory_id {
set_flow_memory_id(&mut tx, uuid, memory_id).await?;
}
@@ -9577,9 +9560,6 @@ async fn run_preview_flow_job(
&run_query,
user_message.as_ref(),
uuid,
// Run from the editor's test panel: a trial, not a real conversation.
true,
&flow_args,
)
.await?;
}
+3 -5
View File
@@ -560,7 +560,7 @@ pub async fn run_server(
if server_mode || mcp_mode {
use mcp::{
add_www_authenticate_header, add_www_authenticate_header_gateway,
extract_workspace_from_token, reject_token_query_param,
extract_workspace_from_token,
};
let (mcp_router, mcp_cancellation_token) = setup_mcp_server(
db.clone(),
@@ -573,17 +573,15 @@ pub async fn run_server(
let workspaced_mcp_router = mcp_router
.clone()
.route_layer(from_extractor::<ApiAuthed>())
.layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(reject_token_query_param))
.layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(add_www_authenticate_header))
.layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(extract_and_store_workspace_id));
// Gateway MCP router — resolves workspace from token
let gateway_mcp_router = mcp_router
.route_layer(from_extractor::<ApiAuthed>())
.layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(extract_workspace_from_token))
.layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(reject_token_query_param))
.layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(
add_www_authenticate_header_gateway,
));
))
.layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(extract_workspace_from_token));
(
workspaced_mcp_router,
gateway_mcp_router,
+2 -28
View File
@@ -43,14 +43,11 @@ use axum::{
extract::{Extension, Path},
http::Request,
middleware::Next,
response::{IntoResponse, Response},
response::Response,
routing::get,
Json, Router,
};
use windmill_common::{
auth::hash_token, db::GatewayWorkspaceId, error::JsonResult,
global_settings::MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM,
};
use windmill_common::{auth::hash_token, db::GatewayWorkspaceId, error::JsonResult};
// McpAuth impl for ApiAuthed is in windmill-api-auth (same crate as the type)
@@ -449,29 +446,6 @@ pub async fn add_www_authenticate_header(
}
}
/// Middleware refusing a credential carried in the MCP URL once the instance sets
/// `mcp_disable_token_query_param`. Sits outside everything that reads the token, so neither
/// the gateway lookup nor `ApiAuthed` ever sees it, and inside the `WWW-Authenticate` layer,
/// whose header is what sends the client into the OAuth flow instead. Refused rather than
/// ignored: the URL leaked the token whether or not the request used it.
pub async fn reject_token_query_param(request: Request<axum::body::Body>, next: Next) -> Response {
let carries_token = MCP_DISABLE_TOKEN_QUERY_PARAM.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed)
&& request
.uri()
.query()
.is_some_and(|q| url::form_urlencoded::parse(q.as_bytes()).any(|(k, _)| k == "token"));
if carries_token {
return (
axum::http::StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
"This instance does not accept a token in the MCP URL. Remove the token query \
parameter and let your client sign in through OAuth, or send the token in an \
Authorization header.",
)
.into_response();
}
next.run(request).await
}
/// Extract the bearer token from either the `Authorization` header or the
/// `?token=` query parameter (MCP clients commonly pass it in the URL).
fn extract_gateway_token(request: &Request<axum::body::Body>) -> Option<String> {

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