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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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  Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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1f661f5816 |
chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands
Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist. The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb |
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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397116926f |
fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry
The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix". Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb |
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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7b01f35c3b |
fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it
`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation. The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under the default. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR |
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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41ea76f806 |
fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it
`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose. Naming a role exists precisely to not do that. A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a `datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments. Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR |
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Diego Imbert
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b3448d0111 | fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix | ||
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Diego Imbert
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f41aa85226 | nit worker error msg | ||
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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9c2dbe423f |
fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data
A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed — and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one. Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR |
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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e3a2f92c47 |
fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles
pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role. The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing. Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR |
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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31292ef9f2 |
fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically
The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call `/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant". The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that. Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR |
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Diego Imbert
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33aef570ab | Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/datatable-roles-redesign' into datatable-roles-redesign | ||
 Diego Imbert
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0a7fa38926 | Merge branch 'main' into datatable-roles-redesign | ||
 Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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d23da87c16 |
chore(cli): restore module mocks so they stop leaking into later test files
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SoXmLSb53SU8jfCMANugoY |
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Diego Imbert
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aaf234a4af | Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/datatable-roles-redesign' into datatable-roles-redesign | ||
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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0b37226078 |
fix: chain redeploys onto a retired path's version history (#11029)
* fix: chain auto_parent onto the archived lineage tip at a path Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GoTAmRTjG2KAH4g4mco6T5 * fix: check descendants unscoped and drop the hash-guard move Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GoTAmRTjG2KAH4g4mco6T5 * fix: widen retired-path adoption, lock it, drop inherited grants Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KMhCSFeWSezY61g6woQiz2 * fix: check lineage linearity unscoped, under the parent lock Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GoTAmRTjG2KAH4g4mco6T5 * fix: do not name a lineage conflict the caller cannot read Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GoTAmRTjG2KAH4g4mco6T5 --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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67091eec69 |
fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks
Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved. A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state. Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once from what it named before the save. The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named, with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal. Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint. Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR |
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Diego Imbert
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2ef865c774 | Merge branch 'main' into datatable-roles-redesign | ||
 hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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448fce93f7 |
fix: make the native trigger disable/enable toggle actually save (#11024)
* feat: let a native trigger be disabled without deleting it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: show and control the native trigger pause outside the flow editor Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: create a native trigger already paused instead of pausing it after Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: correct the native trigger enabled comments for create-time init Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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785277e0bb |
feat(nativets): bound fetch on a peer that never answers (#11026)
* feat(nativets): bound fetch on a peer that never answers
deno_fetch applies no deadline of any kind. A peer that completes the TCP
handshake, accepts the request and then goes silent leaves `await fetch(...)`
pending indefinitely, holding its worker slot until the *job* timeout -- which
on self-hosted defaults to DEFAULT_SELFHOSTED_TIMEOUT, i.e. 7 days.
Nothing else catches this. Zombie-job detection keys off a stale
v2_job_runtime.ping, and a worker blocked inside a pending fetch keeps pinging
normally throughout: the worker is alive and healthy, only the work is dead.
What this bounds is the wait for a response to begin, and it stops there:
- a peer that never answers -> rejected after N seconds
- a peer slow to answer, but under N -> unaffected
- a body that then streams for an hour,
or is read slowly by the caller -> unaffected, always
That last line rules out the obvious implementation: AbortSignal.timeout(N)
around every fetch would bound the hang and break every streaming response and
long download. This is a hang detector, not a latency budget.
Default 300s via WINDMILL_FETCH_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECS (0 disables), with a
per-script `//fetch_response_timeout <seconds>` annotation alongside the
existing //useragent and //proxy. Both nativets paths inherit it, since
eval_fetch_timeout and the dedicated-worker path in bun_executor both funnel
through create_nativets_runtime.
The ms value is clamped to i32::MAX: deno_web's setTimeout runs its delay
through webidl.converters.long, a 32-bit conversion that *wraps*, so a setting
past ~24.8 days would come out negative and fire immediately -- turning an
over-generous timeout into an instant one on every fetch.
The window covers connect, TLS and request upload as well as server think
time, so a very slow large upload is bounded by it too; the error message says
so rather than claiming the connection went silent.
Not covered: a body that stalls midway. Reaching that needs the response's
InnerBody, which deno_fetch keeps module-private, and every way to wrap it
from outside changes observable Response semantics (locking, bodyUsed,
double-consume errors). Left for a follow-up in deno_fetch itself.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JshNT5XVH78ZsTMvDWfFHb
* test(nativets): cover the instance-wide response-timeout env var
A typo in WINDMILL_FETCH_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT_SECS would compile, pass every
other test, and silently hand every operator the 300s default -- the same
class of silent-default failure the timeout itself exists to prevent. Its
own test binary, since a LazyLock resolves the value once per process.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JshNT5XVH78ZsTMvDWfFHb
* fix(nativets): inherit the caller's RequestInit, and clear the long-poll ceiling
Two problems with the first cut, both found in review.
`{ ...init, signal }` copied only own enumerable properties, but RequestInit is
a WebIDL dictionary whose members deno_fetch reads with plain property gets
that walk the prototype chain. Anything inherited or non-enumerable was
dropped: `fetch(url, Object.create({method: "POST"}))` silently became a GET.
Worse, a non-object init went from a loud TypeError to a silent GET, because
spreading "POST" yields {0:"P",1:"O",...} -- a valid dictionary with ignored
keys. Now the init is inherited from rather than copied, and a non-dictionary
is handed straight back to deno_fetch for its own TypeError.
The 300s default also sat at half of TIMEOUT_WAIT_RESULT (600s), which
run_wait_result long-polls against with no response headers. A script running
another job synchronously for 300-600s would have timed out client-side while
the server was still legitimately holding the request open -- the long-poll
risk class, instantiated inside the product and reachable without writing a
raw fetch. Default raised to 900s, with the constraint recorded where someone
would break it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JshNT5XVH78ZsTMvDWfFHb
* fix(nativets): hand the caller's RequestInit to Request untouched
Carrying a WebIDL dictionary across by hand has no safe form, and both
previous attempts were wrong in opposite directions. Spreading a copy drops
inherited and non-enumerable members, and turns a non-object init from a loud
TypeError into a silent GET. Inheriting from it via Object.create fixes those
but makes the child the receiver, so an accessor on the original runs against
an object that lacks its private-field brand:
Cannot read private member #body from an object whose class did not
declare it
So don't carry it at all. fetch()'s own first act is `new Request(input,
init)`; doing that here hands the init to the same constructor, read exactly
as it would be without this wrapper, and our signal travels in an init we own.
`req.signal` is then deno's own resolution of init.signal over an input
Request's signal, which removes the hand-rolled version of that rule too.
The Request is built twice as a result, once here and once inside fetch. That
is cheap: cloneInnerRequest carries method, headers, redirect mode, clientRid
and blob entry, and a body is proxied rather than buffered -- a static body is
a shallow {body, consumed} copy sharing its bytes, a stream gets a one-chunk
pass-through.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JshNT5XVH78ZsTMvDWfFHb
* fix(nativets): keep an aborted fetch settling in the same tick
deno_fetch keeps its outer fetch non-async on purpose: "WPT has a test that
aborted fetch is settled in the same tick. This means we cannot wrap the
promise if it is already settled" (26_fetch.js). An `async` wrapper adopts
that promise through another one, so a rejection that used to land before any
microtask queued after the call now lands after it.
Made the wrapper non-async, with an early return that hands deno's settled
rejection straight back for an already-aborted signal, and no timer armed
there since there is no response to wait for. Construction still has to reject
rather than throw, so it is caught and returned as a rejection, which is what
the `async` was buying.
The comment claiming this matched deno_fetch's own `async function fetch` was
wrong on two counts -- that function is not async, and the wrapper was not
matching it. Replaced with the constraint that actually holds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JshNT5XVH78ZsTMvDWfFHb
* fix(nativets): keep fetch's observable shape and reach intrinsics safely
Three ways the wrapper was distinguishable from the fetch it replaces, all
observable from a script sharing the isolate.
`.then` was an ordinary property lookup, so `Promise.prototype.then =
undefined` broke fetch after the request had already gone out. deno's own
modules reach intrinsics through primordials, and this file already captured
setTimeout, clearTimeout and Promise.reject for exactly that reason, so the
lookup was the odd one out. Now captured alongside them.
Declaring `init` without a default made `fetch.length` 2 where the standard
says 1. And the empty-call branch forwarded two explicit `undefined`s, so
deno's required-argument check saw two arguments and raised "Invalid URL:
'undefined'" instead of "1 argument required". Forwarding through
ReflectApply preserves the count.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JshNT5XVH78ZsTMvDWfFHb
* docs: clarify fetch timeout restart requirements
* fix: capture native fetch abort helpers
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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bc78383c74 |
refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings
Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.
The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.
One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.
Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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30803e4e5a |
fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing
The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own `global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles` and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a consequence of this change. Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing: A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step, and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose. Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction. Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which workspace is gone. Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed); the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog` was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR |
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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035897b9b9 |
fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced
The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names. Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot". The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it. `read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while `set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions` — it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR |
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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0c16d3a91c |
fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery
Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways. The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either. Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every login it described. `custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret, written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape: `datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist. No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to take it out. Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And `set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings row across validation and write. Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish: `read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and `converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's. Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but `extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR |
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Ruben Fiszel
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946756ae83 |
perf: reduce shared worker debug polling frames (#11028)
* fix: reduce php parser stack use in debug workers * test: document php stack regression expression depth * fix: offload php signature parsing from async workers * fix: address php parser review nits * perf: reduce shared worker debug polling frames * test: refresh agent volume fixtures |
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Ruben Fiszel
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2cb02e3b33 |
fix: offload php signature parsing from async workers (#11027)
* fix: reduce php parser stack use in debug workers * test: document php stack regression expression depth * fix: offload php signature parsing from async workers * fix: address php parser review nits |
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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b2479e87fa |
fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract
The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them. Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway. The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and `converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at the definition, which is where the next caller looks. Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and `resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker. Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a `StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now said at the field. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR |
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Ruben Fiszel
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2ae8509b14 |
fix: reduce php parser stack use in debug workers (#11025)
* fix: reduce php parser stack use in debug workers * test: document php stack regression expression depth |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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de98adf055 |
feat: let a worker group override the dependency cache object store (#11019)
* feat: let a worker group override the dependency cache object store Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01R6hBAWqNUsQMAJ7P59juug * fix: address review findings on the worker-group cache override Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01R6hBAWqNUsQMAJ7P59juug * fix: close the remaining config read route and re-evaluate the override on plan change Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01R6hBAWqNUsQMAJ7P59juug * fix: serialize override reloads and keep a store a failed rebuild still serves Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01R6hBAWqNUsQMAJ7P59juug * fix: require enterprise for the cache override and lock its whole transition Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01R6hBAWqNUsQMAJ7P59juug --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Diego Imbert
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0f557ad408 |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into datatable-roles-redesign
# Conflicts: # backend/ee-repo-ref.txt |
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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f0ae50becf |
fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code
The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence. `list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the check runs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR |
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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8421579133 |
fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded
Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo.
Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an
`UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a
live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because
the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so
the operation is retryable once the row is restored.
Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are
left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy
would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it
stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table
this workspace never had.
`InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now
hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line.
Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the
governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that
predates this and sends no job id.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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f081fb1070 |
feat: recognize // volume: mounts in PHP scripts (#11018)
* feat: recognize `// volume:` mounts in PHP scripts Volume annotations were parsed for every language but PHP, so a PHP script could not mount a workspace volume. Two things stood in the way: PHP had no entry in the comment-prefix maps, and a PHP script opens with `<?php`, which ends the leading comment block the parsers scan before any annotation is read. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T3FR7iS9nRhpFt615cnuQ7 * fix: tolerate a PHP opener that carries code, drop the inert CLI hunk The open-tag skip matched `<?php` exactly, so `<?php declare(strict_types=1);` still ended the leading comment block and every annotation below it was silently ignored. Match the tag as a case-insensitive prefix and skip the whole line. The CLI local-graph hunk could never fire: PHP has no wasm asset parser, so `fallbackParse` handles it, and its own header scan stops at `<?php` — the script is dropped as a non-pipeline-member before any volume asset is read. Making only the CLI PHP-aware would also put the local graph out of parity with the deployed one, whose `parse_pipeline_annotations` stops there too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T3FR7iS9nRhpFt615cnuQ7 * docs: correct the CLI mirror comment, state the own-line annotation rule Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01T3FR7iS9nRhpFt615cnuQ7 --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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6a97f67713 |
fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping
A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and `CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read. Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it calls a data table changes nothing about the data table. Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR |
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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0ec1cb2bdd |
fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin
Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant. All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the only right answer for the copy paths. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR |
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Diego ImbertandClaude Opus 5
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c5446a7a26 |
feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles
A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection, `custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table. A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares `-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch — grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`. A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before. Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint, `get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could `RESET ROLE` its way out of. A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not where an access decision should be made. Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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3e3a41d418 |
feat: report a WAC task failure the workflow body never awaited (#11017)
* feat: warn when a WAC task fails and the body never awaited it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q6FHYvk7z4eGvhZXKZB9JF * fix: report unawaited WAC failures on the failing round and in stream order Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q6FHYvk7z4eGvhZXKZB9JF * docs: state the WAC warn-placement invariant where the wrapper enforces it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q6FHYvk7z4eGvhZXKZB9JF --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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9444049d60 |
feat: bring gitlab repositories to parity for git sync (#10938)
* feat: track and rotate gitlab git-sync repository tokens * chore: point ee-repo-ref at the gitlab credential branch * fix: strip server-owned credential status and correct expiry copy * fix: gate credential maintenance on enterprise and alert on stalled renewal * fix: alert on an auto-renewed token only once it has actually expired * feat: receive gitlab push webhooks for instant git sync pull * feat: open gitlab merge requests and post diff previews on them Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * fix: keep gitlab merge request previews out of the project's own pipeline Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * fix: bound the credential maintenance pass and gate the gitlab picker on a license Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * fix: create the gitlab picker's variable in the edited workspace Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * fix: make the gitlab picker's variable path collision-resistant Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * docs: state the gitlab scope and rotation facts the code relies on Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * fix: resolve the check marker's repository from its path, not a stored url Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * fix: refuse to finish a check whose repository has been repointed Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * fix: trust a check marker's captured url when it carries no identity Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * fix: recreate a missing webhook from credential maintenance Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * docs: state that relative-url gitlab installs are out of scope Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * fix: keep credential status out of exports and clear stale webhook warnings Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * fix: refuse an unprovable check and guard the picker on the stored repository Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * fix: re-check the picker's target path at the moment it is written Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * fix: snapshot the picker's inputs before it starts writing Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * docs: recommend a project access token per repository Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * [ee] feat: keep the git-sync credential in workspace settings * [ee] fix: drop a removed repo's credential and honor the workspace override * [ee] fix: resolve a fork's git credential from its whole ancestry * [ee] refactor: reuse fork_ancestor_chain instead of a second ancestry walk * [ee] fix: resolve an app installation from the whole ancestry, not the parent * [ee] revert: keep the app installation fallback at one level * fix: store the git credential only once the resource is saved * fix: keep a repository's credential when it leaves git sync settings * docs: cut the gitlab picker's token guidance down to what it needs * feat: mark a repository whose credential windmill holds * fix: ignore the managed-credential marker when the url carries a token * docs: drop the picker's setup alert for a line by the token field * feat: replace a repository's stored token from its resource * fix: store a picked credential for its own workspace, before the resource * refactor: key a stored git credential by its repository, not its resource Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * chore: refresh the sqlx cache for the repository-keyed credential queries Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * fix: gate the credential pass budget on the features that use it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * fix: decide credential rotation ownership by repository, not resource path Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * refactor: renew only the credentials windmill holds, not tokens in a repo url Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * fix: authenticate the fork-branch poll and correct the renewal guidance Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * fix: do not claim a managed credential for a url the client cannot resolve Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * fix: define the credential facade for private builds without enterprise Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * fix: pin the listed token before the await and name the real renewal blocker Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * fix: pin the token the replace flow checked, and derive the scope test once Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * fix: classify the renewal state once so the card cannot contradict itself Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * refactor: ask only whether the token gets renewed, not why it does not Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * refactor: replace the managed-credential marker with a server answer Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * fix: read renewal from the credential and its origin, not a removed field Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * fix: read the provider for url-token repos, await the origin before defaulting, and visit unchecked repos last The maintenance pass sorted repositories with no recorded check first on the premise that they cost nothing, but a token-in-URL remote on a host that is not GitLab is probed every pass and never records a check, so it held the head of the list ahead of the tokens that expire. Such repositories now sort last. The card decided its delivery defaults before the origin lookup landed, so a freshly picked GitLab repository never got webhook delivery; the two lookups are awaited together. The resource editor offers to replace a token only where it is held, not in a fork that borrows it, and the replace flow refuses a URL it cannot parse instead of keying the token to it. Attaching a stored credential to a commit-hash probe now requires admin, matching the installation credential beside it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * docs: describe the gitlab listing token the way the picker and the setup guide do Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * refactor: a token in the repository url is a plain remote, not a tracked credential Drops the status fingerprint that told one URL token from another, the docs' promise that such a token's expiry is reported, and the test's expectation that a URL-token repository declares a host. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * fix: the card reads the credential origin for managed controls and honours the licence for a borrowed token Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * chore: bump the ee ref Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * fix: hide a repository's credential line once nothing is held for the repository it names Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * docs: describe the exported credential status as it is Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * refactor: run the credential maintenance pass as its own task, without a budget The pass ran inside the monitor's join, whose deadline cancels every future in it, and a rotation cancelled between GitLab issuing a token and Windmill storing it loses the token family. A wall-clock budget with a least-recently-checked ordering kept it under the deadline. Spawning the pass instead makes the deadline irrelevant, so the budget, the ordering and the counter go; the advisory lock keeps a slow pass from overlapping the next, as it already did. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * docs: say what detaching the maintenance pass buys, and what it does not Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * chore: run git sync on the hub script version that reads a stored credential Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * chore: run the deploy push and the connection test on the hub versions that read a stored credential Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * fix: keep App repositories and plain remotes out of the stored-credential paths Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * chore: host-neutral deploy preview wording, drop the project filter from the GitLab picker Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * chore: bump ee ref, rotation no longer retains a second connection per repository Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * chore: bump ee ref, the rotation write-back holds a single connection Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * chore: hold the credential maintenance lock in a transaction so a dead sweep releases it Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * docs: describe the credential-stored callback as it fires Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * fix: keep the credential maintenance lock past the pool's idle-in-transaction timeout Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01C1xHmkxuxYb1GYvth1BS75 * chore: update ee-repo-ref to e092518ee60e33160fee9ae91a4d109566f7b0ee This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #771 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 74481f7cc345757aebb2a8b04d3a22978328c348 New ee-repo-ref: e092518ee60e33160fee9ae91a4d109566f7b0ee Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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6860521b4e |
refresh a dbt column trace with its graph, and stop calling whole ones cut (#11015)
* fix: refresh a dbt column trace with its graph, and stop calling whole ones cut Follow-up to #11014, addressing two findings from the review round that landed after it merged. **A deliberate graph refresh now re-asks for the lineage.** The dedup key held only the workspace, the pin and the seed relations, all of which a redeploy leaves alone — so the pipeline page's Refresh refetched the graph and left the trace as it was, pairing the new version's SQL and columns with the previous one's edges. The key now carries which fetch of the graph is on screen, taken from `graphRes.current`'s identity: it moves on a Refresh, a deploy and a folder switch, and on nothing else, so an editor keystroke still cannot make the pane re-ask. **`truncated` is set only with evidence.** `pending` was read as proof the component had been cut, but it only says a relation's owners have not been asked about yet — and those owners are usually the project already in hand. A project holding more than the expansion budget across unrelated families therefore reported a small, complete component as truncated. The owners query now runs before the budget and round stops, so a trace is called cut only when a project this caller may read is left unread, or when the walk itself was cut. Two smaller things from the same round: a failed lineage request says so instead of rendering the empty trace a project without the analysis pass renders — the two were indistinguishable, and a Refresh now retries it — and `asset_paths` is capped as well as refused when empty. `MAX_HELD_EDGES` is renamed `EXPANSION_EDGE_BUDGET`: it never bounded what its name claimed, since the seeds' own projects are read whole whatever their size. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NY4kuFy2jAnGEzaCc1CseL * fix: show a failed column-lineage request beside a partial trace, not only instead of one Review-round findings on this PR. The failure line only rendered when the trace had no nodes at all. A ducklake selection whose producers declare column lineage has nodes from the graph the canvas already carries, so a failed dbt request left a trace that rendered and was missing a half — which is the reading the line exists to prevent. It now renders beside a drawn trace as well, and says the trace may be incomplete rather than that nothing loaded. The dbt branch of the details pane also opened on `selectionColumnLoading` but not on the failed state, so a relation with neither SQL nor a column schema fell through to "no inline preview" and the line never rendered at all. Dropped "Refresh to try again": the dbt editor has no Refresh for this, and its recovery is a re-parse or reselecting. The comment on the error handler says both paths again rather than only the one the pipeline page uses. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NY4kuFy2jAnGEzaCc1CseL * fix: clear a column-lineage failure when the next request goes out Round-2 nits, both reviewers on the same state. `failed` was cleared only when an answer landed, so a retry kept saying the trace may be incomplete while it was being fetched, and a new selection inherited the previous one's failure until its own answer arrived. It is cleared as the request goes out instead. Also documents the bounds on `asset_path` in the two routes that take it: the 1000-relation cap and the at-least-one rule were both enforced and neither was written down, so a caller met them as a 400 with no way to have known. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NY4kuFy2jAnGEzaCc1CseL --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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d3f305db98 |
feat: retry a workflow-as-code task from its task options (#11013)
* feat: retry a workflow-as-code task from its task options Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WvjgKMRNtRNPnAkg6MkiTA * fix: claim every retry attempt key up front, so a step cannot alias one Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WvjgKMRNtRNPnAkg6MkiTA * fix: bound retry attempts, which now claim their keys up front Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WvjgKMRNtRNPnAkg6MkiTA * fix: honour an explicit zero retry multiplier in the python client Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WvjgKMRNtRNPnAkg6MkiTA * docs: state the retry validation rules once in the task docstring Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WvjgKMRNtRNPnAkg6MkiTA --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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33f9828c3e |
feat: draw a dbt column trace, across projects and the pipeline boundary (#11014)
Serves the edges `dbt_column_edge` has been storing. `assets/column_lineage`
answers the connected component a set of relations' columns sit in, and the
details pane draws it beside the model's SQL — in the dbt editor, on the
pipeline page, and for a run through `jobs/dbt_column_lineage/{id}`.
The unpinned component crosses projects. A relation one project produces is
another's source, so resolving owners once — for the relations asked about —
stops the trace at the first boundary. Owners are resolved to a fixpoint
instead, and the caller's gate is re-applied to every project the expansion
discovers: reaching a relation says nothing about who may read the project on
the far side of it. A pinned answer needs none of it, by version or by job: the
pin says which stored graph is on screen, and another project's live graph is
not part of it.
One request per selection, whatever it reaches: the endpoint takes every
relation at once and answers their union, so nothing is held between selections
and there is no staleness, retry bookkeeping or per-click dedup to balance.
The answer is bounded. A synthetic 3000-model project whose models share a
column has 58k direct edges and returns 7.3MB, which no column diagram can draw;
the walk is breadth-first from the asked-for relations and stops at 5000 edges,
so what survives is the part nearest the selection, and `truncated` says the
trace was cut rather than ended.
Also adds the columns section the pipeline page's asset pane was missing, so
`column_schema` is visible there and not only in the dbt editor.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NY4kuFy2jAnGEzaCc1CseL
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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0139467b01 |
feat: ingest dbt column lineage and real column schemas from the engine's parquet index (#10977)
* feat: column-level lineage for dbt from the engine's parquet index `manifest.json` carries no column-to-column edges, which is why decision 14 recorded column lineage as unavailable. The edges live in a different artifact: `dbt compile --static-analysis strict --write-index` writes `target/index/`, whose `dbt.column_lineage.parquet` holds them and whose `dbt.node_columns.parquet` holds every column of every node, typed and ordered rather than only the ones an author documented. Strict analysis rejects SQL the default accepts, so this is a separate compile with its own `--target-path`, opt-in per project via `column_lineage: true`, and best-effort throughout: a project it cannot analyze keeps exactly the graph it had, with the engine's own diagnostics in the job log. Storage mirrors `dbt_edge`: `dbt_column_edge` keyed by (path, version, job) with the same composite FK to `script` and the same sweeps. The typed column list lands in `dbt_node.column_schema`, beside `columns` rather than merged into it, so `columns` stays what the author declared. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PRtsPQ3Ck69Fu9DNr7bMcJ * fix: address review findings on the dbt column-lineage pass - The workspace fork copied every other dbt sidecar table and not this one, so a fork lost its column lineage silently and could not recover it: the cloned digest covers the column edges, so a dynamic run in the fork matched it and stored nothing. - The parquet was collected whole before the edge cap applied, which is exactly the input the cap exists for — a project whose `scan` lineage is quadratic in its widest model could take the worker process down. Decoded a row at a time with the bound enforced during the decode. - The pass swallowed every error from the runner, including the job poller's cancellation and deadline, so a run that blew its timeout inside an optional annotation could still publish a graph and report success. `run_captured` now carries the exit status in its value, so only a failed COMPILE is downgraded, and the pass may spend at most half the remaining wall clock so it cannot starve the build that follows it. - `scan` edges are stored but no longer served: they are most of a project's lineage, nothing renders them, and the graph endpoint is polled by the run page. They are also the first thing the storage cap gives up now, rather than evicting the direct edges the trace draws. - `column_schema` and the column edges take the same gate as the model's SQL. A column-level view is the shape of what the author wrote, one level finer than the `ref()` graph, which is ungated only because it draws relations the caller already sees. - `graph_digest` hashes the new section only when it has edges, so a project that never asked for the pass keeps the digest it has instead of re-snapshotting on every dynamic run until it is redeployed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PRtsPQ3Ck69Fu9DNr7bMcJ * fix: the editor buffer's column lineage, and three bounds that were wrong Round-2 review found four defects, all of them introduced by the round-1 fixes. - The `script_visible` gate on the column edges was copied from the node query without its `script_hash IS NULL` arm. `= NULL` is never true, so every version-less row was filtered out and an editor buffer's parse rendered its typed columns and none of their lineage — the one place the feature is meant to be used. Pinned by an assertion in `dbt_pinned_graph.rs`, which is where this class of bug already had a home. - The phase budget was handed to the poller, whose expiry is an `Err` indistinguishable from a cancellation or the job's own deadline, so a slow but valid analysis aborted the build it exists to annotate. The runner gets the full deadline again — those two must still fail the job — and the budget is a race around the whole pass, where expiring is this budget and nothing else. - The decode cap counted parquet ROWS, so `scan` and out-of-graph rows could spend it before a single drawn edge was read. It now counts what is kept, takes direct kinds in a first pass, and is handed the graph's own nodes so the budget cannot go on rows that could never be stored. - Hashing the new digest section conditionally did not preserve old digests, because an absent `column_schema` still serialized as `null` inside the nodes. It is skipped when absent instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PRtsPQ3Ck69Fu9DNr7bMcJ * refactor: split the lineage pass by error contract, and read it in one query Round 3's findings were all consequences of round 1 and 2's fixes, clustered in the same two files, so this reshapes those two seams rather than patching again. The worker pass was one function being three things at once — a subprocess runner with job-lifecycle error semantics, a bounded decoder, and a best-effort degrader — which is why each fix to one perturbed another. It is now `compile_index`, which owns the JOB's semantics (only a cancellation or the job's deadline can `Err`; a non-zero exit, the output ceiling and the phase budget are outcomes), and `read_index`, which owns the ARTIFACT's and knows nothing about the job. The budget wraps the compile alone, so a decode can no longer outlive the timeout that reported the build would get the rest. The output ceiling likewise becomes a value rather than a job error, for the caller that can carry on without the tail of a compile's stdout. The column edges were read by a fourth hand-written copy of the `live`/`chosen` CTEs and the version/editor-buffer join conditions, and copying them is what dropped the `script_hash IS NULL` arm and hid every buffer parse's lineage. Both kinds of edge now come from ONE statement over a `UNION ALL`'d edge source, so those conditions exist once. The union is at the source rather than a join because column lineage can name a node pair `dbt_edge` has no row for: a model reading `{{ this }}` gets edges from itself to itself, and `parent_map` has no self-loop. The cap on the column half now sits after the scope filter, the visibility check and the graph joins — the scope moved into SQL via the existing `ScopePathFilter` — so a row the caller may not read can no longer spend it and leave an allowed project's trace short. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PRtsPQ3Ck69Fu9DNr7bMcJ * refactor: serve dbt column lineage from its own endpoint The column edges rode on the folder-wide asset graph, which a run page polls, while the trace is drawn for one selected relation. That needed a cap, and a cap has to be applied after every filter that can drop a row. Keyed to the asset there is no cap: `assets/column_lineage` answers for one relation, and the caller's `scripts:read` scope and the project's visibility are decided once, for the script that owns it. Pinning to a run's snapshot or the editor's parse of its buffer costs the job-read gate, so that form is `jobs/dbt_column_lineage/{id}` — the same shape `jobs/dbt_graph/{id}` has. The worker's decode now bounds work and memory separately, and a compile stopped by the output ceiling reports as truncated rather than complete. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: resolve the owning dbt version the way the graph does The unpinned arm picked the newest live version at the path without narrowing to dbt, so a path since redeployed in another language answered with no lineage while the graph beside it still drew that project's stale nodes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: gate pinned column lineage on reading the project, and answer the component Four things round 5 found, three of them in code this branch rewrote: - The pinned arm resolved the version from the job and stopped there, so a share-link viewer entitled to a run got the project's column names and edges while the graph beside it still redacted `raw_code` and `column_schema`. Resolving WHICH version answers is not deciding whether the caller may read it; the version-less editor buffer keeps its exemption, having no `script` row to ask. - The answer was the whole owning project's edges. The canvas lays out the connected component of the selected relation's columns, so the rest was unrenderable weight; a recursive walk over both directions returns exactly what is drawn, and the project key travels with it so a `unique_id` two projects share cannot walk from one graph into the other. - The decode had no exit but the 4M-row backstop once its buckets were full, spending wall clock the build below does not get. - An unreadable index was reported as a missing one, sending the reader to look at their engine rather than at the file. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: stitch the two column graphs, and walk the component in Rust Round 6's two findings, both regressions this branch introduced: - The decode returned `Continue` on the edge that FILLED the direct-edge budget, so a `scan`-only tail after it decoded to the 4M-row backstop with nowhere to put anything. The read now ends on that edge. - Seam 3 made the pipeline page choose between the dbt graph and the producer one. They share node ids — `// column total <- dbt://wh/analytics/orders.amount` mints the same `(dbt, path, column)` node dbt's own lineage does — so choosing ended a trace at the boundary in both directions. They are merged again, and a ducklake selection asks about the dbt relation its producers name so the chain continues past it. The dbt editor gets the same merge. Also: the component is walked in Rust rather than by a recursive CTE. A CTE has no index, so the recursive term rescanned the doubled edge set once per level — 1243ms against 59ms for the query alone on a 3000-model project, 11.7M rows in the plan. Same answers, same tests; end to end 1.48s to 0.73s there and 1.60s to 0.26s on a 1000-deep chain. The client stops re-asking for a component it already holds, which is most clicks within one project. The four doc sites that described a whole-project answer are rewritten around what it now is, rather than edited where they disagreed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: expand every dbt boundary a selection reaches, and only skip what was asked Round 7's findings, all in the frontend seam this branch added: - A ducklake selection seeded the dbt fetch from the FIRST boundary relation it found, so a table derived from two unconnected dbt relations expanded one and left the other a leaf — the same "stops at the boundary" symptom the round-6 fix removed, one hop further along. Every distinct boundary is fetched now and the components merged. - The component cache skipped a relation merely PRESENT in the graph in hand. A relation two projects describe has an owner row in each, and a component fetched for one carries it as an endpoint without the other's half, so that skipped the request that would have resolved the second owner. Only a relation actually asked about under this pin is skipped. - A comment still called the producer graph gated to ducklake selections after it was widened to dbt. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: land dbt column lineage as storage and ingest only The API surface that draws a column trace moves to a follow-up PR, on `dbt-column-lineage-surface`. It kept generating findings — a client cache whose premise was wrong for a two-owner relation, then staleness and a lost retry from tightening it, and a seed walk that stopped at the first boundary — and the fix for the last of them is a transitive owner expansion, which has to re-apply the caller's gate to every newly discovered project. That is the same shape as the leak four reviewers caught in the pinned arm, and it wants its own review rather than being the fourth fix at the end of this one. What lands here stands on its own: the analysis pass, `dbt_column_edge`, `dbt_node.column_schema`, the engine gating and the error-contract split — plus the one user-visible half, the typed and ordered column list, which rides the asset graph the details pane already fetches and replaces a panel that could only show the columns an author had documented. Also fixes a real bug in the pass, found in review: it compiled without the build's `--full-refresh`. `is_incremental()` branches on that flag, so an incremental model reading `{{ this }}` compiles its self-join — and any `ref()` inside that branch — only when the flag is absent, and the pass was storing lineage for SQL a full-refresh run never executed. The flag now comes from one place shared with the build, and a run that overrides it gets its own graph rather than standing as the version's. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: say why direct kinds get the budget without naming a view The bucketing comments explained the priority by what a trace draws, which is a forward reference now that the surface moved out. The reason stands on its own: `copy`/`mod` say the value travelled, `scan` says the column was read to produce the row and so reaches every output column of its model. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: round-9 findings on the descoped PR - The `full_refresh` helper was inserted between `selection_is_overridden` and its doc comment, so thirteen lines about `select`/`exclude` echoes documented the wrong function and the one they were written for had none. Moved below it. - The parse path ran the analysis compile and the parquet decode BEFORE the guard that returns when there is no warehouse identity, paying for both and dropping the result. Moved after it. - Three sites still described a `/column_lineage` endpoint this branch no longer has, and two user-facing strings promised a column trace it no longer renders: the panel's hint and the descriptor template now say what the flag actually buys, which is the typed column schema. - Dropped test scaffolding the removed suite left behind: a `raw_orders` node and `dbt_edge` whose only assertion re-tested pre-existing graph behaviour, and a second editor-buffer node nothing asserts on. Documented rather than fixed: an incremental model has two shapes, and which one the index holds depends on whether the target existed when the pass ran. `is_incremental()` is false with no target as well as under `--full-refresh`, and dbt has no mode that emits both — so a version's graph describes the compile that produced it, and only a re-ingesting run describes its own run. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep lineage_kind in the edge key, and one answer for --full-refresh - Both unique indexes omitted `lineage_kind`, so a column that is projected AND used as a predicate for the same output column — an ordinary shape — had its `copy` and `scan` edges collapse under `ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING`, while the digest counted both. The kind is part of the fact, so it is part of the key. Edited in the migration rather than added as a second one: it has not landed. - `full_refresh` was shared between the build and the analysis pass without the `command != "test"` condition that sat at the build's call site, so the two disagreed for exactly the runs that build nothing. The condition moved inside the function, which is the point of sharing it, and the command is threaded to the pass. - The "what a trace draws" rewrite missed the copy in `dbt_manifest.rs`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: drop the unreachable full_refresh threading, test the uniqueness key `DBT_COMMANDS` is `["build", "retry", "show", "parse"]` and `default_command` returns `build` in every arm, so `command == "test"` cannot happen — the guard the last commit moved into `full_refresh` was already inert where it came from. Threading the command through five signatures to preserve it bought nothing, so it is gone; the build and the pass call one function of the descriptor and the invocation, which is what the sharing was for. The uniqueness-key fix now has a test: a column projected AND used as a predicate for the same output column stores both its `copy` and its `scan` row. Verified against the old key, where it returns 1 instead of 2. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: restore the dbt test --full-refresh guard I removed on a wrong premise The previous commit removed it after reading `DBT_COMMANDS` and concluding `"test"` was unreachable. That is only true of the command a CALLER can name: `run_dbt` is invoked with `"test"` directly for the `after_all` test phase, so an `after_all` project with `full_refresh: true` reached it — and dbt rejects `--full-refresh` on `test`, failing the phase. Both reviewers caught it. The guard is back inside the shared function, where the build and the pass get one answer, and its doc now records why reading the allowlist alone is misleading. The test covering the `test` case is restored with it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: notice a job that ended during the decode, and name truncation as the cause - The parquet decode runs on a blocking thread with no poller watching it, so a cancellation or an expired deadline during it was invisible: `dbt_dep` went on to publish the graph and the job returned success. The job's state is checked once the decode returns, before the caller publishes anything, and an ended job `Err`s — which this module may always do for the job's own semantics. - A compile stopped by the output ceiling could leave no artifact, and the log then blamed the engine's capability, sending the reader to check their adapter rather than the ceiling. Truncation now names itself in the missing and unreadable branches too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: read cancellation from the DB after the decode, not from a poller's field `ctx.canceled_by` is only ever written by a poller, and no poller runs during the blocking decode — which is the exact window the check was added for. So the guard caught only a cancellation already observed before it, and the comment beside it claimed more than it did. It now queries `v2_job_queue` directly, the same probe `worker_lockfiles` uses before it overwrites a flow. A failed probe answers "still running": this decides whether to discard work already done, so an unreachable database must not be the reason a healthy deploy loses its graph. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: reuse job_is_canceled rather than a second copy of it The probe added last round was `job_is_canceled` from the same file, retyped — same query, same `Connection::Http` behaviour. Reused instead. Its doc said a non-database connection was "a failed probe", which reads as an error path. It is not: it is the agent worker, and on one there is no database to ask, so only the deadline answers and a cancel issued during the decode is not observable. The retry path avoids that by refusing to run on an agent worker at all — which an optional annotation has no business doing — so the gap is recorded at both ends instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: close the agent-worker cancellation gap instead of documenting it The previous commit said a cancel issued during the decode is not observable on an agent worker. It is: `ping_job_status` returns `canceled_by` over both connection kinds, and is how the poller itself notices one there. So the check asks through the ping rather than querying `v2_job_queue` directly, and holds on an agent worker, where a direct query reaches no database at all. `job_is_canceled` goes back to private and its doc to what it said before — the retry that calls it still refuses to run on an agent worker for its own reasons. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: decode the index under the job poller instead of checking after it Two findings with one cause: the decode was the only phase of this pass with no subprocess behind it, so nothing heartbeated while it ran. A large index left the worker silent for as long as it took, which the zombie sweep reads as a dead job and restarts — and the cancellation check bolted on afterwards could only ever report what had already happened, while dropping the ping's `already_completed`, so a force-cancelled deploy still published its graph. Running it under `run_future_with_polling_update_job_poller` answers all of it: the poller pings throughout, and ends the phase with an `Err` on cancellation, `AlreadyCompleted` or the phase timeout. The bespoke probe is gone with it. Verified on a live deploy: 32 edges and 4 typed schemas ingested through the polled decode. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: stop a cancelled decode, and say what the read phase can now do Putting the decode under the poller heartbeats it and ends the phase when the job does, but dropping a `JoinHandle` detaches a blocking task rather than cancelling it — so a cancelled job left a thread decoding up to four million rows for a job that was over. The row loop reads an abandonment flag that a drop guard on the awaiting future sets, so the decode stops at its next row. That same change made the read phase able to `Err`, and three places still said it could not — decision 14 in as many words. The distinction that holds is narrower: nothing the ARTIFACT does or fails to do can fail a job, so absent, unreadable and partial are all values; the JOB can still end the phase the read runs in. Stated that way in the module doc, the `Artifact` doc, `MAX_INDEX_ROWS` and the decision. Verified on a live deploy: 32 edges and 4 typed schemas. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: share AbortOnDrop, and stop citing a hazard that is now handled `Abandon` was `ansible_executor`'s `AbortOnDrop` retyped — same struct, same reason, same `spawn_blocking` shape. Moved to `common` and used from both. The paragraph explaining why the phase budget wraps the compile alone gave as its reason "a decode still running on a blocking thread", which is exactly what the abandonment flag now prevents. The reason that survives is the one that was always the point: the budget exists to leave the build its share of the clock, and only the compile can spend that share unboundedly. The decode's end is the job's, through the poller it runs under. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: put both doc comments back on the items they describe Moving AbortOnDrop orphaned a doc at each end: it landed between `raw_to_string`'s doc and `raw_to_string`, and the doc of the struct it replaced stayed behind to prefix `fetch_repo_archive`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: name the binding the row loop actually reads `Abandoned` was neither the type nor the binding; the flag is `abandoned`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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621fac55ab |
feat: durable dbt state per environment, and --defer onto it (#10975)
* feat: durable dbt state per environment, and `--defer` onto it `dbt retry` worked off two artifacts and only one was durable: `dbt_run_state` holds `run_results.json` keyed by principal, and the manifest lived on worker-local disk under a four-generation cache. That is enough to resume the last run and nothing else — the next run of a project usually lands on a worker holding neither artifact — so deferral had nothing to read. Adds `dbt_environment_state`: one row per (workspace, script path, environment), holding `manifest.json` and `run_results.json` from the last successful run, with the blob inline under `DBT_STATE_INLINE_MAX_BYTES` and in the workspace's object storage above it. Environment is the warehouse, the target, and the database and schema they resolve to, so a repointed warehouse or a moved schema reads as an environment nothing has published rather than as state whose relation names no longer fit. A run publishes it when its graph becomes what the script owns and it succeeded — the same condition, and the same reason: an invocation that scoped its own model set describes where the caller put those relations, not where the project's models live. `defer` is a `build` command-block field defaulting to the descriptor's own, and the state is materialised into the job directory for `--defer --state`. The retry path already did that materialisation for `dbt retry`; both go through one `write_state_dir` now. `--state` is also where `dbt retry` reads the run it resumes, so a retry on dbt-core 1.x takes `--defer-state` instead, and one on an engine without that flag is refused before the build rather than rebuilding its nodes with every unbuilt `ref()` resolving into the schema this run writes into. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ned2pmRJwB3GpenEcrA9TF * fix: address the local review of the dbt environment state The oversized-artifact home moves from the workspace's object storage to the instance's, where every other internal worker artifact already lives. The workspace bucket is the one members read and write through `job_helpers/*` with a caller-supplied key and only `volumes/` is reserved there, so a manifest under it is one any member could replace — and the next deferring run would hand dbt an attacker-chosen `defer_relation` for every unbuilt `ref()` while holding the script's warehouse credentials. The environment key takes the target dbt actually runs rather than the descriptor's `profile.target`, which is absent whenever the target is inherited from the workspace warehouse or the project's own `profiles.yml` — filing every inherited target under one empty name, while a `target.name` macro decides where a model is built. `write_profiles` returns a named struct now that it resolves one more thing. Publishing takes the row's lock before uploading, so two publishers of one environment cannot interleave their uploads and leave one run's manifest beside another's results, and carries the live-dbt-script guard the retry state already had, so a job finishing after its script was renamed, archived or deleted cannot recreate state at a path for whatever is created there next. A rename now clears the environment state instead of moving it: an oversized artifact's key is derived from the path, so a moved row would keep pointing at a key a script created at the old path publishes over. A build recovered by the automatic in-job node retry publishes its manifest without results — `run_results.json` is then the retry's, naming only the nodes it redid — and the refusal for an environment with nothing published names the runs that cannot publish rather than suggesting a run that would not help. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: serialize dbt state publishers on an advisory lock The row lock only serializes publishers once a row exists, and the first publish of an environment — two runs of a newly deployed script — is exactly when two of them are most likely to race and interleave their uploads. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: make dbt state publication atomic and bind it to the version that ran Every publication now writes its own object keys and the row switches to them in one statement, so an upload never overwrites an artifact the committed row still names: a run failing between its two uploads, or between them and its row, leaves the state pointing at the pair it already had. The objects a commit displaces are dropped afterwards — never before, since a reader that has already read the row is about to fetch them — and a reader that loses that race re-reads the row once rather than reporting a state that is there. What a publication uploaded and then could not commit is dropped on the way out. The write's guard names the VERSION rather than the path: the live dbt script there must be the one this job ran, or a later version of it. "Some live dbt script is here" is also satisfied by a script created at a path this one was renamed away from, and this job's manifest would then become that project's deferral state. A preview names no version and so publishes nothing. A `show` defers too. It compiles the model it previews, so a model whose upstream this environment built and this run did not is exactly the case a deferral exists for, and every engine takes the flags on it. Three comments said "the workspace's object storage" where the code deliberately uses the instance's, which is the whole security argument; `mib()` labelled MiB values MB. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: hold the script row across a dbt state publication, and let a rename move it The version guard read `script` without a lock, so lifecycle cleanup could find no environment row to clear, finish, and leave this transaction to commit state at a path a new script goes on to occupy. It now holds that row (`FOR SHARE`) for the rest of the publication — taken before the sidecar, the order every other dbt writer takes — and the artifacts are uploaded before the transaction, so the lock covers the row work rather than a network round trip. A commit that reports an error may still have committed: what was lost can be the acknowledgement. Dropping this run's objects then leaves the committed row naming objects that are gone, so an orphan is the cheaper side to take. A failed second upload left the manifest it had already written behind; it is dropped now. Per-publication keys retired the reason a rename cleared the environment state rather than moving it: the path is only a prefix, and the row is what names an artifact, so a script created at the old path can no longer publish over a moved row. The rename moves both halves again. `dbt ls` gets the deferral flags too, without which a `result:` selector — which reads `run_results.json` out of the state directory, and which `select` passes to dbt verbatim — fails before the build that would have honoured it. Also: the migration was the last site describing the workspace's object storage rather than the instance's, `publication_lock` folded 32 bits where it claimed 64, and `ResolvedProfile` had taken `write_profiles`'s doc block. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: a deferring dbt run never publishes the state it read `publishes_ownership` reads the CALLER's overrides, so a descriptor that already narrows `select` needs none and a run of it with `defer: true` published. A deferring run built some of the relations its manifest names and resolved the rest out of the state it read, so recording that manifest claims relations nothing built — and a model renamed since is recorded under a name only a full build creates, breaking every later deferral until one repairs it. Also: `publication_lock` parsed 16 hex digits as `i64`, which overflows for every digest with the top bit set — half of them — collapsing those environments onto one advisory key; and a failure to open the transaction returned without dropping the objects already uploaded. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: only a deployed dbt run publishes state, and key its objects per execution A preview carries a caller-supplied `script_hash` into `runnable_id` (`run_preview_script`), so the version guard alone let anyone who may run a job publish arbitrary content as a deployed script's deferral state. The job's KIND is checked beside it now. Verified: a preview submitted with the deployed path and hash builds and leaves the row untouched. Object keys carry a per-execution nonce. Zombie recovery re-runs a job under its own id, so keyed on that alone a second attempt overwrote the objects the first attempt's committed row still named, then read those same keys back as displaced and dropped them — leaving the row unreadable. The displaced set is also filtered against this publication's own keys, so the invariant is stated rather than re-derived from the key format. A project-owned `profiles.yml` that templates its schema or database is refused a deferral: dbt renders those and Windmill does not, so two renderings resolve to one `relation_root` and would share one environment key. Plainly absent is left alone — that is the adapter's default, which does not move. The deferral log line now says the run publishes no state of its own, which was otherwise invisible. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: a templated profile location publishes no dbt state either, on every path A `dbt_profile` resource is one block of the user's own `profiles.yml` copied through unchanged, and `profile.schema` is written as given, so either can carry a template dbt renders and this runtime does not — exactly as a project-owned file can. Only the project-owned path detected it. And the refusal now covers publication as well as deferral: a published template would sit under a key a literal profile shares, so de-templating later would make that stale manifest readable as the new location's. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: recognise Jinja statement blocks as a rendered dbt profile location dbt renders a profile through Jinja, so `{% if env_var('ENV') == 'prod' %}…{% endif %}` moves a schema exactly as an `env_var()` substitution does — and only `{{` was detected, so such a profile published and deferred under one environment key for every rendering. One predicate now serves both profile paths, with a test for each delimiter. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: a dbt state read outruns successive publications rather than one The loader re-read once, which answers a single publication overtaking it: a reader takes no lock and the advisory lock is released before the displaced objects are dropped, so back-to-back publications could each overtake the same read and the second was reported as a missing object. It now re-reads for as long as the row keeps MOVING, bounded, and reports only when an unmoved row's objects are genuinely gone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: a dbt state read outruns successive publications, not one Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: name both ways a dbt state read can fail Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: length-prefix the dbt environment key's components A dbt target name and a schema are both the user's own strings, so joining them on `|` let one component spell another tuple's key: `prod|analytics` + `scratch` and `prod` + `analytics|scratch` were one environment, and a profile moving between them read as the same one rather than as one nothing has published — the collision the key exists to prevent. The schema and database are also taken apart now rather than through `relation_root`'s own join, so neither can absorb the other's delimiter. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: name the dbt environment in words where a message shows it The key is length-prefixed for storage, which is not something to put in front of a caller: the "nothing published yet" refusal now reads "warehouse `main`, target `prod`, relations in `dbt_wh_defer.analytics`". The worked example of the encoding also miscounted a component. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: delete a script version in the transaction that cleans up after it `delete_script_by_hash` soft-deleted through the pool, committing before the cleanup that follows it in `tx`. In that window the path has no live version, so a concurrent deploy can take it — and `clear_dbt_script_state_if_path_retired` then finds that new script live, keeps the deleted project's dbt state, and leaves the replacement able to defer through its manifest. The update moves into the same transaction, which is what `archive_script_by_hash` beside it already does. The retirement guard itself was pinned by nothing: the existing test moved the only row away before calling the conditional clear, so it could not fail. `state_goes_only_once_no_live_version_is_left` covers both directions — a second live version keeps the state, the last one leaving takes it — and fails if the predicate is inverted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: archive a script by path in the transaction that cleans up after it The last of the four routes still writing outside its own cleanup transaction. Archived on its own, a cleanup that then fails leaves dbt state at a path no live version occupies, and whatever is created there next can defer through it. The by-hash archive and both deletes already take their write in `tx`; this makes the set uniform. Two comments beside those clears still called the state the RETRY state alone, which the rename made false — they cover both halves now — and the merged verification list had two `11.`, main's #10978 having inserted an item above it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: refuse a dbt state selector the engines resolve inconsistently `state:`, `result:` and `source_status:` selectors resolve against the artifacts in `--state`, which only a deferring run is handed. The engines disagree about what happens without one, and two of the three disagree silently: dbt-core 1.x raises, but dbt-sa-cli 2.x and fusion read a missing state as an empty one and exit 0, so `state:modified` builds nothing and `state:new` builds the whole project, each reporting success. Refuse them up front instead, naming `defer`. From the descriptor they are refused outright, since that selection also decides which nodes the script owns and the deploy resolves it with no state at all. `source_status:` is refused under any setting: it compares `sources.json`, which no run publishes here. A caller's selection is now allowed to match nothing, which is what `state:modified+` returns when nothing changed since the published state. It is stored as that run's own snapshot and never becomes what the script owns, so the ownership-wipe the refusal guarded against cannot happen. The descriptor's selection still may not. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: refuse a dbt result selector the published state cannot answer Round 18 findings. Codex P1: `defer` alone was enough to allow a `result:` selector, but a build recovered by node retry publishes a manifest with no `run_results.json` — the only file such a selector reads. dbt-core then raises an internal error and the Rust engines match nothing and exit 0. The deferral now reports whether the state carries results, and a `result:` selection against one that does not is refused, naming the run that published it. Claude P2: a `parse` returns before `defer` is read, so its deferral is always absent and "turn `defer` on" was advice that led nowhere. The check now distinguishes a run that could defer from a command that never does, and the parse path says so. Codex P2 / Claude P2: the roadmap still listed `state:modified` as out of scope while the same file documented it as working. Narrowed both that line and the scope list to the slim-CI work that genuinely remains. Also pins the invariant the relaxed empty-selection guard rests on: an overridden selection must not publish ownership, or an empty caller selection would wipe the script's graph. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: exempt an empty dbt selection by method, not by who chose it Round 19 findings. Codex P1: the empty-selection exemption keyed on whether the caller overrode the selection, so a misspelled model name resolved to nothing, passed the guard and reported a build that did its work. Key it on the selector instead: only a `state:` or `result:` method may match nothing, its empty answer being a real one. Every other selection matching nothing is refused again, from a run as from the descriptor, each with the message that applies to it. Claude P2: the spec still described a node-retry-recovered publication as one where `result:` selectors merely lose their input, which the previous commit stopped being true, and the section stating the selector rules recorded neither the `result:`-without-results refusal nor the `parse` one. Both written down. Also drops the refusal's claim that the publishing run WAS recovered by node retry: an unreadable file reaches the same absent-results state, and the remedy is the same either way. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: record why an exempted empty dbt selection cannot wipe the graph The safety argument left with the origin-based condition it justified. Under the method-based one it is a consequence of the descriptor refusal in check_state_selectors, two hops from this site, so state it here: relaxing that refusal would let a descriptor-narrowed `state:modified+` reach the exemption and be ingested as owning nothing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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15c2b81d6c |
chore: run local codex review on gpt-6-astra, bump codex cli pin (#11011)
* chore: run local codex review on gpt-6-astra and bump codex cli pin Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X8u6o9MRAs2Rz16UbKQaD9 * fix: keep local codex review alive when --version is unparseable Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01X8u6o9MRAs2Rz16UbKQaD9 --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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 Ruben Fiszelandrubenfiszel
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a9d42b489f |
chore(main): release 1.805.0 (#10995)
* chore(main): release 1.805.0 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com>v1.805.0 |
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c3f7f8a458 |
fix: stop an untouched item's form from saving a draft nobody wrote (#10964)
* feat: gate drafts on real user input so a moved-on schema is not a draft Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ScVgqGpuyDMWdzVNPm7Q5f * Revert "feat: gate drafts on real user input so a moved-on schema is not a draft" This reverts commit |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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7feaf619cf |
feat: run a linked AI agent's draft when testing a flow, and offer to deploy it (#10993)
* feat(frontend): run a linked agent's draft when testing a flow, and offer to deploy it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017B4omp8dRgmLitbpQEqFMp * fix(frontend): settle an agent's autosave before reading it, and refresh its card on a draft save Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017B4omp8dRgmLitbpQEqFMp * fix(frontend): deploy the agent draft that was validated, and make the draft-tools flag explicit Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017B4omp8dRgmLitbpQEqFMp * fix(frontend): refuse a stale agent deploy, and warn when a never-deployed agent is kept as a draft Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017B4omp8dRgmLitbpQEqFMp * docs: record what inlining an agent draft puts in a preview job Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017B4omp8dRgmLitbpQEqFMp * fix(frontend): name the draft-changes dialog after what it lists Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017B4omp8dRgmLitbpQEqFMp * fix(frontend): refuse a draft deploy when the draft row is gone Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017B4omp8dRgmLitbpQEqFMp * fix(frontend): apply the missing-draft refusal to raw apps too Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017B4omp8dRgmLitbpQEqFMp * fix(frontend): stop reading a deployed resource row as a draft on deploy Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017B4omp8dRgmLitbpQEqFMp * fix(frontend): do not mistake an outage or a vanished draft for a deploy Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017B4omp8dRgmLitbpQEqFMp * fix(frontend): refuse an agent read whose pending draft save failed Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017B4omp8dRgmLitbpQEqFMp * fix(frontend): space the trigger badges and right-align the agent actions Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017B4omp8dRgmLitbpQEqFMp * fix(frontend): surface a failed agent-draft read instead of dropping it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017B4omp8dRgmLitbpQEqFMp * fix(frontend): give the agent draft delete a baseline so a newer edit survives Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017B4omp8dRgmLitbpQEqFMp * fix(frontend): drop the agent draft cell locally instead of deleting twice Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017B4omp8dRgmLitbpQEqFMp * test(frontend): pass the withDraft flag the guard tests were missing Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017B4omp8dRgmLitbpQEqFMp * refactor(frontend): deploy agent drafts the way Review & Deploy does Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017B4omp8dRgmLitbpQEqFMp * fix(frontend): give the read-only flow graph its own linked-tools bucket Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017B4omp8dRgmLitbpQEqFMp * fix(frontend): base the resource draft delete on the read that promoted it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017B4omp8dRgmLitbpQEqFMp * fix(frontend): refresh every step linking an agent when its draft is saved Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017B4omp8dRgmLitbpQEqFMp * fix(frontend): write nothing at all when a resource draft has gone Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017B4omp8dRgmLitbpQEqFMp * test(frontend): pin that the resource draft delete follows its baseline seed Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017B4omp8dRgmLitbpQEqFMp --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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48a56158c1 |
feat: report resource type picks to the hub and rank pickers by popularity (#10982)
* feat: report resource type picks to the hub and rank pickers by popularity Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FqHuykfRrkDHj9dHCJQQcE * fix: scope the hub pick route as a write and keep an alphabetical floor Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FqHuykfRrkDHj9dHCJQQcE * fix: rank the types a workspace already uses above the hub's own picks Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: total local usage per integration, not per resource type name Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: remember a failed hub index read briefly instead of retrying every open Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Diego ImbertandClaude Fable 5.1
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519a5c8bc7 |
fix(frontend): stop hover flicker on asset nodes shared with an overflow popover (#10996)
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HNugALVxFkkAeM5mce4CFQ Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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8d0f4754e4 |
fix: let a draft-only schedule, trigger or resource be deleted (#11010)
* fix: let a draft-only schedule, trigger or resource be deleted Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012SV5kjTis3AFtTx2nW2VRi * fix: keep the legacy-draft write gate out of the draft-only delete Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012SV5kjTis3AFtTx2nW2VRi * fix: don't gate a draft-only resource discard on the deployment rules Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012SV5kjTis3AFtTx2nW2VRi * docs: condense the draft-only delete comments per the comment policy Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012SV5kjTis3AFtTx2nW2VRi --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Diego ImbertandClaude Fable 5.1
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1be390aa87 |
fix(frontend): no phantom draft when opening a CLI-pushed script (#10997)
* fix(frontend): no phantom draft when opening a CLI-pushed script Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QpqVdiTiqVGCvgmpBzL6m3 * fix(frontend): infer the dbt descriptor schema on mount like ScriptEditor Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QpqVdiTiqVGCvgmpBzL6m3 * fix(frontend): retry the baseline schema inference once like the editors do Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QpqVdiTiqVGCvgmpBzL6m3 --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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8f553eab35 |
fix: point the app viewer's edit button at the editor for the app's kind (#11009)
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GDiZaPzhC4R9G4hLPgy1B2 Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |