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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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  Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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70129b89f4 |
perf: drop the legacy audit index and per-table limit from this PR
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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3d88676bbe |
perf: index the legacy audit table by operation too
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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9ed483ae70 |
perf: key the audit operation index on id with a trailing timestamp
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszel
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8ce6ed722f |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into perf-v2-job-audit-slow-query
# Conflicts: # backend/ee-repo-ref.txt |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
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75a4e7cf0b |
perf: index audit logs by operation and limit each audit table on its own
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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 Ruben Fiszelandrubenfiszel
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01b38320ea |
chore(main): release 1.815.0 (#11212)
* chore(main): release 1.815.0 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com>v1.815.0 |
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 hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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37e493ae66 |
feat: add an instance setting to refuse a token in MCP URLs (#11162)
* feat: add an instance setting to refuse a token in MCP URLs
MCP clients are commonly configured with the token in the URL
(`/api/mcp/w/{workspace}/mcp?token=...`). A URL-borne credential ends up in
browser history, proxy logs and referrers, so an instance can now turn that
channel off with the `mcp_disable_token_query_param` global setting and leave
the Authorization header as the only way in, which sends MCP clients through
the OAuth flow the endpoints already advertise.
The rejection is a middleware on both the workspaced and the gateway MCP
mounts, layered outside everything that reads a token and inside the
WWW-Authenticate layer, so the 401 carries the resource pointer a client needs
to start OAuth discovery.
Off by default. With it on, the token drawer and the home connect drawer stop
offering to mint a token for an MCP URL and hand over the bare URL instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: read the MCP URL policy when a URL is asked for, and drop the all-workspaces option
Two review findings on the token drawer:
The policy was read once per page load and cached for the browser session, so a
superadmin turning the setting on left every open tab handing out `?token=` URLs
the server now refuses. Both entry points now read it when the user actually asks
for an MCP URL: when MCP mode is entered, and when the connect drawer opens.
The workspace picker offered "All workspaces / Multi-workspace", but the gateway's
consent screen binds the token it issues to the one workspace picked there, so
OAuth has no multi-workspace grant to hand out. That entry is now token-only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: don't guess the MCP URL policy, and say where the switch lands on restart
Review findings:
The comment on the settings load claimed `MODE=mcp` as the target deployment, but
that mode joins no monitor loop, so the startup pass is its only read and a change
lands on restart. That is true of every global setting there, `base_url` included;
the comment now says so, and the setting description tells an operator running
dedicated MCP servers what to expect.
A failed settings probe resolved to "tokens allowed", so with the switch on the
drawer would mint a non-expiring token and hand over a URL the server refuses for
as long as it exists. The probe now propagates its error and the panel reports it
with a retry, creating nothing until the answer is known.
The test passed a valid token, so it could not tell a rejection before
authentication from one after it. It now also sends a token that was never valid
and asserts the middleware's own message, which fails if the layer moves inward.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: withhold the MCP URL until a workspace is picked
With no persisted workspace the store starts undefined, so opening the drawer from
/user/workspaces before choosing one rendered a copyable
`/api/mcp/w/undefined/mcp`. It reads like a real URL and a client pointed at it
would never connect. The panel now asks for a workspace instead, matching the guard
the token branch already has on its generate button.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: drop the coverage-status note from the MCP switch test
It documented what the test does not reach rather than a constraint the next
reader could break; that belongs in the PR, not the module doc. The layer-order
rationale, which is what a future edit would break, stays.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: fall back to the bare MCP URL instead of alerting on a failed read
When the setting read fails, show the bare URL rather than an error with a retry.
It works whichever way the setting is, so no alert is needed, and it still never
mints a token for a URL the server may refuse. The connect drawer's wording falls
back the same way so the blurb matches the panel.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor: move the MCP URL token setting to Core
It sat in the Auth/OAuth/SAML list, which the settings sidebar shows under SSO,
suggesting a dependency on SSO that does not exist: MCP OAuth has Windmill act as
the authorization server, and any login method, password included, completes it.
It is an instance-wide credential policy, so it now lives with the other ones in
Core, kept out of quick setup like its neighbours.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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f0d66a42eb |
fix: re-encrypt git sync secrets on workspace key rotation (#11218)
* fix: re-encrypt git sync credentials and webhook secrets on workspace key rotation Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: point ee-repo-ref at the git sync key rotation companion Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to bc3ef08c8e4233508c023e6ee847a3cd0b8be43b This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #814 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: 8121eac421c5d026f36e2edec140f3c79b23d2cd New ee-repo-ref: bc3ef08c8e4233508c023e6ee847a3cd0b8be43b Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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9d335de87a |
feat: add a workspace toggle that adds its admins and developers to new forks (#11215)
* feat: add a workspace toggle that adds its admins and developers to new forks Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: add members copied into a fork as manual members, not instance-group ones Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style: keep the fork members copy comment at the query and drop the raw spacer Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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53afecd458 |
fix: register the job token with the sensitive log masking system (#10943)
* fix(worker): register the job token with the log masking system The masking system covered secrets fetched through `get_value_internal` and `$encrypted:` args, but not the job's own token, so a script that echoed `$WM_TOKEN` wrote it verbatim into logs that are persisted to the database and, when configured, to object storage. `run_worker` now registers the token for the job it just pulled, alongside the existing `register_running_job` call, so it is redacted like any other registered secret. That makes every job carry at least one registered value, where before the per-batch mask snapshot was skipped entirely for the majority of jobs that touched no secret. Cache the compiled Aho-Corasick automaton per job and invalidate it when a new secret is registered, so a chatty job no longer rebuilds it once per log batch. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P316wKe2QCYNcdsx1PwAJ3 * fix(nativets): mask secrets in the in-process log path NativeTS hands `console.log` output to a task that drains a channel into `append_logs`, so it never reaches the masking in `handle_child::write_lines` and a script logging `$WM_TOKEN` persisted the raw JWT. That drain can still be flushing after the job is unregistered, so a plain per-line `snapshot` would leave the tail unmasked. `JobMasker` keeps the last masks it saw for exactly that window, and refreshes while the job is alive so secrets fetched mid-run are covered too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P316wKe2QCYNcdsx1PwAJ3 * fix(nativets): seed the job masker at construction A `JobMasker` that only looked up its masks on the first `mask` call had the same hole at the head of the log that its retention closes at the tail: if the drain task's first productive poll landed after the job was unregistered, the registry was already gone and every line was written raw. `new` now takes the snapshot, and its callers construct it from the job's own execution while the job is still registered. Also cover the nativets sink with an integration test, gated on `deno_core` the way the CI test build is. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P316wKe2QCYNcdsx1PwAJ3 * fix(nativets): mask on the producing side of the log channel Masking as the drain task wrote to `append_logs` left two holes, because that task is detached and outlives the job: a secret registered mid-run could still be queued when the job was unregistered and would then be written raw, and the `windmill:job_log` tracing emission that EE forwards job logs on never went through the mask at all. Mask where the line is produced instead. That loop is joined before the job completes, so the job's secrets are always still registered, and one call now covers both the tracing mirror and the channel. The result stream keeps reading the raw text, the way `handle_child` keeps its raw `line` for results. `JobMasker` is no longer load-bearing for the post-unregistration window, so it is documented for what it now does: keep the security notice to once per set of secrets for a sink that masks line by line. Also drop the nativets test's tag override — `DEFAULT_TAGS` does advertise `nativets`, so the comment justifying it was wrong — and pin the automaton cache invalidation, whose failure mode is an unmasked secret. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P316wKe2QCYNcdsx1PwAJ3 * fix(worker): hold the log-masking lifecycle at the job boundary Registering the job around the poller's call left every other way of running a job uncovered: the interactive worker shell and inline AI agent tools both call `handle_queued_job` directly, and a script logging `$WM_TOKEN` from either persisted the live credential. Register from inside `handle_queued_job` instead, under a drop guard, so each path is covered by construction rather than by remembering to add a call. Nothing is lost by unregistering earlier: the writes that follow go through `append_logs`, which never consulted the registry. In nativets, decide the stream/log routing before masking. `MaskSnapshot`'s notice is one-shot, so a secret-bearing `WM_STREAM:` chunk used to spend it on text that is then discarded, leaving later redactions in `job_logs` unexplained. Restore the masker's post-unregistration test: the memory-limit path never joins the producing loop, so that fallback is still load-bearing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P316wKe2QCYNcdsx1PwAJ3 * docs: correct the nativets masking comments The producer loop is not joined on the memory-limit path, so it does not "always" run while the job is registered — say normally, which is what `JobMasker`'s fallback is there for. Name the reason a stream chunk stays raw everywhere it goes, including the tracing mirror: it is result data that no log sink persists, so masking it would be masking a result. State the masker test's invariant without asserting a mechanism behind it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P316wKe2QCYNcdsx1PwAJ3 * fix(masking): keep the security notice on a line of its own `mask` appended the notice as a newline plus the notice text, which assumes the caller hands it a bare log line. nativets hands it a chunk that already ends in a newline, and its sink concatenates chunks verbatim, so the notice arrived after a blank line and the next log line was welded onto the end of it. Emit the notice as its own line for either shape. `handle_child` is unaffected: its input never ends in a newline, so it keeps the original path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01P316wKe2QCYNcdsx1PwAJ3 --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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 GuilhemandClaude Opus 5
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3b4e13d1c5 |
fix: key the large root font size on screen width, not window width (#11216)
* fix: key the large root font size on screen width, not window width Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: move the flow preview button offset to the screen-width query Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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 Alexander PetricandClaude Fable 5.1
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0cb92a7dcf |
chore(security): resolve Dependabot alerts in python-client/wmill/uv.lock (#11180)
Targeted lock bumps only (idna, pytest, pygments); requires-python kept at >=3.14. Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Alexander PetricandClaude Fable 5.1
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2a390c173d |
chore: remove two lockfiles that nothing consumes (#11183)
benchmarks/pulumi/package-lock.json: the directory is used with bun (bun.lockb); no workflow, Dockerfile or script installs from this lockfile. rust-client/Cargo.lock: library crate whose Cargo.toml is generated by dev.nu; the lockfile is not consumed by downstream crates.io users and was stale (pinned 1.518.2). Ignored from now on. Both only generated Dependabot alerts about dependency trees that never ship. Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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a08992834d |
feat: render an AI agent result as its answer, not as raw JSON (#11051)
* feat: render an AI agent result as its answer, not as raw JSON Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: sanitize agent markdown through the shared plugin chain Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: fold agent stream events incrementally per poll Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: separate the agent meta line from the result toggle group Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add a transcript view of an agent run's conversation Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: retire AIAgentLogViewer in favour of the transcript Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: show the partial transcript a max-iterations failure carries Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: move the agent meta line and system prompt below the conversation Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: show an agent run as what it did, not as a conversation Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: name the agent run breakdown a trace Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ai-agent): label the save-as-agent form fields per the guidelines Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ai-agent): reuse the resource form's path and description fields Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ai-agent): keep the action tags on a max-iterations failure Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ai-agent): keep offline replay inert and the streamed answer to one turn Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ai-agent): reset the streamed answer on providers that skip tool_call Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: carry the event type narrowing through the stream parser Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: survive a malformed message rather than take the viewer down Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: coerce agent messages once at the parse boundary Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: show an agent run as one scroll ending in its output Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep every streamed turn instead of dropping the narration Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: share the chat divider and drop the unsafe run auto-scroll Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: give the labelled divider a border colour and the standard pretty icon Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: pad the agent run below its badges as well as above Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: follow a streaming run's pane without moving the page Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: share the chat's stick-to-bottom mechanics with the agent run Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep the answer's citations and end a turn's reasoning with the turn Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: read the agent stream through the windmill-chat sdk parser Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: show an agent run's thinking instead of falling back to raw json Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: stop a stream the fold cannot use from claiming the run pane Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: identify an agent run by more than the job id the replay withholds Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: drop the tests and comment lines that were not earning their place Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: stop a streamed turn's text shifting when a tool call closes it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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48f00259c5 |
feat: support $flow_expr[...] dynamic tags on flow steps (#11170)
* feat: resolve $flow_expr[...] dynamic tags on flow steps Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: run an unresolvable $flow_expr tag on the default tag and give it the step input scope Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: resolve $flow_expr tags by path lookup instead of expression evaluation Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: say a $flow_expr tag fails to resolve, not to evaluate Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(frontend): word the $flow_expr help like the other dynamic tag lines Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: reject a malformed $flow_expr placeholder instead of queueing its literal tag Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: render $flow_expr tag values through the $args path lookup Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: pin interpolate_args through the shared tag path rendering Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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9320312eac |
feat: cap user token expiration with an instance setting (#11159)
* feat: cap user token expiration with an instance setting Adds `max_token_expiration_days`, an instance-wide ceiling on how far ahead a token created through `POST /users/tokens/create` may expire. With it set, that route refuses a token with no expiration and one that expires past the window; absent or non-positive, nothing changes. Only the user-facing handler enforces it. Server-side mints (native trigger webhook tokens, app embed tokens, sessions) pick a lifetime the caller never chooses and go straight to `create_token_internal`, so they stay uncapped, as does the superadmin `impersonate` route. Service accounts are exempt, in the workspace the token targets or in any workspace for a global token, so unattended automation can keep longer-lived credentials. The token form now surfaces the API error instead of only logging it, and offers "Expires In" in MCP mode as well: that mode always sent no expiration, which the cap refuses, leaving MCP URLs impossible to generate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: shorten over-long token expirations instead of refusing them Refusing a non-compliant request breaks the callers that cannot comply. The CLI authorization page, `wmill user create-token` and the editor's language-server token each pick a lifetime — usually none at all — with no way to read the setting, so a cap made browser login hang and the editor lose its LSP root rather than stopping the long-lived tokens the setting is aimed at. `cap_token_expiration` now returns the expiration to store, shortening a request that asks for too long or for none. The policy still holds absolutely, no caller can break, and there is no clock-skew boundary where an expiration exactly at the ceiling flips to an error. The token form needed no changes at all, so its MCP and error-toast edits are gone with it. Also drops the Enterprise badge on the setting, which nothing enforced, notes the mint paths in docs/auth-surface.md, and pins that `tokens/impersonate` and the second-workspace case stay outside the exemption. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: drop the unintended token-form change and correct the exemption docs The token form needed no change once the ceiling shortens rather than refuses, but the earlier revert restored from the index, which already held the staged edit, so the MCP expiration field and the error toast stayed on the branch with a comment justifying them by a refusal that no longer happens. docs/auth-surface.md claimed a service-account row in any workspace exempts outright; that only holds for a workspace-less token, which has no workspace to match. A ceiling written as a string, which the YAML instance config and config sync can both produce, now has a test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: offer only expirations within the ceiling in the token form The server shortens a token that asks for longer than `max_token_expiration_days` or for no expiration, which the token form could not tell anyone: a user picking "No expiration" got the ceiling silently. The form now reads the setting and, with one set, drops "No expiration" and every choice above it, adds the ceiling itself as "N days (maximum)" and selects it, and says the instance limits tokens to N days. MCP mode hides the expiration field and always sent none, so with a ceiling the field now shows there too and keeps its value across the toggle. Without a ceiling the form is unchanged. Reading it needs no superadmin: the setting joins the keys any logged-in user can read through `GET /settings/global/{key}`. It holds a policy, not a secret. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: make the token form and the server agree on what counts as a ceiling The form parsed `max_token_expiration_days` more loosely than `cap_token_expiration`, so the two could disagree on whether a ceiling exists at all. A `7.0` from the YAML instance config, or a string such as "7.0" or "1e1", made the form hide "No expiration" and announce a 7-day limit while the server capped nothing; a value between chrono's and JavaScript's date limits preselected an expiration the server could not parse. Both now read the same thing as a ceiling: a whole number of days from 1 to 1,000,000, stored as an integer, an integral float or a string of digits. `parseMaxTokenExpirationDays` holds the frontend's copy, and the instance settings validation uses it too, so the settings page no longer accepts a value the server would ignore. The bound replaces the date-range guard on both sides. Also corrects the rationale for shortening rather than refusing: the setting is now readable by any logged-in user, so those callers do not read it rather than cannot, and CLIs already installed never will. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: cap service-account tokens like everyone else's The ticket exempted service accounts from `max_token_expiration_days`, but their tokens are the long-lived ones a rotation policy is meant to bound, and the exemption let any workspace admin get an uncapped token by impersonating one. It also left the token form unable to agree with the server: an admin impersonating a service account was offered only capped choices while the server would have kept any. `cap_token_expiration` now takes just the requested expiration, with no per-caller lookup, and the service-account query and its cache entry are gone. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: cap superadmin impersonation tokens and pin the frontend parser `POST /users/tokens/impersonate` wrote its own token row with whatever expiration the superadmin sent, so it was the one route left that could mint a token that never expires with `max_token_expiration_days` set. The ceiling only decides the stored expiration (the auth lookup never reads the setting), so leaving it uncapped meant exactly that. It now goes through `cap_token_expiration` like `create_token`; nothing in Windmill calls it, so no caller changes. Also adds `tokenExpiration.test.ts`, pinning which stored values `parseMaxTokenExpirationDays` reads as a ceiling against the server's reading, and documents that tokens existing when the setting is turned on or lowered keep their expiration. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: reject a max_token_expiration_days the token routes cannot read The settings API and config sync stored any value for the key, and the token routes can only read an unparseable one as no ceiling. A typo such as `7.5` or "7.0" was accepted and silently turned the policy off. `parse_max_token_expiration_days` in windmill-common is now the single server reading of the setting: null or empty clears it, a whole number of days within the bound is the ceiling, anything else is an error. The settings write hook and `sync_global_settings_declarative` reject that error, and `cap_token_expiration` reads through the same function, logging a value written around both. Tests: the parser's accept/clear/reject table (the same table as the frontend parser's), the settings API refusing 7.5, and config sync refusing "7.0". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: reserve the CLI login token label so its expiry does not email the user With a token expiration ceiling, the token the CLI authorization page mints now expires, so every `wmill` login earned an "expiring soon" and an "expired and deleted" email and critical alert. The CLI already signs in again on its own when that token stops working, so those notifications ask the user to do nothing. The page now labels it `cli-login:<username>` (previously `cli-<username>`), reserved in `is_user_token` and its SQL and Svelte mirrors: no expiry notifications, and the label cannot be edited. A colon-terminated namespace like `embed_app:` and `impersonation:` keeps hand-made labels clear of it. Not in `is_server_minted_label`, since the page mints through `/users/tokens/create`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: skip the expiring-soon warning for tokens that were short-lived from the start A token whose whole lifetime fits in the 7-day warning window got its "expiring soon" email (and critical alert, when enabled) minutes after it was created, about a lifetime its creator had just picked. With an expiration ceiling of 7 days or less that is every token created from the form or `wmill token create`. `register_token_expiry_notification` no longer queues a warning for such a token. The window is now `TOKEN_EXPIRY_WARNING_DAYS`, shared with `check_expiring_tokens`, so shortening the warning window can never leave tokens of an intermediate lifetime with no warning at all. The "expired and deleted" notice still goes out for every user token. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: exempt service-account tokens from the expiration ceiling again Service accounts are the identity automation that needs a long-lived credential runs as, so their tokens are exempt from `max_token_expiration_days` once more: a service account in the workspace the token names, or in any workspace for a workspace-less token. `tokens/impersonate` checks the impersonated account, so a superadmin minting a token for a service account gets the same exemption. The token form applies the same rule for the account it is running as, when that account is a service account in the current workspace, which is what an admin impersonating one sees; otherwise it would offer only capped choices while the server keeps any. Any workspace admin can create and impersonate a service account to hold an uncapped token, so the ceiling bounds personal tokens; the doc comment and docs/auth-surface.md say so. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: decide the token form's service-account exemption from the token's workspace The form treated the account as a service account only when it was one in the workspace the app was on, while the server checks the workspace the token is for, or any workspace for a workspace-less token. With an email that is a service account in one workspace and an ordinary member of another, picking the other workspace in MCP mode offered "No expiration" and the server silently stored the ceiling; the reverse hid the exemption. `GET /workspaces/users` now returns each membership's `is_service_account` (its query already joins the `usr` row), and the form applies the server's rule to the token's own workspace. The selection becomes a derived value held within the ceiling, so switching to a capped workspace never leaves an unoffered choice selected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
|
9690c4462c |
fix: re-point cloned fork identities that name nobody in the fork (#11161)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
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Alexander PetricandClaude Fable 5.1
|
de4818d905 |
chore(security): resolve Dependabot alerts in frontend, windmill-yaml-validator, typescript-client and cli lockfiles (#11181)
Targeted dependency bumps only; no behavior change intended. Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
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Alexander PetricandClaude Fable 5.1
|
1015874f7c |
install the multiplayer server from its lockfile (#11190)
DockerfileExtra copied multiplayer/package.json alone and ran `npm install`, so the image shipped whatever npm resolved at build time and the committed multiplayer/package-lock.json described nothing that ran in production: Dependabot alerts on it were meaningless either way. Copy the lockfile and install with `npm ci --omit=dev` so the image is reproducible and the lock is the source of truth for what ships. The lock is refreshed with `npm update <dep>` per direct dependency, which moves each to the newest version inside its existing caret range without touching package.json. That is exactly what a lockfile-less `npm install` resolves today (verified: a fresh `npm install --package-lock-only` from the same package.json produces identical versions), so the image does not regress: ws 8.19.0 -> 8.21.3 (covers the open alerts on ws < 8.21.0) y-websocket 3.0.0 -> 3.1.0 yjs 13.6.29 -> 13.6.32 lib0 0.2.117, y-protocols 1.0.7, isomorphic.js 0.2.5 unchanged package.json has no devDependencies and the lock has no `dev: true` entries, so `--omit=dev` changes nothing today and only guards against future ones. Validation: - `npm ci` on the pre-update lock and `npm ci --omit=dev` on the updated lock both succeed; `node --check server.mjs gateway.mjs` passes. - Smoke start: server.mjs listens on PORT=3999 and logs "Multiplayer server running"; gateway.mjs listens on PORT=3998 and logs its route table. - The same COPY/RUN lines built on node:22-slim with the repo root as build context (the context build-extra-image.yml uses) install the six locked packages and pass `node --check`. A full DockerfileExtra build was skipped: it is a single stage on an uncached multi-GB base image. Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
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Alexander PetricandClaude Fable 5.1
|
813e486e16 |
fix(frontend): inline only the package version, not the whole package.json (#11191)
`vite.config.js` had `define: { __pkg__: version }` where `version` was
the entire parsed `package.json`. Vite's `define` substitutes the full
object literal at every site that reads `__pkg__.version`, so each of
those sites became `{name:..., version:..., scripts:{...},
devDependencies:{...}, ...}.version` in the client bundle and the
minifier kept the object. On origin/main that is 11 copies of a
22,093-byte object (npm scripts, dependency/devDependency lists,
overrides) across three chunks — 243,023 bytes of package.json shipped
to every browser, for a single version string.
The only property ever read is `__pkg__.version` (script_helpers.ts,
apps/editor/component/default-codes.ts, flows/content/s3Scripts/deno.ts),
and the declarations in src/app.d.ts, src/global.d.ts and
sharedUtils/sharedUtils.d.ts already type it as `{ version: string }`,
so define the dotted expression `__pkg__.version` to the JSON-encoded
version string instead. Any new property read would now fail
`npm run check` rather than silently compile to `undefined`.
Verification (npm ci, generate-backend-client, check, build):
- `npm run check`: 0 errors, 82 warnings.
- `grep -l '"generate-backend-client"' build/_app/immutable/**/*.js`:
3 chunks before, none after.
- `grep -c 'windmill-labs/components' -r build/_app/immutable`: 11 → 0.
- `npm:windmill-client@1.813.0` still appears in the chunks that build
the default Deno/pgsql/S3 snippets (3 chunks, 11 sites).
- build/_app/immutable apparent size: 81,815 KB → 81,578 KB
(JS bytes 54,202,793 → 53,959,705, -243,088 bytes).
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
 Diego Imbert
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ecd0a6c77b |
fix: show the New menu's description panel only on hover (#11199)
* fix: show the New menu's description panel only on hover * fix: keep the New menu's submenus reachable with the mouse |
||
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df61dea5fa |
fix: keep instance groups when editing auto-invite (#11217)
* fix: keep instance groups when editing auto-invite and push them from sync Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: compare settings.yaml without undeclared instance groups on push Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: read a missing auto_invite as empty when diffing settings.yaml on push Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update ee-repo-ref to f2fced19fcae81de7f6dac545010ce404c052e1b This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #813 was merged in windmill-ee-private. Previous ee-repo-ref: cf4258c1232720ca3b82db2b22ea1fb4bca9533e New ee-repo-ref: f2fced19fcae81de7f6dac545010ce404c052e1b Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
|
5639187fec |
feat(auth): 2 h login links and a click-to-sign-in page for emailed ones (#11203)
* feat(auth): 2 h login links and a click-to-sign-in page for emailed ones
Raise the login link cap from 15 min to 2 h, so a link sent by email still
works when it is read.
A link minted with `confirm: true` is a /user/login_link page instead of
the API path. Loading the page does nothing; its button POSTs to
/api/auth/login_link/{token}, which spends the link and answers where to go.
Mail scanners that open links on delivery no longer burn them. Links minted
without `confirm` still sign in on open.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(auth): keep the login link page to design-system components
A tokenless visit bounced off a raw <p>; send it to the page a spent link
already bounces to, and show the modal's own spinner while it goes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
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 AlexRV12andClaude Opus 5
|
c8c06d8f79 |
feat(ai-chat): tell the chat which kind of app it is looking at (#11208)
* feat(ai-chat): tell the chat which kind of app it is looking at Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018r5ppn8YmHsM1MaAwY7xgB * refactor(ai-chat): drop a stale comment and hoist the prefix local Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018r5ppn8YmHsM1MaAwY7xgB * test(ai-chat): add a global eval for refusing to edit a drag-and-drop app Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018r5ppn8YmHsM1MaAwY7xgB * test(ai-chat): make the app-kind eval require editing the code app too Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018r5ppn8YmHsM1MaAwY7xgB --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
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AlexRV12andClaude Opus 5
|
6f9c4dc294 |
feat(ai-chat): render get_run through the run tools' card (#11204)
* feat(ai-chat): render get_run through the run tools' card Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ai-chat): retry unreadable logs on reopen and drop the loading tint Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(ai-chat): inline two single-use deriveds in the run card Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(ai-chat): record why an inspected run's logs need the dedicated endpoint Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ai-chat): key an inspected run's fetch to the tool call, not the job Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(ai-chat): say an inspected run's logs are a tail, not the whole log Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
 Henri CourdentandRuben Fiszel
|
041ac95dc4 |
Auth providers capital (#11209)
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev> |
||
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Guilhem
|
72507d52a0 | fix: stop picker listing a draft twice when drafts share a friendly path (#11214) | ||
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0e807fb1dd |
feat: put a data table's connection under Postgres roles (#11020)
* feat(datatables): put a data table's connection under Postgres roles
A data table backed by the instance database resolved to exactly one Postgres connection,
`custom_instance_user`, for everyone who could reach it at all. There was no way to say
this job reads, that one writes, this one never sees the salaries table.
A data table role is now a real Postgres login on the cluster, defined once for the
instance by a superadmin and named exactly as they named it. A script that declares
`-- role analytics` connects as `analytics`, and Postgres decides what it may touch —
grants are ordinary SQL. Windmill answers only "may this caller ask for this role", from
the tenant lists on the data table entry: `u/alice`, `g/analysts`, `f/finance` or `*`.
A data table with no `permissions` block behaves exactly as before.
Everything that opens a connection on someone's behalf goes through one chokepoint,
`get_datatable_resource_from_db`, which takes the identity explicitly and fails closed when
there is none. The role logs in as itself — never `SET ROLE`, which a script could
`RESET ROLE` its way out of.
A fork's data table entry becomes a pointer at the workspace that governs it rather than a
copy of it. The settings clone used to hand a fork a byte-identical entry naming the
parent's database, which a fork admin could edit to grant themselves `admin` there; a
pointer has nothing local to edit, and its tenants are evaluated as a member of the
governing workspace, by email. `permissions` is stripped from the workspace export and
ignored on import: tenants name principals of one workspace, and a settings push is not
where an access decision should be made.
Operations that see the whole database whatever the roles grant stay with the governing
workspace's admins: editing the roles, a migration that declares none, and opening a
replication stream for a Postgres trigger or capture.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): gate the paths that reach a whole database as admin
Auditing what still resolved through the unchecked resolver turned up three that act for a
caller and hand back the admin connection: `resolve_pg_source_checked` (behind schema
export, the full-schema read, database creation, import and the forked-database drop), the
connection test, and the schema snapshot a fork clone takes of its parent. On a data table
under roles each let any workspace member — or a fork admin who is nobody in the governing
workspace — read or copy the whole database whatever its roles grant.
All three now require admin reach on the governing workspace. A dump taken under a
restricted role would be a silently truncated copy rather than an error, so refusing is the
only right answer for the copy paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): confine roles to the instance database, and stop a fork reaching the parent's bookkeeping
A data table role is a login on Windmill's own Postgres. Nothing stopped a workspace admin
putting a *resource-backed* data table under roles, at which point the executor dialled the
host that resource names — one the admin chose — with the role's real cluster password, and
`CONNECT` is granted to every registered instance database. Both ends now refuse: the
permissions endpoint rejects the save, and the chokepoint refuses to substitute credentials
on a non-instance entry rather than trusting the record it read.
Two more places reached the governing database without answering to it. The initial-migration
generator returned a `pg_dump` of the whole schema to any member. And the migration
rename/delete cascade followed a fork's pointer into the parent, so a fork admin renaming or
removing their own local entry relabelled or wiped the parent's `_wm_migrations` — after
which the parent re-runs every migration from zero. The remote half is now skipped when the
entry resolves into another workspace, which is also just correct: a fork renaming what it
calls a data table changes nothing about the data table.
Also: revoking a tenant now bounces the replication streams of every workspace holding an
entry that resolves here, not only the governing one, so a fork's trigger stops rather than
living on inside its open connection; the instance role catalog and the governing workspace's
tenant lists are no longer returned to someone who cannot edit them; and the tenant rename
dedup collapses non-adjacent duplicates, per role rather than once any role changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): fail loudly where a role or a pointer can be left half-recorded
Three ways the feature could end up in a state nobody could see or undo.
Creating a role writes the cluster first and the catalog second, but the catalog write was an
`UPDATE` that matched nothing when the instance Postgres settings row was absent — leaving a
live login with a password nobody recorded: invisible to the catalog, un-recreatable because
the name is taken, and un-deletable because there is no entry to delete. It now errors, so
the operation is retryable once the row is restored.
Deleting a workspace only nulls the fork lineage; the data table entries pointing at it are
left resolving to nothing. Sweeping them is not an option — turning a pointer back into a copy
would hand each fork the database outright — so the delete now names the data tables it
stranded, and resolving one says which workspace is missing rather than reporting a data table
this workspace never had.
`InstanceDatatableRole` derived `Debug` while holding a Postgres password; it is now
hand-written so `{:?}` on the catalog cannot put a live credential in a log line.
Adds the two branches the reviews found unpinned: a caller who is not a member of the
governing workspace at all, and `NoIdentity` — the compatibility path for an agent worker that
predates this and sends no job id.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): unbreak two operator messages and two comments that described other code
The two strings this branch added for states an operator hits once — the catalog write that
matched nothing, and the delete that stranded a pointer — were collapsed from their multi-line
form with the indentation left in, so both rendered with a fourteen-space gap mid-sentence.
`list_datatables` claimed to report a chain it cannot follow and then dropped it; it does drop
it, and the comment now says why that is the right place to stay quiet. The non-superadmin
check in `edit_datatable_config` was introduced as also covering references, which it does not
and need not: `reference` is overwritten from the stored entry for every caller before the
check runs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): serialize role catalog mutations, and state each helper's authorization contract
The catalog is one JSON document, so create, rename, enable and delete are all
read-modify-write. Two concurrent creates read the same snapshot, both succeed in the
cluster, and the second write drops the first — leaving a live Postgres login with a password
nobody recorded, which is the exact state the delete path exists to prevent. Every mutation
now runs in one transaction holding an advisory lock across the read, the cluster DDL and the
write, so a lost update cannot happen and a failure rolls the whole thing back. The DDL
helpers take that transaction rather than the pool, which is what makes the lock cover them.
Their statements moved off `sqlx::raw_sql`: the simple protocol is only needed for genuinely
multi-statement SQL, and its future is not `Send`, which an axum handler holding the
transaction requires. Each of these is one statement anyway.
The new cross-crate surface now says what callers must do. `read_role_catalog` returns
plaintext credentials; `create`/`rename`/`set_login`/`drop_instance_role` and
`converge_connect_grants` mutate cluster-wide state; `read_datatable_entry` reads a workspace's
raw config. All of them are superadmin-gated by their current handlers, but nothing said so at
the definition, which is where the next caller looks.
Also: the roles table reloads after a failed login toggle instead of leaving it claiming a flip
that did not land; the rename affordance is the design-system `Button`, not a raw one; and
`resolve_datatable_pg_as_caller` drops a `role` parameter no caller ever filled — browsing
resolves as the data table's default until the database manager grows a picker.
Why role passwords stay a plain `String` while the instance user's password beside them is a
`StringOrSecretRef`, asked three times across reviews: that one is a secret ref because an
operator supplies it and may want it from their own backend, while these are minted here and
never entered by anyone, so there is nothing for a ref to point at. Encrypting generated
secrets at rest is a separate change that would take the replication password with it. Now
said at the field.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): give the role catalog its own row, out of reach of the config machinery
Putting it inside `custom_instance_pg_databases` was the wrong call, and it cost two ways.
The catalog serializes a generated Postgres password per role, and that row is the
operator-facing instance config, so the passwords reached `get_instance_config` and its YAML
editor — a live cluster credential in a response body, a UI field and any log of either.
Worse in the other direction: `to_settings_map` strips the catalog, so a full-row upsert of
that key writes the row back without it and the catalog is gone, while the cluster keeps every
login it described.
`custom_instance_replication_pwd` is the precedent and says exactly why — a generated secret,
written only by the server, never operator-authored, hidden so the config machinery cannot
read, rewrite or drop it. The catalog is the same thing, so it now has the same shape:
`datatable_roles`, in `HIDDEN_SETTINGS`, `PROTECTED_SETTINGS` and the agent-worker denylist.
No redaction to keep in step with three code paths, and no way for a neighbouring write to
take it out.
Two races on the same shared documents. `edit_datatable_config` read the stored data tables
outside its transaction and then wrote the whole `datatable` document, so a permissions save
committing in between was silently rolled back; it now reads under `FOR UPDATE`. And
`set_datatable_permissions` validated role ids against the catalog before opening its
transaction, so a deletion in between let it write a deleted role back — including as the
default, which every later job then fails on; it now holds the catalog lock and the settings
row across validation and write.
Completes the authorization contracts the previous commit claimed but did not finish:
`read_datatable_entry` (which it named and missed), `resolve_governing_datatable`, whose whole
job is to answer for a workspace the caller may not belong to, and
`converge_connect_grants_with`, which had not inherited its wrapper's.
Also the generic Python SDK reference: `_format_py_params` learned the bare `*` last time, but
`extract_py_functions` is a second formatter and still rendered `datatable(name, role)`, so
code written from that page passed a keyword-only argument positionally.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): make the concurrency test pin the handlers, and the contracts describe what is enforced
The concurrency test reimplemented the read-modify-write inline, so deleting the lock from all
three handlers left it green — it pinned Postgres, not the code it was written for. It now
drives `create_datatable_role` twice concurrently and asserts the catalog kept both names.
Checked the way the last one should have been: removing the lock from the handler makes it
fail with "wmtest_a_… is a live cluster login the catalog forgot".
The contracts added last commit were stricter than this PR's own callers, which is worse than
none — the next reader sees a rule already broken and learns to ignore it.
`read_role_catalog` said superadmin-only while two of its four callers are open to any
workspace member, and `converge_connect_grants` said superadmin while
`set_datatable_permissions` reaches it as a workspace admin. Both were fine on substance: the
rule that actually holds is about the credential never reaching a response, log, audit record
or export, not about who may call. They now say that. `read_datatable_entry` gets the same
treatment rather than the one the earlier message claimed for it: it is the primitive every
resolution goes through, so it is deliberately open, and what must not escape is `permissions`
— it names the governing workspace's users, groups and folders.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): close the last ways a role or a pointer can be left pointing at nothing
The raw settings readers hand back whatever is in the row, so moving the catalog into its own
`global_settings` key protected the config machinery and left `GET /settings/global/datatable_roles`
and the settings listing returning every live password. Both now filter that one key. The
neighbouring `custom_instance_replication_pwd` has the same shape and is not touched here: it
predates this and widening the fix to it is a decision about an operator workflow, not a
consequence of this change.
Three ways a save could leave something resolving to nothing:
A permissioned data table could be moved to a PostgreSQL resource. The block was carried across
as a server-owned field, the runtime refuses roles on a resource-backed table, so the save
succeeded and every job afterwards failed. Refused instead — turning roles off first is one step,
and it keeps discarding an access decision something somebody chose.
Renaming a governing data table left every fork pointing at the old name: the data table
disappears from their pickers and their jobs stop, with nothing in the renaming workspace to
suggest why. The rename now follows into the pointers in the same transaction.
Deleting one cannot be followed the same way, so it is reported instead — the response names what
it stranded, the way deleting a workspace does, and the fork's own error already says which
workspace is gone.
Also: `ensure_instance_db_grant_options_unchecked` claimed superadmin while the permissions
handler reaches it as a workspace admin (the same class fixed last commit, one instance missed);
the role entry kept an `instance_config_schema` derive it no longer needs; `write_role_catalog`
was the one writer of that table not stamping `updated_at`; and the concurrency test dropped its
roles only on success — a failing run is exactly the one that creates them without recording them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* refactor(datatables): put the role catalog in its own table, not in global_settings
Five findings across three rounds were all the same choice. A set of live Postgres credentials
was living in `global_settings`, which has generic read, list, write, config-export and CLI
round-trip paths that know nothing about what they carry: the passwords reached the instance
config and its YAML editor, a full-row upsert of a neighbouring key erased the catalog,
`GET /settings/global/{key}` and the settings listing returned them raw, and this round the
redaction that fixed the last two turned `wmill instance push` into something that wipes every
password — a fix breaking the assumption the previous fix made. `POST /settings/global/datatable_roles`
could also empty it outside the lock.
The approved plan offered a table or `global_settings`, so this is the other option it already
allowed rather than a new design. `datatable_role` is a table: no generic settings path can read
it, list it, export it, write it or round-trip it, so none of the five needs a guard. The
redaction, the hidden/protected/agent-denylist entries and the JSON document all go with it.
One row per role also removes the read-modify-write the concurrency work was about: two
concurrent creates are two inserts, and the unique index on `name` is what settles a collision.
The advisory lock stays for the one window rows do not cover — `CREATE ROLE` is invisible to
another transaction until commit, so without it both creates pass their `pg_roles` check.
Also from this round: rename mappings are checked against the configuration they claim to
describe, since fork pointers are rewritten from them — a caller could otherwise submit
`main -> missing` against an unchanged config and repoint every fork of `main` at a name nothing
has, and `A -> B` plus `B -> C` moved what pointed at `A` all the way to `C`. And the warning
naming forks a delete stranded reached the response but not the screen: both the data table
settings save and the workspace delete now show it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): validate a rename against the save it describes, and re-check under the locks
Three from the round, all about deciding on state that could already have moved.
A permission save resolved the data table and checked it was instance-backed before taking any
lock, then wrote under one. A config save committing in between could move the table onto a
PostgreSQL resource — recreating exactly what the transition guard refuses — or rename it, in
which case the write targeted a key that no longer existed and reported success having changed
nothing. It now re-resolves and re-checks on the locked state.
Rename validation checked that the source existed before and the target existed after, which
still accepts `main -> decoy` against a save that keeps both: every fork of `main` then follows
onto a different data table, silently, because it keeps resolving. The rule is now the actual
old-to-new key transition — a source may only survive if another rename took its name, and a
target may only pre-exist if another rename freed it. That also stops two sources sharing one
target, and it admits a swap, which the previous guard refused: `datatables` is keyed by name, so
a swap cannot be done one save at a time, and refusing it was a regression against main. The
pointer cascade now runs in two passes through a temporary name, the way the migration cascade
one layer down already handles the same shape, so `A -> B` with `B -> C` moves each pointer once
from what it named before the save.
The tenant mutators say what they are for: they write an access decision for any workspace named,
with an arbitrary mutation, and exist for the transaction that frees or renames a principal.
Editing a decision on purpose belongs in the permissions endpoint.
Carried in the same change: the stranded-fork list is a field rather than a phrase to grep out of
a success string; the pointer cascade matches with `EXISTS` instead of a `LIKE` over the whole
document, so a workspace whose pointers name something else is not rewritten to a byte-identical
value under an exclusive lock; and `InstanceDatatableRole` drops the serde derives left over from
the JSON document, one of which would emit `pwd`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): cascade on the leave route that is used, gate migrations before the admin connection, and drop a role atomically
The tenant cascade on leaving went onto `/users/leave`. The UI and the generated client call
`/workspaces/leave` — a different handler in a different crate with the same name — which
deleted the membership and left `u/<username>` in the tenant lists. Leaving and rejoining
therefore restored the access the leave was supposed to end, and a later account taking the
username would have inherited it. The regression test drives the route the client actually
calls; without the fix it fails with "leaving kept the tenant".
The migration endpoints authorized too late. `run_datatable_migrations` opened the data table's
admin connection, created `_wm_migrations` and read it before reaching the per-migration role
check — so with nothing pending, nothing was checked at all. Rollback returned before its check
when nothing was applied, and the status endpoint had none. All three now ask, before any
connection is opened, whether the caller can reach the data table as any role at all; which role
a given migration runs as is still decided per migration, and by the executor after that.
Deleting a role committed the cluster drop and the catalog row, then swept the tenant lists in
separate transactions. A sweep failing part-way left workspaces naming a role nothing can connect
as, while the retry answered `NotFound` because the catalog entry was already gone. The sweep now
runs in the same transaction, so the drop, the row and every tenant list commit together.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): refuse to copy a data table that is under roles
pg_dump carries no roles and the import runs with --no-privileges, so a copied
data table arrives owned by the admin connection with no GRANT for any role.
The settings clone brings `permissions` across, so the fork's tenants pass
Windmill's check, connect as the role they were given, and are denied by
Postgres on everything: an entry that reads as configured and answers nothing.
Refuse the copy — in the import endpoint before any data moves, and in the fork
path the CLI takes. Replaying the source's owners and ACLs into the clone is
what lifts this, and is a change of its own. Dropping `permissions` from the
copy instead would be the unsafe half, since the copy holds the parent's rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): refuse the clone's database too, not only its data
A clone is two endpoints: `create_pg_database` then `import_pg_database`. Only
the second refused a data table under roles, so a fork asking to clone one
created and registered an empty `wm_fork_…` instance database and then failed —
and nothing collects it, since `drop_forked_datatable_databases` only drops
entries carrying `forked_from` and no entry names this one.
Refuse in both, so the clone stops before a database exists.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* nit worker error msg
* fix pg_dump stuck on version 17 on nix
* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role annotation instead of ignoring it
`-- Role operator`, `-- role operator;` and `-- role operator -- why` all failed
the annotation parser's exact-match rule, so the query fell through to the data
table's default role and ran, silently, under a login the author did not choose.
Naming a role exists precisely to not do that.
A leading comment whose first word is `role` is now an annotation attempt: the
keyword matches case-insensitively, one trailing `;` is tolerated, and anything
else is an error naming the line. Only callers that already know the target is a
`datatable://` reference ever run this, so ordinary SQL keeps its comments.
Also bumps the dev shell's postgres client to 18 — it trailed the server the dev
database runs, which takes out every data table export, clone and fork-with-data.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): refuse a malformed role query string instead of ignoring it
`?Role=analytics`, `?role=` and `?x=1&role=…` all fell through the reference
parser's exact-match rule, so the connection resolved to the data table's default
role and ran under a login the caller never asked for — the URI half of the same
trap as a malformed `-- role` annotation.
The key now matches case-insensitively, and anything else in the query string is
an error naming it; `role` is the only parameter a reference takes. Callers that
only need the entry keep a lenient `datatable_ref_name`, since they never act on
the role. The DuckDB `ATTACH` parser propagates it rather than attaching under
the default.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012ti5HyeTikPMYyW8YSdiHR
* fix(datatables): carry the role annotation into the row_to_json retry
The retry rebuilds its SQL from `pruneComments(code)`, so the leading comment
block never reached the second attempt — and with it the `-- role <name>` line
that decides which login the query runs as. The retry connected as the data
table's default role instead, so a query the first attempt was denied could
succeed on the second, reported as "recovered with the row_to_json fix".
Carry the leading comment block over. The retry itself is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* chore(datatables): don't mount the roles UI until the ACL editor lands
Enforcement ships first. The permissions drawer is what turns roles on, and the
catalog section is what creates them — both are only useful once there is a way
to grant a role the privileges it needs, which arrives with the ACL editor. Left
mounted they would offer a feature whose other half does not exist.
The two components are complete and reviewed; only their call sites here are
commented out, with a note pointing the follow-up PRs at them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): honour `-- role: x`, and fix the DuckDB attach test
Two review findings, both real.
`attach_datatable_parses_name_and_role` never compiled: `parse_attach_datatable`
returns `Result<Option<_>>` now and one call site kept a single `unwrap`. Its
`?Role=analytics` case also asserted a refusal, contradicting the parser in the
same commit, which matches the key case-insensitively. Replaced with the cases
that are genuinely malformed, and a positive one for the cased key.
`-- role: analytics` fell through to the default role — the silent fallback the
strict parser exists to remove, for the spelling most likely to be typed. The
keyword now accepts an optional colon, attached or spaced, while a word that
merely starts with it (`rolebased`) is still not an attempt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): clone a fork's pointer instead of failing after the copy
Forking a fork with cloning left an orphan database. The preflight resolves the
pointer and sees the governing entry, so both endpoints ran and filled the new
database; `apply_forked_datatable` then refused the inherited pointer and rolled
the fork back, stranding a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names and whose
name blocks the retry.
Refusing earlier would have been the smaller change, but forking a fork and
cloning worked before pointers existed, so it would trade an orphan for a
regression. Resolve what the pointer names and write the terminal entry the
clone needs: the whole `database` object rather than a patch of its
`resource_path`, since a pointer has none, and `reference` removed with it.
Also accepts `-- role=x` and `-- Role = x`, two more spellings that fell through
to the default role.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): refuse to roll back the catalog while roles exist
The down migration dropped the table and left every role behind: live Postgres
logins whose passwords only that table carried, so after a revert Windmill could
neither use, disable nor delete them, and re-applying could not recreate them
because the names were taken. Cleaning up here is not possible either — dropping
a role means reassigning what it owns in every instance database, and a
migration runs in one — so it now refuses while the catalog is non-empty and
says to delete the roles through instance settings, which does the cluster work.
Also enforces the instance-only invariant the resolved-pointer clone relies on
rather than only asserting it in a comment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* refactor(datatables): settle clonability in one place, before anything is created
A clone is three stages a workspace apart — `create_pg_database`, then
`import_pg_database`, then `apply_forked_datatable` inside the fork transaction.
Only the third can roll back, and `CREATE DATABASE` is not transactional, so any
refusal that lives there strands a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names
and whose name blocks the retry.
That orphan has now been fixed three times, most recently reintroduced by a
guard added one commit ago. Patching each new refusal into the first endpoint is
not the fix; having two places that can refuse is. `ensure_datatable_is_clonable`
now answers every reason a copy can be refused and returns what it resolved, and
the stage that writes the entry only does the work.
Also takes an ACCESS EXCLUSIVE lock before the rollback guard counts, so a role
created concurrently cannot slip between the check and the drop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BjfMkJyKzodxkobqGZ6Lqb
* fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database
A clone creates its target database one request before it copies into it, and
the fork that would name it is written a request after that. Any failure in
between — a pg_dump error, a bad restore, a dropped connection, the source's
roles changing mid-flow — left a registered `wm_fork_*` that no entry names,
and every retry then failed on its name. This predates data table roles.
`create_pg_database` now reclaims such a leftover before creating: only a
`wm_fork_*` database Windmill registered as a data table database and that no
data table or ducklake entry names, in any workspace, archived ones included.
The drop never terminates connections, so a clone still copying into it makes
the reclaim fail instead of being cut off. It is limited to callers who
administer the source — reaching it is not enough, since on a data table
without roles every member reaches it — and anyone else gets the refusal an
existing database always got.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Revert "fix(datatables): let a retried clone reclaim its own leftover database"
This reverts commit
|
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|
Guilhem
|
e2a91ca2b1 |
feat: flow chat job-backed detail, smooth streaming and answer chrome (#11186)
* feat: flow chat job-backed detail, smooth streaming and answer chrome * chore: document setFlowPath, drop unused chatIdentity, tighten comments * fix: read a nested agent tool's call from its own job * fix: show only the model's arguments on a tool card read from its job * feat: add attachments to the chat sdk message type * refactor: read a flow chat message's files from the message, not its run * fix: keep every job-backed answer when reads finish out of order * refactor: build flow chat tool cards from the conversation row alone * feat: keep the model picker's current choice when a flow chat retry replays its run * fix: export ChatAttachment from the chat sdk entry point * fix: drop a conversation list for the flow path before setFlowPath * fix: return the current listing, not old-path rows, after setFlowPath * fix: treat a listing stale on kind or path as one stale listing * revert: drop setFlowPath and rebuild the chat when the flow path changes * fix: refuse a flow chat retry once any turn ran while it read the run * docs: say where a display message's createdAt comes from * style: drop the rule between New chat and the conversation list |
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GuilhemandClaude Opus 5
|
c4c9677982 |
feat: attach files to a flow chat message (#11185)
* feat: attach files to a flow chat message Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: store chat uploads under windmill_uploads and withdraw refused sends cleanly Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: refuse extra files for a single-file input and keep attachments on retry Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: clean up partial upload batches, withdraw a stopped send once, free retry payloads Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: list a chat conversation only once its run starts and require files where the flow does Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: carry uploaded attachments on the pending chat user message Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: route rich-composer file paste through the attachment lanes and tighten comments Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep a stopped turn's files for retry and let an explicit media type win Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: refuse chat attachments sent without text and shorten comments Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: resolve the attachments input from real flow input reads, ignoring loop iteration Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: read flow input references through one parser for the model and attachments controls Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: withdraw an attachment send stopped after its uploads answered Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: discard uploads when a send is stopped as its attachments are announced Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: keep uploadAttachments' doc comment on uploadAttachments Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: never delete chat uploads from workspace storage Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: pin that a failed upload aborts the rest of its batch Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben FiszelandClaude Opus 5
|
d1a25360b0 |
perf: count completed jobs on the v2_job_completed index with a timeout (#11211)
* perf: count completed jobs on the v2_job_completed index with a timeout Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: cover the count_jobs tags filter on completed jobs Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszelandrubenfiszel
|
d440ebb520 |
chore(main): release 1.814.0 (#11171)
* chore(main): release 1.814.0 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com>v1.814.0 |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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5371519f0f |
feat: let plan mode search and read connected mcp servers (#11205)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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GuilhemandClaude Opus 5
|
a571117f3f |
feat: store mcp tool call, result and reasoning on flow conversation rows (#11176)
* feat: store mcp tool call, result and reasoning on flow conversation rows Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep the failure reason and web search citations on tool rows Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: persist a structured answer as its own row and keep reasoning-only rows from closing a turn Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep a failed Windmill tool's error on its conversation row Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: let a structured answer row claim its streamed thinking Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: scope a structured answer's claim to its own turn and document the row fields as stored Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: claim a textless assistant row only within the newest turn Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: store the thinking that led to a tool call on the tool row Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep tool calls in stream order and scope a structured answer to its turn Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: store the files a user message carried as object-storage references on its row Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(chat-sdk): read a message's attachments and build their download URL Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(chat-sdk): carry a loaded user message's attachments in AI SDK metadata Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: store the model's call and what it got back on every tool row Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: pass no extras in the orphaned-conversation test's message insert Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(chat-sdk): keep a stored JSON null tool result instead of the row text Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: label a tool call the turn finished without as not finished Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep a structured answer's streamed call out of the did-not-finish label Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: write a turn's conversation rows in order and describe stored tool calls Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: await the image answer row like the agent loop's other rows Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(chat-sdk): place a row nothing streamed by its sequence, not at the end Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(chat-sdk): place only tool rows by sequence, keep a closing row last Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(flow chat): show a failed tool's error, and no Retry on a running or stopped turn A failed tool card showed the row label in place of the error the row now stores. The live tool result now reports failures, so a failed call briefly flagged a running turn as failed; a stopped turn, whose last row is the failed tool or the cancelled flow's failure, offered Retry too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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GuilhemandClaude Opus 5
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6e1ef93f32 |
feat: let test_run_flow name the conversation of a chat-mode test run (#11198)
* feat: let test_run_flow name the conversation of a chat-mode test run Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: refuse a non-UUID conversation_id and mint chat test-run ids in one place Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(ai-evals): add a chat-flow follow-up case and mock flow preview runs Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: expect the conversation id argument on the manager's flow test bridge Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(ai-evals): require the chat-flow follow-up runs to share one conversation id Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: name the test_run_flow argument memory_id after the run parameter Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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c297ed0052 |
feat: managed memory with an inherited or custom memory id per step (#11118)
* feat: split ai agent memory into agent policy, run memory id and step history * fix: scope string memory ids to workspace and flow, keep nested tool history inputs * chore: update sqlx cache for the flow context query * docs: describe memory id scoping as collision-free rather than isolated * chore: regenerate openflow json after merging main * fix: offer no memory id for legacy manual memory, document linked history inputs * fix: seed provided messages from legacy manual memory and hide its note once set * fix: bypass memory when a provided messages expression evaluates to null * fix: require a user message when provided messages are empty * chore: keep the empty messages comment within the line width * docs: name the history inputs wherever linked steps list their flow-local inputs * docs: keep the memory storage path on one line * feat: managed memory with an inherited or custom memory id per step Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: list a custom memory id in the test run form and name where an inherited one comes from Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep memory id out of the add-field menu and drop the memory id telemetry Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep legacy auto memory without an id working after an untouched redeploy Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: rename step messages to previous_messages and address review Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style: rewrap comments and docs lines lengthened by the previous_messages rename Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: read agent memory as either a legacy shape or the current one Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: name the memory setting in ignored-input notes and keep conversions honest Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep a legacy memory count unset on open and read a cleared count as off Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address review on cleared test history and zero-count memory Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: drop flow-local keys from a linked agent resource before interpolating it Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep a linked resource's own inputs as fallbacks and note ignored history on image runs Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: restore the linked agent draft tests and log ignored history on every image run Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: resolve the one-of variant from the value when the selected one leaves the list Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: treat zero-count managed memory as off when enabling chat mode and shorten comments Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: stop requiring user_message in the openflow agent contract when previous messages are the prompt Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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GuilhemandClaude Fable 5.1
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4eab995cf7 |
feat: tell test flow conversations from deployed ones and rename a chat (#11179)
* feat: mark test flow conversations apart from deployed ones and allow renaming a chat Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep the conversation kind across refreshes and reject NUL titles Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: ignore conversation lists for a kind no longer selected Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: start a fresh conversation listing when the kind changes on a later page Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: refuse sending into a conversation of the other kind Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: refuse cross-kind conversation continuations on the server Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep the conversation filter unavailable while an answer runs Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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381d4470ef |
fix: disable a schedule whose cron has no run left instead of panicking (#11195)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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AlexRV12andClaude Opus 5
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e954d33613 |
feat(ai-chat): add list_workers and list_data_metrics global tools (#11143)
* feat(ai-chat): add list_workers and list_data_metrics global tools Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ai-evals): keep the generated eval workspace id valid for the backend Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(ai-chat): trim the worker truncation note and added comments Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gi6UeLKJB9UaSWtjDCVaMq * fix(ai-chat): only hedge an empty worker list when workers can be hidden Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gi6UeLKJB9UaSWtjDCVaMq * fix(ai-chat): show the empty-worker message in the tool card Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gi6UeLKJB9UaSWtjDCVaMq * fix(ai-chat): stop advertising workers in the api catalog tool Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gi6UeLKJB9UaSWtjDCVaMq * test(ai-evals): move the workspace id guard beside its function Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gi6UeLKJB9UaSWtjDCVaMq * fix(ai-chat): keep the empty metric note true for every filter shape Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gi6UeLKJB9UaSWtjDCVaMq * fix(ai-chat): resolve the caller role before judging an empty worker list Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gi6UeLKJB9UaSWtjDCVaMq * fix(ai-evals): collapse doubled hyphens in the generated workspace id Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gi6UeLKJB9UaSWtjDCVaMq * docs(ai-chat): describe what the ducklake tools and the worker hedge do Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gi6UeLKJB9UaSWtjDCVaMq * fix(ai-chat): name the missing lake when a metric table filter has none Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gi6UeLKJB9UaSWtjDCVaMq * fix(ai-chat): strip the ducklake scheme from the table retry hint Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gi6UeLKJB9UaSWtjDCVaMq * test(ai-evals): add a global case for the declared measure path Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gi6UeLKJB9UaSWtjDCVaMq --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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AlexRV12andClaude Opus 5
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5bb37ca338 |
feat(ai-chat): merge get_job_logs and get_flow_run_details into get_run (#11172)
* feat(ai-chat): merge get_job_logs and get_flow_run_details into get_run Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01N1arUSfbbVQSq2DsjamxKF * fix(ai-chat): tell an unreadable log apart from an empty one in get_run Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01N1arUSfbbVQSq2DsjamxKF * fix(ai-chat): keep get_run's step tree optional when the read resolves undefined Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01N1arUSfbbVQSq2DsjamxKF * fix(ai-chat): match each WINDMILL_TOO_BIG marker to the field it elides Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01N1arUSfbbVQSq2DsjamxKF --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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GuilhemandClaude Fable 5.1
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189793c2e4 |
feat: flow chat model picker on a shared model-settings component (#11187)
* refactor: render the session chat model menu from a shared ChatModelSettings config Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: pick the flow chat's model and thinking from the provider fields the flow exposes Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: name only the thinking level the flow run will send on the model button Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: let the flow chat take a typed model id and keep a shared thinking input editable Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: promote a flow input to the model button only where its control can edit it Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: drop any reasoning token the chosen model rejects before a flow chat run Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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GuilhemandClaude Fable 5.1
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68f2248018 |
feat: keep flow inputs and seed the agent when chat mode is enabled (#11177)
* feat: keep flow inputs and seed the agent when chat mode is enabled Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: leave a linked agent's memory and streaming to the agent when enabling chat mode Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Guilhem
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23c24a9688 |
feat: collect flow conversations and agent memory once their last message goes (#11178)
* feat: collect flow conversations and agent memory when their last message goes * fix: lock the conversation lookup so a new turn orders against its cleanup * fix: let concurrent turns recreate a collected conversation without conflicting |
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GuilhemandClaude Fable 5.1
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a9ec0aec3a |
feat: render the flow chat through the shared session chat components (#11175)
* feat: render the flow chat through the shared session chat components Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: settle the flow chat queue on the turn's outcome and guard IME enter Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep copilot free-tier banners and deploy-locked sends out of the flow chat Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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9d348f84c7 |
fix: skip expiry notifications for app embed and SDK tokens (#11169)
* fix: skip expiry notifications for app embed and SDK tokens Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: share app token label prefixes between mint sites and the check Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: skip expiry alerts for impersonation and test-connection tokens Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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hugocasaandClaude Opus 5
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02e47de8b4 |
feat: allow git sync auto-pull, promotion and PRs on Pro licenses (#11173)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Guilhem
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64dffe6106 |
feat: show flow step detail inside the graph tab on narrow detail layouts (#11168)
* feat: show flow step detail as a page inside the graph tab on narrow detail layouts * fix: pad the detail step tab, wrapped header row and raise the tabbed layout breakpoint * fix: keep the step header pinned and switch to triggers on every trigger node tap |
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GuilhemandClaude Fable 5.1
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3d08197182 |
feat: badge chat-input flows on the home list (#11164)
* feat: badge chat-input flows on the home list Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: keep a malformed draft value from aborting the runnables list Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: only a JSON boolean marks a draft flow as chat-enabled Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Ruben Fiszelandrubenfiszel
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c3e11bd223 |
chore(main): release 1.813.0 (#11141)
* chore(main): release 1.813.0 * Apply automatic changes --------- Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com>v1.813.0 |
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GuilhemandClaude Fable 5.1
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6885226c26 |
collapse detail page header actions into menus below lg (#11163)
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |