Commit Graph

13885 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Diego Imbert 5cf6acdd1d fix(raw-apps): keep the picker autosave suspension paired in every exit path
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-14 18:51:23 +02:00
Diego Imbert d1a9ebd4f2 fix(raw-apps): don't save a draft (or reload the editor) on template pick
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-14 18:45:55 +02:00
hugocasa cfc3f292ad fix(apps): allow setting sandbox isolation and public access before first deploy (#10085)
* fix(apps): allow enabling sandbox isolation before first deploy

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(apps): allow setting public access mode before first deploy

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-14 17:19:42 +02:00
hugocasa 98e6cca75d feat(cli): add --tag override to script and flow run/preview (#10079)
* feat: custom tags on CLI runs, show previews in default runs view

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* revert: don't include previews in default runs view

Deferring the runs-view UX change; keeping only the CLI --tag work.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(cli): forward --tag for codebase/bundle script previews

The bundled-preview branch posts a multipart payload to
/jobs/run/preview_bundle; --tag was only wired into the non-bundled
runScriptPreview call, so codebase previews silently used the default
tag. Include tag in the preview payload (backend reads preview.tag).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-14 17:18:42 +02:00
Guilhem 32f32d9a29 feat(ai-chat): port flow-group and sticky-note instructions to global chat (#10090)
* feat(ai-chat): port flow-group and sticky-note instructions to global mode

Global-mode AI chat inherited only the bare FlowGroup schema and had no
sticky-note support, so it never proactively segmented flows into groups
and could not author flow-wide notes. Flow mode carried this guidance
inline in its own prompt and set_flow_json tool.

Bring global mode to parity:
- Enrich write_flow's `groups` description (color palette + fields) and add
  a `notes` field mirroring flow mode's set_flow_json.
- Thread `notes` through editableFlowToDraftValue and the write_flow handler
  so notes reach FlowValue.value and survive the deploy round-trip. Reads and
  patch_flow_json already carried notes via the shared editableFlowJson helpers.
- Expand getFlowInstructions with the groups/notes organizing guidance
  (strongly-recommended proactive grouping, color palette, when-to-use-which)
  and mention notes in the write/read/compact-view/structural-edit bullets.

Add a write_flow -> read_workspace_item notes round-trip test.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(ai-chat): trim write_flow groups/notes schema descriptions

The write_flow tool schema is re-sent every chat loop iteration, so the
verbose groups/notes descriptions were a per-iteration token tax that
duplicated the on-demand getFlowInstructions() prose. Trim the .describe()
calls to the correctness-critical bits (color palette, type "free", null
semantics) and point to get_instructions for the full field reference,
which getFlowInstructions() already carries.

Addresses CI review feedback (Claude + Pi).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-14 17:18:01 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel 89bb63cff5 ci: drop debuginfo in backend integration tests to prevent runner OOM (#10088)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-14 16:58:24 +02:00
Guilhem eff9076e91 fix(sessions): reopen script test panel when preview goes full screen (#10082)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-14 15:52:20 +02:00
Alexander Petric f2869d8c1a fix(apps): load themes when selecting the Resources → Theme tab (#10086)
The Resources page dispatches per-tab data loads from the Tabs
`on:selected` handler and `reload()`, but both only handled `cache`
and `states` — selecting the Theme tab never called `loadTheme()`, so
`themeResources` stayed undefined and the tab rendered empty even
though app themes existed. The reload `$effect` reads `tab` inside
`untrack`, so it didn't re-fire on tab change either (only a filter or
workspace change did, which is why typing in the filter "fixed" it).

Add the missing `theme` branch in both places.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-14 15:17:26 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel 15391f6399 perf(runs): index-bound batch re-run selection with a lossless completed_at bound (WIN-2168) (#10074)
"Re-run all jobs matching filters" selects completed jobs via list_filtered_uuids
windowed by started_before/started_after (the timeframe). v2_job_completed has no
index on started_at (only completed_at), so that filter alone forces a
workspace-wide seq scan — a query observed at ~48s on a large instance.

started_at >= minTs implies completed_at >= minTs (a job completes at/after it
starts), so adding completedAfter = minTs is a lossless bound: it drops no row the
started_at window keeps, but lets the (workspace_id, completed_at DESC) index start
the scan at the window's lower edge instead of scanning the whole table. The
selected cohort is unchanged (started_at stays the exact filter); this is purely a
plan improvement. EXPLAIN: seq scan -> completed_at index scan.

Not completedBefore: a job can start in-window but finish after maxTs, and bounding
completed_at above would drop it. Scoped to re-run; batch cancel (v2_job_queue,
small) is untouched.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-14 15:15:48 +02:00
Guilhem bfcec7e8ac feat(sessions): support many pending sessions persisted in IndexedDB (#10076)
* feat(sessions): support many pending sessions persisted in IndexedDB

Allow several unsent AI sessions to be set up in parallel. Split the
transient flag into "in-memory, not yet persisted" (unsent is derived
from workspace_id), persist a pending session to IndexedDB on first
touch with its own draftPrompt, show pending sessions in the sidebar
under the family filter, and reconcile them by pending_workspace_id.
The + button reuses the untouched draft in the active family so idle
clicks don't pile blank entries; touching one spawns a fresh blank.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(sessions): focus composer when + reuses the untouched draft

When there are no pending changes, `+` reuses the active family's untouched
draft instead of creating a new session (unchanged). But when the reused draft
is the one already on screen, currentSessionId doesn't change, so nothing
navigated and the click gave no feedback. Bump a composerFocusRequest nonce in
the reuse branch and have SessionWrapper's focus effect depend on it, so the
composer re-focuses and the user can type right away.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(sessions): per-session debounce for draft prompt flush

A single module-level flush timer let a keystroke in one pending draft
cancel a sibling draft's pending first-touch flush, so the earlier draft
was never written and its typed prompt vanished on reload. Key the
debounce per session so parallel drafts persist independently. Also
collapse the touch rationale repeated across the preview-tab/collapse/size
setters onto persistTouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-14 13:21:06 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel 1ffe5a1075 chore(main): release 1.757.0 (#10080)
* chore(main): release 1.757.0

* Apply automatic changes

---------

Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com>
v1.757.0
2026-07-14 12:47:53 +02:00
hugocasa 851e30914e feat(saml): add ALLOW_PRIVATE_SAML_METADATA_URLS SSRF bypass (#10077)
* feat(saml): add ALLOW_PRIVATE_SAML_METADATA_URLS SSRF bypass

Introduce the ALLOW_PRIVATE_SAML_METADATA_URLS env var and its
allow_private_saml_metadata_urls() helper, mirroring the existing
ALLOW_PRIVATE_MCP_SERVER_URLS opt-out. This lets self-hosted deployments
with internal SAML IdPs (private IPs, no public DNS) skip the metadata-URL
SSRF check that otherwise blocks server startup.

The companion EE change (saml_ee.rs) consumes the helper to gate the
validate_url_for_ssrf() call and additionally treats a cleared
(empty/whitespace-only) SAML_METADATA setting as no SAML configured.

Fixes WIN-2169

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(saml): surface opt-in hint and record SSRF control in threat model

Add saml_ssrf_error_message() so private-IdP metadata URL rejections point
to ALLOW_PRIVATE_SAML_METADATA_URLS (mirroring the MCP helper), with a unit
test. Record the new SSRF opt-in under T2 in THREAT_MODEL.md, and bump the
EE ref for the companion saml_ee.rs change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(saml): add validate_saml_metadata_url with opt-in unit tests

Factor the SAML metadata SSRF gating into validate_saml_metadata_url()
(mirroring validate_mcp_server_url) so the private-URL opt-in branch is
unit-tested at the ssrf layer: blocks private by default, allows on
true/1, and keeps scheme/host syntax guards when the opt-in is on. Bump
the EE ref for the companion saml_ee.rs change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 394ad23242de429aef4074cc1dc28867dac95870

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #659 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 86da208c5aef2570568e18c7ab98f4d58adeec18

New ee-repo-ref: 394ad23242de429aef4074cc1dc28867dac95870

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-14 12:24:22 +02:00
hugocasa 46f07ab032 docs: mandate local-review-codex alongside local-review before PRs (#10078)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-14 12:21:08 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel b4c834f3cd ci: run Codex/Pi review on fork PRs when a maintainer triggers it (#10069)
* ci: run Codex review on fork PRs when a maintainer triggers it

The fork skip in codex-pr-review.yml unconditionally bailed on
cross-repository PRs, so even a maintainer's /codex or /review comment
(routed through pr-review-commands.yml via workflow_call, gated by
check-write-access) skipped external PRs.

Gate the skip on the automatic pull_request trigger only, detected via
an empty INPUT_PR_NUMBER (the metadata step already branches on this at
the same step). The workflow_call path now reviews fork PRs; the auto
pull_request trigger still skips them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* ci: run Pi review on fork PRs when a maintainer triggers it

Apply the same fork-skip gating as the Codex review: skip fork PRs only
on the automatic pull_request trigger (empty INPUT_PR_NUMBER), so a
maintainer's /pi or /review comment (workflow_call, gated by
check-write-access) reviews external PRs.

Claude's pr-ready-review.yml needs no change: it has no fork skip, checks
out main (not the fork ref), and reviews via gh pr diff/view with a
restricted tool allowlist, so it already handles fork PRs on the command
path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* ci: harden fork-review path against secret exfiltration

Addresses the CI review of the fork-review enablement. On the fork path
(maintainer-triggered workflow_call for a cross-repository PR), the
reviewer ran an autonomous agent over the attacker-controlled merge
checkout with the EE token present, full-access sandbox, and the review
prompt itself read from that untrusted checkout — so a malicious fork
could rewrite the reviewer's own instructions to exfiltrate secrets.

For fork PRs only (detected via the is_fork step output):
- withhold WINDMILL_EE_PRIVATE_ACCESS: skip the EE access/checkout/
  substitution steps, so the private-repo token is never in the env.
- read REVIEW.md and the prompt file from the trusted base ref
  (git show origin/<base>:...) instead of the merge checkout.
- restrict the agent: Codex runs with -s workspace-write (network off)
  instead of danger-full-access; Pi drops the bash tool.

Non-fork PRs are unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* ci: redact provider credentials from fork review comments

The model call needs the provider credential in its environment/config, so a
network-disabled sandbox alone can't stop a prompt-injected fork review from
reading the key (Codex: $HOME/.codex/auth.json; Pi: /proc/self/environ) and
emitting it in the final message, which both workflows post verbatim. GitHub
Actions log masking does not cover comments posted via the API.

Strip the known credential values (OpenAI key + raw Codex auth JSON and its
nested tokens; DeepSeek key) from the review body before posting, closing the
comment as an exfiltration channel. Applied unconditionally since a credential
should never appear in a review comment regardless of trigger.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* ci: don't persist github.token in fork review checkout

actions/checkout writes github.token into .git/config (http.extraheader) by
default. The review agent can read the checked-out tree, so on the fork path a
prompt injection could exfiltrate that token (issue/PR write) via .git/config —
the provider-credential redaction added earlier didn't cover it.

Set persist-credentials: false on the merge-ref checkout so the token is never
written to disk. Safe on both paths: the only later git op is an unauthenticated
fetch from the public origin, EE checkout uses its own token, and gh uses
GH_TOKEN. Also redact github.token from the posted comment as defense-in-depth.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* ci: disable Pi project-local discovery on fork reviews

Pi auto-discovers and executes project-local .pi extensions (.ts/.js) at
startup with DEEPSEEK_API_KEY in its environment — before the --tools allowlist
applies — so a fork could add an extension that exfiltrates the key over the
network, which output redaction can't catch.

On the fork path (cwd is the fork checkout), pass --no-extensions to disable
extension discovery, plus --no-skills/--no-prompt-templates/--no-themes/
--no-context-files so fork-controlled skills, templates, themes, and
AGENTS.md/CLAUDE.md aren't auto-loaded into the reviewer's prompt as an
injection vector. Non-fork behavior unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* ci: use unguessable delimiter for untrusted PR metadata outputs

The PR title/body were written to $GITHUB_OUTPUT with a fixed heredoc
terminator (PR_BODY_EOF). A fork author could embed that terminator in their PR
body to close the heredoc early and append their own output lines — e.g.
is_fork=false, which (last-write-wins) overrides the real is_fork=true and puts
fork code back on the trusted path (EE checkout + substitute_ee_code.sh with the
private token, full-access agent).

Generate a per-run random delimiter (128 bits from /dev/urandom) for the title
and body heredocs so the terminator can't be predicted or embedded. Everything
else in the block is single-line and newline-free, so this closes the injection.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* ci: set PI_OFFLINE=1 on fork Pi reviews to block package resolution

--no-extensions only filters which resources are *loaded*; Pi still resolves
packages declared in a fork's .pi/settings.json first, running `npm install` /
the configured npmCommand and lifecycle scripts with DEEPSEEK_API_KEY in env and
network available — before the extension filter applies.

Set PI_OFFLINE=1 on the fork path so the resolver's installMissing() short-
circuits (returns false) for every missing package, skipping all install/clone/
lifecycle execution. It gates only startup network ops (installs, helper-binary
downloads), not the provider inference call, so the review still runs. Verified:
a fork .pi/settings.json with a malicious npmCommand does not execute under the
flag. Non-fork path unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* ci: run fork Pi review from an isolated dir to cut off project config

Root cause of the recurring fork-review exposure: Pi resolves every project
config from <cwd>/.pi — settings/packages, extensions, skills, themes, prompts,
SYSTEM.md, APPEND_SYSTEM.md — so running inside the fork checkout let a fork
inject any of them to execute code or rewrite the reviewer's system prompt with
DEEPSEEK_API_KEY in env. Per-flag opt-outs (--no-extensions, PI_OFFLINE, ...)
only covered discovered vectors one at a time (SYSTEM.md wasn't covered).

Discovery is cwd-based (single level, no walk-up; global fallback is the trusted
runner home), so run Pi from a fresh mktemp dir where no fork .pi/* is on the
path. The fork agent has no shell, so pre-compute the diff (base...head SHAs are
trusted) into the context file it reads; it may still read fork files by
absolute path for extra context — reads are safe, only config discovery and code
execution were the risk. Outputs now use absolute workspace paths since cwd
moved. The --no-* flags and PI_OFFLINE stay as belt-and-suspenders. Non-fork
path unchanged. Verified: a fork .pi/SYSTEM.md sentinel is not discovered from
the isolated cwd.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* ci: keep review artifacts outside the checkout to defeat symlink writes

Both workflows wrote generated files (final message, event stream, review
context, prior-comments) into $GITHUB_WORKSPACE. On the fork path the merge tree
is attacker-controlled, so a fork could commit any of those paths as a symlink
(e.g. codex-final-message.md -> ../../_actions/actions/github-script/v7/dist/
index.js). Our write would follow it and overwrite the next action's code, which
then executes with the provider credential and the write-capable GitHub token —
no prompt injection required.

Route every generated file through $RUNNER_TEMP, which is runner-created and
outside the checkout, so no fork-committed symlink is on the path:
- prior-comments.json and pr-review-context.md are written to RUNNER_TEMP; the
  context step reads prior-comments from there.
- The agent is given the context file's absolute RUNNER_TEMP path (appended to
  the prompt); prompt files updated to reference it instead of a checkout-
  relative path. Pi (no shell on forks) gets the diff pre-computed into that
  context file; the isolated-cwd hardening is retained.
- Codex writes -o to RUNNER_TEMP; Pi writes its events/final message there; both
  post steps read from RUNNER_TEMP.

Non-fork behavior is functionally unchanged (trusted checkout; same review
inputs, now sourced from RUNNER_TEMP).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* ci: condense fork-review comments to the 4-line limit

AGENTS.md requires each invariant stated in <=4 lines. Trim the security
comments added in this branch (fork-skip rationale, output delimiter, isolated
cwd, RUNNER_TEMP artifacts, credential redaction) to comply without dropping the
constraint each one records.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-14 12:16:49 +02:00
hugocasa 207ce8649c fix(ai-agent): don't mark repeated tool calls as failed in flow graph (#10075)
* fix(ai-agent): don't mark repeated tool calls as failed in flow graph

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(ai-agent): cover reporter's mixed repeated-tool-call scenario

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-14 12:12:00 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel 4f65187f9e chore(main): release 1.756.1 (#10072)
* chore(main): release 1.756.1

* Apply automatic changes

---------

Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com>
v1.756.1
2026-07-14 10:46:55 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel 710a13a59d fix(apps): cover script/flow component outputs in deployed-app S3 provenance gate (#10070)
* fix(apps): cover script/flow component outputs in deployed-app S3 provenance gate

Deployed apps read S3 files on-behalf of the app author for logged-in viewers
(#10048). A confused-deputy guard confines those reads to files the app
"produced", but the recent-production check only matched inline `appscript`/
`preview` jobs nested under the app path. Files produced by the deployed
script/flow components an app is wired to run (e.g. a SQL query persisted to S3)
were therefore denied "File restricted" for every viewer, admins included.

Expand the provenance check to also match completed `script`/`flow`/`flowscript`/
`flownode` jobs whose `runnable_path` is one of the app's declared triggerables,
and accept the author identity via `permissioned_as = on_behalf_of` (not only
`created_by = caller`) so files produced on-behalf of the author are covered.
Reads outside the app's declared triggerables stay denied.

Adds a regression test seeding a script-kind produced file that reproduces the
"File restricted" denial before the fix and passes after.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(apps): key S3 provenance on on-behalf identity + cover flow steps (review)

Addresses the CI review on the S3 provenance gate:

- P1 (confused deputy): the recent-production check keyed on `created_by =
  caller`, so a viewer who can run a declared script/flow directly (outside the
  app, with un-pinned inputs) could craft a result naming an author-only key and
  read it back through the app as the author. Key provenance instead on the
  producing job's `permissioned_as` matching the on-behalf identity the download
  reads as (the author in author-mode); a viewer's direct run has
  `permissioned_as = viewer` and no longer clears the gate. Drops `created_by`
  from both the appscript/preview and script/flow branches, closing the same
  latent hole in the pre-existing inline-script branch.

- P2 (dead flow-step branch): `flowscript`/`flownode` jobs have
  `runnable_path = <flow_path>/<step_id>`, which exact `= ANY(...)` never matched.
  Split script vs flow triggerable paths; flow kinds now match the flow's own job
  (bare path) and its step jobs via a `<flow_path>/%` prefix, bounded to declared
  flows.

- P2 (test realism): the regression test now uses the production
  component-prefixed triggerable key format (`<id>:script/...`), exercises a
  flow-step-produced key, and asserts a viewer's own direct run of a declared
  script stays denied (the P1 case).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(apps): tie deployed-app S3 provenance to an app-origination marker (review)

Second CI-review round flagged that `permissioned_as` still does not prove a job
was app-launched: a runnable configured with its own `on_behalf_of` makes a direct
`/jobs/run` resolve `permissioned_as` to that identity (the app author), so a viewer
with run access could execute a declared runnable directly, craft an S3 result, and
read it back through the app. The flow-path `LIKE fp || '/%'` match also let `_`/`%`
in a declared path admit unrelated flows.

Introduce a real app-origination marker instead of inferring provenance:

- Add `JobTriggerKind::App`; `execute_component` stamps every app-launched job with
  `trigger_kind = 'app'` + `trigger = <app path>`. A direct `/jobs/run` cannot set
  this, so it is the authoritative signal that a file was produced *by the app*.
- The provenance gate's recent-production check collapses to
  `trigger_kind = 'app' AND trigger = <this app path>` (+ the 3h window and result
  containment). This drops the forgeable `created_by`/`permissioned_as`/
  `runnable_path`/kind logic entirely and removes the `LIKE` wildcard issue.
- Provenance is scoped to THIS app's path, so another app's jobs (even same author)
  do not authorize this app's reads.

Regression test rewritten to the marker model: an app-produced key clears for viewer
and admin; a direct run whose `permissioned_as` resolves to the author stays denied
(the forgery); another app's output stays denied. Adds `app` to the OpenAPI
JobTriggerKind enum.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(apps): assert execute_component stamps trigger_kind='app' at runtime

Adds an end-to-end test that runs a real script component through the app
runtime (`apps_u/execute_component`) and asserts the enqueued job carries the
app-origination marker `trigger_kind = 'app'` + `trigger = <app path>` (not the
runnable path). The provenance-gate tests seed the marker directly; this proves
the runtime actually produces the exact marker the gate depends on.

execute_component commits the job row and returns its id, so the assertion reads
the row directly — no worker needed to run the job.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(triggers): reject trigger_kind=app for suspended-job reassignment (review)

`JobTriggerKind::App` (added for the app-origination S3 marker) became a valid
value for the resume/cancel suspended-trigger routes, whose handler derives the
table name `<kind>_trigger`. There is no `app_trigger` table, so both endpoints
would fail with a missing-relation database error (500). Reject `App` in
`get_suspended_trigger` alongside webhook/schedule so it returns a clean 400.

Adds a regression test asserting the reassignment route returns 400 (not 500) for
trigger_kind=app.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(apps): don't stamp app-origination marker on preview runs (review)

The app-origination marker (trigger_kind='app') was stamped unconditionally,
including preview mode. A preview lets a `jobs:run` caller supply arbitrary
`raw_code` against ANY app path without that app's deployed policy (raw_code with
no path/id skips all app authorization), so a preview returning
`{"s3":"<author-only-key>"}` would forge the exact marker the S3 provenance gate
trusts and read the victim app author's file.

Gate the marker on `!is_preview`: only deployed, policy-checked executions are
app-provenanced. Preview/editor S3 display does not rely on this marker (the editor
routes reads through the force_viewer allowlist), so nothing legitimate regresses.

Adds a regression test asserting a preview run's job is not stamped trigger_kind='app'.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(apps): editor-authorize preview marker + per-viewer S3 provenance isolation (review)

Closes the codex P1 (preview forgery) without breaking editor preview downloads,
and adds cross-viewer isolation to the provenance gate.

- Preview marker now requires app write: `execute_component` stamps the
  app-origination marker on a preview only when the caller can EDIT that app
  (`require_is_writer`), instead of never stamping previews. An app editor already
  wields the app's author identity (they can deploy a component that reads the same
  file), so marking their own preview is no escalation and keeps preview-produced
  S3 results downloadable in the editor; a `jobs:run`-only caller who cannot edit
  the app still cannot forge the marker. Deployed runs are unchanged (always
  marked).

- Per-viewer isolation: the provenance gate now also requires
  `j.created_by = <this caller>`. The security boundary stays the un-forgeable
  `trigger_kind='app'` marker; `created_by` is an additional filter ANDed under it,
  so it only narrows — a viewer can only download keys their OWN app runs produced,
  not another viewer's result. Restores the per-caller scoping #10048 had, now safe
  on top of the marker.

Tests: preview marked iff caller can edit the app; cross-viewer isolation (another
viewer's app-marked key denied, no admin bypass); direct-run and other-app keys
still denied; deployed run still stamped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(apps): require apps:write scope (not just writer ACL) to mark preview provenance (review)

require_is_writer checks the user's underlying ACL but ignores token scopes, so a
writer's token deliberately scoped to apps:run/apps:read/jobs:run but WITHOUT
apps:write could still mark a preview and forge provenance — even though that token
cannot deploy the app (update_app requires apps:write), breaking the "any marked
caller can deploy equivalent code" rationale.

Require BOTH apps:write:<path> scope (check_scopes) AND the writer ACL
(require_is_writer) before stamping a preview's app-origination marker. Deployed
runs unchanged.

Adds a scope-restricted-writer token to the test (apps:run/read + jobs:run, no
apps:write) and asserts its preview stays unmarked; retains the full-editor
positive case and the non-editor negative case.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(apps): never app-provenance preview runs; read editor S3 as the caller (review)

Simplifies the preview handling: a preview executes as the *caller* (Viewer mode),
never as the author, so its results must be read back as the caller — never
author-mode — and must never carry the app-origination marker. This removes the
whole `require_is_writer` / `apps:write` / `can_preserve_on_behalf_of` reasoning
(which was also unsound: a writer's token or session may not be able to deploy a
component running as the app's on-behalf identity, so marking their preview could
still escalate).

- Backend: mark the app-origination marker for deployed runs only (`!is_preview`).
- Frontend: `getS3File` (AppImage/AppPdf/AppDownload) now routes editor/preview
  reads through the viewer-scoped `job_helpers/download_s3_file` endpoint (reads as
  the caller), matching what DisplayResult/ParqetCsvTableRenderer already do; only
  a deployed app view uses the provenance-gated `apps_u` endpoint. This is the path
  that previously relied on marking previews, so nothing regresses.

Test: a preview is never app-provenanced (owner's own preview and a non-editor's
both stay unmarked). Cross-viewer isolation, deployed marking, and the reassignment
guard are unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(apps): app components run on-behalf of the app, not the referenced runnable (review)

Root-causes codex's on-behalf-preview finding: `execute_component` was overriding the
app's resolved on-behalf identity with the referenced script/flow's OWN
`on_behalf_of` (its `on_behalf_of_email`). That is wrong in the app context — the
app's execution mode should govern:

- A Viewer-mode app could execute a component AS the referenced runnable's on_behalf
  identity (privilege confusion / escalation), instead of as the viewer.
- A preview would run as that identity rather than as the caller, so its S3 output
  could not be read back as the caller — the download-identity mismatch codex flagged.

Always use the app-resolved identity (author in author-mode, caller in
viewer/preview); a referenced runnable's own `on_behalf_of` no longer leaks into app
execution. Direct `/jobs/run` still honors a runnable's `on_behalf_of` (unchanged).
With this, previews always run as the caller, so reading editor/preview S3 as the
caller (viewer-scoped `job_helpers`) is unconditionally correct.

- Test: the deployed-component e2e now seeds the script with a distinct on_behalf and
  asserts the component job's `permissioned_as` is the app identity, not the script's.
- Also reword the getS3File `configuration` param comment to describe current state
  only (AGENTS.md comment rule).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(apps): surface 'app' trigger kind in Runs UI; condense provenance comments (review)

Addresses codex review nits:
- Add `app` to `jobTriggerKinds`, `triggerIconMap` (LayoutDashboard), and
  `triggerDisplayNamesMap` so app-component jobs (which now carry
  `trigger_kind = 'app'`) are filterable in Runs and render their trigger info.
- Condense the app-origination marker, on-behalf-identity, and provenance-gate
  comments to state each invariant once in <=4 lines at its relevant site
  (AGENTS.md comment rule).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-14 10:29:48 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel 22b47c8823 chore(main): release 1.756.0 (#10062)
* chore(main): release 1.756.0

* Apply automatic changes

---------

Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com>
v1.756.0
2026-07-12 10:30:58 +02:00
lucsoft 29f4cd4b6f feat(triggers): serve binary HTTP-route responses via base64 transfer encoding (#10058)
Add an opt-in `wm_content_transfer_encoding: "base64"` field to the composite
result. When set (together with `wm_content_type`), result_to_response decodes
the string result into raw bytes before sending it, so sync HTTP routes/webhooks
can return arbitrary binary payloads (PDFs, images, ...) with any content type —
not just as base64 text or via object storage.

Explicit and safe: the encoding is never guessed, invalid base64 is a hard error
(no silent fallback to the encoded text), an unsupported encoding is rejected,
and a transfer encoding without a content type is rejected. Existing string
responses are unchanged.

Closes #5986
2026-07-12 10:26:55 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel 92b7f375a9 fix: replicate all secrets on fork when external backend is configured (#10060)
* fix: replicate all secrets on fork with external backend (WIN-2161)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: add Azure KV fork secret-replication reproduction (WIN-2161)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* style: condense clone_variables invariant comment (WIN-2161)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: drive real create_fork handler in Azure KV repro (WIN-2161)

Replace the windmill-common test that mirrored clone_variables' loop with an
end-to-end test in windmill-api-integration-tests that exercises the real
migration, create_fork and variable-read endpoints against a local Azure KV
emulator. Verified it fails (404 "not found in Azure Key Vault") without the
fix and passes with it; unique per-run ids keep it robust to the emulator's
persistent state.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 10:19:20 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel 5cde2d5b67 fix(sessions): sync AI-session preview with workspace edits + stop phantom autosave (WIN-2160) (#10061)
* fix(sessions): sync AI-session editor preview with workspace edits + stop phantom autosave (WIN-2160)

Two related draft-sync fixes surfaced by the new AI sessions preview.

1. Session preview went stale after a workspace edit. A session's editor
   runtime cell (content store + loadedPath) outlives the sessions page: it
   survives toggling to workspace mode and MRU tab eviction. The shared
   per-user draft can change while the editor is unmounted — most visibly by
   editing the same item in the classic workspace editor, or from another
   device — but on the next mount the load early-returns on the still-set
   loadedPath and the preview keeps showing the pre-toggle content. Fix:
   invalidate the cell's loadedPath when SessionEditorTarget unmounts, so the
   next mount re-fetches the draft as a clean first load. This also sidesteps
   a Monaco model-reuse race (a force-reload that remounts the editor while
   the old one is still disposing renders a stale model) and prevents the
   outbound draft-sync from posting the stale store back (ready() stays false
   until the reload lands). Applies to all three editor kinds (script, flow,
   raw app) since they share SessionEditorTarget.

2. Opening a deployed script in the full-page editor autosaved a phantom
   draft with no user change. The deployed baseline carries a server-derived
   assets: [] that the editor's draft value never reproduces, so
   draftValuesEqual never matched baseline, discardIf returned false, and the
   settle-time write posted a no-op draft. Fix: ignore assets in the
   draft-vs-baseline comparison (it's derived from content, so it can't mask a
   real change).

Fixes WIN-2160

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(sessions): condense teardown-invalidation comment to repo comment-length rule

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 10:19:08 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel 4783c01bff ci: drop debuginfo in Windows backend tests to fix disk exhaustion (WIN-2162) (#10059)
The Windows integration-test build (`cargo test --all --features …`) fills
the runner's C: drive during linking. profile.dev leaves the (large)
windmill workspace crates at the default debug = 2, so full debug info is
emitted into every object file and embedded in each test binary — the
dominant consumer of the ~63GB free on the runner. The previous
split-debuginfo=off knob only suppressed the separate .pdb, leaving the
embedded debug info in place; it was borderline and the Rust 1.97.0 bump
(v1.755.0) pushed it over into a disk-full failure.

Set CARGO_PROFILE_DEV_DEBUG=0 and CARGO_PROFILE_TEST_DEBUG=0 so no debug
info is generated at all for the CI dev/test profiles. This supersedes
split-debuginfo=off (no debuginfo => no .pdb, no mspdbsrv type server) and
substantially shrinks the target dir. CI-only; local dev builds are
unaffected.

Fixes WIN-2162

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 08:50:19 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel 1ed7fc066b chore(main): release 1.755.0 (#10041)
* chore(main): release 1.755.0

* Apply automatic changes

---------

Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com>
v1.755.0
2026-07-12 00:01:39 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel ff774c46bf feat: add per-workspace job-retention override (#10050)
* feat: add per-workspace job-retention override (EE)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 2ba6a2a75b6fc97858b306b2c98ada481e363c10

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #658 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: e7fb36acd813cd717bcf05f5aafbf81de271d618

New ee-repo-ref: 2ba6a2a75b6fc97858b306b2c98ada481e363c10

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-11 23:46:34 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel 6f49a1f6a9 fix(docker): pin ansible tool interpreter to a persistent path (#10054)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-11 16:35:33 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel 04eb7ddd39 fix: clearer errors on auto-draft save failure (WIN-2157) (#10053)
* fix: clearer errors on auto-draft save failure (WIN-2157)

When an autosave draft save fails, the cloud indicator now surfaces the
backend reason on hover (native title tooltip) in addition to the
existing click popover, so the cause is discoverable without a click.

Backend now returns a clearer, actionable message:
- `require_can_write_path` distinguishes a malformed path (unrecognized
  namespace prefix -> BadRequest) from a genuine permission denial, and
  the deny message spells out where the user *can* write.
- `require_owner_of_path` no longer panics with an out-of-bounds index on
  a malformed single-segment path (e.g. a bare `u`/`f`); it returns a
  clear BadRequest instead. Covered by a regression test.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: trim narrative comment to invariant in drafts.rs (WIN-2157)

Address CI review (AGENTS.md: comments record constraints, not narration,
≤4 lines): keep the malformed-path invariant, drop the motivation tail.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: don't let a malformed stored draft 400 the draft listing (WIN-2157)

Address CI review (P1): require_can_write_path can now return BadRequest
for a malformed path, and list_drafts propagated it — so a single
malformed stored draft row (the draft table has no path constraint;
legacy/admin-authored rows may be malformed) would make GET /drafts/list
return 400. Treat BadRequest like NotAuthorized there: the row is simply
not writable. Verified e2e on EE — listing returns 200 with can_write
false for the malformed rows.

Also trim "unchanged"/"still" drafting-history narration from the
regression test comments (P2, AGENTS.md).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: compress list_drafts comment to 4 lines (WIN-2157)

Address CI review P2: keep the constraint (draft table has no path
constraint) and the invariant (one malformed row must not 400 the
listing) within the AGENTS.md ≤4-line limit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-11 16:00:53 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel a89b896ce5 fix(frontend): mint draft path for new SDK builder items so autosave attaches (#10056)
Fixes WIN-2159

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-11 15:50:41 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel 7d02d9a1e4 fix(frontend): keep draft autosave alive after AI-session round-trip (#10052)
* fix(frontend): keep draft autosave alive after AI-session round-trip

A UserDraft entry is shared by refcount across the components editing the same draft — notably an AI-session preview and the nav editor on either side of the Workspace<->AI Sessions toggle. The entry's autosave mirror was a $effect.root created inside whichever component first acquired it; when that component (the session preview) unmounted while the returned-to nav editor still held a refcount, the mirror stopped firing even though the entry lived on — silently killing autosave in the workspace editor for scripts, flows and (raw) apps. Move the cell out of the mirror root (so handles survive) and re-home the mirror to each new acquirer, so it is always owned by a mounted component.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(frontend): record mirror-ownership invariant on releaseEntry

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(frontend): preserve sync baseline across mirror re-home

Addresses a re-home edge case (Codex review): the replacement mirror rearmed the first-write skip, so a draft edit the outgoing mirror had not yet observed (e.g. a session edit still pending at the Workspace<->AI Sessions handoff) was swallowed as the new baseline instead of POSTed, dropping the final change. Persist the serialization baseline on the entry (mirrorBaseline) and, on a re-home, seed the mirror from it without re-arming the skip — so a genuine unobserved change still syncs while an unchanged inherited value still doesn't POST.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(frontend): make draft autosave mirror component-independent

Replaces the re-home approach (Codex review): re-homing the mirror to the last acquirer assumed LIFO holder lifetimes, which the sessions UI breaks — it keeps multiple warm session previews mounted at once, so two warm previews of one draft share the entry and closing the newer one killed autosave in the surviving older one. Instead create the entry's mirror $effect.root in a microtask, where no component/effect is active, so it is a true top-level root owned by the ENTRY: it survives every holder unmounting and is disposed only at refcount 0. Removes the re-home/baseline bookkeeping entirely.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(frontend): condense mirror-deferral comment per review

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-11 11:54:08 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel 1e192f2d86 feat(apps): authorize deployed-app S3 reads on-behalf of the author for logged-in viewers (#10048)
* feat(apps): authorize deployed-app S3 reads on-behalf of the author for logged-in viewers

A logged-in user viewing a deployed app now reads S3 files (rich result,
table/image/PDF preview, CSV export, download, metadata) the same way an
anonymous viewer already does: on-behalf of the app author per the app policy's
execution_mode, gated by an app-provenance check — instead of against the
viewer's own S3 permissions. This aligns S3 with every other thing an app does
(scripts, flows, resources all already run on-behalf of the author) and lets an
operator who lacks folder S3 permission still see data rendered inside the app.

The raw job_helpers/* S3 API stays viewer-scoped: a viewer who lacks folder
permission is still denied there. Only which endpoint the app frontend uses for
logged-in deployed viewers changes.

Backend:
- Add app-scoped, provenance-gated apps_u/* variants for all S3 display ops
  (download_s3_file already existed; add download_s3_parquet_file_as_csv,
  load_file_metadata, load_file_preview, load_parquet_preview, load_csv_preview,
  load_table_count). Each routes through one shared helper
  (app_s3_on_behalf_and_provenance) that scope-confines an app embed token,
  resolves the on-behalf identity, and runs the provenance gate ONCE before
  dispatching to the EE *_internal S3 helpers.
- Close the confused-deputy hole in check_if_allowed_to_access_s3_file_from_app:
  the unconditional Ok() bypass for a logged-in, non-embed session now only
  applies in viewer execution mode (where the on-behalf identity IS the viewer,
  so the viewer's own permissions still bound the read downstream). Author-mode
  reads (anonymous/publisher) always enforce provenance, for anonymous and
  logged-in viewers alike, so a viewer cannot launder the author's S3
  permissions with an arbitrary file_key.

Frontend:
- Route the deployed-app view through apps_u/* using the app-viewer isEditor
  signal instead of login state (the old $userStore proxy wrongly sent
  logged-in deployed viewers to the viewer-scoped job_helpers API). Editor and
  preview keep viewer identity via job_helpers.

execution_mode: viewer remains the escape hatch for per-viewer S3 enforcement.

Fixes provenance-gated S3 display for logged-in operators on deployed apps.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(backend): document cargo features, restarting the dev backend, and filesystem object storage

The dev backend runs `cargo watch --features quickjs` by default, which omits S3,
EE, MCP, and non-JS runtimes — feature-gated routes then 404 or return a
"requires <feature>" stub at runtime. Add a backend/CLAUDE.md section that:

- explains that you must restart the backend with the appropriate features to
  exercise gated functionality, with the pid/cwd-scoped restart recipe (never
  pkill target/debug/windmill) and the PORT=$BACKEND_PORT gotcha;
- documents what each commonly-toggled feature gate does (private, enterprise,
  license, parquet, duckdb, language runtimes, mcp, trigger kinds, no_auth) plus
  common combinations;
- documents using the built-in FilesystemStorage large-file storage for dev
  workspace object storage (hidden from the UI dropdown; set via
  edit_large_file_storage_config), including the advanced_permissions shape.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(apps): don't flatten inner query in app-scoped S3 preview routes

axum's `Query` uses `serde_urlencoded`, which cannot deserialize the typed
(numeric/bool) fields of a `#[serde(flatten)]`-ed struct and 400s on `limit` /
`offset` ("invalid type: string, expected u32"). The app-scoped
load_csv_preview / load_parquet_preview / load_table_count routes flattened
LoadPreviewQuery / LoadCountQuery, so their previews were broken. Restate the
fields directly on the outer query structs (with an into_inner() to rebuild the
inner query) and extend the CE OSS stub to match.

Also bumps ee-repo-ref.txt for the companion EE csv-separator panic fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address CI review — nested DisplayResult routing, byte-range contract, docs, tests

- [P1] Thread `appPath` into the nested `DisplayResult`s (render_all children and
  the expanded-result drawer) so logged-in deployed viewers route nested/expanded
  S3 tables, images, PDFs, and downloads through `apps_u/*` too, not job_helpers.
- [P2] Mark `read_bytes_from`/`read_bytes_length` required on the
  `apps_u/load_file_preview` route (they are non-optional in LoadFilePreviewQuery),
  and mirror the full query shape in the CE OSS stub so the byte-range contract is
  enforced identically on CE and EE.
- [P2] Fix the backend retrigger command in backend/CLAUDE.md: cargo watch runs
  from `backend/`, so `touch README.md` (not `backend/README.md`).
- [P2] Trim app_s3_onbehalf.rs comments per AGENTS.md (state the invariant once,
  no drafting-history narration).
- Extend the integration test to cover the table-count, csv-preview (numeric
  limit/offset deserialization), and file-preview (byte-range required) routes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(apps): tighten S3 provenance-gate comments per AGENTS.md

Consolidate the viewer-mode / author-mode rationale to ≤4 lines at each branch
of the gate, and drop the repeated explanation from the shared
app_s3_on_behalf_and_provenance doc comment (which now just states what the
helper does). No behavior change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to f292a1040da6a667ce7c22abf63ec0debfdd480f

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #657 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: a582389084eb363997cb5e8053f29220e0d3eaec

New ee-repo-ref: f292a1040da6a667ce7c22abf63ec0debfdd480f

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-11 10:14:40 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel 3e251db7c8 add local-review-codex skill and bump CI codex to gpt-5.6-sol (#10051)
* feat: add local-review-codex skill and bump CI codex to gpt-5.6-sol

Add a `/local-review-codex` skill that runs the same Codex review as the
codex-pr-review GitHub action, locally and scoped to unpushed work
(committed + uncommitted), so contributors can catch what CI would flag
before pushing. Same REVIEW.md policy, gpt-5.6-sol model, and xhigh
reasoning effort as CI; runs read-only so it cannot modify the tree.

Also bump the CI codex-pr-review job to model gpt-5.6-sol on Codex CLI
0.144.1 (from gpt-5.5 / 0.128.0), and document the new skill in AGENTS.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(local-review-codex): use bash in docs and fall back to origin/main

Address CI review findings:
- Docs invoked the runner with `sh`, which ignores the Bash shebang and
  fails on `set -o pipefail` under Dash (/bin/sh on Debian/Ubuntu). Use
  `bash` and note it in SKILL.md.
- Default base `main` is unresolved in checkouts that only have
  `origin/main`; resolve through a local ref first, then fall back to the
  remote-tracking ref. Fix the misleading `git fetch` recovery hint.
- Pin the codex-not-found install hint to @0.144.1 to match the workflow.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-11 06:37:39 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel e668193a93 fix(frontend): don't re-seed empty editor on stale ?new_draft after draft exists (#10044)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-11 06:18:00 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel 5844c32ac5 fix: enforce read authorization when signing S3 objects (#10049)
`sign_s3_objects` minted a long-lived HMAC bearer signature for any S3 key
handed to it, by any authenticated workspace member, with no check that the
caller was allowed to read that key. Since `validate_s3_signature` only
verifies the HMAC and expiry at fetch time, any member (operators included)
could mint a transferable capability to read arbitrary S3 keys, bypassing the
advanced S3 permission rules (`check_lfs_object_path_permissions`).

Authorize the read at mint time: add an `ApiAuthed` extractor and, before
signing each key, require the caller's own `S3Permission::READ` via
`get_workspace_s3_resource_and_check_paths`. A caller can no longer sign a key
they cannot themselves read. The fetch-side validators are left unchanged.

The only legitimate caller is the wmill SDK invoked from an app-author job,
whose token authenticates as the executing (author) identity — which can read
the key — so authorized app display is unaffected.

Adds an integration test proving an authorized caller can sign a readable key
(and the signature validates end-to-end through the presigned fetch route)
while an unauthorized caller is refused.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-11 05:57:48 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel ab38e1418e fix: keep agent-worker server job-completed processor alive & self-healing (#10033)
* fix: keep agent-worker server job-completed processor alive on init-script failure

The agent-worker API server's background job-completed processors relay
completions on behalf of many remote agent workers. The processor loop exited
(dropping its receiver) on an init-script failure, but on the server that failed
init script belongs to a remote worker, not the server. Once enough processors
exited, the shared completion channel disconnected and every /send_result POST
returned 500, stranding completions and creating zombie-job restart loops.

Add an is_agent_server flag so server relay processors don't self-terminate on
init-script failure. Pins the EE companion change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: bump EE ref for send_result wait-for-processor change

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: agent-worker server survives a failed init script

End-to-end regression for the agent-worker-server processor bug: an agent worker
runs a failing init script, POSTs the failed init-script completion to
/send_result, and the test asserts the server's background job-completed
processor stays alive (a subsequent job completes and no bg-processor critical
alert is raised). Fails if the is_agent_server guard is removed (the processor
breaks, the supervisor raises a critical alert).

Requires --features enterprise,license,private,agent_worker_server.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test: replace heavyweight init-script e2e with focused unit tests

The panic/respawn/alert and 503 timeout paths are now covered by fast, deterministic
unit tests in windmill-api-agent-workers (supervise_processor, classify_send). Drop
the enterprise-only, global-config-mutating e2e in favor of those. Bump EE ref.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to bc45d9275d4307132927dc8ad3e82049b1aed463

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #653 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 2aca03f28bb37e938ae548b81f1620b2e00dc0f7

New ee-repo-ref: bc45d9275d4307132927dc8ad3e82049b1aed463

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* chore: bump EE ref for bg-processor alert rate-limiting

Picks up windmill-ee-private#654: exponential backoff + rate-limited critical
alerts in supervise_processor, addressing the code-review nit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to d48c0e01e8601a372353c032dd237ddb6fa3bbad

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #654 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: f89eeb6e333614850ef650e7df78e3c2335f107c

New ee-repo-ref: d48c0e01e8601a372353c032dd237ddb6fa3bbad

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

* chore: bump EE ref for graceful-shutdown-during-backoff fix

Picks up windmill-ee-private#655: supervise_processor re-checks shutdown before
respawn and selects on the shutdown broadcast during backoff, so a crash-loop
backoff can't hang graceful shutdown. Addresses the Codex P1.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: update ee-repo-ref to 9bc5dfb9ce73a2d9b981a1de86eea6aa26688b79

This commit updates the EE repository reference after PR #655 was merged in windmill-ee-private.

Previous ee-repo-ref: 8dc3b3d9ec8f9c28b227d36c2a1327b4b2017665

New ee-repo-ref: 9bc5dfb9ce73a2d9b981a1de86eea6aa26688b79

Automated by sync-ee-ref workflow.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: windmill-internal-app[bot] <windmill-internal-app[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-10 23:42:30 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel d35402d08e chore: bump Rust to 1.97.0 in worker build images and CI (#10047)
Update the pinned Rust toolchain from 1.93.0 to 1.97.0 (latest stable,
released 2026-07-09) across the worker/server build Dockerfiles
(Dockerfile, docker/DockerfileFull, docker/DockerfileFullEe) and all CI
workflows that pin a toolchain.

Verified the backend compiles cleanly with 1.97.0 under `-D warnings`
(the default RUSTFLAGS used by actions-rust-lang/setup-rust-toolchain).

Fixes WIN-2155

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-10 23:35:41 +02:00
Ruben Fiszel 8343203ec2 feat(mcp): add multi-workspace MCP tokens via the gateway endpoint (#10043)
* feat(mcp): add multi-workspace MCP tokens via the gateway endpoint

A single MCP token with no bound workspace (workspace_id NULL + mcp scope)
now works across every workspace the token owner can access, served through
the existing /api/mcp/gateway endpoint. This avoids having to register one
MCP server entry per workspace in clients like Claude/Cursor.

In multi-workspace mode the runner exposes a synthetic `list_workspaces`
tool plus the generic API endpoint tools, each workspace-scoped one gaining
a required `workspace_id` argument (mirroring the proxy pattern users built
externally). Per-workspace scripts/flows are not enumerated to avoid
flooding the tool list — they are run via runScriptByPath/runFlowByPath
with an explicit workspace_id.

Auth is resolved per tool call: the gateway middleware detects a
workspace-less mcp token and marks the request MultiWorkspaceMcp, and the
runner resolves a per-workspace ApiAuthed from the raw token via the
AuthCache (validating membership; superadmins may act in any workspace).
Single-workspace tokens are unchanged.

Frontend: the MCP token creation flow gains an "All workspaces" option that
produces a workspace-less token and the gateway URL.

Fixes WIN-2153

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(mcp): cover multi-workspace endpoint tool transformation

Unit tests for endpoint_tool_to_mcp_tool_multi and list_workspaces_tool:
workspace-scoped tools gain a required workspace_id arg, global tools are
left unchanged, workspace_id is not duplicated, and list_workspaces takes
no arguments.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(mcp): forward script/flow args for runScriptByPath/runFlowByPath

These endpoints have an additionalProperties body (no declared properties),
so build_request_body previously returned an empty body and dropped every
script/flow argument. This was latent for the per-path run endpoints and
became load-bearing in multi-workspace mode, where scripts/flows can only be
run via runScriptByPath/runFlowByPath — parameterized runs silently lost
their arguments.

build_request_body now forwards all arguments not consumed by a path/query
parameter for pass-through (additionalProperties) bodies, keeping the strict
declared-only behavior for endpoints with explicit properties. The runner
strips the synthetic workspace_id argument before dispatch so it can't leak
into the forwarded body.

Reported by Codex review on #10043.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(mcp): note workspace_id requirement in multi-workspace tool descriptions

Workspace-scoped tools already gain a required workspace_id parameter (with
its own schema description) in multi-workspace mode, but the tool's prose
description was unchanged. Append a note so models/clients that read the
description text know to pass workspace_id (and to call list_workspaces
first). Global tool descriptions are left untouched.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(mcp): trim multi-workspace tool/arg descriptions

The workspace_id note repeats across every workspace-scoped tool in each
tools/list, so keep it terse: description suffix "Requires `workspace_id`."
and arg description "Target workspace id (from list_workspaces)." to avoid
spending tokens on repeated boilerplate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(mcp): enforce script/flow path scopes for multi-workspace run-by-path

In multi-workspace mode runScriptByPath/runFlowByPath are the only way to run
scripts/flows, but they were authorized against the endpoint scope only — never
the caller's mcp:scripts:/mcp:flows: path scopes. A granular token could run
items outside its allowed paths (e.g. mcp:scripts:f/team/* + mcp:endpoints:*
running f/other/secret), and a mcp:endpoints:* token could run arbitrary
scripts.

Now these two endpoints are authorized by the script/flow scope of the
requested path (matching single-workspace mode's per-item tools): exposed in
list_tools only when the token grants some script/flow (McpScopeConfig::has_any),
and at call time the path is checked via is_allowed("script"/"flow", path).

Verified e2e: mcp:scripts:f/team/* runs f/team/* but is denied f/other/*;
mcp:endpoints:* alone no longer exposes or runs run-by-path.

Reported by Codex + Pi review on #10043.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(mcp): deny run-by-path for mcp:favorites multi-workspace tokens

mcp:favorites sets granular=false, so the previous run-by-path scope check
(gated on `granular`) was skipped entirely — a default "Favorites only"
all-workspaces token could run any script/flow by naming its path, bypassing
the favorites restriction.

Favorites are an enumerated set reachable only through per-item tools, not by
arbitrary path, so they grant nothing for run-by-path. has_any() now returns
true only for mcp:all (not favorites), and the call-time check drops the
`granular` gate and relies on is_allowed() directly (already false for
favorites, true for mcp:all, pattern-matched for granular).

Verified e2e: mcp:favorites no longer exposes or runs run-by-path; mcp:all
still runs; granular script scopes still path-enforced.

Reported by Codex review on #10043.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-10 23:32:30 +02:00
hugocasa 3b0781761b fix(frontend): show nested restart button for subflows nested in containers (#10042)
* fix(frontend): show nested restart button for subflows nested in containers

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(frontend): keep nested-restart flat fallback anchored to the leaf

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-10 15:23:09 +00:00
Ruben Fiszel 40f93cee87 unblock EE CUDA image build on trixie by allowing SHA1 for NVIDIA repo (#10040) 2026-07-10 15:02:08 +00:00
hugocasa 1c88242849 fix(frontend): show optimistic user message and fork-creation label before beforeSend (#10037)
* fix(frontend): show optimistic user message and fork-creation label before beforeSend

In AI chat, `sendRequest` previously set `loading` and pushed the user
message only after the `beforeSend()` hook completed. For forked sessions
`beforeSend` runs several sequential API calls (materialize session, flush
files, create workspace fork, load copilot config) that take seconds, while
the composer clears its textarea immediately. The result: the message text
vanished into a void with no bubble and no loading indicator until the fork
finished.

Now the user bubble and loading indicator are shown optimistically before
`beforeSend`, with context elements and the snapshot attached afterwards. A
general-purpose `loadingLabel` lets any `beforeSend` hook describe its
pre-flight work; the session hook sets "Creating workspace fork..." around
`commitSessionWorkspace`. If `beforeSend` throws, the optimistic bubble and
loading state are rolled back.

Fixes WIN-2150

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(frontend): make Stop/Escape cancel the send during the beforeSend pre-flight

Showing the loading indicator before beforeSend also exposed the Stop
button and Escape handler during "Creating workspace fork...", but the
abort controller was created after beforeSend, so cancel() had nothing to
abort and the request still fired once the pre-flight resolved.

Create the abort controller before beforeSend and check `signal.aborted`
after it: a Stop/Escape during the pre-flight now rolls back the optimistic
turn and skips the request. Factor the rollback into a shared helper reused
by the beforeSend-failure and cancel paths, and refresh the now-stale
beforeSend doc comment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(frontend): restore prompt and hand off queued message on pre-flight cancel

The pre-flight abort check rolled back the optimistic turn and returned
early, skipping the recovery the main cancel path runs. Because the input
clears its composer on send, a Stop/Escape during "Creating workspace
fork..." lost the typed prompt from both the bubble and the composer, and
bypassed the queued-message handoff.

Mirror the main "cancelled before usable output" path: restore the prompt
to the composer via the same restoreInstructions helper, or auto-send a
queued message when one is taking over, and return true so a parent
queued-flush doesn't re-queue the cancelled turn.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-10 14:54:54 +00:00
Ruben Fiszel 38a190b53a chore(main): release 1.754.0 (#10017)
* chore(main): release 1.754.0

* Apply automatic changes

---------

Co-authored-by: rubenfiszel <275584+rubenfiszel@users.noreply.github.com>
v1.754.0
2026-07-10 13:59:22 +00:00
Guilhem c5060a1e9a fix: scope AI-session flow/script editors to the session workspace (#10025)
* fix: scope flow script-edit drawer to session workspace and fix scroll

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: scope flow schema inference to session workspace

Thread an optional workspace through loadSchemaFromPath/loadSchemaFlow/
loadSchemaFromModule/loadFlowModuleState/initFlowState/pickScript/pickFlow
and pass the op (session) workspace at fork-context call sites, so a flow
opened in an AI session resolves path-referenced scripts/subflows against
the session workspace instead of the nav workspace.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: scope script editor log panel and git-repo pickers to op workspace

LogPanel and the ansible git-repo viewer/picker read the nav workspace
directly; pass the script editor's op workspace so past-test results/logs
and git-repo resource/file lookups target the session workspace in a fork.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: correct session pipeline trigger-editor workspace comment

The comment claimed session activation syncs $workspaceStore; SessionPicker
intentionally does not, so trigger create/edit/delete from a fork session's
pipeline canvas writes to the nav workspace. Document the known limitation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: forward op workspace to git-repo S3 file browser

GitRepoViewer scoped its own calls to the op workspace but rendered the
nested S3FilePickerInner without workspace={ws}, so the file list/preview/
metadata still queried the nav workspace with a session-workspace prefix.
Addresses Codex review on #10025.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-10 13:51:16 +00:00
Ruben Fiszel 15f9e9b48f perf: skip redundant retry-chain job query for successful top-level scripts (#10035)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-10 13:48:37 +00:00
Guilhem 03535691d6 fix(frontend): open new script/flow/app in AI session (not-found + friendly tab) (#10028)
* fix(frontend): open new script/flow/app in AI session without "not found"

"Open in AI session" on a never-deployed item opened the session preview
against the friendly live-edited path (script.path / $pathStore) instead of
the URL draft path the editor loads and saves by, so get-by-path 404'd. It
also flushed only queued autosaves, so an untouched new item — which never
triggered autosave — had no draft row to load at all.

Target the URL draft path (userDraftPath / liveEditorDraftStoragePath;
raw-app already used appPath), and add UserDraft.forcePersist to materialize
a brand-new draft in beforeOpen, gated to never-deployed items where there is
no deployed baseline to discard against.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(frontend): label a new session preview tab by its friendly name

A never-deployed item's preview tab read draft_<uuid> instead of the typed/
auto name. The sessions page can't reactively read a runtime cell's state
across reactive roots, so the live editor (SessionEditorTarget, handed the
runtime as a prop) now stamps a transient friendlyLabel onto the tab model —
which the page does observe — via a pure draftFriendlyLeaf helper. Unifies
scripts, flows and raw apps through one path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(frontend): address review nits on AI-session open

- Flow drawer (FlowEditorDrawer) mounts FlowBuilder with no
  liveEditorDraftStoragePath, so gating the AI button solely on it hid the
  session entry point there; fall back to $pathStore (the pre-PR behavior for
  those deployed-flow drawers) while the main editor still prefers the URL
  draft path.
- Clear a tab's stamped friendlyLabel when it is retargeted, so a draft tab's
  friendly name no longer lingers after navigating to a plain page.
- Trim the repeated persist-hook comments to satisfy the AGENTS.md comment rule.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Ruben Fiszel <ruben@windmill.dev>
2026-07-10 13:39:52 +00:00
hugocasa 6c521e9d87 fix(backend): propagate script timeout when restarting perpetual scripts (#10029)
Perpetual scripts (restart_unless_cancelled) re-pushed their restart job
with custom_timeout = None, so every rerun ignored the script's
configured timeout and fell back to the instance-level job_default_timeout.
Only the first run honored the script timeout.

Fetch the script timeout alongside restart_unless_cancelled (both cached
by the immutable script hash) and pass it as custom_timeout when
re-pushing the perpetual job.

Fixes WIN-2149

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-10 13:33:54 +00:00
Ruben Fiszel c029d6dcde fix(security): drop --allow-run from Deno sandbox (GHSA-gj6h-vw66-mr8f) (#10039)
The `// sandbox` annotation (and global nsjail sandboxing) restricted Deno to
`--allow-run=git,/usr/bin/chromium`. Both binaries can be coerced into spawning
`/bin/sh`, escaping Deno's permission model:

- git via hook configs, e.g. `git -c core.fsmonitor='/bin/sh -c <cmd>' status`
- chromium via subprocess-launcher flags, e.g. `--renderer-cmd-prefix` /
  `--gpu-launcher`, pointed at a launcher the script writes into `./`

Because the subprocess is spawned by git/chromium — not Deno — it is invisible
to Deno's permission checks, giving any user with script-execution permission
arbitrary OS command execution (root, in the default worker container).

Critically, the Deno runtime is the ONE language never wrapped in nsjail (there
is no run.deno.config.proto; every other language has one). So for deno the Deno
permission model is the *entire* sandbox — there is no OS-level containment to
fall back on, and handing it any subprocess-spawning binary is an unconditional
escape regardless of the nsjail setting.

Fix: emit no `--allow-run` in the restricted path, denying all subprocess
execution. The advisory's alternative (inject `-c core.fsmonitor=false ...`)
doesn't apply — the user controls the git/chromium argv, so any injected
hardening is overridden. Admins who accept the risk (e.g. puppeteer) can still
re-add specific binaries via `DENO_FLAGS`.

Verified with both PoCs on a running worker: git and chromium invocations now
return `Requires run access to "<bin>"`; the sandbox escapes are closed.

Fixes WIN-2151

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-10 13:33:22 +00:00
Ruben Fiszel 689b20a470 fix(security): remove git from Deno sandbox allow-run (GHSA-gj6h-vw66-mr8f) (#10038)
The `// sandbox` annotation restricts Deno to `--allow-run=git,/usr/bin/chromium`.
git can be coerced into spawning `/bin/sh` via hook configs such as
`git -c core.fsmonitor=<cmd> status`, and that subprocess is spawned by git —
not Deno — so it is invisible to Deno's permission model. This let any user
with script-execution permission run arbitrary OS commands as root inside the
worker, fully defeating the sandbox.

The advisory's alternative (injecting `-c core.fsmonitor=false -c
core.hooksPath=/dev/null`) does not apply here: the user's own script invokes
git directly via `Deno.Command`, so Windmill cannot inject hardening flags into
that call. Removing git from the allowlist is the only complete fix. git was
originally allowed for git-sync-adjacent use, which no longer needs it.

Verified with the advisory PoC: git invocation now returns
`Requires run access to "git"` and the sandbox escape is closed. chromium
(puppeteer) support is preserved.

Fixes WIN-2151

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-10 12:51:09 +00:00
Ruben Fiszel 9feda57c15 perf: index v2_job(parent_job) to speed up run child-job listing (#10034)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-10 07:51:16 +00:00
hugocasa 5a460dbec6 fix: accept bunnative language in AI chat flow step validation (#10030)
* fix: accept bunnative language in AI chat flow step validation

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: regenerate copilot flow schema from openflow spec

Run gen_openflow_schema.sh + minifiedOpenflowJson.sh instead of hand-patching. Also syncs three fields the checked-in generated files had drifted from since the last regen (reasoning_effort, reasoning_token_delta streaming event, aiagent tag).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: regenerate system prompts for bunnative openflow schema

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-10 09:24:09 +02:00
AlexRV12 5387076c1c fix(frontend): persist per-session preview panel resize width (#10031)
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-10 09:23:43 +02:00
AlexRV12 3704d00956 fix: sync theme into session page preview iframes on toggle (#10018) 2026-07-09 19:56:50 +02:00
AlexRV12 d7a9b46ab9 fix(sessions): open test pane when enabling debug so the debug UI is visible (#9998) 2026-07-09 19:53:55 +02:00